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In memory of my parents

Der Sahag Der Bedrosian and Zabelle Chorbajian Der Bedrosian

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A. D. Bedrosian

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THE UNITED STATES
AND
THE ARMENIAN QUESTION, 1894-1924

A Thesis
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of the
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Ralph Elliott Cook
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The following work records the activities of those people involved with the Armenian Question whose acts had an effect on Armenian-American and on Turkish-American relations. Although the relevant activities of Turks, Armenians and others are reviewed, emphasis in this study has been placed on the actions and attitudes of Americans. This is both a record of official United States' policy and of American public opinion.

The method of presentation is primarily a chronological one. The period upon which attention was focused extended from 1894 to 1924, or roughly from the beginning of the large-scale massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire to the signing of the American Treaty of Lausanne. In order to supply necessary background information for an understanding of this topic and to place the subject of American involvement with the Armenian Question in proper historical perspective, it was necessary to review Turkish-American relations in their broadest scope from 1830 to 1956 and to examine the growth of Armenian nationalism during the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Several people have assisted me in the preparation of this work. I would particularly like to express my gratitude to Professors Ruhl J. Bartlett and Frank Nowak of the Fletcher School who advised me on the preparation of this study, to Dr. E. Taylor Parks of the Department of State who gave me encouragement and assistance in the selection of the topic, to the men and women in the Foreign Affairs Branch of the National Archives who devoted considerable time to aiding me in the selection and location of documents, and to Gladys Samels who worked untiringly to prepare this work in its final form. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my wife who assisted in innumerable ways in the completion of this dissertation and to whom it is dedicated.

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BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

As the last decade of the nineteenth century dawned, an observer of the Government and people of the United States would have found both primarily interested in that tremendous economic development in the nation which was beginning to give promise of some of the multitudinous advances which were to be accomplished in the ensuing years. On the foreign plane, those Americans who bothered to look beyond the borders of the United States found their primary preoccupation in watching the growth of unrest in Cuba. America had not yet taken a decisive place in the family of nations and her contacts with foreign powers were limited, for the most part, to establishing and maintaining beneficial commercial intercourse.

The Ottoman Empire, its Sultan, and its polyglot population were all far removed from the thoughts of most Americans. Among private citizens, only a few businessmen and a somewhat larger group of missionaries were either interested in, or cognizant of, events transpiring in that far-off land. The Department of State had maintained diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman Empire since 1830, while Turco-American consular relations extended back to 1824.¹ Following the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of 1830 between the two countries, Commodore David Porter became the first accredited American diplomat at the Sublime Porte.² In 1839, Porter's title was changed from that of Charge d'Affaires to Minister Resident. In 1882, the American

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1. An excellent review of Turco-American relations from the earliest contacts to 1930, with emphasis on the economic problems between the two nations, is given in Leland J. Gordon, American Relations with Turkey - 1830-1930, An Economic Interpretation, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932).
 2. Ibid., pp. 9-11. For a report on the futile negotiations for a treaty in the 1820's, as well as for complete coverage on the successful negotiations terminating in the Treaty of 1830, see: Henry M. Wriston, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1929), pp. 319-34. Text of the Treaty, with commentary, is given in: David Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, (8 Vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), Vol. 3, pp. 541-98.

diplomatic representative to the Sultan became an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and in 1906, the position was raised to ambassadorial rank. In 1895, the United States maintained consulates general at Constantinople and Cairo, and consulates at Bagdad, Beirut, Jerusalem, Sivas, and Smyrna. In addition, there were twenty-three consular agencies of the United States in the Ottoman Empire.

During the six decades following the proclamation of the Treaty of 1830, Turco-American relations were relatively friendly and of minor import to the foreign offices of both nations. The United States had little political interest in Turkey, American nationals had a highly restricted economic investment in the Empire, and emigration from Turkey to the United States did not become significant until a later date. To Americans who were aware of Turkey or the Turks in this period, little animosity was experienced toward either the government or the people.³

In 1876, following the brutal suppression of Bulgarian rebels by the Ottoman Government, the American Consul-General in Constantinople, Eugene Schuyler, accepted appointment as an official investigator. His report, which refuted Disraeli's minimized account of the events, was of such importance to the Bulgars in their struggle for independence that the future Bulgarian Government noted a resolution of thanks to him.⁴ However, official American

3. During the American Civil War, the Turkish Government was openly friendly to the Union. Even at this time, however, a few Americans were being subjected to views which were less than favorable in their treatment of the Moslem Turks. Writing in 1878, Cyrus Hamlin, one of America's foremost experts on the Ottoman Empire, stated that American tourists were receiving a distorted view of Turkey from native Christians who guided these visitors about the Empire. He referred to these Levantines as "the enemies of Turkey," who never reported anything good about the nation or its government. Hamlin also stated that an association had recently been formed in England for the purpose of exposing all the faults of Turkey, and he wondered whether any government could stand such an ordeal unharmed. Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks, (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1878), pp. 357-8.

4. See: Laddie J. Stewart, Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the U. S.

interest in internal problems of the Ottoman Empire was limited. In 1892, Secretary of State Foster wrote to Minister Thompson in Constantinople: "The question of paramount importance in the relations of the United States with the Ottoman Empire, is succinctly, the status of Americans in Turkey, with all which that implies in the various phases and conditions of life."⁵

Prior to the First World War, the name Armenia usually denoted a geographic area in eastern Turkey and southern Russia. Normally, "Armenia" included the Turkish vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Diarbekr, Harput, Sivas, and part of Trebizond. In addition, the vilayet of Adana and surrounding territory in the fertile region sloping down to the Mediterranean, north of Syria, known alternately as Cilicia or Lesser Armenia, was also included in traditional Armenia. Included in Russian Armenia were the provinces of Kars, Erivan, and Elisavetopol. As virtually all of the events which took place during the period prior to the Lausanne Conference, and which are described in this work, occurred in the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish area is the one to which attention has been focused. In 1876, in the six contiguous vilayets first listed in this paragraph, the Armenians numbered approximately 1,200,000 out of a total population of 2,600,000. It should be noted that despite the fact that the proportion of Armenian citizens to the total population was greater in these vilayets than elsewhere in Turkey, this figure was still under fifty percent. In addition, over 1,000,000 Armenians lived in other parts of the Empire, many in the capital city, Constantinople.⁶

Consulate General in Constantinople, Turkey, 1855-1935, (Unpublished document prepared at the National Archives, Washington, D. C., 1954), p. 1

5. U. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1892, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893). p. 609. Hereafter referred to as Foreign Relations Papers, plus the date.

6. Sir Edwin Pears, Life of Abdul Hamid, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1917), p. 215.

The Armenians are of the Aryan race with an Indo-European language and with a Christian Church which was established as the official religion of the Armenian nation in 301 A.D. Most of the members of this church acknowledged in the past, and continue to acknowledge today, the supremacy of an Armenian Catholicos at Etchmiadzin in Russian Armenia. Conquest of the independent state of Armenia by the Turks occurred in the fourteenth century. For the next five centuries, there was apparently little revolutionary activity among the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire; in fact, the Armenians came to be known as the "faithful nation" by the Turks while the other Christian peoples under the rule of the Sultan were rising in revolt or engaging in subversive activity. By the end of the nineteenth century, many Armenians had risen high in the service of the Sultan, or held responsible positions in the diplomatic corps of the empire. Down to the time of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, Armenia was probably better off economically than the rest of the Ottoman Empire and the Armenian merchants and bankers formed the richest class in the empire.⁷

Partly due to internal pressures, and partly because of the involvement of foreign nations in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire, the status of the Christian races, subject to the Sultan, became an international issue. Both the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 made protection of Christians in the Ottoman Empire an international problem. In 1839, the Sultan promulgated the Hatti-Sherif, guaranteeing security of life, honor, and property for all subjects and promising complete equality for all Ottoman nationals regardless of race. These reform guarantees were confirmed and strengthened by the Hatti Humayoun of February 18, 1856, which promised that effective measures would be taken in order that the guarantees might

7. See: Sir Edward S. Creasy, Turkey, (Vol. 14 of The History of Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, ed. in chief; New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1913), pp. 497-8.

have full and entire effect. After the Crimean War, "Turkey was admitted within the comity of European nations, with the specific understanding that she would introduce certain reforms and carry out those already promised."⁸

Due to a rising spirit of ethnic unity or nationalism in the Armenian population, an Armenian National Assembly was formed at Constantinople in 1860. Three years later, the Sultan constituted it a duly sanctioned deliberative body to discuss non-political affairs. A constitution for his Armenian subjects was ratified at this time by Sultan Abdul Aziz. This document has been described as an "instrument governing the internal and non-political affairs of the nation."⁹ Although the Armenian National Assembly was to experience many vicissitudes in the decades which followed its creation, it was not until 1934 that that body was officially dissolved by the Turkish Government.

On December 23, 1876, Sultan Abdul Hamid II promulgated a constitution for his empire, the first Ottoman constitution in history. It was considered a rather liberal document for the time, and it was one of the last liberal acts of the Sultan during his long reign lasting until the revolution of 1909. The provisions for the subject peoples were such that if the constitution had remained in effect and the provisions had been implemented in fact as clearly as they were stated on paper, the Armenian Question might well have remained unborn. However, the constitution was withdrawn by Abdul Hamid in the following year, 1877.

Much of the War of 1877 between Turkey and Russia was fought in Turkish Armenia. The conflict eventually ended in Russian victory with the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano. One of those who was instrumental in the creation of this treaty was Loris Melikoff, confidante and advisor to Czar Alexander II, a general in the war, and an Armenian. Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano dealt with the eastern provinces of Turkey, at that time occupied by Russian

8. A. O. Sarkissian, History of the Armenian Question to 1885, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1938), p. 26.

9. Ibid., p. 2.

troops, and was worded as follows:

As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect without further delay the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.¹⁰

As Russian troops still occupied Turkish Armenia, it is obvious that the Russian Government could ensure that the reforms would be put into operation.

Many historians since the Congress of Berlin have dealt harshly with those European powers which had a part in eliminating Article 16 of San Stefano and replacing it with Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, signed July 13, 1878. Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin reads as follows:

The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.¹¹

It should be noted that in this article, unlike the previous one, there was no implied sanction for non-conformance by the Turks in carrying out the promised reforms. There was no provision for Russian troops to remain until action by the Sultan had been secured to guarantee the safety of the Armenians from raids and depredations from the semi-civilized Kurds and Circassians of the region.

The Armenians were actually represented in Berlin, though not at the conference, by a delegation which urged the powers to grant to the Armenians in the six vilayets a measure of autonomy, including a Christian governor presiding over a government similar to that which had existed in the Lebanese

10. Cited in Pears, Life of Abdul Hamid, p. 218.

11. J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1535-1956, (2 Vols., Princeton: D Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), Vol. 1, p. 190.

part of the Ottoman Empire since 1861. The delegation further asked that the European Powers be constituted the guardians of the Armenians in Turkey. Disappointed at the lack of success of their mission, the members of the Armenian delegation returned to their homeland after lodging a formal protest in Berlin which read in part:

The Armenian delegation will return to the East carrying with it the lesson that without struggle and without insurrection nothing can be obtained. Nevertheless, the delegation will never cease addressing petitions until Europe has satisfied its just claims.¹²

The Cyprus Convention between England and Turkey, which was signed before the Congress of Berlin had terminated its labors, bound England to aid the Sultan in defending his territories from further Russian encroachment in return for which the Sultan promised to introduce reforms for his Christian subjects. The British also received the island of Cyprus to occupy and administer. Thus, by the terms of the Cyprus Convention, Great Britain took upon herself the task of ensuring that the promised reforms for the Sultan's Christian subjects would become realities and indirectly bolstered the spirit of revolt in the minds of subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire when such reforms did not occur. An Armenian sympathizer referred to the Cyprus Convention in colorful simile as "a dagger thrust by a friend into the heart
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of Armenia." A more scholarly work states:

A close study of the Armenian Question will perhaps show that most, if not all, of the succeeding calamities and tragedies may be traced back to the suppression of Article 16 of the San Stefano Treaty in

12. Simon Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian Question, (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Company, 1943), p. 12. See also: Kevork Aslan, Armenia and the Armenians, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1920), p. 126.

13. M. C. Gabrielian, Armenia, A Martyr Nation, (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1918), p. 192.

favor of Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin.

Regardless of the tangible and intangible long range effects of the Cyprus Convention and the Treaty of Berlin on the Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, there were several immediate and very real effects on these people. Russia acquired 22,600 square miles of Ottoman territory by the Treaty which left about 35,600 square miles of traditional Armenia under Turkish control. This arrangement not only gave the Russians a large Armenian population but also provided Russia with a valuable strategic area of the Ottoman Empire for use in possible future aggression against Turkey. The transfer of territory also resulted in the movement of thousands of nomadic Circassians from their homes in the territory ceded to Russia into what remained of Turkish Armenia, where they began to prey on the Christian minority in the area, already long subject to depredations from the Kurds. Two further results of the terms of settlement created at Berlin were to provide (1) a plotting ground for Armenian revolutionists in Russia easily accessible to their targets in Turkish Armenia, and (2) a convenient haven for those revolutionists when they found it necessary to flee from Turkish pursuers.

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During the period from 1878 to 1881, the European powers urged the Sultan to fulfill his promises of reform. The collective note of September 7, 1880 urged reforms specifically designed to "secure the life and property of the Armenians." Usually, these demarches by the European states resulted in a polite reply from the Porte which promised much and resulted in little. From 1881 to the beginning of the first large-scale massacres in 1894, with the exception of Great Britain, the European powers engaged in little diplomatic activity on behalf of the Armenians.

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14. Sarkissian, History of the Armenian Question, p. 84. Sarkissian also quotes from Seton-Watson's, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: "The Armenian massacres of the nineties, and the culminating tragedy of 1915, might have been avoided if Article LXI of the Treaty had been enforced."

15. See Creasy, Turkey, p. 498.

16. Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian Question, p. 14.

17. There are several books dealing with the acts of the European Powers as they

Meanwhile, in the decade of the eighteen-eighties, the Armenians, observing the success of other Christians in the Ottoman Empire in securing various forms of freedom from Moslem rule, varying from limited autonomy to complete independence, experienced a growth of nationalism which was manifested in the organization and growth of secret revolutionary societies. Some of the leaders of these societies undoubtedly saw in the recent events in Bulgaria an example of one means of securing autonomy; i.e., obtain the intervention of the European powers in the relations between the Sultan and his Christian subjects. These leaders may also have noted that massacres had been the catalytic agent in bringing about European intervention in Bulgaria.

The forerunner of the secret societies was called "Defenders of the Fatherland" and its members had for their stated object the seeking of means "to remedy the plight of their fellow-countrymen in the Armenian provinces." Organized in 1880, this society was crushed by the Turkish authorities in 1882. A group calling themselves the Armenakans was founded in 1885, "to gather together all the militant elements of the race in order to prepare for more effective forms of revolutionary activity." This secret society went the way of its predecessor. In 1887, there was organized the first society which was to continue in existence until the present. This organization was not only a secret revolutionary society but also a political party basing its philosophy of government on Marx. Called the Hunchakian Party, it was dedicated to delivering the Armenian people from Turkish and Russian rule by
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force.

related to the Armenian Question. Some of the most interesting material on the effect of the Armenian unrest on the contest for control of Turkey and the Near East during the decade of the 1890's is given in E. T. S. Dugdale, ed., German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, (4 Vols., New York: Harper and Brothers, 1929), Vol. 2, pp. 109-14, 211-35, and 348-64.

18. See: Jirayr Missakian, A Searchlight on the Armenian Question 1878-1950. (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Company, 1950), pp. 26-8.

The best known of the secret societies, and the one destined to have the greatest influence on Armenia's struggle for independence, both prior and subsequent to the First World War, was called the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or Dashnagtzoutune. Founded in 1890, this organization was also a political party with the avowed purpose of liberating "the Armenian people from the tyranny of the Sultan, and their survival as a distinct national entity." Despite their acceptance of the use of violent means to achieve this end, they professed to believe in a program embodying the "principles of equality of all races and creeds before the law, security of life, honor, and property, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of religion, universal suffrage, compulsory education for all, free enterprise and fair distribution of land among the peasantry." Obviously, here was a program for which many Americans and Western Europeans could have sympathy. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation did not adopt a program advocating total independence until the events of 1915-1916. At the 1907 convention of the Federation, a resolution was adopted to the effect that "Turkish Armenia forms an inseparable part of the Constitutional Ottoman State enjoying local autonomy." Further evidence of this loyalty to the Ottoman Government is to be found in the cooperation between the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress and the Dashnagtzoutune immediately
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following the Young Turk revolt of 1908.

In the period of over six decades between the signing of a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1830 and the beginning of the massacres in 1894, there were at least two problems of a politico-legal nature which had an important influence on Turco-American relations and which were intimately

19. For a highly favorable comment on the Dashnagtzoutune, see: Missakian, Searchlight, pp. 28-9. Adverse comment on this organization is given in K. S. Papazian, Patriotism Perverted, (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934).

connected with the Armenian Question. One problem, divergent views on naturalization and the right of expatriation, was closely related to the second, the conflicting interpretations of the capitulatory rights granted to Americans in the Ottoman Empire.

Beginning with the reactionary trend in the domestic policies of the Turkish Government in the 1860's, there began a constant flow of the subject peoples of the Empire away from Turkey and into the Western World - many of them immigrating into the United States. Among the subject nationalities, the Armenians contributed the largest number of immigrants of any group entering America from Turkey. As will be indicated in greater detail in Chapter Three, the Armenians settled as skilled or unskilled laborers in several cities in the Northeast and on the West Coast. After fulfilling the basic residence requirement of five years in the United States, most of the Armenians applied for American citizenship as they could normally fulfill the other requirements necessary to obtain naturalization as citizens. However, some of the naturalized Armeno-Americans returned to the Ottoman Empire, claiming, of course, all the rights of native-born Americans. When these ex-Ottoman subjects returned to their native cities and villages demanding the extensive rights guaranteed by treaty to Americans and also demanding the protection of the United States Government when these rights were denied or infringed, a source of irritation in Turco-American relations was created.

The situation was complicated greatly by the lack of a naturalization treaty between the Ottoman Government and the United States, particularly as the United States accepted the right of expatriation without the original sovereign's consent, while the Sultan's Government, subscribing to the ancient

doctrine of jus sanguinis, claimed the perpetual allegiance of Ottoman nationals and denied the right of expatriation without the express permission of the Ottoman ruler. When, in addition, the Armenians who had migrated to the United States claimed the protection of the American flag not only for themselves but also for their wives and children, some of whom had never been in America, the ingredients for a diplomatic controversy were present in abundance.

Still another irritating factor was present which tended to complicate the situation. If the returning Armeno-Americans had been solely engaged in friendly commercial or even religious activities, the Ottoman Government would undoubtedly have complained infrequently about their acts and would not have arrested them or subjected them to Turkish imprisonment. Unfortunately for the Sultan's Government and Turco-American amity, many of the returning ex-Ottoman subjects engaged in subversive activities as members of the revolutionary organizations.

One problem involving American rights in Turkey dominated the relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire from the establishment of diplomatic relations until after the First World War. That problem was relative to the capitulatory rights of Americans as defined in Article Four of the Treaty of 1830. The Americans and Turks did not agree on the version of the treaty in the English language which had been accepted by the United States Senate. According to American officials, Article Four of the Treaty read as follows:

If litigations and disputes should arise, between subjects of the Sublime Porte and citizens of the United States, the parties shall not be heard, nor shall judgement be pronounced, unless the American Dragoman be present. Causes, in which, the sum may exceed five hundred piastres, shall be submitted to the Sublime Porte, to be decided according to the

laws of equity and justice. Citizens of the United States of America, quietly pursuing their commerce, and not being charged or convicted, of any crime or offense, shall not be molested; and even when they may have committed some offense, they shall be tried by their Minister or Consul, and punished according to their offense, following in this respect, the usage observed towards other Franks.²⁰

The Turks, on the other hand, could find no reference in their version of the treaty, to the trying of Americans by the United States Minister or Consul. When the agreement was negotiated, the Americans at the Porte had accepted the Turkish version as authoritative. Despite this concession at the time of the signing of the treaty, the Americans later insisted on their interpretation of the treaty's provisions.²¹

There was no serious dispute over the provisions of Article Four or over the general problem of extra-territoriality between the two nations until 1868 when two Americans in Syria allegedly committed offences against the Ottoman Government. From that date until the conclusion of the Treaty of Ankara in 1930, there were many disputes, the Turks contending that the United States was claiming capitulatory rights not granted to any other Christian nation.²²

20. Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts, Vol. 3, pp. 542-3. The interpretation of this Article is given in this volume, pp. 541-98. Another source for treatment of the capitulatory problem is: Nasim Sousa, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1933). See also: Gabriel Bie Ravndal, The Origin of the Capitulations and of the Consular Institutions, 67th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Doc. 34, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921).

21. In 1931, Dr. J. H. Kramers of Leiden translated the original Turkish version, the authoritative version, of the treaty and found the Turkish contention substantiated. "...while no accusation or crime is ascertained, they shall not be interfered with or molested without cause; and even if they come under accusation, they shall not be imprisoned by the authorities or the police officers, but in the same way as other persons living under a peace treaty are treated, the suitable punishment shall be applied to them with the cognizance of their minister and consuls." Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts, Vol. 3, pp. 554-5.

22. See: Gordon, American Relations, p. 192. Edgar Turlington pointed out that the inability of the Ottoman Government to enforce its interpretation of

By 1905, the American Government was willing to concede the right of trying the offender by the United States diplomatic or consular representative. But by this time, the Ottoman Government desired the complete abolition of the capitulations by all the powers and, consequently, demanded not only the right to try the offender, but also the right to arrest, detain, and punish him. This was unacceptable to the Government of the United States.²³ Shortly after the outbreak of the World War in 1914, the Turks tried to end the entire problem of extra-territorial rights in the Ottoman Empire by unilaterally abrogating all capitulatory agreements.

Turning to the questions of naturalization and expatriation per se, it can be seen that the legal basis for the subsequent dispute over the naturalization of Ottoman subjects in the United States, is to be found in two laws passed within a year of each other in the two countries. The naturalization law of 1868, passed by the American Congress, permitted foreign nationals to become American citizens upon fulfilling certain specified criteria, such as the five-year residence requirement, regardless of the positions taken by previous parent governments toward this emigration and subsequent change in the nationality status of their one-time subjects.²⁴ On January 16, 1869, the Ottoman Government promulgated a law covering the subject of expatriation. Articles Five and Six were in conflict with the American law of the preceding year, for they stated:

Art. 5. The Ottoman subject who has acquired a foreign nationality with the authorization of the Imperial Government is considered and treated as a foreign subject. If, on the contrary, he has naturalized

Article IV of the Treaty of 1830 generally resulted in no prosecution of any kind against Americans accused of penal offenses against the natives of the Ottoman Empire; Edgar Turlington, "The American Treaty of Lausanne," World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. 7, Nr. 10 (1924), p. 567.

23. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 78, Leishman to Secretary of State, November 18, 1905, March 8, 1906, National Archives.

24. Gordon, American Relations, pp. 326-7.

himself as a foreigner without the preliminary authorization of the Imperial Government, his naturalization will be considered as null and void, and he will continue to be considered and treated in all respects as an Ottoman subject. No Ottoman subject can in any case acquire foreign naturalization until after obtaining an act of authorization delivered by virtue of an Imperial Irade.

Art. 6. Nevertheless, the Imperial Government may declare loss of the character of an Ottoman subject against any Ottoman subject who shall have naturalized himself in a foreign country or who shall have accepted military function under a foreign government without the authorization of his sovereign.

In any case, the loss of the character of an Ottoman subject shall entail, ipso facto, the interdiction of the return to the Ottoman Empire of the person who shall have incurred it.²⁵

Negotiations to reconcile these conflicting positions on the subject of naturalization were successfully terminated with the signing of a naturalization treaty between the two nations on August 11, 1874. The treaty provided that a naturalized citizen returning to his native land and living there for a period of two years was liable to lose his acquired nationality unless he had a justifiable reason for prolonging his residence in his former homeland. The justifiable exceptions were listed in the treaty and included such reasons as the performance of commercial duties, engaging in religious activities, or the arising of unforeseen exigencies. In accepting the treaty, the United States Senate amended the phrase "the intention not to return shall be considered established" to read "the intention not to return may be considered established." When ratifications were exchanged on April 22, 1875, the Ottoman Government included a memorandum stating that each government would have the right to regard its former nationals as having renounced their acquired nationality after a period of residence in the former homeland of two years. When the Department of State learned of the Turkish memorandum,

²⁵. Given in: Foreign Relations Papers, 1893, p. 714. See also: John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, (8 Vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), Vol. 3, pp. 679-708.

it declared the entire treaty null and void, as the provisions of the American and Turkish versions of the treaty were incompatible.²⁶

Subsequent negotiations were brought to near success in 1889, when a treaty was again prepared and accepted by representatives of both governments. For some unknown reason, Abdul Hamid declined to affix his signature to this document and, consequently, naturalization was still a vexing problem in Turco-American relations when the Armenian massacres began in 1893-4.²⁷

Prior to 1893, the Turkish Government took the position that the acquiring of foreign nationality by a citizen of the Empire without Imperial sanction was prohibited by the Law of 1869 and the Government intended to enforce this regulation. The activities of a returning citizen were irrelevant to this problem although occasionally they were an additional reason for arrest. In 1892, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Said Pasha, in a note to the American Minister, requested that the United States:

...kindly send instructions to its consuls and agents in the Empire that they may not eventually give their protection to this category of individuals - natives of the country - in order to prevent difficulties with the Imperial authorities.²⁸

In August, 1893, the Turkish Minister in Washington specified the reason why the Ottoman Government took such a grave view on the subject of expatriation when he informed the Secretary of State that "everybody" knew that the greater part of the Armenians who sought refuge in the United States had for their object to remain therein a short time in order to obtain American nationality and thereupon they returned to Turkey where they engaged in seditious acts against the public order and tranquillity of the Empire.

26. See: Gordon, American Relations, p. 333; and Jacob C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 169.

27. Gordon, American Relations, p. 334.

28. Foreign Relations Papers, 1892, pp 533-4. x

Mavroyeni Bey also stated that the Ottoman Government intended to refuse to allow these individuals to enter Turkey, basing such action on the right of the defense of "legitimate authority." In adopting this reason for excluding the Armenians from returning to Turkey, the Turkish Minister outlined a new course upon which the Ottoman Government could base its action - namely, self-protection from the actions of dangerous subversives, rather than punishment for the breaking of an Ottoman law on expatriation.²⁹

To support his claim of defense of legitimate authority, the Turkish Minister supplied the Department of State with a copy of the newspaper Haik, published in the Armenian language in New York. The editorial in the issue sent to the Department was later shown to the President and probably influenced his remarks on naturalization in his message to Congress of December, 1893. The article stated in part:

Experience has shown that the political reconstruction of the nation [i.e. Armenia] through diplomatic action is impossible. Positive and energetic means are needed in order to bring about diplomatic intervention. Those means are fire and sword, which call for soldiers and money. It is the nation that must furnish them. It must establish its center of activity in Russia or the United States. Just as there is an Armeno-Russian corps in the East, ready and organized, so must an Armeno-American corps, equally strong, be raised in the West.³⁰

As far as the United States was concerned, for as long as the Turks insisted on arresting returning naturalized Armeno-Americans, solely on the basis of having violated the Law of 1869, the American Government could not accept either the Turkish action or the reason for it. Secretary of State Bayard best expressed the position of the United States on this issue. In November, 1885, he wrote:

The question is, in its broadest aspect, one of conflict between the laws of sovereign equals. The authority of one is paramount within

29. Foreign Relations Papers, 1893, p. 709.
30. Ibid., p. 712.

its own jurisdiction. We recognize expatriation as an individual right. Turkey, almost solely among nations, holds to the generally abandoned doctrine of perpetual allegiance. Turkey can no more expect us to renounce our fundamental doctrine in respect of our citizens within her territory than she could expect to enforce her doctrines within the United States, by preventing the naturalization here of a Turk, who emigrates without the authorization of an Imperial irade.³¹

The United States insisted on perfect freedom of action for Americans in Turkey whether native-born or naturalized. Minister Hirsch wrote to the Turkish Foreign Ministry in 1892 that "anyone in the Empire duly in possession of an American passport is entitled to the protection of the United States Government."³² His successor was no less vigilant in protecting all Americans. In September, 1893, Minister Terrell sent a note to the Foreign Minister, in which, commenting on the arrest of two returning Armeno-Americans, he stated:

The arrest of the men cannot be justified on the ground that they emigrated to America without obtaining the consent of His Imperial Majesty. Such men, naturalized as citizens of the United States, will, when they return to Turkey, be as jealously protected against arbitrary arrest as if they had been born in American territory, until the Government of His Imperial Majesty and the United States mutually agree to the contrary.³³

However, by mid-1893, the Secretary of State informed the Turkish Minister that the United States would not sanction any conduct by American citizens abroad that disturbed the peace of a foreign country and by late that same year, the correspondence between the Department of State and the Legation in Constantinople indicated that the position of the American Government had definitely become one of accepting the right of Turkey to expel or arrest for eventual expulsion Americans who were originally Turkish citizens. As pointed out by the Secretary, the Government of the United States was forced to accept

11. Quoted in Foreign Relations Papers, 1894, pp. 764-5.

12. Foreign Relations Papers, 1892, p. 530.

13. Foreign Relations Papers, 1893, pp. 687-8. At another time, Terrell

the right of expulsion for it was at that time engaged in expelling and
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excluding natives of China.

It was at this time also that the American Minister to the sublime Porte made a suggestion to end the naturalization problem between the two countries which had been heard before and was to be suggested subsequently. The suggestion was to include on all American passports a statement similar to one found on all British passports:

This passport is granted with the qualification that the bearer shall not, when within the limits of the foreign state of which he was a subject previously to obtaining his certificate of naturalization, be deemed to be a British subject, unless he has ceased to be a subject of that state in pursuance of the laws thereof, or in pursuance of a treaty to that effect.³⁵

If this suggestion had been accepted, the entire problem regarding naturalization would doubtless have been eliminated; unfortunately, any such action on the part of the Department of State would have required an act of Congress, and that body was at that time becoming increasingly concerned with the welfare
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of naturalized Americans in the Ottoman Empire.

At this point it might be desirable to note that only the United States

Informed the Porte that "The United States demands the same protection in the Ottoman Empire for every American citizen bearing its passport, whether native-born or naturalized, that is accorded to any titled prince of any power in Europe." Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, p. 1313.

34. Foreign Relations Papers, 1893, pp. 706-7.

35. Ibid., p. 684. A subsequent suggestion to this effect was contained in: Notes from the Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Mavroyeni Bey to the Secretary of State, October 22, 1894, N.A.

36. In August, 1894, Terrell suggested that the United States require any naturalized citizen who wished to return to the Ottoman Empire to have his passport visaed by the Turkish Minister or by a Turkish Consul in the United States before being permitted to leave the country. When Gresham declined to accept this suggestion, Terrell suggested a treaty which would place every Turkish subject naturalized without the Sultan's consent under the jurisdiction of Turkey when such person returned to the Ottoman Empire. The Secretary of State similarly declined to follow through on this proposal. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 57, Terrell to the Secretary of State, August 4, 1894, September 17, 1894; Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 5, Gresham to the American Minister, October 20, 1894, N.A.

was at variance with the Ottoman Empire over naturalization. One of the reasons, of course, was the large number of Armenians in the United States compared to the number in other nations. Another reason lay in the fact that the other states handled the problem of expatriation of Turks in a different manner. The British method is described above. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Italy did not give protection to naturalized Turks when they returned to their original homeland. France and a few smaller nations refused to grant citizenship to Ottoman subjects without an imperial irade to indicate the Sultan's concurrence.

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Because of the impartial and objective review of the American position relative to the naturalization of ex-Turkish subjects in the United States given in President Cleveland's message to Congress in December, 1893, and because it officially sanctioned a change in emphasis in the American view toward the issue, his remarks on the subject are herewith quoted in full:

Turkey complains that her Armenian subjects obtain citizenship in this country, not to identify themselves in good faith with our people, but with the intention of returning to the land of their birth and there engaging in sedition. This complaint is not wholly without foundation. A journal published in this country in the Armenian language openly counsels its readers to arm, organize, and participate in movements for the subversion of Turkish authority in the Asiatic provinces. The Ottoman Government has announced its intention to expel from its dominions Armenians who have obtained naturalization in the United States since 1868.

The right to exclude any or all classes of aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. It is a right asserted and, to a limited extent, enforced by the United States, with the sanction of our highest court. There being no naturalization treaty between the United States and Turkey, our minister at Constantinople has been instructed that, while recognizing the right of that Government to enforce its declared policy against naturalized Armenians, he is expected to protect them from unnecessary harshness of treatment.³⁸

W. Foreign Relations Papers, 1894, p. 760.
W. Foreign Relations Papers, 1893, p. x.

The Sultan informed the President of his pleasure at the wording in the annual message regarding naturalization of Armenians in the United States. When Minister Terrell had an interview with Abdul Hamid in March, 1894, the two men reached an agreement whereby disloyal and dangerous Armenians who had become naturalized Americans might be expelled from Turkey but without imprisonment or cruelty. ³⁹ In April, Said Pasha informed the American Secretary of State that no Turkish subject naturalized illegally abroad would be imprisoned for that reason. Such people might be expelled, but imprisonment would be reserved for those committing other crimes. ⁴⁰

As the number of incidents involving Armeno-Americans in revolutionary exploits in Turkey multiplied, the Department of State became increasingly aware of the difficulties being experienced by Ottoman authorities. In mid-1895, the Acting Secretary of State wrote to the Minister in Constantinople that the American Government could not prevent irresponsible persons from taking arms against a friendly government, "nor exempt them from the consequences on the grounds of American citizenship, but as citizens they should have a fair trial and opportunity for defense, without any arbitrary discrimination because of such citizenship." ⁴¹

At one time during the Armenian massacres, the United States Government put forth a tentative claim to protection for individuals who could not possibly be considered American citizens. The people involved, many of whom had been arrested for subversive activity in the Ottoman Empire, were the native teachers, mostly Armenians, working with the American missionaries.

... Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 57, Terrell to the Secretary of State,
... Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Mavroyeni Bey to the Secretary
... State, April 5, 1894, N.A.
... Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Adee to the American Minister,
July 11, 1895, N.A.

In October, 1894, Secretary of State Gresham, while still recognizing the right of the Turkish Government to punish her own subjects for violation of her laws, insisted that these native teachers not be arrested arbitrarily or capriciously. Terrell did succeed in securing an order from the Porte which granted permission to the Americans to have a representative present at all investigations of charges against native workers who were assisting the members of the American religious organizations in Turkey. ⁴² Again in March, 1895, Gresham insisted that there should be no "vexatious interference" with the agents of American enterprises in the Empire and further insisted that such native agents and dependents should not "be ceaselessly interrupted in the performance of their regular duties." ⁴³ In general, the Secretary's demands were met and native workers of the American business and religious organizations in Turkey were not molested during the years 1894 - 1896.

It was at this time that the Congress of the United States became interested in the naturalization question, among others involving the status of Armenians in Turkey. In Cleveland's Annual Message of December, 1894, the President recalled his statement of the previous year about naturalization and reiterated that while the United States "acquiesces in the asserted right of expulsion it will not consent that Armenians may be imprisoned or otherwise punished for no other reason than having acquired without Imperial consent American citizenship." ⁴⁴

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42. Foreign Relations Papers, 1894, pp. 744, 747.
 43. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Gresham to the American Minister, March 20, 1895, N.A.
 44. Foreign Relations Papers, 1894, p. xv.

On the same day, the Senate brought forth the following resolution:

Resolved, That the President be requested, if in his judgment it be not incompatible with the public interest, to communicate to the Senate any information he may have received in regard to alleged cruelties committed upon Armenians in Turkey, and especially whether any such cruelties have been committed upon citizens who have declared their intention to become naturalized in this country, or upon persons because of their being Christian.⁴⁵

The reply of the Secretary of State to this Senate resolution reviewed the entire Armenian Question and American interest in it. Admitting that the Turkish Government might expel undesirable Armeno-Americans, the Secretary, nevertheless, emphasized the right of the United States to demand the same treatment for both native-born and naturalized citizens of the republic. The secretary concluded that as the American Minister and Consuls had express jurisdiction over charges of insurrection and rebellion in a foreign country committed by an American citizen, the United States "is unable to forego its right in the premises and cannot relinquish jurisdiction over any citizen, even though after naturalization he return to his native land and identify himself with its political conspirations."⁴⁶

A year later the Senate once again passed a resolution relative to this problem. This resolution of December 16, 1895, requested the Secretary of State to inform the Senate whether naturalized citizens of the United States of Armenian birth were allowed to visit Turkey on business or to visit their families, and whether United States passports held by them were recognized by the Turkish Government. In addition, the Senate wished to know whether the families of such naturalized citizens residing in Turkey were permitted to leave

1. Ibid. pp. 714-5.

2. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, pp. 1259-60.

that country and go to the United States and whether naturalized citizens of the United States of Armenian birth had the same rights and protection in Turkey as did naturalized citizens of Great Britain, France, Germany, or Russia.⁴⁷

In his reply, Secretary of State Olney assured the Senate that Turkey had not pressed the assertion that it could treat the individuals mentioned in the first part of the resolution as Turkish subjects. As for the second part of the resolution, Mr. Olney reminded the Senate that this was a matter of internal jurisdiction in Turkey but that when families of naturalized citizens were not permitted to emigrate, the American Embassy normally offered its good offices in an attempt to get the decision reversed. In regard to the last part of the resolution, the Secretary could assure the members of the Senate that American nationals of Turkish birth in Turkey received more protection from their adopted government than did naturalized citizens of the other powers.⁴⁸

Another problem in Turco-American relations was closely associated with the issue of expatriation and naturalization and was noted in 1896 in a communication from the Turkish Foreign Minister to the Secretary of State, in which the Ottoman Government requested the cooperation of the United States' authorities in preventing the landing of Armenian revolutionists and their war material in Ottoman territory. Secretary of State Olney, in reply, assured the Turkish Government that the American Government would not interfere in attempts to stop clandestine landings in the Ottoman Empire and pointed to the order previously given to the admiral commanding the United States fleet on European station, which instructed him to assist the American Minister in Constantinople in preventing entry into Turkey of armed American citizens as revolutionists.⁴⁹

47. *Ibid.*, p. 1471

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 1471-3

49. *Foreign Relations Papers*, 1896, pp. 925-8.

Toward the conclusion of his residence in Constantinople, Minister Terrell frequently had occasion to complain about those Armenians who returned to Turkey after obtaining citizenship in the United States, claiming the protection of both governments, depending on which protection was more desirable under specific circumstances, and yet were in a position where they could not be forced to respond to the demands of either. Calling this procedure a "fraud on our naturalization," the Minister asked his superiors in Washington under what circumstances a person in this category might lose his American citizenship and the protection that went with it.⁵⁰ Mr. Rockhill, Acting Secretary of State, after reviewing the State Department's previous decisions on naturalization, informed Terrell that he found that the Department had consistently supported a position that "a passport may be refused to a person applying therefor while abroad when the circumstances show a purpose to reside indefinitely in a foreign country or fail to show a reasonable intention to return to the United States." In adopting this view, the Acting Secretary's words were not far removed from the text of the rejected treaty of 1874.⁵¹

In 1900, Secretary Hay informed a naturalized Armenian in Chicago, who had requested information as to the protection that he could expect from the United States if he were to visit Turkey, that while the Department and its diplomatic and consular agents in the Turkish dominions would use every effort to protect any naturalized citizen of Turkish origin who returned to Turkey, it could not foresee that he would be permitted to enter the Empire, or that having entered he would escape molestation or expulsion. This situation, the Secretary explained, was due to the fact that the individual in question held dual citizen-

50. Foreign Relations Papers, 1897, p. 584.

51. Ibid., pp. 584-5. In 1901, the American Charge in Constantinople was informed that Armenian-Americans who concealed their American nationality and represented themselves to be Ottoman subjects to suit their convenience were not entitled to American protection. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 7, David Hill to American Charge, February 16, 1901, N.A.

ship under international law and could therefore not expect to receive equal protection with non-Ottoman-born American citizens while traveling or residing in Turkey.⁵²

Mr. Leishman, who represented the United States at the Porte for several years at the turn of the century, was frankly critical of many returning Armenians. In one dispatch he referred to the attempts he had made to correct the impression in the minds of Turkish officials regarding the activities of the Americans in Turkey but stated that his efforts were frequently disrupted "by the fact that a naturalized citizen of Ottoman origin is occasionally caught red handed in inciting sedition....."⁵³

At another time, Leishman complained that because of the many naturalized Armenians returning to Turkey and the protection they received from the American Government, many of the Turks imagined that America was championing the Armenian cause, "which feeling has naturally been encouraged by the Armenians and their friends....."⁵⁴

The United States naturalization law of June 13, 1906, followed by the general citizenship law of March 2, 1907, virtually eliminated the extended controversy with Turkey by promulgating provisions which were nearly identical with those included in the rejected treaty of 1874. By the provisions of the latter law any naturalized citizen who resided for two years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five years in any other state, would be presumed to have ceased to be an American citizen. Once again, as in the proposed treaty of 1874, provision was made for legitimate reasons for the naturalized citizen remaining abroad, such as being engaged in commerce, working for a

52. Foreign Relations Papers, 1900, pp. 938-9.

53. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 76, Leishman to the Secretary of State, May 6, 1904, N.A.

54. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 73, Leishman to Secretary of State, April 6, 1903, N.A.

religious institution, or some unforeseen emergency.

The organization originally responsible for directing virtually all of the American Protestant missionary activity in the Ottoman Empire was the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, established in 1810, and at that time representing in the mission field the Congregational, Presbyterian, and Reformed Churches in the United States. At no time during the 100 years preceding the First World War was there a significant missionary effort on behalf of any other American Protestant religious group in the Ottoman Empire. By 1870, the missionary activity in Syria and in the area south of that part of the Ottoman Empire was assigned to the Presbyterian Church, while Anatolia and the Straits area became the exclusive field of the Congregational Church.

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In 1819, the first missionaries from the American Board sailed from the United States to establish a mission in the Levant. During the decade of the 1820's, other missionaries followed, and in 1829, the Executive or Prudential Committee of the American Board decided to establish a mission to the Armenians in Turkey, primarily to the approximately 100,000 members of that race living

55. Foreign Relations Papers, 1908, p. 744. Secretary of State Elihu Root demonstrated a sense of humor regarding the problem of returning Armenians in a letter to Thomas Nelson Page, who was planning a trip to Turkey. On October 24, 1905, Root wrote as follows: "It is a pleasure to serve you. I feel bound, however, to warn you that if you are an Armenian by birth and have been naturalized in this country in the hope of securing protection against the consequences of returning to Turkey for the purpose of committing murder, my letter will not be effective for your protection. The Government of Turkey has a vulgar prejudice about such things, which we have been unable to overcome by diplomatic methods." Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, (2 Vols., New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938), Vol. 2, p. 59.

56. Two standard works on the activities of American missionaries in Turkey are: Leon Arpee, A Century of Armenian Protestantism, 1846-1946, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946); and William E. Strong, The Story of the American Board, (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1910). A good monograph on the subject is: Bernard F. Nordmann, American Missionary Work Among Armenians in Turkey, 1830-1923, (Abstract of a Doctoral Dissertation, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1929).

in Constantinople. The Reverend William Goodell arrived in the capital city in 1831 to direct the development of this mission. At approximately the same time, two American missionaries were assigned by the American Board to explore the eastern provinces of the Anatolian part of the Ottoman Empire. The findings of these two men, during their fifteen month journey into the Armenian provinces and northern Persia, were reported in Researches in Armenia. This volume was one of the first to be published in the English language on the Armenian people, country, and history, and consequently, it helped create in both the United States and England an interest in Armenia and the Armenians. 57

As the years passed and the activities of the American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire expanded, one mission station after another was established. Most of the cities chosen for major mission stations were in Armenian districts, although some attention was given to Greek and Nestorian Christians in the Empire. Major stations were established at: Trebizond (1835), Erzerum (1839), Aintab (1847), Brousa (1848), Sivas (1851), Cesarea (1854), Harput (1855), Marash (1855), Mardin (1856), Bitlis (1858), Marsovan (1862), and Van (1872). 58

The original intention of the American Board in sending missionaries to Turkey was to convert Moslems and Jews to the Christian religion. However, as apostasy from Mohammedanism was punishable by death until after 1856, little progress was made in converting this religious group. The Jews, for other reasons, were similarly unreceptive to the proselytizing of the American Protestants. It was at this point that "the missionaries discovered that there

57. Eli Smith, Researches in Armenia, (2 Vols., Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1833).

58. Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1899, (Boston: The American Board, 1899), p. 67. Hereafter referred to as Annual Report, plus the year. Also: Ibid., 1900, pp. 43-58. By 1860, the missionary organization in Turkey was so extensive that it was sub-divided into three separate missions for administrative purposes. At a later date, the Western Turkey Mission was again sub-divided to include a Balkan Turkey Mission.

were already signs of an awakening in the Gregorian Church; reformers and religious enthusiasts had striven to break through its formalism." Soon it became the object of the American Board to "revive the knowledge and the spirit of the gospel among Oriental Churches and by this means operate upon the Mohammedans, not to subvert them, not to proselyte, but merely to re-awaken them to new duties in Christ." ⁵⁹ At first there was an attempt made by the Americans to follow these rules and to work for "reform" within the ⁶⁰ Armenian Church.

The Armenian Patriarch in Constantinople had warmly welcomed the American Protestants upon their arrival in 1831; but as time passed his friendliness turned to distrust, and by 1839, those Armenians who advocated the religion ⁶¹ of, or otherwise supported, the American missionaries were denounced. In 1836, the American missionaries founded the Evangelical Union, which was for all practical purposes a Protestant Church, although it referred to itself as a society. By the mid-1840's, the Armenian Church was excommunicating those Armenians sympathetic to the teachings of the missionaries. On July 1, 1846, the First Evangelical Armenian Church of Constantinople was founded, and the attempt to work within the ancient Armenian Church was over. Lord Cowley, British Charge at the Porte, is usually given credit for securing from the Sultan an imperial irade on November 15, 1847 recognizing the Protestants of Turkey as a separate religious community and guaranteeing to them the same freedom of worship already officially granted to the Gregorian, Orthodox, and ⁶² Roman Catholic Christians.

59. Strong, Story of the American Board, p. 91; Nordmann, American Missionary Work, p. 3.

60. See: Arpee, Century of Armenian Protestantism, p. 52, which gives the instructions passed to Cyrus Hamlin at time of his departure for Turkey in 1839.

61. The condemnation of American mission work had actually been begun by the Catholic Patriarch of Constantinople in 1836 and his example was soon followed by the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church.

62. Arpee, Century of Armenian Protestantism, pp. 39-40.

The general dislike of the American-sponsored Protestant movement in Turkey continued on the part of the hierarchy and many of the members of the Armenian Church for the rest of the nineteenth century. During the massacres of the 1890's and 1909, however, Gregorian and Protestant Armenians were murdered indiscriminately by their Moslem neighbors and this common disaster brought the survivors into closer association. In the American Board's Annual Reports of 1894 and 1910, mention is made of the "growing friendliness" ⁶³ between the Gregorian and Protestant Churches.

The fact that Armenians in Turkey were receptive to Protestantism can be shown by comparing the size of the missionary plant in 1850, in 1894, the year the massacres began, and in 1914. In 1850, a handful of missionaries were responsible for the activities of seven mission stations, with six minor or outstations. By the middle of the last decade of the nineteenth century, the number of stations had increased to fifteen and the number of outstations to 268. There were 153 Americans, including missionaries and their wives as well as several unmarried female workers, aided by nearly 800 "laborers," many of them ordained or unordained Ministers. By this time there were 299 places of worship, including 112 churches, with the official list of church members carrying over 11,000 names and with an estimated 47,000 adherents to Protestantism. By the outbreak of war in 1914, the number of major stations had increased to 17, the number of outstations was down to 256, but the number of American workers had jumped to 174. Over 1200 native laborers, of whom 82 were ordained ministers, aided in the work of the missions, which now included responsibility for 137 churches with about 14,000 communicants and with an

63. Annual Report, 1910, p. 105; Ibid., 1894, p. 51. See also: Nordmann, American Missionary Work, p. 8.

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estimated 50,000 adherents. This increase between the year 1894 and 1914 is significant when taken in conjunction with the fact that many Armenians who were members of the Protestant Church had emigrated to America in the intervening years; yet the missions were able to overcome the loss and actually increase their membership during this period.

But the story of American missionary work in Turkey would be most incomplete if the growth in the size of religious institutions alone were given. Perhaps more than in any other field, the missionaries contributed to the life and future of the natives, particularly the Armenians, in the field of education. From the first school in Pera in 1834, the educational program of the American Board in Turkey grew to mammoth size by 1914. By 1845, the first school for girls was opened; the Americans pioneering in the movement for education of females in the Ottoman Empire. Several schools of higher learning were founded, the most famous being Robert College in Constantinople, founded in 1863 by Cyrus Hamlin. This was followed by the creation of other colleges including the American College for Girls at Constantinople in 1890.

By 1914, the mission schools and colleges numbered 426, including eight colleges, three theological seminaries, 46 secondary schools, and 371 other schools. These schools had an enrollment of about 1700 college students, over 4,000 high school students, and about 19,500 boys and girls in the primary

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schools. Most of the students and teachers were Christians, and of these, a large percentage were from the Armenian community. It could truthfully be said that the missionaries founded a complete educational system to fit every

64. See: Arpee, Century of Armenian Protestantism, p. 46. See also: Annual Report, 1894, p. 109; Ibid., 1914, p. 107.

65. Annual Report, 1914, p. 107.

kind of ambition and desire and "to train Armenia's future leaders in western democratic methods and spirit."⁶⁶ Certainly, this inculcation of "western democratic methods and spirit" had a pronounced effect on the Armenians and their attitude toward the Ottoman Government. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Ottoman officials began to blame the American schools for creating a spirit of restlessness in the Armenian race.

In another field, medicine, the American missionaries played an important role in Armenian and Turkish life. In 1831, the American Board sent three physicians to Asia Minor in an effort to counteract the spread of witchcraft in the area. These men remained for many years in the Levant. By 1859, the training of native doctors had begun and hospitals were built in the years following. By 1914, there were nine hospitals in the Empire and ten dispensaries serving the needs of the local citizenry. There were nearly 40,000 patients who received treatment at the medical centers in that year, with the total number of treatments reaching over 130,000.⁶⁷

In a fourth field, that of book and periodical publication, the missionaries in the Ottoman Empire played a significant part in Armenian life. This activity was closely associated with the American Bible House in Constantinople, the two organizations often using the same facilities in the publication and sale of pamphlets, books, and periodicals. The pamphlets and books were not confined to educational and religious subjects alone. In the 1860's, the missionaries began publication of the Treasury of Useful Knowledge in the Armenian language. This encyclopedia continued to be published for over fifty years, being the first publication in the Armenian language to endure for an

66. Nordmann, American Missionary Work, p. 3.

67. Annual Report, 1914, p. 107.

extended period of time. It is probable that this periodical made a significant contribution in the creation of a national spirit among the Armenian subjects

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of the Sultan. Another missionary-sponsored periodical which achieved fame was the weekly newspaper Avedaper, also published in the Armenian language for over fifty years, and another instrument tending to weld the Armenian

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people into a single political entity.

Reviewing the size of the American missionary effort in Turkey, it is quite easy to understand why the missionaries hesitated to leave the country in the desperate days of 1894-1896, even when the American Minister in Constantinople urged their rapid withdrawal from the interior provinces to ensure their safety. In a letter to Minister Terrell, in December, 1895, the representative of the American Board in Constantinople summed up the position of the Board relative to its activity in Turkey. Calling the mission activities "a great American enterprise," he stated that the expense for organization, equipment, and maintenance of the enterprise had been about six million dollars. The Americans in the United States contributed over \$150,000 a year to the upkeep of the mission property; an additional \$70,000 a year was received in the form of tuition for students and in book sales in the Ottoman Empire. Putting the argument on a purely economic plane, Mr. Dwight compared this \$220,000 received annually to interest on normal capital invested in economic enterprise and deduced that the American missionary effort in the Ottoman Empire was worth about \$7,000,000. After thus proving that the American Board had created a large and prosperous economic entity in Turkey, the missionary

68. Sarkissian, History of the Armenian Question, p. 118.

69. See: Annual Report, 1910, p. 111.

representative concluded that the American Board's business in Turkey was of sufficient financial importance to warrant the somewhat persistent demands for its protection which were made to the United States Government. 70

American missionary activity to Armenians in Russia was never crowned with the success which it obtained in Turkey. Part of the Erzerum Mission Station was located in Russian Armenia, but an American missionary was persona non grata in this area and the missionary work accomplished was performed by native workers acting under the direction of Americans in Turkey. The Annual Reports of 1900 and 1905 both refer to the persecution and severe difficulties under which the native workers in Russia operated. 71 These facts are significant in light of the suggestion often heard in the United States in the 1890's among both government officials and religious leaders, that a possible and desirable solution to the Armenian Question could be achieved if the powers would permit Russia to detach the Armenian vilayets from Turkey.

Despite the remarkable success of the American missionary effort in the Ottoman Empire, the reaction of a large majority of Armenians toward the American missionaries in the years prior to the World War probably did not differ greatly from the hostile position assumed by the leaders of the Gregorian Church. However, some "proof" of this Armenian hostility is of questionable validity. At one time during the massacres of the 1890's, the Turkish Minister in Washington transmitted a copy of a petition from sixty Armenians in Harput, addressed to the Grand Vizier, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, the Secretary of the Imperial Palace, and the Armenian

70. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, pp. 1427-30. By 1914, the sum contributed by Americans to the Turkish Mission had increased to over \$250,000 per annum.

71. Annual Report, 1900, p. 62; Ibid., 1905, p. 58.

Patriarch, which stated that the American missionaries had caused Armenian children to turn from the correct path, and had prejudiced them against the Ottoman Empire. The petition concluded by begging the recipients to force the Americans to leave the city. At the request of the American Government, the British Vice-Consul in Harput investigated the matter and found that the petition was signed by the Armenians under duress, the paper having been circulated by Turkish officials the day after the bombardment of American mission property in the city.⁷²

The early friendliness of the Turkish Government to the creation of a Protestant community in the Ottoman Empire has previously been noted in this chapter. This attitude on the part of the Government could have been an example of the sincere trend toward liberalism existing in the Turkish Government until the 1860's. A more cynical explanation would be that the Sultan could not fail to profit by the division of his Christian subjects into smaller conflicting groups on the proposition of divide et impera.

Regardless of the reasons for the cordial reception of the American missionaries in the early years, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and with the beginning of the Armenian revolutionary activities, the Sultan's government began to look upon the Americans in a less favorable light. The reaction against the missionaries actually began as early as the 1860's when the Sultan, for the first time, saw the schools and churches of the Protestants as "hotbeds of nationalism." Official action was taken during this period which demonstrated the government's concern with the missions. Interference by local authorities in the performance of mission functions, restrictive laws passed

72. Foreign Relations Papers, 1896, pp. 854-7.

by the government curtailing the activities of schools and the publication of books in the Empire, and refusal to grant building permits for the erection of mission buildings at the stations are all examples of such action.⁷³ Regardless of the exact date when the Sultan's government began an active campaign against the missionaries, by 1887 there was no question of its hostility toward this group of Americans. Consul Selah Merrill stated in that year that only a lack of power and courage prevented the Turkish Government from making the situation for the missions "disastrous."⁷⁴

In 1893, fire destroyed the unfinished girls building at Anatolia College in Marsovan. When the United States Government demanded an indemnity, the Turkish Government replied that the school was a center of Armenian sedition. Investigation by the United States Consul determined that the fire had been started by Turkish police officials. However, this same investigation also uncovered the fact that two of the professors at the school were officials of an Armenian revolutionary society. An attempt was made to eliminate active revolutionists from the faculty of the college and the Turkish Government paid an indemnity for the loss.⁷⁵

In general, the Armenian revolutionary leaders disliked the American missionaries because nearly all of the latter refused to participate actively in the seditious plans of the rebels. In 1896, the American Minister to Turkey reported that Armenian revolutionists were capable of injuring American missionaries in the country and blaming the action on the Turks or Kurds in an

73. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, p. 163. There is far less to confirm the view of another writer who stated: "The antagonism of the Turkish Government to the American Mission never was from the beginning in doubt." See: Arpee, Century of Armenian Protestantism, p. 80.

74. Annual Report, 1887, p. xxi.

75. Gordon, American Relations, pp. 238-9.

attempt to involve the United States in the Armenian Question. In the
Annual Report of the American Board for 1895 it was stated:

Revolutionary parties among the Armenians have arisen in many sections, bringing no little danger to the missionaries because they would not aid or countenance them or their plans. Serious threats of violence have been made at different times.⁷⁷

The official position of the American Board toward the Armenian revolutionary activity was cogently described in a letter from Dr. Judson Smith, Foreign Secretary of the Board, to the Secretary of State, in early 1895, in which he stated that repeatedly instructions "direct and distinct, as well as indirect and implicit," had been sent to the missionaries in Turkey to maintain a loyal attitude toward the Turkish Government and to hold themselves aloof from anything which looked toward revolutionary tendencies. The missionaries were also instructed to inculcate a sentiment of loyalty to the Ottoman Government upon all the native people over whom they had influence in
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their religious and educational work.

In general, it may be stated that the American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire abided by this rule and gave no direct aid or encouragement to the Armenian revolutionists. Several missionaries publicly and privately denounced
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the revolutionary activities of the Armenians. The Ottoman Government did expel two American missionaries on charges of sedition in 1896 but these charges were never proved. Similarly unsubstantiated were protests by the Ottoman

76. Foreign Relations Papers, 1896, p. 849.

77. Annual Report, 1895, p. 50

78. Quoted in: Notes to Turkish Legation, Vol. 2, Gresham to Turkish Minister, Feb. 16, 1895, N.A.

79. See: Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Jan. 3, 1894, which encloses a letter by Cyrus Hamlin appearing in The Congregationalist; Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 58, Terrell to Secretary of State, Feb. 14, 1895, which encloses letter from President Tracy of Marsovan College, N.A.

Legation in Washington that American missionaries acted as couriers between Armenian revolutionists in Turkey and their associates in the United States.⁸⁰ The possibility of involving the missionaries directly in the violence of race-riots was particularly strong during the Armenian massacres of the 1890's when Armenian rebels sought refuge in the missions. To refuse shelter under such circumstances would have been inhuman and to have granted asylum meant endangering the safety of the mission personnel. In general, this dilemma was resolved by the Americans in favor of permission for the rebels to seek safety on the mission station. Such action, however, resulted in the destruction of some American property by Turkish forces in 1895.

Despite the apparently sincere and successful efforts of the American missionaries to remain apart from political questions, they indirectly aided the Armenian cause. The Americans contributed greatly to the rise of Armenian nationalism by referring both orally and in writing to the Armenian "nation," despite the fact that no map had included Armenia as a political entity for over 500 years. In 1896, the American Minister at Constantinople denounced the missionaries for planting among the Armenians the "religion of discontent."⁸¹ In addition to creating a spirit of nationalism, the missionaries indirectly aided the plans of the Armenian revolutionists by supplying the American public with frequent, comprehensive reports on the Turco-Armenian controversy. These reports, in the form of books and newspapers and magazine articles tended to bring the problem before the American public and to present, almost without exception, a highly pro-Armenian viewpoint.

80. See: Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Olney to American Minister, July 16, 1896; and Notes to Turkish Legation, Vol. 2, Gresham to Turkish Minister, Dec. 27, 1894. N.A.

81. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 62, Terrell to Secretary of State, July 30, 1896, N.A.

The attitude of the United States Government toward missionary activity in Turkey, underwent a change in the latter part of the 1880's and subsequent to that date every effort was made to ensure protection for missionary interests in the Empire, even when aggressive measures were necessary. In view of the disturbances in the Ottoman Empire in connection with the Armenian Question during the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth centuries, if the United States had not adopted a vigorous policy to protect the missionaries, the work of these men and the educational institutions created by them might have been eliminated or drastically reduced in size. ⁸²

Such a policy of vigorous support for the missionary interests had not always been followed. In 1842, the Secretary of State found it necessary to remind the American representative at the Porte that missionaries had a right to receive the same attention from the Minister as did other citizens of the United States, such as merchants or others engaged in commercial activity in the Empire or who lived or visited in Turkey. ⁸³ By 1892, the pendulum had obviously started to swing in the other direction when Minister Hirsch in Constantinople recommended to the Department of State the establishment of a Consulate at Erzerum due exclusively to the fact that the city was the center of an important mission district. ⁸⁴

The American Board and its missionaries in the Ottoman Empire continually exerted pressure on the American State Department to ensure the safety of Americans in Turkey. At all times the Board of Foreign Missions was quick to assert its equal right with commercial representatives for indemnity or

82. See: Gordon, American Relations, p. 235.

83. Quoted in Arpee, Century of Armenian Protestantism, p. 60.

84. Foreign Relations Papers, 1892, p. 530.

redress in case of injury. Reverend Edwin M. Bliss complained that the American Government blamed the difficulties which occasionally occurred between missionaries and the Ottoman Government on the religious character of the work of the former and that the State Department was less diligent in securing the rights of missionaries than it was in securing those of travelers and merchants.

There is good evidence that the missionaries, through their homeboard, could exercise considerable pressure on the American Department of State. From among the missionaries came the most influential Americans in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. One of the most important of these was Dr. George Washburn, for many years President of Robert College in Constantinople, a cousin of Secretary of State John Hay, and a writer of considerable renown. This missionary was aptly titled the "Father of Bulgaria" for at one time, no less than seven of the nine Bulgarian cabinet members were ex-students and friends of this man.

Occasionally, pressure could be brought to bear by the immense size of a religious organization in the United States. In December, 1894, the Evangelical Alliance petitioned the Department of State, requesting (1) that the United States participate with the British, French and Russian representatives in an investigation of the Armenian massacre, (2) increase American consular representation in Turkey to afford better protection for missionaries

85. Edwin M. Bliss, Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities, (Philadelphia: Hubbard Publishing Co., 1896) pp. 543-5.

86. Lloyd Griscom, American Charge in Constantinople at the turn of the century, wrote: "...even the head of our State Department used to quake when the head of a Bible Society walked in." Lloyd C. Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, (New York: The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1940), p. 134.

in the Empire, and (3) "exercise all the influence consistent with our foreign policy in behalf of religious liberty and personal rights in the Ottoman Empire," there being "no hope for reform from within." This organization claimed to be acting on behalf of 15,000,000 Americans.⁸⁷

At another time, an organization in Boston, whose membership contained many prominent members of the American Board, submitted a petition to the State Department, calling on it to protect Americans in Turkey, utter a protest against the events in the Ottoman Empire, and obtain an indemnity for past events and security for the future. This petition, the Department was informed, was being sent to every Protestant minister in the United States, with a request that it be read to his congregation on a specified Sunday. It is small wonder that the Department of State felt it impolitic to ignore such requests for action. Referring to this petition, the Turkish Minister in Washington concluded that there seemed to be a "religious uprising of the entire country against Turkey."⁸⁸

Only once in the long period between the arrival of the first missionaries and the outbreak of the World War did any European Protestant group make a serious effort to join in this missionary field. This was a generally friendly invasion of the Turkish field by German Protestant missionaries who began to arrive in Armenia after 1895. In 1910, they were reportedly co-operating with the Americans in Harput and Van, while the two groups had divided Bitlis into "spheres of influence." By 1913, the Annual Report of

87. Press clipping enclosed in note from Turkish Minister to Gresham. Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Dec. 21, 1894, N.A.

88. Notes from Turkish Legation, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Vol. 7, Mar. 11, 1895, N.A.

the American Board noted that the German missionaries seemed to be "pushing
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their work." Co-operation was reported as "fairly cordial." This general
aloofness on the part of English and German Protestants from entering the
Armenian missionary field may have resulted from an understanding between the
religious organizations in the three countries to leave the Turkish missionary
effort to Americans for it was generally conceded in Europe that America
could not possibly have any political ends to serve by sending missionaries
90
into the Ottoman Empire.

Attempts to evaluate the results of the American missionary activity in
Turkey prior to the First World War have led to varied conclusions. There
has been much praise for the missionaries who inculcated liberal ideas in
the minds of generations of Armenians, who encouraged Armenian youths to
finish their education at schools in the United States, and who pursued their
work in the Ottoman Empire with a generally favorable reaction from the
authorities and people, both of whom apparently realized that the missionaries
had no political motives to advance. Some people have tempered their praise
for the work done by the missionaries. While admitting that the American
missionaries stimulated the Armenians to better their own educational insti-
tutions and to introduce modern ideas and reforms in the Armenian Church,
these people have also pointed out that the introduction of Protestantism was
a severe blow to the unity of the Armenians because the Church of Armenia
91
had been for centuries "the fortress" of this subject people.

89. Annual Report, 1910, p. 122; Ibid., 1913, p. 69.

90. See: H. Allen Tupper, Armenia: Its Present Crisis and Past History,
(New York: John Murphy and Co., 1896), p. 97.

91. See: Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian Question, p. 84; and M. Vartan
Malcom, The Armenians in America, (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1919),
pp. 19-20. One Armenian wrote the following: "The introduction of
Protestantism among the Armenians has had more ruinous effect on the nation
than anything else ever had;" A. P. Vartoogulan, Armenian Ordeal, (New York:
1896), p. 37.

By 1894, when the reports of massacres in the Armenian vilayets of the Ottoman Empire began to filter into the United States, the traditional friendship between Turkey and America was already being subjected to severe strains. The legal dispute over the right of expatriation was complicated by the activities of Americans of Armenian descent returning to the land of their birth. The desire of all Americans, both naturalized and native-born, to exercise legitimate or supposed capitulatory rights granted by the Treaty of 1830 was being seriously challenged by the Sultan's Government. Finally, the American missionaries with their established enterprises in the Ottoman Empire, their traditional interest in the Armenian people, and their control over most of the reports emanating from Turkey had achieved a position from whence they could and did wield considerable power on American policy toward the developing crisis between Turks and Armenians.

THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES, 1894-1896

The events in Turkish Armenia during the years 1894-1896, which were to result in the loss of thousands of lives, cannot be blamed on any single¹ cause. Sir Edwin Pears, who spent many years in Constantinople, believed that the following factors were important in creating an atmosphere where massacre was possible:

The causes of the massacres in Armenia in 1894-1897 were four. All of them had been in operation for years. There was first, a traditional feeling among their Moslem neighbors that they had the right to plunder Christians; second, the superior industry and thrift of the Armenians, which had enabled them to acquire land and become generally wealthier than their neighbors, who thus coveted their possessions; third, their superiority in intelligence, due to their thirst for instruction which had induced them to be less tolerant than they had formerly been of periodical robbery and outrages upon their wives and daughters. In other words, education had fostered the desire to be free. Lastly, a series of petty persecutions by their Moslem neighbors, especially by the Kurds, and the impossibility of obtaining redress. These causes led to the emigration of many Armenians to Russia and America, and to the formation of revolutionary committees outside Turkey. In despair of obtaining redress, a few Armenians within the Empire joined these committees. These bodies gave Abdul Hamid the excuse for massacre.²

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1. The total number of fatalities, mostly Armenian, by 1897 was placed as high as 350,000 by some writers. A report compiled by the American Red Cross in the field in 1896, estimates the deaths at 120,000 from violence and about 80,000 more from starvation, disease, and exposure. Somewhat more conservative is the estimate of Sir Edward Creasy, who wrote that about 40,000 Armenians lost their lives in the years, 1894-6. This latter figure agrees with the estimate submitted by the American Minister in February, 1896, when he reported that 37,035 Armenians and 938 Moslems had lost their lives from 1894 to the date of his report. See: Sir Edwin Pears, Life of Abdul Hamid, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1917), p. 239; Sir Edward Creasy, Turkey, (New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1913), p. 500; and Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 62, Terrell to Secretary of State, Feb. 4, 1896, N.A.
2. Quoted in Eliot G. Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1924), pp. 518-9.

The actual position of the Ottoman Government toward the massacres of these years is still veiled in mystery. It is an established fact that the Sultan had recently armed his Kurdish tribesmen and formed cavalry detachments of these fierce warriors. It is also a well known fact that the Armenians, in common with other Christians, were not allowed to have arms in their possession. However, the motivating force behind the events of the mid-nineties is still in the realm of conjecture. In general, it appears that the Ottoman Government was, at best, negligent in protecting its Christian subjects from the violence directed against them by part of its Moslem population. Whether, as is claimed, the Ottoman Government planned and directed the massacres cannot be fully investigated in this study and no conclusion has been drawn.

The year 1894 saw the continuing growth of revolutionary organizations among the Armenians. The example of Bulgaria was before them, and the intervention of the European Concert to secure reforms, possibly autonomy, was anticipated if persecution by the Turkish Government continued. However, the only hope for the success of such an Armenian plan, involving outside assistance to secure reforms or autonomy, lay in the willingness of the great powers to cooperate in demanding that the Ottoman Government act. That these powers would not cooperate to the extent necessary to force the Turkish officials to stop the massacres and to institute reform was recognized by members of the Sultan's Government and was exploited by them to the fullest in the years 1894-1896.

The American upon whom fell the responsibility for securing the protection of the United States' interests in the Ottoman Empire during these

years was Judge Alexander W. Terrell of Texas, who became Minister to the Porte after Cleveland became President for the second time. Terrell was, according to friendly contemporaries, brave, warm-hearted and a person of considerable innate ability who did his best, under most trying circumstances, to defend American citizens and interests. Others, who also had contact with him, concluded that this ex-Confederate officer, who arrived at Constantinople "without diplomatic experience or inhibitions," was not an effective agent for the protection of American interests during the Armenian massacres of 1894-1896. Both friends and critics of Judge Terrell³ agreed, however, that the Texan was a highly controversial figure.

Although Armenian massacres were said to have occurred as early as 1843, the first massacre of Armenians to claim world-wide attention took place in the mountainous Sassoun district of Turkish Armenia in September, 1894. On the 28th of that month, the American Minister reported that an "entirely reliable" source stated that over sixty Armenians had been killed near the city of Moush. No further news arrived from Terrell on the subject until the 23rd of November when he wrote that estimates of the dead in the September events were now given as six to eight thousand.⁴

Meanwhile, in the United States and Europe, rumors began to spread that many Armenians had been killed in the Sassoun district. On the 25th of November,

3. See: Mary M. Patrick, Under Five Sultans, (New York: The Century Co., 1929), p. 184; Lloyd C. Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, (New York: The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1940), p. 168; Alfred L. P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1928), p. 449; and George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), p. 226.

4. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 57, Terrell to Secretary of State, Sep. 28, 1894; and Vol. 58, Terrell to Secretary of State, Nov. 23, 1894, N.A.

Secretary of State Gresham asked Terrell for more information on the September events.⁵ A reply from Constantinople was sent on the 23th by the American Minister and read as follows:

Reports in American papers of Turkish atrocities at Sassoun are sensational and exaggerated. The killing was in a conflict between armed Armenians and Turkish soldiers. The grand vizier says it was necessary to suppress insurrection and that about fifty Turks were killed. Between three and four hundred Armenian guns were picked up after the fight, and reports that about that number of Armenians were killed. I give credit to his statement.⁵ 67

On the 30th of November the Sultan asked Terrell to send a request to the President to approve the sending of an American Consul with a Turkish Commission to investigate the reported atrocities in the Sassoun district. The American Minister suggested in his despatch that the American Consul at Sivas, Milo Jewett, be chosen for the mission. Terrell stated that he believed that consent for Jewett's participation would result in great benefit to the American missionaries in Asia Minor. The Sultan, it was explained, had desired to have a representative of a "neutral power" in the investigation and consequently had requested a consular official from the United States of America.⁶

In an answering telegram of December 2nd, the Secretary of State informed the American Minister that the President had declined to allow an American to participate in the investigation.⁷ As Cleveland later pointed out in his annual message, the despatch of November 23th from Terrell "weakened any motive for an interference based on considerations of humanity, and permitted us, without embarrassment, to pursue a course plainly marked out by other

5. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Gresham to American Minister, Nov. 25, 1894; N.A.; and Foreign Relations Papers, 1894, p. 715.

6. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 58, Terrell to Secretary of State, Nov. 30, 1894, N.A.

7. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Gresham to American Minister, Dec. 2, 1894, N.A.

controlling incidents." The President stated that as Turkey was legally bound to report to the powers on steps taken for reform in Armenia and the powers were to superintend their application according to the Treaty of Berlin, American participation in the investigation would have been embarrassing "if not entirely beyond the limits of justification or propriety."⁸

On the same day that the Sultan's request for American participation was declined, Terrell sent a second telegram to the State Department regarding the September massacres: "Information from British Ambassador indicates far more loss of lives in Armenia, attended with atrocities, than stated in my telegram of 28th."⁹ According to the President, in his annual message, this report, taken in conjunction with additional requests for participation from the Sultan and the British Government, created a new situation and brought forth a new decision:

In view of changed conditions, and upon reconsideration of the subject it was determined to send Mr. Jewett, our consul at Sivas, to the scene of the alleged outrages, not for the purpose of joining with any other government in an investigation and report, but to the end that he might be able to inform this Government as to the exact truth.¹⁰

On the 5th of December, the decision to send Jewett was communicated to the American Minister for presentation to the Sultan.¹¹

There was no immediate answer from the Porte regarding the acceptance by the President of the Sultan's offer, under the special conditions outlined by Cleveland. Finally, on the 10th, Terrell cabled that the Ottoman Government

8. Foreign Relations Papers, 1894, pp. 715-6.

9. Ibid., p. 715.

10. Ibid., p. 716.

11. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Gresham to American Minister, Dec. 5, 1894. N.4.

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had refused Jewett's participation on the conditions outlined. By this time, the Sultan had invited Great Britain, France, and Russia to send representatives to join in an investigation with the Turkish Commission. Russia and France had already agreed to send their consuls to Erzerum to direct the project from that city. Within a few days, Great Britain also agreed to this procedure and the three Western consuls journeyed to Armenia to participate in the investigation.¹³

By mid-December, the American press carried many reports of atrocities in Armenia and the nation was emotionally involved in the problem; consequently, on the 15th, Secretary Gresham cabled Terrell to try to secure a reversal of the Porte's attitude toward Jewett's participation as an observer, warning that refusal by the Sultan would arouse resentment in the United States.¹⁴ On the following day, The New York Times carried an editorial which denounced the Turkish Government for refusing to accept Jewett as an observer on the investigating commission and speculated that the reason for the Sultan's action might be found in the fact that Jewett was an expert on Turkey, one who understood the language, and therefore, one who would be able to determine the truth regarding the atrocities.¹⁵

12. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 58, Terrell to Secretary of State, Dec. 10, 1894, N.A.

13. By mid-1895, the Europeans on the investigative mission found it impossible to continue working with the Turkish members of the group. Consequently, the Europeans eventually issued one report condemning the Turks for the massacres, while the Turkish members issued their report in which the Armenians received blame for causing the disturbances.

14. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Gresham to American Minister, Dec. 15, 1894, N.A.

15. The New York Times, Dec. 16, 1894.

The American Minister pleaded with the Porte to have the Sultan reverse his decision. Terrell even secured an audience with the Sultan who reminded the American of his offer to the United States prior to extending a similar offer to other states. Nothing could change the attitude of the Turkish sovereign. However, that this was necessarily the voluntary decision of the Sultan was questioned by the American Minister. The British Ambassador had informed Terrell that Russian influence was paramount at Constantinople and that neither Russia nor France would allow the Sultan to invite an American either as a participant in the commission or as an observer. When Terrell called on the Russian Ambassador, he was informed by the latter that the Czarist Government could not permit an American to join the investigation as such action would result in demands for similar treatment for consuls of all the Berlin Treaty powers. If such demands were accepted, an intolerable situation would result for such a large group of investigators would disagree¹⁶ and many conflicting reports would be submitted. As this same reason was presented to Terrell by the Porte and to the Department of State by the Turkish Minister in Washington, it would appear that Russian influence in keeping¹⁷ Jewett off the investigating commission was decisive.

Despite chagrin in the State Department and considerable irritation in Congress and the press, the United States could do no more to secure permission for the American consul to accompany the mission to Sassoun. Consequently, on the 24th of December, Gresham directed Terrell to cease his¹⁸ demarches on behalf of Jewett. The final result of this episode was

16. See: Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 58, Terrell to Secretary of State Dec. 20 and 23, 1894, N.A.

17. Ibid., Dec. 20, 1894; see also, Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Dec. 22 and 25, 1894, N.A.

18. Foreign Relations Papers, 1894, p. 723.

heightened ill will toward the Turks on the part of certain elements in America, particularly the press.

Meanwhile, Congress had become interested in the reported atrocities in the Ottoman Empire. Reference has previously been made to the Senate Resolution of December 3, 1894, which called on the President to communicate information received by him regarding alleged cruelties toward Armenians in Turkey. It was not stated earlier that a second paragraph of this resolution requested that the President also inform the Senate, as to whether "any expostulations have been addressed by this Government to the Government of Turkey in regard to such matters, or any proposals made by or to this Government to act in concert with other Christian powers regarding the same." In reply to this resolution, Cleveland transmitted Terrell's two conflicting despatches and stated that in the absence of "authentic detailed knowledge," no expostu-
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lations had been made by or to other powers.

During the following months, several members of Congress presented petitions from mass meetings held in various parts of the country protesting Turkish treatment of the Armenian minority and suggesting various means by which the United States could aid in solving the Armenian problem, usually in cooperation with European powers. It would seem logical to expect Congressmen from the States in which large Armenian colonies were established to be the most insistent in their requests for American aid for the Armenian sufferers and consistent in denunciation of the Sultan's Government. It is true that senators and representatives from these states did frequently offer resolutions regarding the situation in the Armenian provinces; but it is equally

19. Ibid., pp. 715-6.

true that some of the most startling proposals for dealing with the Turks came from members of Congress who had few, if any, Armenian constituents.²⁰ The problem appeared to be of interest to Americans from all sections of the country and of both political parties.

On the 3rd of January, 1895, a group of missionaries of the American Board submitted a request to the Secretary of State and to certain members of both Houses of Congress in which it was suggested that United States consulates should be established at the cities of Erzerum and Harput. The following day, Senator Hale of Maine introduced the petition in the Senate with a recommendation that it be accepted, explaining that the posts would be used to protect native-born American citizens residing in Eastern Turkey.

From Erzerum, Bitlis and Van can easily be cared for, while Mardin and Mosul would naturally come under Harpoot, and thus the Americans in the whole territory would be brought within two or three weeks' journey of consular protection.²¹

Admittedly, as the Turks pointed out, American commerce in the districts surrounding the two cities was insignificant, but it is also a fact that the missionaries, far removed from other Americans or even other citizens of Western Powers, depended on consular posts for protection.²² Much praise was given during the years 1894 to 1896 by the American missionaries in the interior for the invaluable aid and protection given to them by the British

20. These included Senators Hale and Frye of Maine, and Senators Call and Blanchard of Florida; also Representatives McCreary of Kentucky, Grosvenor of Ohio, and Hepburn of Iowa.

21. Congressional Record, 53rd Cong., 3rd Sess., Vol. 27, Pt. 1 (Jan 4, 1895), pp. 620-1.

22. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, p. 1262. In 1895, Great Britain, Russia, and Persia had consulates at Erzerum, while France and Italy maintained vice-consulates at that city. There were no consulates or vice-consulates at Harput. Ibid., p. 1471.

consuls and vice-consuls in localities where no American consular representation existed.²³

The request to establish consulates at these two posts seemed perfectly logical and in the Diplomatic and Consular Appropriations Act of March 2, 1895, provision was made for the establishment of the two consulates. On the 24th of June, Secretary of State Olney requested Terrell to secure the exequatur²⁴ for the new consuls - a routine request. Without waiting for the request to be acted upon, two young men were appointed to the posts and despatched to Constantinople where they remained for some time. During the following months, the American Minister attempted to secure the exequatur but without success despite repeated assurances from the Porte that they would soon be granted. In November, when disaster struck at Harput, there was still no United States Consul in that city.

Disorders continued throughout the Armenian districts of the Ottoman Empire during 1895 even while proposals for reestablishing tranquility were under study. In September, there was a violent outbreak of religious hatred in the capital itself. Great Britain, France and Russia, the three powers represented on the investigating commission, drew up recommendations for reform, and the Ottoman Government busied itself with similar plans for changes in the administration of Turkish Armenia. After the violence in the capital, continued delay was obviously impossible, and on October 18th, a weak but comprehensive plan of reform was promulgated by the Sultan. With more optimism than was warranted, the American Minister cabled: "Armenian

23. Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1896, (Boston: The American Board, 1896), p. 39.

24. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Olney to American Minister, June 24, 1895, N.A.

Question settled last night. Trade of the Sultan securing reforms satisfactory to the three powers."²⁵

Within a week, the American diplomat had reversed his opinion and pessimistically concluded that there was nothing really new in the scheme of reforms. It was the view of the Minister that permanent security and order were impossible in Turkey as long as race and religious hatred, which had remained unmitigated by the reform effort, and was being steadily fanned by the Armenian anarchists, who "will never rest while certain of the sympathy of the Christian world," remained unchanged. Gazing into the murky depths of European diplomacy at the Porte, Terrell concluded that the European Powers had accepted so little in the way of reform due to either (1) the fact that atrocity reports had not been based on factual evidence, or (2) the British had been compelled by the other powers to retreat in their demands for reform. The American Minister²⁶ tended to give credit to the second possibility.

This more pessimistic view of the future was apparently justified, for in November, 1895, the massacres of the Armenian race were renewed on an even greater scale. On the 15th of the month, the most serious incident, from an American viewpoint, in the entire period before the First World War, occurred when three school buildings belonging to the American mission in Marash were looted by Turkish mobs and one building was destroyed by fire. At the same time, in the city of Harput, both school buildings and homes belonging to the American missionaries were plundered, and eight of the buildings were destroyed by fires started by the Turks. Despite the property loss suffered by the Americans, not one of the mission personnel was killed or injured.

25. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2. p. 1325.

26. See: Ibid., pp. 1325-7.

Terrell immediately put forth a demand for indemnity for the destruction of American property, the sum to be determined later. The American Minister had reliable proof that Turkish troops had participated in the plundering and arson, and consequently felt that the demand for compensation should be backed by force. As the American fleet on Mediterranean station had been in or near Turkish waters since early in the year, and had been strengthened by large warships from the Atlantic squadron, Terrell felt that he had the necessary weapons at hand to secure satisfaction of his demands. On the 27th of November, he cabled:

It is probable that my demand for payment will be met with evasion and delay; the presence of a fleet at Beirut, Smyrna, or Salonika to compel payment under the muzzle of its guns, if necessary, is needed, if you [Olney] shall authorize an ultimatum.²⁷

In support of this telegram, Terrell wrote to Secretary of State Olney on the 30th, that the Turks had little cause to fear the United States due to American reaction to previous "repeated wanton and unexplained outrages." This time according to the Minister, payment for the destruction of mission property should be secured to reestablish American prestige in Turkey. Going even beyond his previous suggestion of putting one of the Turkish ports under the muzzle of American guns, the American diplomat proposed that a Naval squadron, with British blessing, unexpectedly rush the Dardanelles and place the Porte itself under the guns of the warships. Only thus, reasoned Terrell, would the United States be able to obtain the indemnity and ensure security for the future. ²⁸ This suggestion for employing the most forceful

27. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 60, Terrell to Secretary of State, Nov. 27, 1895, N.A.

28. Ibid., Nov. 30, 1895.

type of diplomacy on the Turks, reluctant to agree to payment of the indemnity, was not accepted, or, as far as can be determined, even seriously considered. Although the British Ambassador was an ardent partisan of the Armenian cause, it is open to question that he would have approved of the American proposal - to say nothing of the Foreign Office in London. The attitude of the other powers to such an unusual scheme would hardly have been favorable and their attitude could not have been ignored.

In the year that followed, Terrell did his best to secure payment of the indemnity but without success, for the Turks would not accept responsibility as such acceptance would also make the Ottoman Government liable for damage done to the property of French, British, German and Russian nationals in the Empire. The American demand for an indemnity was complicated by the fact that American missionaries were in an exposed position in Turkey, subject to violent acts by Turkish mobs, acting with or without authorization from the Government in Constantinople. For this reason, the American Minister hesitated to press the claims with undue force, although he did persistently bring the matter to
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the Porte's attention.

Meanwhile, on December 2, 1895, Cleveland presented his annual message to a joint session of Congress in an atmosphere still charged with the excitement aroused by the recent destruction of American property at Harput and Marash. In late November, Cleveland had been assured by the prominent Republican Senator Hoar from Massachusetts of the latter's support for the "most vigorous action" the President might deem necessary to prevent more cruelties

29. See: Foreign Relations Papers, 1896, p. 880.

to the Armenian race in Turkey. The President did not decide to take vigorous action at that time, however, and so stated in his message. He reminded Congress that the European Powers alone had the right and duty to intervene on behalf of the Christian World and he expressed the hope that prompt and effective action on their part would not be delayed. The remainder of his words on the Armenian situation dealt with a review of American action taken to protect American nationals in the Ottoman Empire from death or injury during the disorders, reassuring the legislators that "no efforts have been spared in their behalf, and their protection in person and property has been earnestly and vigorously enforced by every means within our power."³¹

In the following six weeks, the members of Congress introduced a multitude of resolutions on the Armenian Question. On December 4th, Senator Hoar introduced three resolutions, the first two going to the Committee on Foreign Relations while the third was immediately adopted by unanimous vote. The first resolution pledged the support of the Senate to the President in whatever vigorous action he might take for the protection and security of American citizens in Turkey and to obtain redress for injuries committed upon such citizens. The second resolution requested the Chief Executive to make known to the Turkish Government the "strong feeling of regret and indignation" with which the American people view the injuries inflicted on Christians in the Ottoman Empire and warned that the people of the United States "can not be expected to view with indifference" repetition or continuance of these atrocities. The final resolution, which was accepted, requested the President to communicate to the Senate all information received relative to injuries

30. See: Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 8, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Nov. 25, 1895, which incloses a news clipping giving text of Hoar's telegram.

31. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 1, pp. xxiv-xxvi.

to persons or property of American citizens in Turkey; information as to whether all American consuls were at their posts, and, if not, what circumstances prevented their performing their duties; and, finally, information on the oppression practiced upon the Armenian subjects of Turkey.

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The President's reply to the above request for information was delivered to the Senate on the 19th of December. The report was a fairly long one, which gave, in detail, a history of the American attempts to secure protection for United States nationals, the attempted investigation by Jewett, the sending of a fleet to the Levant, the events in Harput and Karash, and it stated that the Consuls appointed to Erzerum and Harput had not been allowed to go to their posts because of the refusal of the Turkish Government to grant exequaturs to the two men due to the small commercial interest of this country in Turkey. The section of the report on the oppression of the Armenians blamed the massacres on (1) the savageness of the Kurds, (2) the acts of Armenian revolutionists, and (3) the fact that the Turkish Government put forth no serious effort to stop the violence.

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The most dramatic and sweeping Congressional resolution regarding the Armenian Question discussed during this period was introduced by the ardent champion of Cuban independence, Senator Call of Florida, on December 10th. This resolution, which was passed to the Foreign Relations Committee, read as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That humanity and religion and the principle upon which all civilization rests demand that the civilized Governments shall, by peaceful

32. Congressional Record, 54th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 28, pt. 1 (Dec. 4, 1895), p. 36.

33. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, pp. 1255-65.

negotiation, or, if necessary, by force of arms, prevent and suppress the cruelties and massacres inflicted on the Armenian subjects of Turkey, by the establishment of a government of their own people, with such guarantees by the civilized powers of its authority and permanence as shall be adequate to that end.³⁴

This resolution not only advocated the establishment of an independent Armenian Government in an area of the Ottoman Empire, but implied that the United States would aid in the creation of such a state by force of arms if necessary. Although this resolution of Senator Call's was never adopted, it was one of many indications of the adoption of a new outlook toward Turkish internal affairs by some American law makers.

On the 24th of January, 1895, Senator Cullom of Illinois reported out a concurrent resolution from the Committee on Foreign Relations. The resolution began by quoting Articles 61 and 62 of the Treaty of Berlin. It continued by expressing the earnest hopes of the American Congress that the European Concert, which had established its right to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, would take requisite action to "stay the hand of fanaticism and lawless violence, and as shall secure to the unoffending Christians of the Turkish Empire all the rights belonging to them both as men and Christians...." The resolution also called on President Cleveland to communicate its provisions to the Governments of Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Russia. In conclusion, the bill pledged the Congress to support the President "in the most vigorous action he may take for the protection and security of American citizens in Turkey, and to obtain redress³⁵ for injuries committed upon the persons or property of such citizens."

34. Congressional Record, 54th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 28, pt. 1 (Dec. 10, 1895), p. 108)

35. Ibid., (Jan 22, 1896), p. 854)

The debate which followed the reporting out of the above resolutions is interesting primarily for the violence of the oratory and the fact that few legislators questioned the right of the United States to inform the states of Europe that they were not living up to their obligations and to explain to those nations what these obligations were. In addition, no senator arose to protest that this resolution was basically opposed to the traditional American foreign policy of non-intervention in the affairs of Europe. The only debate³⁶ in the Senate was over whether or not the resolutions were strong enough.

There were those in the Senate who utilized this debate for a bit of demagogic speech-making. Senator Cullom, referring to the "merciless, pitiless tornado of bloody ruin," that had occurred in the Armenian provinces, blamed all of the European states, but particularly Great Britain, for not stopping the massacres. This inaction, according to the Senator from Illinois, was due to a desire on the part of all European states to be ready to gather³⁷ in portions of the Ottoman Empire as it fell apart. Senator Frye from Maine denied the right of any foreign agreement to keep American ships from sailing through the Dardanelles and anchoring before Constantinople to ensure protection for American citizens. Frye proposed a unique solution for the Armenian problem: "I would have Congress memorialize Russia and say to her: 'Take Armenia into your possession. Protect the lives of these Christians there. And the United States of America will stand behind you with all of its power.'³⁸" Senator Call demanded that his strongly-worded resolution of December 10th be substituted for the Committee resolutions under debate, and referred to the latter as an "empty and meaningless declaration of sympathy." The Senator from Florida explained that the situation in Armenia

36. Ibid., (Jan. 24, 1896), p. 964.

37. Ibid., (pp. 959-61).

38. Ibid., p. 962.

was remarkably like the one that existed in Cuba. Finally, after describing the power that could be wielded by the United States, he informed his colleagues that, "We owe it to civilization and humanity that the power which has been given to us shall be exercised."³⁹

On January 27, 1895, debate on the Senate-approved resolutions began in the House of Representatives. The debate in the House was longer and the speakers discussed international affairs with even less restraint than had the legislators in the upper house. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in presenting the resolutions to the House, informed the members that the United States had the right to summon the signatories of the Berlin Treaty before "the high court of national honor and good faith and ask why these pledges [to the Armenians] have not been performed." Once again the changing attitude of America's lawmakers toward the world about them was emphasized when the Chairman stated that "the time has gone by in the development of the human race when one nation can shut its eyes to the mighty transgression of another...."⁴⁰

The debate on the Armenian resolutions presented some of the Representatives with a chance to play to the galleries which were filled with Armenian sympathizers who furnished these speakers with heady applause. One of the Congressmen, calling the events in Armenia "a crime against God and man," said that the then current Venezuelan boundary dispute with Great Britain was a "trivial" matter in comparison to America's interest in the welfare of a Christian race in Asia Minor. Another felt that the proposed resolutions were far too mild and, if passed, would make the House of Representatives "contemptible" in the eyes of the world for not demanding more drastic action. Repre-

39. Ibid., p. 964.

40. Ibid., (Jan. 27, 1896), p. 1001.

sentative Brumm of Pennsylvania injected politics into the discussion by claiming that no resolution would have been necessary if Republican James G. Blaine were Secretary of State. The loudest applause was reserved for Representative Hepburn of Iowa who blamed Great Britain for keeping "this foul blot of a Government [the Ottoman] upon the map for the last twenty years." Hepburn concluded by offering an amendment to the resolutions under discussion which would have severed diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey.⁴¹

During the debate, voices of caution were not completely silent in the House of Representatives. Representative Bailey of Texas questioned the propriety of the United States demanding the enforcement of the provisions of a treaty to which it was not a party, particularly in light of America's well known position in denying the right of European states to intervene in the Western Hemisphere. On this basis, the speaker termed the resolutions a "downright insult" and "an impertinence" to the European powers. Finally, Representative Bailey reminded his listeners that the Armenian Question was solely an internal issue in the Ottoman Empire and consequently beyond the range of interests traditionally held by the American Congress.⁴²

Other voices raised in opposition to the jingoistic statements of Hepburn and those of similar view pointed out that severance of diplomatic relations would eliminate the one means the United States could utilize for giving aid and protection to Americans in the Ottoman Empire. One member of the House rose to protest that the resolutions under discussion, if passed, would actually be an infringement of the power of the Executive Branch of the government in

41. Ibid., pp. 1004-5; also Ibid., pt. 2 (Jan. 27, 1896), pp. 1010, 1013, and 1015. The Hepburn Amendment was rejected by a vote of 121 to 19.

42. Ibid., pt. 1 (Jan 27, 1896), p. 1003.

its handling of the foreign relations of the United States. Representative Turner of Georgia noted that the Congress was proposing to intervene in this situation in violation "of our public policy thus established and ordained from our most ancient times and undertake to declare to the signatories... not only what is the proper construction [of the Treaty of Berlin], but the duty of those who entered into it." Another Congressman put the entire matter most succinctly when he advised his colleagues that "the days of the Crusades have passed."⁴³

The result of the oratory in the House was passage of the Senate resolutions by the overwhelming vote of 143 to 26. The concurrent resolutions, theoretically expressing the will of the majority of the American people, were then passed to the President to be transmitted at his discretion to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia. Cleveland, for unknown reasons, declined to transmit the Congressional Resolution to the Governments of the Great Powers.

The reaction of the press in America to the passage of the resolutions by the Congress was mixed. The New York Daily Tribune described them as "well framed, temperate, but forcible in tone," which would go on record "to convict the Powers - if the latter still remain inactive...."⁴⁴ On the other hand, The New York Times commented editorially that the resolutions were "quite unobjectionable" and "quite ineffectual."⁴⁵ The Boston Advertiser believed that they would "exert a considerable degree of moral pressure;" but the Philadelphia Record stated that the United States Government had "neither the right to interfere nor the power to obtain satisfaction of the Governments of Europe." The Pittsburg Commercial Gazette concluded that the Congress acted

43. Ibid., pp. 1004, 1007.

44. New York Daily Tribune, Jan. 24, 1896.

45. The New York Times, Jan. 25, 1896.

"wisely;" The Washington Post, on the other hand, called the action "ill advised."⁴⁶

From the other side of the Atlantic, the reaction was more uniform. The Times of London commented, "As a sentiment this cannot, of course, be condemned. But as a proposition of foreign policy it will not bear examination."⁴⁷ A Viennese correspondent for The Times cabled London that the American resolution was "not altogether to the taste of some Continental Powers....." The correspondent continued by stating that the governments of these powers regarded the resolutions as indicative of a turning point in the United States' foreign policy and "as proving a desire on the part of the United States to influence European affairs." To prove his contention with regard to the view of the Austrian Government, the correspondent included a statement from the Pester Lloyd of Vienna, which included the words: "...America is meddling with what does not concern her."⁴⁸

To American diplomats abroad, the resolutions were of considerable interest. Ex-Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard, then Ambassador to the Court of St. James, wrote to Cleveland: "On the Armenian question there seems to be an insanity on both sides of the Atlantic and some of the propositions reported from the United States would wrap the world in flames if carried out."⁴⁹ From Constantinople, Terrell commented in a despatch to Olney that the action of Congress would cripple and destroy "all the influence

46. These press comments appeared in the New York Daily Tribune, Jan. 30, 1896.

47. The Times (London), Jan. 28, 1896. The reporter for The Times referred to the senators who sponsored the resolutions as the "same impenitent jingoes" who had acted with least restraint in the Venezuelan boundary dispute.

48. Ibid., Feb. 4, 1896.

49. Allan Nevins, ed., Letters of Grover Cleveland, 1850-1908, (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933), p. 426.

I could otherwise have exercised in matters which rested in Turkish discretion."

By the beginning of 1896, Judge Terrell's diplomacy was subjected to increasingly frequent criticism by officials of the Department of State. During the months immediately following the massacres in Sassoun, Terrell received several admonitions from his superiors in Washington regarding his diplomacy with the representatives of foreign powers in Turkey and regarding his attitude toward the Armenian situation. He was criticized rather vigorously for telling the British Ambassador, at the time of the refusal of the Porte to allow Jewett to join the investigation, that the United States "sought to exert, in combination with Great Britain a 'potential' influence upon the Porte to overcome the apparently adverse influences of France and Russia in this matter" of Armenia. Secretary Gresham felt that it was necessary to enjoin upon Terrell "increased prudence and reserve" in discussing continental politics at Constantinople in order to avoid "possible embarrassment and misconstruction of the policy and motives" of the Government of the United States.

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In December, 1894, the American diplomat had written to Gresham concerning his impression of the Sultan, who, Terrell was convinced, "sees nothing but cringing sycophants, and is approached only by scheming diplomats" and is kept ignorant of the "enormity of alleged cruelties." In his contacts with the

50. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 62, Terrell to Secretary of State, Feb. 10, 1896, N.A.

51. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Gresham to American Minister, Jan. 30, 1895. Terrell had displayed more caution in August, 1894, when Sir Philip Currie suggested that the two representatives of the Anglo-Saxon nations cooperate to secure greater religious freedom for Protestants in Turkey. Terrell referred the suggestion to Washington with a comment on the seditious activity known to occur occasionally within Protestant groups in the Empire. Gresham agreed with the American Minister regarding the need for caution and pointed out that, while the United States had a "sympathetic interest" in the project, the United States, unlike the United Kingdom, had no treaty right in this matter: See: Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 57, Terrell to Secretary of State, Aug. 2, 1894; and Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 5, Gresham to American Minister, Oct. 26, 1894, N.A.

missionaries in Turkey, Terrell allowed his impression that the Sultan was not responsible for the atrocities in Armenia to become known. Consequently, in March, Gresham felt compelled to warn him of the impropriety of acts which might strengthen "the impression, unfortunately already existing in some quarters, that you are disposed to appear as the Sultan's apologist or advocate." Gresham further cautioned Terrell to wait until all the facts regarding the Armenian case were collected and known before making further controversial statements.

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Despite the warnings from Washington, the American Minister continued to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. In 1895, while on a tour of Alexandretta, Terrell was informed by a missionary of an imminent revolt in that area with the probable loss of both Christian and Moslem lives. The American Minister immediately wired the Secretary of Legation in Constantinople to tell the Grand Vizier that a thousand troops sent to the area at once would be sufficient to preserve order. The order was carried out, the troops were sent and no incident took place.

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Terrell was never hesitant to supply the Department with his analysis of the situation and his views as to where the blame should be affixed for the violence that was taking place in Armenia. Reviewing his despatches for the period from December, 1894 to the end of 1896, it is clear that Russia was the

52. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 58, Terrell to Secretary of State, Dec. 23, 1894; and Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Gresham to American Minister, Mar. 6, 1895, N.A. Terrell once proposed a solution to the Armenian Question, which, if made public, would probably have created a violent reaction against the Minister. In Dec., 1895, he wrote to his friend, Alvey Adee, in the Department of State: "I am more and more convinced that this Armenian Question will find an early solution if the Turks are let alone in the destruction of Armenian men, and the forced conversion to Islam of the women and children." Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 60, Terrell to Adee, Dec. 1, 1895, N.A.

53. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 60, Terrell to Secretary of State, Sep. 18, 1895, N.A.

major international villain in his eyes. In a despatch dated January 7, 1896, Terrell denounced Russia for the failure of the powers in stopping the disorders. He had recently learned from a trustworthy source that the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople had been blaming all the troubles in the Armenian provinces on American missionaries. The American Minister felt that Russia intended to take the area in due course, but would prefer the vilayets after the Protestants had been removed, citing the attitude of the Czar's government toward American missionaries in Russia as indicative of this fact. Later in the year 1896, Terrell decried the protection and encouragement granted to Armenian revolutionists on Russian territory.⁵⁴

The Russians, however, were not alone in causing the disorders and massacres, according to the American Minister. The Armenian rebels, themselves, bore a major responsibility for the disaster to their race. Their "seditious schemes," according to Terrell, were rapidly leading to the extermination of their people. After accepting these rebellious plots as a major cause of the trouble, the Minister still averred that these acts "neither excuse or palliate the crime of Turkey in butchering the innocent."⁵⁵

During much of his residence in Turkey the American Minister was at odds with the American missionaries, both those within the Ottoman Empire and their friends and co-workers in the United States. Mr. Terrell was particularly irked at what he termed "indiscretions" on the part of the missionaries and feared that the missionary organization in the United States was deliberately

54. Ibid., Vol. 61, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jan. 7, 1896; and Vol. 62, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jul. 16, 1896, N.A.

55. Ibid., Vol. 62, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jul. 16, 1896; and Vol. 63, Terrell to Secretary of State, Sep. 1, 1896, N.A.

trying to force the United States into the Eastern question at a time when it "could hope for no aid or sympathy except from England, against whom would be arrayed, as a disturber of the public peace, all Roman and Greek church

⁵⁶ powers." The constant stream of atrocity stories regarding events in Turkey, appearing in the American and English newspapers and periodicals, were a cause of embarrassment for the American Minister as it was generally known, and often credited in print, that the reports came from American missionaries in, or recently returned, from, Turkey. The source of many of these reports, according to the Minister, was the Evangelical Alliance with headquarters in Boston, London, and Constantinople. Commenting on the flood of reports emanating from the Turkish unit to the other branches in the Anglo-Saxon countries, Terrell noted that all professors and missionaries working for the American Board in Turkey were members of the Alliance, and concluded: "No Government is so well served by correspondents in Asia Minor,
⁵⁷ as is the Evangelical Alliance in this city."

In January, 1895, Terrell wrote to Secretary Gresham that the treasurer of the Bible House in Constantinople had informed him that he was the author of a letter, published in the British press and credited to an American missionary, which was receiving considerable publicity in England as it heartily condemned the Sultan for allegedly ordering the massacres of Armenians. In reply to a question from the Porte, the American Minister officially denied

56. Ibid., Vol. 62, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jul. 30, 1896. The previous October, Terrell had reported that, in his opinion, if the tension in Armenia led to the massacre of missionaries, only Great Britain could be expected to give aid at Constantinople as the other European Powers preferred the Moslem Turks to the Protestants. Ibid., Vol. 60, Terrell to Secretary of State, Oct. 15, 1895, N.A.

57. Ibid., Vol. 59, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jun. 15, 1895, N.A.

that any American missionary official was responsible for the letter, but he also informed Gresham that the Turks would probably soon be able to trace the authorship of the document. He suggested that the time had come when the "self-sacrificing spirit" that had brought the treasurer to Turkey required
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that that individual return to the United States.

Another cause of embarrassment for the American representative was the publication of such works as Reverend Frederick Greene's The Armenian Crisis in Turkey, and Reverend Edwin Bliss' Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities. Both books, extremely hostile to Turkey, were quite popular in America. Terrell reported that Greene's book had made a "profound sensation" at the Porte and he believed it "safe to assume that hereafter no rights will be accorded the missionaries except those plainly secured by treaty, and
59
certainly no favors will be bestowed on them."

Undersecretary of State, Uhl, in replying to the American Minister's criticism of Greene's book, did not agree with the pessimistic picture of the future painted by the American representative. After urging Terrell to continue striving for the missionaries, Uhl did concede that it was unfortunate that Mr. Greene's "indiscretion" should have led him to collate, apparently under cover and sanction of the American promoters of missionary work in Turkey, "utterances and reports theretofore floating through the press as mere
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rumors without localization or paternity."

The missionaries were not the only Americans to publish their views on the Armenian Question during these years. William H. Howard, a newspaper

58. Ibid., Vol. 58, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jan 26, 1895, N.A.

59. Ibid., Vol. 59, Terrell to Secretary of State, Apr. 25, 1895, N.A.

60. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 6, Uhl to American Minister, Apr. 8, 1895, N.A.

correspondent for the New York World, left London for Armenia in December, 1894, and later wrote a widely circulated pamphlet on his trip through the area, entitled Horrors of Armenia. Howard did not receive Turkish permission to visit the scenes of reported massacres and there is some question as to whether or not he did succeed, as he claimed, in penetrating into the Armenian provinces for a personal view of the situation or whether he wrote his pamphlet on the basis of reports furnished him by others. Regardless of his source, Howard compiled a report which condemned the Turks, the governments of Europe, and the United States for their actions, or inaction, relative to the Armenians:

The Armenian has been abandoned to his fate. England has withdrawn her protests and her threats of war; Russia has turned her eyes to the farther East, and the other Powers of Europe remain silent and indifferent, leaving the oldest Christian nation on earth in the hands of the most inhuman monster in the history of all time.

Having insulted the American government without causing even a remonstrance, the Sultan has dismissed America from his mind.⁶¹

The above lines are quoted primarily to demonstrate a type of literature which was entering the American homes in the middle of the last decade of

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the nineteenth century. Howard's publication differs from many others only

61. William W. Howard, Horrors of Armenia, (New York: Armenian Relief Association, 1896), pp. 3-4. An adverse comment on Howard's methods of obtaining information is given in Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 60, Terrill to Secretary of State, Oct. 24, 1895.

62. Two other examples are given below to indicate the intense emotional appeal that the Armenian Question had for some citizens of the United States; "...to noble, free and Christian America might go the honor of leading in a glorious crusade for the deliverance of crushed, desolated and bleeding Armenia from the accursed rule of Islam." A. W. Williams and M. S. Gabriel, Bleeding Armenia, (Chicago: Publishers Union, 1896), p. 494.

"The American government should send a powerful fleet to the Mediterranean, accompanied by a sufficient number of regular troops, and should demand at the cannon's mouth what has been refused to milder requests." Everett P. Wheeler, The Duty of the United States of America to American Citizens in Turkey, an address, (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1896), p. 20.

in his suggestion that a practical solution of the Armenian Question could be found in the re-settling of all Armenians outside the Ottoman Empire, a solution which was heard once again a generation later when, after the massacres of 1915-6, Ambassador Morgenthau suggested that the Armenian race be transported to the United States.

In an attempt to counter some of the anti-Turkish reports which were being published in the United States even prior to the massacres, Abdul Hamid asked Terrell to have two honest men, designated by the American President, come to Turkey and visit any place in Asia Minor and then return to the United States and publish the truth. The Sultan informed the American Minister that he was choosing Americans for this task as the United States had no designs on Turkey.

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It was not until the following year that an American newspaper man, who could be sent on this type of expedition, arrived in Turkey. The individual in question was Gordon Bennett of the New York Herald and he was joined in his tour of Asia Minor by a Presbyterian clergyman, the Reverend George Hepworth. The two men were allowed to draw up their own route of travel, which included the sites of recent massacres. They were given a guard to protect them and apparently had complete freedom of movement in their tour. One of the results of this trip was the publication in 1893 of a book by Hepworth, entitled Through Armenia on Horseback. In this book, the Reverend Hepworth admitted that he arrived at Constantinople at the start of the tour with a distinct bias for the Armenian point of view. Nevertheless, he stated that his observations were set down in as impartial a manner as possible. Hepworth gave much credit to the Sultan for allowing the two men

63. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 57, Terrell to Secretary of State, Mar. 17, 1894, N.A.

to choose their own itinerary and believed that Abdul Hamid was "entirely honest" in his desire to give the two men free scope for the inspection. The Turkish ruler was, according to the author, an honest man but poorly informed by his advisers. In this belief, Hepworth was lending support to the statement from Terrell that the Sultan was badly misinformed as to the massacres by the "cringing sychophants" around him. In concluding his work, Hepworth blamed both Armenians and Turks for the horrors of 1894-1896. ⁶⁴

Despite his frequent irritation at the missionaries, Mr. Terrell apparently did very well in protecting the five or six hundred Americans in the Ottoman Empire, mostly missionaries, from danger during the months of the massacres. Not one American was injured and less than \$100,000 worth of mission property was destroyed. The task of protecting the missionaries was particularly difficult for most of them were stationed far from the coast in the interior of Anatolia, and could be reached by other Americans only over virtually impassable roads. Fortunately, the telegraph was able to keep almost all posts of the American Board in touch with the American Legation in the capital. When the serious disorders started, Terrell adopted an attitude of watchful waiting relative to his task of ensuring the safety of the missionaries. On January 4, 1895, he wrote to the Secretary of State that as long as treaty rights for protection of American citizens were respected, and while Turkey was under the guardianship of the signatory powers to the Berlin Treaty in the treatment of the Armenians, he did not feel that American interests required him "to fan the flame of religious prejudice, by reporting every

64. George H. Hepworth, Through Armenia on Horseback, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1893), pp. 11-2, 339.

rumor circulated against the Turks."

In March, 1895, the American Minister was still dubious as to whether the Americans were in danger or were "dupes of revolutionists." To be adequately protected, however, Terrell requested the Turkish Government to secure protection for all Americans in the Empire. This request was renewed often during the year, particularly strongly after the events in November, when, with Secretary Olney's consent, he coupled the request with a warning that the Turkish Government would be held responsible by the United States for injury to any Americans in Turkey.

In early 1895, Terrell also suggested that to ensure safety for Americans in the Empire a United States warship should be despatched to Turkish waters. His suggestion was received favorably in Washington, and in April, the cruisers Marblehead and San Francisco were detailed to visit Turkish ports. According to the instructions sent to the commanding officer of the two ships, the naval officers were to ascertain the facts regarding possible massacres by conference with American Consuls and other American citizens in the ports visited. If they found sufficient grounds for anxiety, they were "to intimate to the responsible authorities of the Government of Turkey that it is the intention of this Government to afford full protection to its citizens who are peaceably residing in that part of the world under the guarantees of treaties."

The two American warships visited the Turkish ports, and the commanders, after conferring with Americans in the Ottoman Empire, concluded that no danger to citizens of the United States existed. The senior officer in the two ship squadron, Admiral W. A. Kirkland, reported that a visit of

65. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 58, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jan. 4, 1895, N.A.

66. See: Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, pp. 1240, 1351.

67. Ibid., p. 1238.

68. Ibid., p. 1243.

of one warship every six months or so would be all that the situation required
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for the protection of American interests. Shortly after coming to that
conclusion, the Admiral and his ships left Turkey, their mission apparently
completed.

Naturally, the Ottoman Government looked with ill favor on the announced
visit by the American ships despite the assurances of the State Department
that the visit was a friendly one designed for the protection of American
citizens.
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The Turks accepted the American assurances but were hardly con-
vinced of the purely friendly nature of this or subsequent visits when much
of the press of the United States assured the American public that the ships
had been sent to Turkish waters to force the Turks to cease their "atrocious"
71
conduct toward the Armenians.

In October, 1895, shortly after the massacre of September 30th in Constantin-
ople again stirred fears for the safety of Americans, warships from the
Mediterranean station returned to Turkish ports for another visit. As stated
previously, these ships were still in Turkish waters when the American property
was destroyed at Marash and Harput on the 15th of November and were shortly
joined by the Minneapolis, a cruiser which had been despatched from the
United States after the first reports of the American losses. The commanders
of the American warships were instructed to take missionaries or other
Americans on board, if necessary, for their protection. The individual ship

69. Ibid., pp. 1245-7.

70. Ibid., pp. 1248-51.

71. See: Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of
State, Jun. 8, 1895; and Vol. 8, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Aug. 15,
1895, N.A.

captains were also given permission to land forces on Turkish soil if necessary
72
to protect Americans. Fortunately, no occasion arose which necessitated
the landing of American forces in Turkey although The New York Times editorialized in December that it might be desirable to land marines to guard
American property. The Times also suggested a naval demonstration at one of
the ports of Turkey to "bring the Sultan to his senses at once."
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On November 30th, Terrell wrote that American missionaries could be made
safe in Turkey only by "enforcing immediate payment" for the destruction of
mission property at Harput and Marash. The next day, in an informal note to
Alvey Adee in the State Department, he stated his firm conviction that the
Ottoman Government must be compelled to protect American missionaries through
fear, or in the near future, the Americans would be killed or driven out of
Turkey. Terrell repeated his views in a despatch of December 16th, in which
he foresaw a systematic movement on foot by the Ottoman Government to eliminate
Christianity in Asia Minor.
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These despatches from Constantinople indicate the intense apprehension
for the safety of the missionaries and their families which dominated the
thoughts of Minister Terrell in the latter part of 1895. It was this fear
for the safety of American lives that led to an open break between the American
Minister and the leaders of the missionary effort. The issue that precipitated

72. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, p. 1422. when Admiral Selfridge, on board the San Francisco, sent a note to the Vali of Aleppo warning him that the United States would hold the Turkish Government strictly responsible for any infraction of treaty rights guaranteed to Americans in Turkey, Terrell was furious. Eventually, Olney informed Terrell that the Navy had been notified that exchanges between naval officers and provincial officials were unnecessary. See: Ibid., pp. 1385, 1439.

73. The New York Times, Dec. 17, 1895.

74. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 60, Terrell to Secretary of State, Nov. 30, 1895; Terrell to Adee, Dec. 1, 1895; and Vol. 61, Terrell to Secretary of State, Dec. 16, 1895, N.A.

the dispute was a letter written by Terrell in December, 1895, in which he stated that American missionaries would be provided with transportation if they desired to withdraw from Turkey temporarily. He emphasized that, in his opinion, women and children should leave the country and if the men desired to depart also, the mission property would be placed under the protection of the governor of the province, the keys to the buildings being turned over to that functionary. As Terrell pointed out in a subsequent letter to the intermediary between the missionaries and the Legation, it was easier to protect the buildings than the missionaries, and he could no longer guarantee the safety of the latter.⁷⁵

After Terrell's letter to the missionary intermediary, H. O. Dwight, became known to the world, there was an immediate clamor from the missionaries and their friends and associates in the United States. To a limited degree, his critics appeared justified by logic. It might be said that Terrell had counseled the American missionaries to leave Turkey. However his critics claimed he had committed a serious diplomatic blunder in this action for he had stated that he could no longer guarantee the safety of the American missionary personnel. This admission, it was stated, not only reduced the effectiveness of any future demarche for protection of the missionaries, which the American Minister might initiate at the Porte, but substantially confirmed the Ottoman's Government's contention that it was powerless to stop the events in Armenia and thus could not be held responsible for the previous destruction of American property. Although it is questionable that

75. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, pp. 1467-8.

such an Ottoman strategem would have succeeded if it had been tried - and it was not - still, Terrell had run the risk of weakening his future negotiating position on the demanded indemnity.

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In a despatch to the Secretary of State in January, 1896, Judge Terrell commented on the violent reaction to his letter in which most of the missionaries and their friends emphasized the economic and psychological as well as religious benefit of their remaining at the posts. He wrote:

If our missionaries covet the crown of martyrdom, they are no doubt well situated; but their little children are not missionaries, and I do not intend to share with their parents the responsibility for their sacrifice by withholding either my advice or assistance to remove them from danger.

These American missionaries, while acting in the midst of carnage as picket guards of education, are 'permitted' by their American boards 'to leave in their own discretion'. Of course, under such circumstances, they will die, if need be, at their posts. And then, if the worst shall come, not a bayonet would be lifted by Christian Europe to avenge.

Whether, even for the crown of martyrdom, it is right to incur the risk of plunging their country in war, by remaining at their posts to be slain, is a question for them to determine.⁷⁷

By this time, the American diplomat was sincerely worried about the repercussions of an attack on the American missionary personnel in the Ottoman Empire. Some Americans were in a particularly bellicose mood after the destruction of mission property at Marash and Harput and after having been subjected to a flood of pro-Armenian information since before the beginning

76. In a despatch of Jan. 2, 1895, Terrell informed Olney that he had never made the suggestion publicly that missionaries should leave, as this would weaken his power in dealing with the Turks. Unfortunately, the letter was made public almost immediately after being received by Dwight. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, p. 1441.

77. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 61, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jan. 25, 1896. Dwight gave the best defense of the decision of the missionaries to stay at their posts in his answering letter to Terrell; Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, pp. 1427-30.

of the massacres. Terrell, unlike some of his fellow Americans, was in an excellent position to see the danger that an open break between the United States and Turkey would have created. The Concert of Europe was virtually non-operative in regard to the Armenian Question in these years and, consequently, the United States could have expected little help from the European Powers in case of serious trouble with Turkey.

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For the rest of the period of crisis, Terrell kept his own counsel about the desirability for the missionaries and their families to leave the Ottoman Empire. His original advice of December, 1895, was not accepted and fortunately no disastrous consequences ensued. In an open letter to missionary personnel in August, 1896, the American Minister did comment that his previous advice had been misrepresented and consequently, he would not offer it again; however, he did feel compelled to remind the missionaries, who were then demanding the despatch of a sizeable fleet of American warships to the Levant, that the traditional policy of the United States in Turkey had been non-interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

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The demand by the missionaries for increased naval protection was not new. It had occurred several times in 1895 and had been outlined in the reply of Reverend H. O. Dwight to Terrell regarding his evacuation suggestion of December, 1895. At the annual meeting of the American Board in 1896, special mention was made of the salutary effect the arrival of the warships had had during the preceding year for the protection of American mission personnel

78. See: Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 61, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1896, and Jan. 7, 1896, M.A.

79. Foreign Relations Papers, 1896, pp. 850-60.

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in Turkey. Terrell commented, rather sarcastically, that the missionary cry in 1896 was "for gun boats along the coast - to aid in propagating the religion of love."⁸¹

During this period, when relations with the missionaries were not pleasant, Terrell was the recipient of several accolades from some of these very missionaries whose co-workers were denouncing him. Reverend C. C. Tracy of Marsovan thanked the American Minister for his efforts in a letter to the latter in December, 1895. A few weeks later the Reverend P. McNaughton of Marrisawrote to Terrell praising him for his success in securing protection for the missionaries and, as if to apologize for the actions and statements of some of the other missionaries, declared that in the end all would appreciate the work done by the Texan. At the annual meeting of the American Board, referred to above, the following statement was accepted: "We record with hearty thanks the constant, energetic, and effective efforts of the United States Minister in preserving the lives of the missionaries, often seriously imperiled."⁸² One of those who praised Terrell's actions in 1895 was the Reverend H. O. Dwight, intermediary for the missionaries at the American Legation. He wrote in November of that year: "Judge Terrell has labored to his utmost through all of these trying times to do anything and everything possible to keep the Turks up to defending the missions. The United States Minister to Turkey deserves large credit for the safety of all."⁸³

80. Annual Report of the American Board 1896, p. 39.

81. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 63, Terrell to Secretary of State, Sep. 15, 1896, N.A.

82. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, pp. 1408, 1469-70; and Annual Report of the American Board, 1896, p. 39.

83. Foreign Relations Papers, 1895, Vol. 2, p. 1364.

Slightly over one year later, Dwight was the recipient of one of the most unpleasant letters ever penned by an American diplomat. Petty disagreements with the missionaries in Turkey throughout the preceding year, the constant criticism of the American press, and perhaps the knowledge that the Republican victory at the polls in 1896 would terminate his tour of duty at the Turkish capital, combined in creating in Terrell a mood of bitter disillusionment. Beginning with a review of Dwight's activities during the preceding year, the American Minister decried the fact that the missionary's "diplomacy" had aroused Turkish antagonism while at the same time hindering Terrell's own efforts to protect the missions. He denounced Dwight for having originated in November, 1895 the suggestion that an American cruiser rush the Straits. Although a November despatch sent to Secretary Olney by Terrell which recommended this procedure, contained no mention of Dwight, the Minister claimed that the missionary had warned him at that time that unless such a procedure were adopted by the United States, his organization could "call out a storm of indignation which our government would find it disagreeable to meet." Terrell called the press reports regarding his suggestion for the evacuation of the missionaries "lies," inspired by Dwight's "Oriental diplomacy which among other vagaries desires to reinforce Divine providence with battle ships...." The American Minister was greatly displeased at Dwight's attempt to have Cleveland remove him in the summer of 1896, an event which was followed by a direct letter to Terrell from the missionaries suggesting that he resign using any business reason he wished as an excuse. Judge Terrell concluded his letter to this "missionary diplomat" with the observation that "missionary garb does not always sanctify" and expressed doubt that the American Board

could have been more fortunate in selecting its missionaries for the Levant than was Christ who selected the first missionaries for that area, one of whom lied while another was a traitor.⁸⁴

It is noteworthy in reviewing this period of increasing controversy between the American Minister and his fellow Americans in the Ottoman Empire that the Department of State did not allow itself to be drawn into the conflict or give unqualified backing to its stormy representative in Constantinople. The philosophy of the Department of State was well summed up in a despatch to Terrell shortly after the latter wrote his violent letter to Dwight but before a copy of the letter had reached Washington. At that time, Olney wrote:

This Department is inclined on general principle and in the light of past experience to regard public controversy with the representative missionary bodies in this country as at all times unprofitable, and it would seem just now to be especially inopportune.⁸⁵

While his American counterpart was suffering from his own blunders and from conditions above and beyond his control in Constantinople, Mavroyeni Bey, Minister of Turkey to the United States, was experiencing difficulties of his own. It is obvious upon inspection of the records of those years that the Turkish Minister's major problems with the Department of State were over the activities of Armenians in the United States and the unfriendly attitude of the religious and secular press toward the government he represented.

Typical of the numerous protests addressed to the Secretary of State relative to the activities of Armenians in the United States during the

⁸⁴. Quoted in a despatch to Olney; Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 64, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1897, N.A.

⁸⁵. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 7, Olney to American Minister, Dec. 31, 1896, N.A.

years from 1893 to 1897 was one dated September 19, 1893, which protested a demonstration by Armenian-Americans in New York the previous August which had been designed to protest Turkish action in Armenia. Mavroyeni suggested to the Department that the proper authorities in New York be requested not to permit the recurrence of such a demonstration against a friendly government. In his reply to this communication, Mr. Adee instructed the Turkish Minister that the United States and local authorities were not permitted to interfere with the right of peaceful assembly and consequently could take no action on this or any future occasion of similar nature.

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On the 16th of January, 1894, Mavroyeni found another occasion to protest the activities of Armenians in the United States. In this note the Turkish Minister stated that the Consul-General in New York had informed him that thirty Armenians, residents of New York City, "propose to engage in military drill in order that, upon occasion, they may be prepared, as they openly declare through their journals, to disturb order and tranquility in Turkey." He again requested that the state officials be notified so that they could prevent such drills. This time the answer from the Department of State informed the Turkish representative of the difference between violations of municipal law or police regulations, with which the federal government was not interested on a legal basis, and violations of the United States neutrality legislation such as the preparation and execution of an expedition against a friendly power. As this issue was strictly within the realm of the former,

86. Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Sep. 19, 1893; Notes to Turkish Legation, Vol. 1, Alvey Adee to Turkish Minister, Sep. 23, 1893. N.A.

the federal government could take no action but had passed the information
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to the municipal authorities.

Perhaps the most serious report of a threatened violation of American neutrality in the Turco-Armenian affair appeared in the Boston Advertiser of December 6, 1895, and was brought to the State Department's attention by Mavroyeni. The article reported that over one thousand Armenians in the United States would soon leave for Turkey, "armed and prepared to avenge on Turkey the slaughter of their countrymen." According to the newspaper report, these Armeno-Americans would be joined with Armenians from other countries, thus creating an invasion army of upwards of 20,000 men. In his reply to the note, Olney pointed out that the information lacked "positiveness" and failed to show "that the neutrality laws of the United States are being violated or intended to be violated." For these reasons the American Government could take no
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official action. As far as can be determined, no action was taken in this case and no invasion was ever launched.

At one point, Mavroyeni requested the American Government to prevent the publication in the United States of "malevolent articles against Turkey" written by Ottoman subjects. If the government could or would not do this, the Turkish Minister suggested that such writers should be turned over to the authorities of the Ottoman Government. It is not surprising that the reply from the Secretary's office denied both requests, citing the lack of competent power in the United States Government, "save under due proceedings in extradition

87. Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Jan. 16, 1894; Notes to Turkish Legation, Vol. 1, Uhl to Turkish Minister, Feb. 19, 1894, N.A.

88. Inclosed by Turkish Minister in Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 8, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Dec. 9, 1895; Notes to Turkish Legation, Vol. 2, Olney to Turkish Minister, Dec. 11, 1895, N.A.

under a treaty when the commission of a specified offense in the demanding
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country is proved by judicial evidence."

Possibly in an attempt to silence the unfavorable reports from Turkey submitted by missionaries and read by the American public during the years 1894-1896, the Turkish Minister in Washington presented numerous notes to the State Department protesting the activities of the missionary personnel in Turkey and their associates in the United States. The Turkish Minister described the reports in the press, inspired by the missionaries, as slanderous and responsible for inspiring revolutionists to greater efforts. He complained bitterly at reports of meetings of religious groups in the United States at which resolutions were drawn up calling for condemnation of the Turks and action by the United States and/or the Berlin Treaty Powers to secure redress for the Armenians in the Empire. In one note to the State Department, Mavroyeni Bey quoted from a decision of the Supreme Court which read in part: "The citizen of the Union is bound to commit no act of hostility against the nation with which the Government is in amity and friendship." It was immediately pointed out to the diplomat from Turkey that the decision referred to filibustering expeditions, not to oral or written resolutions
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adopted by citizens in peaceful assembly.

The Turkish Minister more than once hinted broadly at the possibility of official action by the Ottoman Government against the missionaries if they continued their activities against the Turks. He pointed out that they were

89. Ibid., Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, May 24, 1894; Notes to Turkish Legation, Vol. 2, Uhl to Turkish Minister, May 26, 1894, N.A.

90. Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Jun. 22, 1895; Notes to Turkish Legation, Vol. 2, Uhl to Turkish Minister, Jun. 29, 1895, N.A.

guests of the Turkish Government and, consequently, the Porte "cannot remain indifferent to the calumnies and distribses of these persons, calumnies and distribses which tend to foment hatred and disorder among the different subjects dwelling under its legitimate authority."

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In early 1896, the Imperial Government apparently decided to put into effect its repeatedly implied threats against continued missionary efforts on behalf of the Armenians. Terrell reported to Secretary Olney on March 31st of that year that an irade was actually issued by the Council of Ministers and signed by the Sultan which ordered all who were comprised in revolutionary activities to leave the country. This was to include the missionaries who were distributing charity to the Armenians. Thanks to the full cooperation of the British Ambassador, Terrell was able to have the irade rescinded before

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it was actually implemented.

Possibly the position of Mavroyeni Bey and of the Turkish Government toward the missionaries during the period of the massacres of the nineties can best be summed up in the Minister's own words. In a note addressed to the Secretary of State, dated November 8, 1895, Mavroyeni accepted Olney's position that the religious leaders in the American missions and in the United States had every right to express their opinions on current events. "Still," continued the Minister,

when these religious bodies accuse the Imperial Government, as they do, of murder and assassination, when they assert that its intention is to exterminate the Armenian race, when they call for the intervention

91. Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 8, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Apr. 11, 1896, H.A.

92. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 62, Terrell to Secretary of State, Mar. 31, 1896, H.A.

of foreign Powers in our internal affairs, when the newspapers of these religious bodies, such as the Congregationalist, repeat these same ideas every week, when the Christian Herald refrains from publishing any news that is favorable to Turkey, and, with a view to extending the list of subscriptions which it has opened, publishes none but the most infamous slanders concerning the Sublime Porte, when that same paper designates a most bitter enemy of the Turkish Government, such as Mr. Howard, to distribute the money collected, when all this goes on and has been said daily since November, 1894, until, now, when these religious bodies assume the extraordinary role of protectors of the Armenians and supreme judges of Turkey, and try to get their unfavorable verdict accepted either by American public opinion or by foreign Governments, when finally, such a course of conduct cannot fail to encourage the revolutionary machinations of the Armenians in Ottoman territory, I really think that I have but to let the facts themselves speak in order to prove the hostile attitude of the American religious bodies toward the Ottoman Government.⁹³

During the years 1894-1896, the religious press was not alone in developing a hostile attitude toward the action of the Turks in Armenia. The secular press denounced both Turkish officials and the governments of the European states. In 1894, both the Republican-inspired New York Daily Tribune and the Democratic New York Times were basically tolerant of the Sultan's government. The Tribune called that potentate "one of the most amiable and humane of men," dominated by fanatic religious leaders who were to blame for the nation's troubles. The Times warned its readers to regard with scepticism reports of Turkish atrocities emanating from Vienna and certain other cities of Europe, "well-known centers of anti-Turkish propaganda."⁹⁴ But during the following year, when reports of massacres and riots became increasingly frequent, both papers denounced the Turkish leaders and demanded European intervention, basing their demands on the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, the Treaty of Berlin, and the Cyprus Convention. When such inter-

93. Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 8, Kavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Mar. 31, 1896, N.A.

94. New York Daily Tribune, Dec. 5, 1894; The New York Times, Nov. 18, 1894.

vention did not occur, both the Tribune and The Times leveled bitter criticism⁹⁵ at the governments of the European states for their failure to act.

In late 1895 and early 1896, when the situation in Armenia reached its most critical stage, the United States was involved with Great Britain in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, and American action in this affair, particularly President Cleveland's famous message of December, 1895, on the Venezuelan crisis, was used by the British as an excuse for non-action in Turkey due to fear of war over the boundary in South America. The Times and the Tribune were equally denunciatory of such a British stratagem. The Times pointed out that during the period of over a year prior to the President's message, disorders had been frequent in Turkish Armenia and the British Government had remained inactive. Meanwhile the Tribune castigated the British Government for being far more worried about the possible loss of a gold mine in South America than about the loss of a Christian nation in⁹⁶ Asia Minor.

On the issue of American involvement in the Armenian Question, it is interesting to note that both newspapers were of similar view. Both insisted that American rights must be respected in Turkey, by the use of force if necessary, but both were heartily opposed to the United States trying to set the Turkish house in order as the powers of Europe were held solely responsible for performing this task. The Tribune was most out-spoken on this point:

There is plenty of wild talk lying around loose, now as always, but none that is more nauseating than that so copiously emitted both

95. See: New York Daily Tribune, Jun. 13, 1895, Oct. 11, 1895, and Dec. 21, 1895; The New York Times, Nov. 19, 1895, and Dec. 25, 1895.

96. The New York Times, Dec. 25, 1895; New York Daily Tribune, Dec. 21, 1895.

in Europe and America to the effect that the United States ought actively to intervene in behalf of Armenia, stop the massacres, reorganize the Government of the Empire, and in general do the work which the Powers of Europe have been talking about for months, but have finally decided not to do. That some one ought to do it is perfectly evident. But for anyone to attempt to put the responsibility upon this country, and therefore put upon this country also the blame and shame and disgrace if the deed is not done, is about the most monstrous piece of effrontery this age has seen.⁹⁷

The editorial reactions of these two large American newspapers to the activities of Minister Terrell during the years 1894-1896 are interesting. In general, it can be stated that the Republican Tribune gave its approval to the diplomacy of this man appointed by a Democratic President. In December, 1895, a Tribune editorial read as follows:

Minister Terrell has apparently been most diligent in looking out for the safety of American residents, and has done all that possibly could be done for the oppressed natives. No foreign Minister at Constantinople can face the civilized world with a clearer consciousness of having done his best in the cause of humanity than he.⁹⁸

The New York Times did not comment editorially on Terrell until after the publication of his letter to Dwight, advocating the removal of missionaries from Turkey. When Terrell was then examined by the editors of this newspaper he was found "incompetent" for his post. By October, 1896, The Times referred to Terrell as an "unfortunate failure," with a "misconception of the situation," one who lacked "diplomatic tact." The American Government was advised that the best way to protect the Americans in the Ottoman Empire was to recall the American Minister and replace him by a competent man.⁹⁹

97. New York Daily Tribune, Dec. 27, 1895.

98. Ibid., Dec. 21, 1895

99. The New York Times, Aug. 5, 1896, and Oct. 9, 1896. Terrell was the object of a particularly unflattering editorial in Harpers Weekly, Vol. 40, (Jun. 13 1896), p. 537. At one point, the American Minister protested to the Secretary of State for the latter's failure to reply to this criticism; Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 65, Terrell to Secretary of State, Jun. 11, 1897.

During the period discussed in this chapter, several private organizations came into existence in the United States because of American interest in the Armenian Question. Space permits the discussion of only a few, but from these few the general characteristics of many can be gathered. On March 21, 1894, in Boston, an organization called the United Friends of Armenia held its first meeting. The stated objects of the organization were to interest Americans in the "literature, folklore, religion, history and present conditions of Armenia." Mrs. Julia Ward Howe was elected president of the group and William Lloyd Garrison was elected treasurer. At this first meeting the featured speaker declared that the liberation of Armenia from Turkish rule should be by arms if words failed to secure this objective. ¹⁰⁰ In February, 1895, the Phil-Armenic Association was founded in Washington, D. C., with an initial membership of one hundred prominent Americans, including many Protestant ministers, and Associate Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court. The object of this group was to render all possible aid in "establishing the security of life, honor and property in Armenia." ¹⁰¹ Another organization founded about the same time, called the National Union for Practical Progress, with headquarters in Boston and with fifty branches in thirty-nine major cities in the United States, sent an appeal to Prime Minister Gladstone in June, 1895, requesting that he use his influence to have Queen Victoria prevail upon the

100. See: Notes from Turkish Legation, Vol. 7, Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Mar. 26, 1894, which incloses a clipping from the Boston Daily Advertiser of Mar. 22, 1894.

101. See: Ibid., Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State, Feb. 1, 1895, which incloses a clipping from the Washington Evening Star of Jan. 31, 1895.

Sultan to appoint a European governor for the Armenian vilayets.

In December, 1895, the National Armenian Relief Committee was founded in New York to coordinate the work of smaller organizations previously established throughout the United States to collect relief funds for Armenians. The governing board contained members from the Armenian Relief Fund Committee, the Chamber of Commerce Committee, and the Evangelical Alliance. The Executive Committee of this organization was composed of prominent leaders in the fields of business, religion, and education. The President of the National Armenian Relief Committee was the Reverend Henry Y. Satterlee, Bishop of Washington; the First Vice-President was Levi P. Morton, Governor of New York and ex-Vice President of the United States.

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Up to this time, the American missionaries in Armenia had acted as the disbursing agents for large funds collected in the United States and England and transmitted to Turkey for the relief of suffering Armenians. Now, however, with the prospect of large sums being collected by the N.A.R.C. for the purchasing of relief supplies and with the hostility of the Turkish Government toward the missionaries becoming more pronounced monthly, it was decided to turn to the American Red Cross with the suggestion that that organization undertake the distribution of the food, clothing, and other aid. Actually, even before the officers of the N.A.R.C. called on the Red Cross to perform this mission, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions had similarly requested that organization to send representatives to Turkey to handle distribution of relief to the Armenians.

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102. The New York Times, Jun. 1, 1895.

103. See: Howard, Horrors of Armenia, pp. 55-60.

104. A complete report on the activities of this organization in Turkey is given in: American National Red Cross, Report - America's Relief Expedition to Asia Minor Under the Red Cross, (Washington: 1896). See especially, pp. 3-4.

The President of the American Red Cross, Miss Clara Barton, accepted the request of the two organizations and personally volunteered to go to Constantinople to direct the distribution of relief funds and supplies. However, the Turkish Government at first refused to allow the representatives of the Red Cross to enter Turkey due, apparently, to a suspicion that the organization was not completely disinterested in the Armenian problem.¹⁰⁵ After the State Department had instructed Terrell to bring to the Porte's attention the fact that allowing the Red Cross to enter Turkey would have "a decided tendency to allay prevalent excitement and indignation in this country," the Turkish Government compromised on the issue by refusing to allow the representatives of the Red Cross, as such, to enter Ottoman territory to perform their humanitarian task, but by permitting the American Minister to Turkey to name persons to enter the empire to distribute relief. Terrell, of course, promptly nominated Miss Barton and her assistants and they arrived at Constantinople to begin their work in February, 1896.¹⁰⁶ The Red Cross unit remained in the Ottoman Empire until August of that year and distributed over \$100,000 of relief supplies and funds to Armenians in need of such help.

Despite this role played in the relief of suffering in Armenia by the American Red Cross, it did not match the much greater amount of relief passed to the Armenians by the American missionaries over the two-year period from the beginning of the massacres to the end of 1896. During that period of time, the

105. Miss Barton wrote of being shown a press clipping stating that the Pro American Alliance in the United States, described as "working hand in glove" with the Red Cross, was about to publish a pamphlet entitled: God Against Allah, Christ against Mohammed, Bible against Koran, Heaven against Hell! Ibid., pp. 11-2.

106. Instructions to Turkey, Olney to American Minister, Vol. 6, Jan. 18, 1896; Despatches from Turkey, Terrell to Secretary of State, Vol. 61, Jan. 23, 1896, N.A.

representative of the American Board distributed relief funds totalling
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over half a million dollars.

Regardless of the dire predictions of the future which were often included in the despatches from Constantinople during the year 1896, no American was killed or injured in the disorders of that year. A serious massacre took place in June, 1896 and a violent outbreak of religious hatred in Constantinople in August resulted in hundreds of deaths. But after the violence in the capital, the Turkish army appeared to stabilize the situation and by the fall the serious disorders were over.

Before concluding this Chapter, reference should be made to a series of events which occurred in September, 1896. They involved an exchange of letters and ideas between Secretary of State Olney and British Colonial Secretary Chamberlain, who was visiting the United States in an attempt to eliminate whatever disagreements still existed between the two countries over the Venezuelan boundary dispute. Although the proposed cooperation mentioned in these letters never materialized into action, partly due to the end of the most violent disorders in Armenia by late 1896, the exchange is indicative of the extent to which the United States was prepared to go in becoming involved
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in the Armenian Question.

On the 19th of September, Chamberlain wrote to Olney asking him if he would care "to express a confidential opinion as to the reception which would be given by the American Government to any proposition from our side tending to cooperation in regard to Turkey"? Olney replied a week later. In this

107. Annual Report of the American Board, 1896, p. 41.

108. Quotations that follow are from Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, pp. 59-61.

letter, the Secretary of State expressed doubt that the Monroe Doctrine would allow the United States to interfere in the political affairs of Europe. However, Olney did feel that something could be done to aid Great Britain:

There is one feature of the situation, however, through which there might come to England some indirect aid and support on the part of the United States in any decided measures she might elect to take for the relief of Armenia. The protection owed to citizens of the United States by its government, is constantly assuming more and more the shape of a practical obligation which must be discharged at all hazards and by the use of all the necessary means. To this more than to any other cause is to be attributed the comparatively recent increase of our navy.

After mentioning that American interests in Turkey were not primarily pecuniary but were highly valued by citizens of this country, Olney continued:

If, therefore, England, should now seriously set about putting the Armenian charnel house in order, there can be little doubt that the United States would consider the moment opportune for vigorous exertion on behalf of American citizens and interests in Turkey. It would feel itself entitled to demand full indemnity for past injuries to them as well as adequate security against the like injuries in the future. It would support such demands by all the physical force at its disposal; with the necessary result, I think, that its attitude would both morally and materially strengthen the hands of England.

Due to either the reason listed above; i.e., the end of the massacres, or to a lack of satisfaction with the Secretary of State's answer, the British Government did not act with decision on the Armenian question during this period. Consequently, the concomitant action by the United States, suggested by Olney, never occurred.

On the 7th of December, 1896, President Cleveland presented his last annual message to the Congress of the United States. The Armenian Question was the first issue discussed by the Chief Executive in the foreign policy section of his speech. His remarks were similar to those in his message of

the previous year; i.e., everything was being done that could be done to protect Americans in the Ottoman Empire, the American warships had been useful in protecting Americans, the task of intervening in Turkey belonged to the Berlin powers, no exequaturs had been granted for vice-consulates at Erzerum or Harput, and attempts were being continued to bring about a settlement for the destruction of American property at Harput and Marash in 1895. The President concluded his remarks on the subject with the following hopeful words:

I do not believe that the present somber prospect in Turkey will be long permitted to offend the sight of Christendom. It so mars the humane and enlightened civilization that belongs to the close of the nineteenth century that it seems hardly possible that the earnest demand of good people throughout the Christian world for its corrective treatment, will remain unanswered.¹⁰⁹

In the election of 1896, the Republican candidate was easily elected President of the United States. It is, of course, impossible to say whether or not an individual plank in the Republican platform of that campaign had a significant influence on the voters in the election. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Republican Platform contained a statement relative to the Armenian Question while the Democratic Platform contained no reference to that problem. The "Armenian Plank" in the Republican Platform for 1896 read as follows:

The massacres in Armenia have aroused the deep sympathy and just indignation of the American people, and we believe that the United States should exercise all the influences it can properly exert to bring these atrocities to an end. In Turkey American residents have been exposed to the gravest dangers, and American property destroyed. There, and everywhere, American citizens and American property must be absolutely protected at all hazards and at any cost.¹¹⁰

109. Foreign Relations Papers, 1896, p. xdv.

110. New York Daily Tribune, Jun. 19, 1896.

As fate willed it, by the time the Republican President took office in March, 1896, the Armenian Question was of far less importance to the Chief Executive than it had been to his predecessor. The massacres were over, the Armenian vilayets were relatively peaceful, and the Americans in Turkey were in less danger than they had been since 1894. Admittedly, several complicated diplomatic problems with Turkey still remained; the indemnity had not been paid nor had the Turkish Government yet admitted responsibility for the destruction, the exequaturs had not been granted for the two vice-consulates, and the status of Armeno-Americans returning to Turkey was still an issue of disagreement between Turkey and the United States. However, the violence of 1894-1896 was a thing of the past, and a relatively peaceful interregnum in the Armenian Question would last for nearly twenty years. Finally, the United States was becoming daily more involved in the welfare of another subject nation and its people far closer to its own borders.

With the conclusion of the major disorders in the Armenian Vilayets of the Ottoman Empire in 1896, an uneasy truce between the warring ethnic groups spread over the land which was to last, with only occasional interruption, until 1915. During this period, the American and Turkish authorities reached agreement on the chief issues of conflict between them caused, in great part, by the massacres of 1894 to 1896 and the reaction in the United States to these events, i.e., the granting of exequaturs to the two American vice-consuls appointed to Harput and Erzerum and the securing of an indemnity for the destruction of American mission property in Turkey. During this same period, the small emigration of Armenians away from Turkey and into the United States, which had been slowly increasing during the latter part of the nineteenth century, became a mass movement of thousands of families seeking new homes away from the violent acts of Kurdish tribesmen. The American Congress and the Executive, particularly Theodore Roosevelt, occasionally displayed an interest in the situation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. More often, they were requested to demonstrate a greater interest by citizens of this or other nations who desired a more active participation by the Government of the United States in the Armenian Question.

Minister Terrell failed to secure the grant of exequaturs to the two American vice-consuls, provided for by the American Congress in 1895. Terrell's successor, James B. Angell, who was Minister from the United States to Turkey from August, 1897 to August, 1898, likewise failed to convince the Turkish authorities of the desirability of granting the long-sought recognition for the vice-consulates. In a long dispatch to Angell's

successor, Oscar Straus, in September, 1898, Secretary of State William R. Day listed four major problems in the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the United States; the exequaturs for Harput and Erzerum were among the four.¹ Finally, in November, 1898, three and a half years after Congress had provided money for the establishment of the vice-consulates, Straus was able to cable to the Secretary of State that the exequatur for Erzerum had been granted by the Sultan. In November, 1901, the Turkish ruler granted equal recognition to the other American vice-consul at Harput.² Thus, six years after the end of the disorders, which had been the basic reason for the establishment of the consulates, the proper credentials were presented to the American diplomats selected to represent the United States at these posts.

The problem which arose out of the destruction of American property at Harput and Marash during the height of the disorders in 1895 has previously been mentioned. In addition to refusing to accept responsibility for the destruction of the buildings, the Ottoman Government also refused to allow the school buildings at Harput to be rebuilt, many Turkish officials being of the belief that the American teachers at Harput were largely responsible for the unrest in the area.³

Terrell had been unsuccessful in securing the irade necessary for rebuilding and had failed to secure payment of the indemnity, which had been placed at roughly \$100,000. The American Board convened in October, 1897, and noted the above facts. However, one of the reports read at the meeting

1. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 7, Day to American Minister, Sep. 13, 1898, N.A.
2. See: Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 67, Straus to Secretary of State, Nov. 7, 1898; and Consular Instructions to Harput, Hay to American Consul, Nov. 28, 1901. The consulate at Erzerum was transferred to Trebizond in 1904.
3. See: Foreign Relations Papers, 1899, pp. 772-4.

described the changed conditions at Constantinople and the arrival of Dr. Angell. According to this report, these two factors made "early and satisfactory" action on the claims "certain."⁴

In December, 1897, Alvey Adee, of the Department of State, instructed Terrell to reiterate the charges of negligence, collusion - even active participation - of Ottoman officials in the events which resulted in destruction of American property and for which the Americans now demanded compensation. Adee firmly denied the Turkish contention that the Ottoman Government was not liable for these claims on the grounds that the injuries had been committed by insurgents in the course of a rebellion which the titular government was unable to control.⁵

In early 1898, Angell had the presence of two American warships, the Brooklyn and Olympia, anchored at Smyrna, to aid him in his demarches to the Porte to secure payment. Writing years later, Dr. Angell argued that if these ships had not been forced to withdraw at the beginning of the Spanish-American War he would have been able to obtain the full indemnity - by a show of force, if necessary.⁶ Certainly, he was not averse to the use of naval force to back up diplomacy. In August, 1898, the Ottoman Government sent identical notes to all powers with claims against it for destruction during the disorders of 1894-1896, denying responsibility for the damages inflicted on foreign

4. Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1897, (Boston: The American Board, 1897), p. 42. In line with this optimism, at the annual meeting of the American Board in 1898, a report was presented which stated that the Ottoman Government, "though not yet friendly," was no longer obstructing missionary efforts on behalf of the Armenians. See: Annual Report of the American Board, 1898, p. xxviii.

5. Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 7, Adee to American Minister, Dec. 11, 1897, N.A.

6. James B. Angell, The Reminiscences of James Burrill Angell, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), p. 211.

Reminiscences

nationals or their property during the course of a revolt which, the government in Constantinople contended, it was unable to suppress. At that time, the American Minister suggested to the Department of State a naval demonstration by the United States, such as the seizure of the customs house at Smyrna in order to obtain prompt payment of the claims. Angell was convinced that the operation could be carried out without the loss of a drop of blood. However, at this time, Secretary of State Day was contemplating the far less violent recourse to an international tribunal in order to secure satisfaction of the American claims.⁷

The arrival of Oscar Straus in Constantinople in the fall of 1898 signalled the beginning of what Alfred Dennis called the only "bright spot" in the history of the American Legation in Turkey during an otherwise gloomy period between 1890 and 1910.⁸ During his brief tour in the Turkish capital, Straus succeeded in securing permission for American citizens to move about more freely in the Ottoman Empire.⁹ However, during his residence in Constantinople he was as unsuccessful in obtaining the indemnity for the destruction to American property as had been his two predecessors. Writing his memoirs in later years, Mr. Straus laid claim, however, to preparing the way for the eventual settlement. This statement was based on an interview between the American Minister and the Sultan on September 23, 1899, at which the final solution to the problem was first discussed.¹⁰

7. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 67, Angell to Secretary of State, Aug. 4, 1898; Instructions to Turkey, Vol. 7, Day to American Minister, Sep. 13, 1898, N.A.

8. For comments on Straus, Angell, and Leishman, see Alfred L. P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy 1896-1906, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1928), pp. 451, 456.

9. See Ibid., p. 451.

10. Oscar S. Straus, Under Four Administrations, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922), pp. 141-2.

Straus had begun strenuous negotiations for payment as early as November, 1898, and the following month, President McKinley assured Congress in his annual message that the new Minister to the Porte had been charged to press for a settlement to the long-standing dispute.¹¹ Nevertheless, at the annual meeting of the American Board ten months later, in the fall of 1899, a report was presented which noted with "surprise and shame" that another year had passed without payment of the indemnity. This report concluded in the following strong terms: "We believe it is high time that the rights of our fellow citizens in Turkey should be vindicated 'at all hazards and at any cost', to use the language of the platform on which the President of the United States was elected."¹²

By the time this report was presented, however, the interview of September 23rd, had occurred and action on the indemnity appeared imminent. At this interview, the Sultan had stated that the claims of the Americans could be "wiped out." The method which he suggested for the elimination of the indemnity was novel. The Turkish ruler proposed that his government purchase a warship from an American firm and include in the payment for the ship a sum, to be transferred to the United States Government, equal to the claims demanded. The reason for the subterfuge was obvious. Other powers, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, also had claims against the Ottoman Government for destruction during the disorders of 1894-1896. Open payment to the Americans would bring forth redoubled demands, harder to deny, from these other governments. In the case of Britain and France, the indemnity was considerably larger than the one demanded by the Americans. As the Turkish finances in

11. Foreign Relations Papers, 1898, p. lxxdiii.

12. Annual Report of the American Board, 1899, p. xvii.

1899 were in a deplorable state, according to the American Minister, payments to all the powers making demands for indemnities would create a serious situation within the financial structure of the government. In commenting on the suggestion, Straus pointed out that the claims totaled under \$100,000 and suggested that the United States might wait to see whether or not the Sultan was serious. He strongly recommended against the use of force to secure immediate payment of the money, and he did not recommend placing the case under arbitration until, or unless, the Ottoman Government failed to carry
13
through on the Sultan's suggestion.

Secretary of State Hay was reportedly divided between mirth and indig-
14
nation at the Sultan's proposal. Nevertheless, negotiations based on the Sultan's suggestion continued for over a year with little or nothing being accomplished. There continued to be a possibility that the contract for the warship would not go to the American firm, Cramp's shipyards in Philadelphia, but to the English firm of Vickers Maxim. For this and possibly other reasons, Hay finally sent a despatch to the legation informing the American diplomat that he had permission to "make as unprincipled a settlement as you
15
please."

In December, 1899, Straus left Constantinople on an extended leave of absence. For over a year, until the arrival of the new minister, John Leishman, in 1901, the legation was under the direction of the charge d'affaires, Lloyd C. Griscom. Griscom, then a young man, was a rather ingenious diplomat,

13. Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 67, Straus to Secretary of State, Sep. 23, 1899, N.A.

14. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, p. 452.

15. Lloyd C. Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, (New York: The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1940), p. 162.

who, by utilizing the advice from Hay, plus his own imagination and diplomatic skill, succeeded on Christmas Eve, 1900 in securing a promise
16
from the Porte to buy the warship in the United States.

Although the contract for the purchase of the ship was signed the following day, it was not until June 12, 1901 that the Secretary of State was informed by the American Minister that \$83,600, nearly the entire amount demanded by the missionaries, had been deposited in the Imperial Ottoman Bank by the Turkish Government to the credit of the American Minister. This money, ostensibly for payment on the cruiser ordered from Cramp's shipyard, was transferred to the American Board and the diplomatic problem, whose genesis
17
dated back six years, was finally settled.

Meanwhile, Griscom had been equally successful in concluding another problem arising from the same events that were basic to the indemnity. The irade for the rebuilding of the school at Harput was finally granted by the
18
Ottoman ruler during the year 1900.

With the successful conclusion of the indemnity question and the granting of an irade for rebuilding the school at Harput, the American missionaries appeared to have few serious problems left. But in the years following 1894, a new problem for the missions had been created by the emigration to the United States of many Armenians who were leaders in the Protestant community in Turkey. As early as 1902, the mission stations at Erzerum, Bitlis, Harput, and Van all reported substantial emigration from these districts to America.

16. For a detailed report on the activities of Charge Griscom in his attempt to secure payment of the indemnity by forcing the Sultan's Government to order the ship from the American firm, see Ibid., pp. 162-71.

17. Foreign Relations Papers, 1901, p. 518.

18. Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, p. 162.

The following year, the Bitlis station reported that one fourth of the members of the Protestant Church in that area had left for America. By 1907, the continuous exit from their homeland of large numbers of trained teachers and leaders in the Armenian Protestant community surrounding the missionaries was referred to in a report from the Western Turkey Mission as "one of the great problems to be dealt with."¹⁹

The missionaries had been instrumental in starting this large movement of Armenians to the United States. Before the disorders of 1894-1896 the immigration of Armenians into America had been very small. Of this number, many were students in American schools and colleges, sent to the United States at the instigation of American missionaries. Almost without exception, the Armenians who arrived before 1894 came for a limited period of time. Some came to study, some to learn useful trades, some to earn money, and some to escape political persecution, but nearly all had the intention of returning to the Ottoman Empire. Many of the immigrants applied for and obtained American citizenship. The fact that this was not a strong deterrent in their plans to return to their homeland has been mentioned previously. These temporary residents, plus the few Armenians who had settled permanently in the United States, did not number more than 3,000 in the year 1894.²⁰

After the beginning of the massacres in the middle of the last decade of the nineteenth century, emigration of the Sultan's Armenian subjects

19. Annual Report of the American Board, 1902, pp. 64-72; 1903, p. xvii; 1907, p. 55.

20. See: M. Vartan Malcom, The Armenians in America, (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1919), p. 61. This book reviews Armenian immigration into the United States from 1834 to the end of the second decade of the twentieth century. It also discusses the Armenian community in America at the time of its publication.

increased greatly and tended to be permanent rather than temporary. Before 1899, the United States Bureau of Immigration listed immigrants into America by country of origin, not by ethnic group. During the period 1895-1898 15,913 Turkish citizens entered the United States. Due to the massacres of 1894-1896, it can be assumed that a large proportion of these Ottoman citizens were Armenians. Between 1899 and 1917, there were 55,067 Armenian immigrants into America. During the same period, 5,852 departed the United States and an additional 2,477 were debarred from entering. Of these Armenians, the vast majority, 46,474, arrived from the Ottoman Empire, while only 3,034 came from Russia.²¹

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the subsequent reaction to it in 1909 had at least three direct effects on the flow of Armenians out of the Ottoman Empire. First, there was the elimination by the new Ottoman Government of the requirement for passports for subjects leaving the country. Previously the cost for this passport had been as high as fifteen dollars -²² a prohibitive sum to members of the poorer classes. Second, the reaction to the Young Turk Revolution led to the Adana massacre of April, 1909, which, although not followed by other disorders, had a disquieting effect on the Christian population still recovering from the horrors of 1894-1896. Consequently, many Armenians fled to America and other nations to escape possible future dangers. Finally, the Government of Turkey in 1910 decreed that henceforth Christian as well as Moslem young men would be inducted into Ottoman military service. This was a radical change from Turkish tradition

21. Ibid., pp. 65-7.

22. Numerical File, Vol. 161, #1358/16-7, Consul, Harput to Assistant Secretary of State, May 18, 1909, N.A.

as Christians previously had not been permitted to serve in the army. Many Armenians, however, regarded military service for the Sultan as most undesirable and these young men left for the United States or other Western nations.

Of those Armenians who came to the United States in the years before the First World War, some were students, as stated above, others were professional men or teachers, but the vast majority were of the poorer and less educated classes. In a despatch to the Secretary of State in 1909, the American Consul at Harput described the Armenian immigrants to the United States, as he had observed them:

The great majority of these immigrants belong to the uneducated and poorest class, they have been born and raised in poverty and hardship, they are however thrifty and industrious and wonderfully saving, and the money they make while in America is carefully put away for future investment. While in America they live in colonies, principally in the cities of the New England states, and from what I can gather from those that have returned, they live while in America very much as they do here, on the cheapest rations, many of them crowded into one sleeping room, and their personal expenses are only for actual living.²³

In the years between 1896 and 1914 the Armenian revolutionary organiza-
24
tions in the United States continued to be quite active. Possibly with the intention of aiding both native-born and naturalized Americans in Turkey on legitimate business or philanthropic missions, the Department of State passed a document to the Turkish Minister in 1906 which described the organization and activities of these societies in the United States. The report was compiled by the Treasury Department's Secret Service. It described in detail the weekly meetings of the three major revolutionary societies in

23. Ibid.

24. See: Malcom, Armenians in America, pp. 119-20. See also: Numerical File, Vol. 593, #8170-8170/6, Leishman to Secretary of State and subsequent exchange of correspondence of August, 1907, N.A.

America, meetings which appeared to be designed primarily to solicit contributions for the revolutionary plans of the Huntchakist, New Huntchakist and Armenian Revolutionary Societies. The American investigators described the audiences at these meetings as "ignorant men" who were easily deceived by the speakers. The report must have been of some interest to the Turkish Government, if the information contained in it was correct, for it described the methods used, including the route followed, for smuggling arms into the Armenian vilayets. It also stated that Ottoman officials in the areas concerned were easily bribed by the Armenians and gave the names and addresses of thirteen prominent Armenian revolutionary leaders outside Turkey. What use was made of the report submitted to the Turkish Minister is not known.

25

During seven years of the period under discussion, Theodore Roosevelt was President of the United States. In a long letter to former Minister to Turkey, Oscar Straus, Secretary of State Root discussed a petition passed to President Roosevelt in January 1906, signed by many influential men in France, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain, Holland, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, which urged the President to take action to prevent future cruelties on the Armenian race in Turkey. Root used the traditional policy of the United States as his major reason for the administration's rejection of the petition. The United States, according to the Secretary:

...is by the unwritten law of more than a century debarred from sharing in the political aims, interests, or responsibilities of Europe, just as by the equally potent doctrine, now nearly a century old, the European powers are excluded from sharing or interfering in the political concerns of the sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere.

25. Notes to Turkish Legation, Vol. 2, Robert Bacon, to Turkish Minister, Mar. 9, 1906, N.A.

As for the suggestion, contained in the petition, that Roosevelt either bring the matter before the Second Hague Peace Conference or take the initiative in convening a special conference on the Armenian Question, Mr. Root expressed his belief that such steps could only be taken by one of the Berlin Treaty powers. After admitting that the sufferings of the Armenians "cry aloud for remedy and redress," Root stated his conviction that American efforts "short of rightful and potential intervention" would accomplish nothing, and, as they would imply reprobation of the acts and motives of the Ottoman Government, would do more harm than good "to the unfortunate creatures whom it is aimed to benefit."

26

One year later, in January, 1907, fifty prominent Americans, men well-known in the fields of education, religion, literature, and business, signed a petition similar to the one mentioned above and forwarded it to the President. This time, however, no request for such openly dramatic diplomatic moves by the United States Government was put forward. Appealing to the President by reference to his diplomatic triumph in the Russo-Japanese peace settlement, the new position requested Roosevelt to bring his "personal influence" to bear upon the Armenian Question "by indirect means, where, in the circumstances, direct diplomatic action on the part of our Government would not avail." As far as can be determined, Roosevelt took no action on this suggestion.

27

During the years preceding the Adana massacre of 1909 there were frequent reports from American diplomats and missionaries in the Ottoman Empire protesting against the activities of Armenian revolutionists, activities which could do

26. Foreign Relations Papers, 1906, Vol. 2, pp. 1417-8.

27. Numerical File, Vol. 333, #3613/5, received Jan., 1907. Two other similar petitions were received from the Armenian Students' Association of America and from the Geneva headquarters of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation; see Ibid., Vol. 128, #918/2 and #918/4. Both attempted to have Roosevelt bring the Armenian Question before the Hague Tribunal.

little but ensure future violence against the Armenian race by the Moslem
majority in Turkey. ²⁸ The missionaries in the field stations were in the
same unenviable position that had faced them in 1894. The Armenians were
attempting to use the mission stations for the furtherance of their cause,
while the Ottoman officials feared that the revolutionists were succeeding
in this attempt.

The area known as Turkish Armenia was in a state of constant unrest
during the years between 1896 and 1909. James B. Angel, arriving to succeed
Minister Terrell in 1897, reported that on the day of his arrival bombs
were exploded in the halls of the Porte - the perpetrators being Armenians.
In 1903 and 1904 there were reports of "more or less trouble" in Armenia
caused, according to the American Minister, John Leishman, by Armenian
revolutionary bands. In 1902, Leishman submitted a report on the Armenian
situation which seems to give an accurate picture of the situation during
the years before World War I: "Armenia is in a constant state of more or
less excitement and smouldering insurrection, still harboring the cherished
hope of being free from Turkish rule...." Foreseeing continued trouble, due
to the political aspirations of the Armenians, more than to religious
differences, the Minister concluded that natives and foreigners were "resting
²⁹
on a volcano."

28. See: Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 66, Angell to Secretary of State, Sep. 18, 1897; Vol. 72, Leishman to Secretary of State, Aug. 4, 1902; Vol. 75, Leishman to Secretary of State, Apr. 30, 1904; and Vol. 76, Leishman to Secretary of State, Aug. 28, 1904, N.A.

29. Foreign Relations Papers, 1904, pp. 836-9; and Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 72, Leishman to Secretary of State, Aug. 4, 1902, N.A. Leishman commented in 1905 that the frequently heard complaints at the Porte that the missionaries often encouraged the Armenian revolutionists were "not entirely without foundation." The Minister stated his belief that the missionaries were no doubt "well-intentioned men," but he also considered many of them "fanatical and credulous, and consequently not level-headed, believing everything they are told by interested parties without investigation...." See: Despatches from Turkey, Vol. 77, Leishman to Secretary of State, May 24, 1905, N.A.

The Young Turk Revolt of 1908, which forced the Sultan to proclaim a constitutional form of government, was hailed by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. The Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation had previously collaborated in their opposition to the Sultan's absolutism. Upon proclamation of the Constitution, the Federation ceased its revolutionary activities and pledged cooperation with the constitutional government of the Ottoman Empire.

The revolt did bring a measure of equality to the subject races in the Turkish Empire. Among other freedoms which the Armenians under the Sultan's jurisdiction obtained was the freedom to purchase and carry arms. The result of this change in the traditional unarmed status of the Armenian village or city dweller was the creation of a situation where any future attacks on the Armenian race would result in greater danger to the attackers. The lifting of the restrictions on the arming of the Armenian race also resulted in an increased danger for the government from the Armenian extremists who were now openly-armed and who, unlike members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, had remained irreconcilable to the new and more liberal government at Constantinople.

In April, 1909, the abortive counter-revolution, led by Abdul Hamid and his advisors against the new regime in Turkey, succeeded in loosening the bonds of control tying the central government with the provinces. This factor, plus the probable complicity, if not leadership, by these officials in the riots against the Armenians in the provinces resulted in a violent uprising of the Moslems and the deaths of many Armenian Christians. John Leishman, who had become the first American Ambassador to the Porte in 1906, in a despatch

to Secretary Knox, stated that in his opinion the reactionaries inspired the disorders in an effort to discredit the new regime.³⁰ Regardless of the motivating force behind the massacres, which occurred mostly in the area surrounding the Cilician city of Adana, several thousand Armenians, hundreds of Turks, and two Americans perished in the violence which began on April 14, 1909. The Americans in Turkey suffered other losses in addition to the death of two of their number. The mission school at Kessab was destroyed, a woman missionary at Hadjin lost some of her private possessions, and the Singer Sewing Machine Company suffered minor loss to its plant.³¹

The death of the two Americans, both missionaries, at Adana, during the disorders in that city, brought about immediate action by the American Government. On April 21, Knox cabled Leishman that the battleships Montana and North Carolina were on their way to Turkey from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.³² However, even before the American battleships left the Cuban port, warships of England, France, and Italy had arrived off the coast of Turkey. It is possible that the arrival of these foreign men-of-war had a sobering effect on the Moslem rioters and may have led to increased protection for Americans residing in Turkey. Shortly after the arrival of this fleet, the counter-revolution was suppressed and was followed by the abdication and exile of Sultan Abdul Hamid. These acts quickly brought an end to the disorders.

During the period immediately after the first report of the death of the two Americans reached Washington, the Secretary of State looked to the European Powers for aid in protecting Americans in Turkey. The British Government was asked whether or not it could furnish protection for Americans

30. Numerical File, Vol. 718, #10044/218, Leishman to Secretary of State, Apr. 28, 1909, N.A.

31. Ibid., Vol. 1087, #20431/11-2, Einstein to Secretary of State, Jul. 24, 1909, N.A. An eye witness report on the massacres is given in Rose Lambert's, Hadjin and the Armenian Massacres, (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1911).

32. Foreign Relations Papers, 1909, p. 568.

in the ⁰ottoman Empire and what the Berlin Treaty powers intended to do about the disorders. The British reply assured Washington that the desired protection could and would be accorded the Americans but did not discuss contemplated action in Turkey by the combined Treaty powers. ³³

The new Ottoman Government brought the situation under control as stated above. It went beyond this point, however, by setting up courts martial in the districts, scenes of the recent violence, which meted out death sentences to over seventy Moslems convicted of participating in the massacres. This appeared to be a new type of Ottoman Government and the United States Government reacted accordingly. On April 29, Representative Wanger of Pennsylvania introduced a joint resolution which expressed the "appreciation" of the American people that the recent revolution in Turkey had given that nation a constitutional government, and that during the recent disorders no wholesale slaughter had occurred. After expressing the felicitations of the American Government to the new Sultan, Mohammed V, the resolution conveyed to him the hope and confidence of the United States that among his earliest achievements would be the "elimination of the appalling atrocities upon Christian missionaries and other non-Moslems which thrill with horror the civilized world." ³⁴ Although the resolution never was reported out of committee, it demonstrated a new feeling of confidence in the Ottoman Government on the part of many Americans. In June, 1909, the Department of State replied to a member of Congress who had transmitted a petition for the Armenian Evangelical Alliance in the United States which asked for prompt American action relative to the Armenian Question. The State Department reminded the Congressman that

33. Ibid., pp. 568-9.

34. Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 44, pt. 2 (Apr. 29, 1909), p. 1615.

the United States was now dealing with a new government in Turkey, not implicated in the recent massacre, and suggested that: "The magnitude and difficulty of the task of the new regime should win the sympathy of all well-wishers of peace, and justify a fair opportunity of accomplishment without interference."³⁵

In line with this expressed sympathetic attitude toward the new Ottoman Government, the American State Department did not press for prompt payment of an indemnity for the death of the Americans and destruction of American property in April, 1909. In February, 1910, Secretary of State Knox instructed the American Ambassador that the responsibility for the death of two Americans was clearly charged to the "indifference, neglect and supineness of the local authorities." But the Secretary once again noted the "unsettled conditions" in the Ottoman Empire at the time of the massacre and the importance to the United States "of supporting to the utmost the effort on the part of that Government to maintain a reformed and constitutional administration." Ambassador Straus was instructed to renew the representations seeking an indemnity but was not to press the claim "insistently at this time as a demand."³⁶ As a result of the adoption of this policy by the Secretary of State, the Adana claims were virtually abandoned and no settlement was ever agreed upon between the two nations.

During the five years between the Adana episode of 1909 and the beginning of the First World War, reports continued to emanate from Turkey of unrest in the Armenian vilayets.³⁷ The new government of Turkey offered much to the

35. Numerical File, Vol. 1060, #19274/22-3, Wilson to Representative Bennett, Jun. 28, 1909, N.A.

36. Ibid., Vol. 1068, #19546/31-2, Knox to American Ambassador, Feb. 14, 1910, N.A.

37. Decimal File, 867.00/465, Rockhill to Secretary of State, Jan. 21, 1913; 867.00/358, Rockhill to Secretary of State, Dec. 12, 1911, N.A. See also: Annual Report of the American Board, 1912, p. 77.

Armenians that would have been unbelievable in 1890 but to some hard-core revolutionists, who now demanded independence for Armenia, this was not enough. In addition, the new government in Constantinople, under the pressure of internal economic, financial, and religious problems and external military defeats, turned to an ever-increasing reliance on a program of Turkification. The fervor of Pan-Islamism, based on a religious motive, was replaced by the equal fervor of Pan-Turkism, with its foundation rooted in nationalism.

In addition, the bonds of cooperation between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation began to deteriorate. The two organizations had been interested in the same progressive and democratic development of the Ottoman Empire prior to 1908. The Young Turks, however, were now primarily interested in the salvation of the Ottoman Empire and were motivated by a strong nationalistic reaction against the incessant meddling of the states of Europe in Ottoman affairs. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, on the other hand, was by the very nature of its creation in favor of loosening the ties that bound the Armenian "nation" in subjugation, was itself strongly nationalistic but in an Armenian not Turkish sense, and finally was traditionally in favor of European interest in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

38

In 1913, the United States Ambassador reported at length on the "very unsatisfactory condition" of northeast Anatolia from whence there had come increasingly frequent reports of persecution. Most of the current trouble was rooted in an agrarian issue tied to the emigration of Armenians prior to 1908. With the promulgation of a constitution and apparent equal rights,

38. A good review of the program, history, and activities of the Young Turks is given in Wade D. David's, European Diplomacy in the Near Eastern Question 1906-1909, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1940), pp. 60-79.

many of these Armenians had returned to Turkey. In the interim, Kurds, acting legally under Ottoman law, had occupied the abandoned land. The government in 1913, according to the Ambassador, was working slowly to resolve differences, and he added that it was "but fair to point out that the Government has quite earnestly and sincerely tried to approach this important question in a consiliatory manner...."³⁹

In May, 1913 the Armenian National Assembly presented a memorandum to the Grand Vizier listing its grievances. The Armenian Patriarchate referred to the document ominously as "the last legal step" to be taken by the Assembly in efforts to secure reforms. The petition from the Armenians commented bitterly that the opinion was spreading in the Empire that only by elimination of the Armenian people could the Empire be saved from foreign encroachment. Prophetically, the memorandum stated that "disquieting symptoms, precursors of a massacre, of a catastrophe capable of overshadowing, in its horror, the most fearful tragedies of the past"⁴⁰ had been noted recently.

Shortly thereafter, the powers, acting on behalf of the Armenians, insisted on some plan of reform for the Armenian portion of the Ottoman Empire. Lengthy discussions led eventually to a firman of reforms issued in February, 1914. This plan divided the six vilayets and Trebizond into two regions, each under a European inspector general, to be appointed with the consent of the Turkish Government. The two men were chosen, one from the Netherlands and one from Norway, but the outbreak of the European war prevented them from assuming their duties.

39. Decimal File, 867.00/465, Rockhill to Secretary of State, Jan. 21, 1913, N.A.

40. Ibid., 867.00/543, Rockhill to Secretary of State, May 15, 1913, N.A.

At the beginning of the World War in mid-summer 1914, the rival national aspirations of Armenians and Turks were increasing the rift between the government and one of the largest minorities which it governed. As long as the Western World, particularly the Berlin Treaty powers and the United States, remained unencumbered by other events and could influence the actions of the Turkish Government in its attitude toward this minority, no serious disorders were likely to occur. But when Europe went to war and the interest of the United States was focused on that conflict and events in Mexico and the Far East, the protection for the Armenian race and the restraining influence on the Turkish Government was removed. Under those conditions it was improbable that the rival ethnic groups could continue to coexist peacefully within the boundaries of one nation.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The First World War was a significant milestone in the tortuous history of the Armenian Question. Before 1914, the problem was both an internal and external dilemma for the Ottoman Government; after 1918, although the Armenian Question affected the conduct of Turkish policy to a greater or lesser degree for many years, it no longer could be considered an internal problem for the Armenian people no longer inhabited Turkish territory.

United States diplomatic representation in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War was under the direction of three highly competent American citizens. From November, 1913 until his departure for New York in February, 1916, Henry Morgenthau, well-known New York lawyer and prominent figure in the Democratic Party, was the American Ambassador. From February to September, 1916, the Embassy was under the direction of Charge d'Affaires Hoffman Philip, a career diplomat with several years experience in the Near East. Judge Abraham Elkus, who arrived in Constantinople in September, 1916 and left after severance of Turco-American diplomatic relations in April of the following¹ year, was the last Ambassador from the United States to the Sublime Porte.

Even before Turkey actually joined the international conflict as an ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Government took advantage of the international situation to abrogate the hated capitulations on October 1, 1914. Ambassador Morgenthau submitted a protest against this act in conjunction with similar protests filed by the representatives of the other powers. The Turkish position was simply that the capitulations, freely given, could be abrogated

1. Joseph C. Grew, who became the next Ambassador from the United States to Turkey in 1927, was accredited to the Republic of Turkey at Angora (Ankara). For a good report on the Constantinople Embassy during the war years, see: Lewis Heck, "Constantinople Embassy," The American Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 12, (March, 1935), pp. 132-76.

unilaterally. The United States did not acquiesce in such abrogation until an American representative affixed his signature to the Turco-American Treaty of 1923, and the American Congress did not accept such abrogation, even implicitly, until 1930. In 1914, the Americans most likely to be adversely affected by this act of the Ottoman Government were the missionaries working with the Armenians in the interior of the country.

In late October, 1914, Turkey entered the war as a belligerent^e and on the 21st of November, the Sultan proclaimed a Jihad, or holy war, against the enemies of Islam. Apparently fearing that one result of the Sultan's action would be persecution of the Sultan's Christian subjects, Secretary of State Bryan, in December, instructed Ambassador Gerard in Berlin to remind the German Government of its responsibilities, as an ally of Turkey, for actions of the latter which might result in outrages against the Armenians.²

Prior to Turkey's entrance into the war, the support of the Armenian people was sought by both the government of the Ottoman Empire and representatives of the Czar. A Turkish delegation, representing the government, arrived at Erivan during the Eighth Quadrennial Convention of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in the summer of 1914. Their purpose was to enlist the support of the million and a half Turkish Armenians in an attempt to foment revolt in Russian Armenia if hostilities between the two countries were initiated. The reward to the Armenian race for such demonstrable loyalty to the Sultan would be an autonomous Armenian state, under a Turkish protectorate to include all of Russian Armenia and parts of the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis.

2. Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1937), p. 367.

Georgia and Azerbaijan were also to be liberated from Russian control and to become Turkish Protectorates. The Armenian leaders, after weighing the offer briefly, reaffirmed the loyalty of the Armenian people to the government but declined to support the plan and suggested to the Turks that the Ottoman Empire should remain neutral in any European war.³

In October, 1914, Count Varantzoff Dashkoff communicated to the Armenian political organizations the desire of the Russian Government to see created an autonomous Armenian state, including the six vilayets in Turkey, under Russian protection following the conclusion of a successful war against the Ottoman Empire if and when such hostilities occurred. The 750,000 Armenians in Russia enthusiastically supported this plan and responded with eagerness to the Czar's call to arms when war was declared.⁴

It would not be pertinent to the subject of this study to trace the military history of the First World War in the region of the Caucasus. On occasion, however, it may be desirable to refer to isolated events which did have a significant effect on the Armenian race. One of these events was the Turkish attack across the Russian border in late 1914. This expedition pushed into the Caucasus, where it met with complete disaster and hastily retreated back into Ottoman territory. The military commander of this Turkish army was Enver Pasha, Minister of War in the Ottoman Government, and one of the three most powerful men in the nation. There is some question as to the role played

3. Simon Vratzian, Armenia and The Armenian Question, (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Co., 1943), p. 25. See also: M. C. Gabrielian, Armenia, A Martyr Nation, (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1918), pp. 295-7; and Jirayr Missakian, A Searchlight on the Armenian Question 1878-1950, (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Co., 1950), pp. 37-8.

4. Herbert A. Gibbons, Armenia in the World War, (New York: 1926), p. 7.

by the Armenian race in this debacle. It is apparent, however, that the Russian Armenians fought with determination to keep the Moslem army from over-running their land. There is a question as to the attitude and action of the Armenians of Turkey toward Enver's expedition. Certainly the Minister of War was convinced of their treachery and his belief, shared by Talaat Pasha and Djemal Pasha, had much to do with subsequent deportations and other acts against the Armenians by the Ottoman Government.

There are several statements by men, whose loyalty to the Armenian cause is unquestioned, that substantiate the belief that Turkish Armenians did much to aid the Russian cause during this important period. A one time deputy in the Ottoman Parliament described in detail his actions in the organizing of a pro-Allied volunteer movement among Armenians in Turkey a month and a half before hostilities began.⁵ One of the leaders of the Armenian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 pointed with pride to the fact that Armenians in Turkey offered to establish and support Armenian legions at their own expense to fight side by side with Russian troops under the command of Russian generals.⁶ Ambassador Morgenthau, in a confidential despatch to Secretary Lansing in 1915, credited the Armenian volunteers from Turkey with a major part in the failure of Enver's expedition.⁷ On the other hand, Friedhof Nansen, who achieved fame for his memorable work on behalf of refugees

5. Garegin Pasdermadjian, Why Armenia Should Be Free, (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Company, 1918), p. 9.

6. Decimal File, 180.03101/47, Secretary's Notes on Conversation by Representatives of Allied and Associated Powers, February 26, 1919, N.A. See also: M. Philips Price, A History of Turkey, From Empire to Republic, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956), p. 115 for a report on Armenians who fled from Turkey and formed three infantry battalions of the Russian Army.

7. Decimal File, 867.00/798½, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Nov. 18, 1915, N.A.

in Europe and the Near East for the League of Nations, concluded, after reading war-time reports from German diplomats and consuls in Turkey, "that there is no proof whatever of Armenian treachery, or that they had any insurrectionist plans."⁸

One thing is certain, there existed a feeling of mutual distrust between the two ethnic groups which needed only a catalytic agent to change these fears to sanguinary deeds. The failure of the Turkish drive into Russia and the subsequent Russian invasion of Turkish Armenia, the Entente attack at the Dardanelles, and a revolt of the Armenians at Van in May, 1915 were all agents of the type mentioned. Morgenthau wrote to Secretary Bryan on May 25, 1915 that mutual fear existed between the Armenians and Turks; "Fear on the part of the Armenians who recall the past massacres and fear on the part of the Government at alledged or dreaded conspiracies."⁹

Basing their action on the right of legitimate self-defense, the Ottoman Government began in April, 1915 the systematic deportation of Armenians living in the zone of military operations near the Russian border to locations in the interior of the Empire, particularly to the vilayets of Konja and parts of Mesopotamia. As most of the able-bodied Armenian men had previously been called up to form labor battalions in the Turkish army, the deportees included primarily the women, children, and the aged. The numerous tales of horror connected with these deportations of entire cities have been included in many reports published at the time of the events and in the following years. Regardless of the legitimacy of the reason for the deportation of a supposed disloyal minority from the zones of probable military operations, it cannot be denied

8. Fridtjof Nansen, Armenia and the Near East, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1928), p. 302.

9. Decimal File, 867.4016/71, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, May 25, 1915, M.A.

that in the execution of the deportation orders the Turkish officials concerned were guilty of extreme cruelty. There is much evidence to indicate that the deportations were merely vehicles upon which to base an official policy of genocide - unparalleled in scope in modern history with the exception of the
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anti-Semitic program of Nazi Germany.

It was difficult for the American Government or people to obtain an accurate picture of the deportations in the first weeks after the official campaign was launched. The Ottoman Government clamped on a thorough censorship of all news emanating from Turkey and, where necessary, quarantined entire cities or districts as epidemic areas to keep missionaries and other foreign
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nationals from reporting the events to their homelands. Ambassador Morgenthau and the American consuls in Turkey were not located in the areas where the most desperate events were occurring but managed to get reports for transmission to Washington so that the full horror of the deportations was appreciated in the State Department before the complete story appeared in the American press.¹²

10. See: Nansen, Armenia and the Near East, p. 248; and American Military Mission to Armenia, Conditions in the Near East, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Doc. 266, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 10. See also the following for collections of documents implicating the Ottoman Government - specifically the Committee of Union and Progress: Aram Andonian, The Memoirs of Naim Bey, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1920); and Johannes Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien, 1914-1918, (Potsdam: Der Tempelverlag, 1919). The Turkish position is presented in: Djemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman - 1913-1919, (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1922); Ottoman Government, Verite sur le Mouvement Revolutionnaire Armenien et Les Mesures Gouvernementales, (Constantinople: 1916, included in a despatch from Elkus to the Secretary of State, Decimal File, 867.00/791, Oct. 14, 1916, N.A. Caleb Gates, President of Robert College during the World War, wrote in his book, Not to Me Only, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), p. 250, that a "very large part" of the Turkish population condemned the deportations from the first as a crime and a political blunder.

11. American missionaries, present at the scenes of massacre, were forbidden by censorship rules to write to the United States regarding the events. Continual reference to Evangeline in their letters home succeeded in informing their co-workers and families of the deportations.

12. Although there were occasional references in the press from 1915, on,

To sum up briefly the events connected with the deportations of the Armenians, it can be stated that these deportations, beginning in April, 1915, continued throughout the following two years despite the most violent foreign criticism. The probable number of Armenians killed or those whose deaths resulted from enforced removal from their homes and from resultant famine and disease is one million.¹³

In addition, many Armenians fled from the Ottoman Empire to areas under Allied control in the southern part of the Empire, to Persia, and particularly to Russian Armenia. By the end of 1916, few Armenians remained in Turkey except in and near the cities of Constantinople and Smyrna. As early as August, 1915, the Ottoman Minister of the Interior, and foremost advocate of the genocide program, Talaat Bey, reportedly told the German Ambassador "La question armenienne n'existe plus."¹⁴ Abdul Hamid's policy of eliminating the Armenian Question by destroying or driving out the Armenians had been accomplished. On August 11, 1916, to emphasize the change in the status of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Government revoked the constitution of the Armenian community, severed all relations of Armenians in the Empire with the Catholicos in Etchmiadzin, and created an

not until the report of the American Committee on Armenian Atrocities was published in several newspapers on Oct. 4, 1915, was the full significance and horror of the events presented to the American public.

13. See: Nansen, Armenia and the Near East., p 318; Bernhard F. Nordmann, American Missionary Work Among Armenians in Turkey, 1830-1923, (Abstract of

a Doctoral Dissertation, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1929), p. 9; Frank A. Ross, C. Luther Fry, and Elbridge Sibley, The Near East and American Philanthropy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), p. 30; and H. Pasdermadjian, Histoire de l'Arménie, (Paris: H. Samuelian, 1949), p. 453. See also: Djemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman, p. 281, where the author estimates that 1,500,000 Turks and Kurds died from Armenian-Russian action during the World War.

14. Nansen, Armenia and the Near East, p. 308.

Armenian ecclesiastical head with his headquarters in Jerusalem for purely religious issues, thus abolishing the ancient position of an Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople.

In Ambassador Morgenthau's despatches to the Department of State, it is easy to trace a change in his attitude from one of mild optimism to one of incredulity to one of utter frustration. In his first report on the deportations, dated April 27, 1915, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that the lives of the deportees were "probably not in danger." By the tenth of July, the persecution of Armenians was reportedly assuming "unprecedented proportions" and by the sixteenth of that month Morgenthau called the Turkish deportation program an attempt at race extermination. On the eleventh of August, the Ambassador, in a long despatch reviewing the events of the past few months, concluded his report with the following words:

It is difficult for me to restrain myself from doing something to stop this attempt to exterminate a race but I realize that I am here as Ambassador and must abide by the principles of non-interference with the internal affairs of another country.¹⁵

At no time during the deportations of Armenians were reports received in Washington of the injury or death of any native-born or naturalized American citizen. Thus, Ambassador Morgenthau's constant and vigorous protests to the Porte had to be founded on other grounds than the injury or death of fellow Americans. He therefore based most of his acts relative to the Armenians on the necessity to act "on behalf of humanity" and in the interest of maintaining friendly relations between the Ottoman Empire and

15. Decimal File, 867.4016/58, 867.4016/71, 867.4016/76, 867.4016/90, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Apr. 27, 1915, Jul 10, 1915, Jul. 16, 1915, and Aug. 11, 1915, N.A.

the United States. Although the American Ambassador realized that only the use of armed force could stop the deportations and the resultant massacres, he never advocated the use of such force by the United States. Both Morgenthau and his successor contemplated urging the United States to sever relations with the Ottoman Government as an indication of official repugnance at the violence against the Armenian race but both declined to recommend use of armed force which might jeopardize American interests and lives in the Ottoman Empire, would eliminate the primary source of relief to the Armenians, and would also remove from Constantinople the Embassy which guarded the rights of most of the Allied states after Turkey's entrance into
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the war.

In a letter to Wilson in 1916, Secretary of State Lansing defended the American policy of intervening in the case of the Armenian deportations, even though this involved purely Turkish subjects. He further clarified his position on the issue by stating in the same letter:

In the case of the Armenians I could see that their well-known disloyalty to the Ottoman Government and the fact that the territory which they inhabited was within the zone of military operations constituted ground more or less justifiable for compelling them to depart from their homes. It was not to my mind the deportation which was objectionable but the horrible brutality which attended its execution.¹⁷

Morgenthau protested to the Ottoman Government often and with some apparent effect despite the fact that the Turkish officials were quick to point out to the American diplomat that he had no legal right to interfere in

16. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau admitted in his book, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story, (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1918), p. 328, that technically he had no right to protest to the Turks. See also: Decimal File, 867.4016/297, Philip to Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1916, N.A.

17. U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers 1914-1920, (2 Vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), Vol. 1, pp. 42-3.

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an internal matter. On the 18th of August, 1915, Talaat informed Morgenthau that orders had been transmitted to the provinces exempting from¹⁹ deportation all Armenians of the Protestant or Catholic faiths. Although this decree affected only about ten percent of the total Armenian population in Turkey and was carried out somewhat less than completely by the Turkish authorities, it did have a mitigating effect on the deportation of many Armenians most closely associated with the American missionaries. Morgenthau was also instrumental in securing from the Ottoman Government permission for the distribution of aid from the United States and other countries to Armenian refugees, many of whom would have perished but for such assistance. At the beginning of the deportations, the Ottoman Government forbade any aid from being distributed to the deportees, whether such aid came from a neutral nation such as Switzerland or the United States or from an ally of Turkey

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such as Germany or Austria.

The American Ambassador also secured Turkish acceptance in principle to his most ambitious scheme for aiding the Armenian race. In the fall of 1915, Morgenthau suggested the immigration of the over 500,000 Armenians still in the Ottoman Empire into the United States. Reportedly, he personally offered one million dollars to help finance the plan and felt he could secure at least four million more from friends in the United States. The project was vetoed by the Department of State and Morgenthau's friends expressed their doubts as to the practicality of the scheme during wartime. Nevertheless,

18. See: Decimal File, 867.4016/74, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Jul. 10, 1915, N.A., in which the Ambassador informs Washington of the Ottoman Government's position on his actions.

19. Ibid., 867.4016/99, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Aug. 18, 1915, N.A.

20. See: Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story, pp. 346-63.

the Ambassador secured Talaat's permission for the departure of all Armenians²¹ whose emigration Morgenthau could vouch for as bona fide. Reviewing the plan from the vantage point of years, it would appear that, despite the failure of this ambitious project, it was important in that the Ambassador's request for aid from his friends in the United States led directly to the creation of one of the greatest American philanthropies of all time, one which was to be the source of the only truly effective help the Armenians in Turkey were to receive from the world.

In addition to the protests originated in Constantinople by the American Ambassador, other protests were delivered by Morgenthau on behalf of the American Government in Washington. In October, 1915, Secretary Lansing requested the American Ambassador to bring to the Ottoman Government's attention the fact that reports reaching the United States had aroused "an intense feeling of indignation" among the American people and if the persecutions of the Armenians continued the feeling of good will which the people²² of the United States had always held for Turkey would be destroyed. In February of the following year, Secretary Lansing appealed to the "sense of humanity and justice" of the Turkish leaders to take steps to ameliorate the conditions existing among the Armenian population and to redress the wrongs previously committed. For the first time a sanction was threatened if the Turkish Government ignored the appeal. Since the beginning of the

21. The New York Times, Oct. 2, 1915; Decimal File, 867.4016/117, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, 3 Sep. 1915 and Acting Secretary Polk to American Ambassador, Sep. 22, 1915, N.A. Apparently some serious consideration was given to a plan for large-scale emigration of Armenians from Turkey to the United States via Russia; see: Decimal File, 867.4016/218b, and 867.4016/250 which are respectively addressed to and received from the American Ambassador in Petrograd on Nov. 8, 1915 and Jan. 29, 1916, and in which the Russian Government agrees to permit Armenians in the Caucasus to go to the United States via Vladivostok, N.A.

22. Decimal File, 867.4016/218a, Lansing to American Ambassador, Oct. 4, 1915, N.A.

deportations the State Department had been gathering a large collection of official reports on conditions among the Armenians from both American and foreign diplomatic and consular representatives in the Ottoman Empire and from both American and foreign missionary and commercial agents operating in the same area. This material, although much of it had appeared in the press, had never been officially nor completely released for public consumption.

Consequently, Lansing could warn:

The Department at the present time is considering the question whether or not it is justified in longer withholding from the American people the facts now in its possession. The decision of the Department as to this question will be greatly influenced by the action which the Turkish Government may take upon the appeal on behalf of the Armenians now made to it by the United States.²³

The threat apparently had some temporary effect on the Government of Turkey, for three days later, Talaat informed the American Charge that all deportations had ceased. However, Talaat's broken promises to the American representatives had now become numerous and soon thereafter, the American Charge²⁴ protested again relative to a new wave of deportations and atrocities.

One of Morgenthau's primary aims in his campaign to end the atrocities against the Armenians was to enlist the support of the foreign diplomatic representatives in Constantinople. Naturally, no help could be expected from British, French, or Russian representatives as these Allied diplomats had departed from Constantinople in 1914, leaving their interests to be guarded by the United States. On behalf of the French Government, Morgenthau presented a warning that the Turkish officials responsible for the Armenian

23. Ibid., 867.4016/258a, Lansing to American Ambassador, Feb. 12, 1916, N.A.

24. Ibid., 867.4016/266, Philip to Secretary of State, Feb. 15, 1916; and 867.4016/271, Philip to Secretary of State, Mar. 28, 1916, N.A.

atrocities would be held accountable at the end of the war. The British Government's position was probably best presented in a speech by Lord Bryce on October 6, 1915 when he called upon the opinion of neutral nations, particularly that of the United States, to make itself felt on Turkey's allies, especially Germany. Later in the year, a remarkable book containing scores of atrocity stories from Turkey was published by the noted British historian,

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Arnold Toynbee. This publication, containing many reports by Americans in Turkey, was widely received in the United States and was an excellent British propaganda weapon. The Imperial Russian Government appealed to the United States on behalf of the Armenian Catholicos in April, 1915, and Secretary Bryan authorized Morgenthau to pass this appeal, on behalf of non-combattant

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Armenians, to the Turkish authorities. Italy was not at war when the deportations and massacres commenced and in the brief span of time before the Italian Government entered the conflict, the Italian Ambassador joined with the American diplomat in protests to the Porte.

It was, however, to the diplomatic representatives of the actual or potential members of the Central Powers, Turkey's allies, that Morgenthau turned in hopes of effective aid in stopping the violence against the Armenians. The Bulgarian representative did not hesitate to join the American in vigorous protest.

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The representative of the Dual-Monarchy also cooperated

25. Ibid., 867.4016/70, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Jun. 18, 1915, N.A.

26. Arnold J. Toynbee, Armenian Atrocities - The Murder of a Nation, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915).

27. Decimal File, 867.4016/58a, Bryan to the Russian Ambassador, Apr. 27, 1915, N.A.

28. See: Ibid., 867.4016/101, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Aug. 20, 1915, N.A. In his book, Morgenthau reports that his wife succeeded in interesting the Queen of Bulgaria in the Armenian case to the extent of securing a strong Bulgarian protest to the Porte,; Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story, p. 341.

by informing Vienna of the situation in Turkey and joining Morgenthau in trying to influence Talaat to end the excesses of the deportations. ²⁹

In the final analysis, Morgenthau realized that if any nation could influence Turkish conduct that nation would be Germany. The German Government protested to the Porte on July 4, 1915, and again on October 8th of the same year, the latter protest being termed "strong" by the American Ambassador. ³⁰ That these or subsequent protests by the Germans had any effect on the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress is very doubtful. In Constantinople, Morgenthau used pressure on the German Ambassador to force him to act, warning him that the German Government would share in the odium which would arise throughout the world from the Turkish Government's acts. It is not possible to determine the effect of Morgenthau's demarches, but in the light of Morgenthau's later charges against the good faith of the German protests to the Porte it is of interest to note that he wrote to Lansing on October 4, 1915, that the German and Austrian Embassies had no restraining power over the Turkish Government. ³¹

Meanwhile, the United States Government in Washington was also trying to enlist the support of the German Government. In October, 1915, and again in

29. Decimal File, 867.4016/60, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, May 2, 1915; and 867.4016/74, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Jul. 10, 1915, N.A.

30. See: Ibid., 867.4016/91, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Aug. 12, 1915, N.A. Nansen gives the German Government credit for several "vigorous" protests to the Porte; see: Nansen, Armenia and the Near East, pp. 306-7.

31. Ibid., 867.4016/74, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Jul. 10, 1915; and 867.4016/159, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Oct. 4, 1915, N.A. In Ambassador Morgenthau's, The Tragedy of Armenia, (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., Ltd., 1918), p. 14, the author states, in regard to the deportations, "Let me say most emphatically, the German Government could have prevented it." Morgenthau denounced primarily Ambassador Wengenheim, who died in early 1916. In Morgenthau's, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story, the American Ambassador gives credit to Wengenheim's successor, Graf Wolf-Metternich, for trying to secure the end of the atrocities.

February, 1916, it tried without noticeable success, to secure the cooperation of the German Government via Count von Bernstorff, German Ambassador in Washington. In the latter part of 1916, the massacres continuing in Turkey, Ambassador Elkus suggested to the Department of State that additional pressure be used on the Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary to secure their aid in forcing the Turks to cease. If this maneuver failed to enlist the support of those governments, Elkus proposed that the President personally appeal to the two emperors and give full publicity to the exchange of notes between the heads of state. In line with this suggestion, in November of that year, Ambassador Gerard in Berlin again requested, on behalf of the State Department, German aid in securing the amelioration of conditions for the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

Although, as stated above, it is questionable that the German Government could have stopped the persecution of Armenians, assuming that it desired that end, it is nevertheless true that many Americans believed that Germany had a controlling influence in Ottoman affairs and consequently they held the German Government and people largely responsible for atrocities they believed could have been prevented by a word from Berlin. Count von Bernstorff and some other prominent Germans did little to contradict this belief. On September 28, 1915, Bernstorff publicly blamed the Armenian people for bringing the reprisals about.

32. Decimal File, 867.4016/173, Count J. H. von Bernstorff to Secretary of State, Oct. 8, 1915; 867.4016/258b, Lansing to German Ambassador, Feb. 16, 1916; 867.4016/299, Elkus to Secretary of State, Oct. 17, 1916; and 867.4016/299, Lansing to American Ambassador (Berlin), Nov. 1, 1916, N.A.

33. Harley Notter, Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 442. This belief was reinforced by the publication from 1916 to 1918 of such books as: Herbert A. Gibbons, The Blackest Page of Modern History, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916); E. F. Benson, Crescent and Iron Cross, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1918); and the two books, previously mentioned, by Ambassador Morgenthau, The Treaty of Armenia, and Ambassador Morgenthau's Story.

34. The New York Times, Sep. 29, 1915.

a report on a recently published article by a noted German military historian in which the author pointed out that the Armenian problem was the affair of the Turks alone and that a military necessity existed to eliminate an internal foe within Ottoman boundaries. The writer even criticized those German diplomatic and consular representatives who had given aid to Armenians suffering from the effects of deportation.³⁵

Naturally, the reports from the Ottoman Empire brought forth in the people of the United States, both those of Armenian descent and those with no connection to the Near East, anger and a desire to help those who were in distress. As early as July, 1915, an American Armenian Relief Fund was soliciting for aid to be sent to the Armenian deportees in Turkey.³⁶ As stated above, Ambassador Morgenthau's report on the destruction of the Armenian race and his request to his friends in New York for funds to enable him to implement his ambitious emigration scheme resulted in the creation of an organization which was to become one of the greatest dispensers of charity of all time. This organization was established at a meeting in New York on September 16, 1915, as the Armenian Relief Committee with James L. Barton of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions as Chairman, Charles H. Crane as Treasurer, and Samuel T. Dutton as Secretary. In addition to the above, the name of Cleveland H. Dodge should be mentioned, for no man was more instrumental in ensuring the success of the new organization than he. Dodge was a member of the Committee's Executive Board along with several other prominent Americans. In November, the Armenian Relief.

35. Ibid., Oct. 10, 1915.

36. Ibid., Jul. 15, 1915.

Committee became the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief and absorbed all previously existing organizations attempting to obtain and transmit aid to the people of these areas. In 1919, this Committee again changed its name, this time being reorganized and incorporated by an act of Congress as the Near East Relief.³⁷

The original goal of the Armenian Relief Committee was \$100,000 for relief purposes. Morgenthau cabled that that sum would help but that more would be needed. The original goal was met within a month, due partly to the publication on October 4 of a collection of supposedly eye-witness reports of massacres and other violence against the Armenians. These reports were collected by a Committee on Armenian Atrocities which included such well-known Americans as Charles R. Crane, Samuel Dutton, Cardinal Gibbons, Cleveland Dodge, Stephen S. Wise, John R. Mott, James Barton, Charles Eliot, William Sloane, Bishop David H. Greer, Oscar S. Straus and others. From letters and statements written or dictated by American, German, English, Greek, Bulgarian, Armenian, and Turkish citizens, the Committee prepared the report which was a ringing indictment against the cruelty of the Turkish deportation program. Many American newspapers carried the report in full and practically all carried at least abstracts from it.³⁸

The initial success of the Committee was to be repeated many times in the succeeding years by it and by its successors. Between 1915 and 1930 this organization under its three successive names was to distribute relief in the Near East to the value of well over \$100,000,000, of which over \$90,000,000 was to come from private sources. An amazing example of American

37. The complete report on this organization has been written by the one man best-qualified to write it: James L. Barton, Story of Near East Relief, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1930).

38. See footnote 12.

generosity, this outpouring of charity to the peoples of the Near East inevitably focused American attention on that part of the world.

As mentioned above, the Ottoman Government, which originally forbade all aid to its deportees, later relented but continued to take a highly unfavorable view of American or other neutral aid being sent to its Armenian citizens. At one point, a protest was presented to Ambassador Morgenthau on the grounds that the American Consuls in the Ottoman Empire, by distributing aid from the United States to Armenian deportees, were not only interfering in the internal affairs of the Empire but also were encouraging resistance against the government. The Turkish representatives also suggested that if American aid were to be distributed to these unfortunate people, such aid should be dispensed by Turkish officials. The American Ambassador ignored the protest, though he did warn the consuls to be particularly careful not to interfere in the legitimate internal affairs of the Ottoman state, and he also refused to allow the Turks to distribute American aid.³⁹ The Ottoman authorities placed other obstacles in the way of American relief efforts by imposing normal import duties on relief supplies destined for the Armenians and by frequent requisition of food supplies which arrived from the United States. These acts led eventually to the sending of currency alone to Constantinople where food, clothing, and other supplies were purchased within Turkey. By late 1916, the Ottoman Government relaxed its opposition to the sending of relief to the Armenians and a mutually acceptable arrangement was worked out between the Government and the Americans.⁴⁰

39. See: Decimal File, 867.48/199, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Nov. 29, 1915, N.A.

40. Ibid., 867.48/475, Elkus to Secretary of State, Nov. 23, 1916. The American Red Cross, which cooperated with the A.C.A.S.R., finally obtained the collaboration of the Red Crescent Society in Turkey.

The American Congress became involved in the issue of relief for Armenians in 1916. On February 9, Senator Lodge of Massachusetts introduced a concurrent resolution in the Senate requesting the President to designate a day on which Americans might "give expression to their sympathy by contributing to the funds now being raised for the relief of the Armenians." The proposal was in line with the President's previous designation of days for collecting relief funds for Poles and Jews who were also exposed to suffering because of the war. With a minimum of debate, the resolution was passed and President Wilson subsequently designated October 21 and 22, 1916 as days for an intensive drive to collect sums to be utilized in purchasing relief supplies for the Armenians. ⁴¹

Although stress has been placed on the relief sent to Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, it should be emphasized that a large percentage of the total aid distributed by the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief was given to Armenian refugees in neighboring areas, particularly in the Caucasus and Persia. Major relief centers were established at Tiflis, Tabriz, Beirut, Cairo, and Jerusalem, as well as at Constantinople. The center at Tiflis was to remain one of the most important relief distribution points in the Near East for many years, supplying the Armenian refugees with aid as they arrived when the Russian Army was in retreat, supplying these same people with aid to re-establish their homes as they followed the Russian Army in its advances into Turkey, and once again meeting these same refugees as they were again forced to flee in the face of Turkish victory over the Russians - particularly after the collapse of the Russian front following the Russian Revolution.

41. See: Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 53, pt. 3 (Feb. 9, 1916), pp. 2335-6; and Ibid., Vol. 53, pt. 2 (Jul. 18, 1916), pp. 11235-6. The hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs were published as: U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Relief of Armenians, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on S. Con. Res. 12, 64th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916).

After relations between the United States and the Porte were broken in April, 1917, the program of relief for the Armenians continued with considerable success throughout the war. Most of the representatives of the American Committee were allowed to remain at their posts in the field. In certain instances Swiss and even German missionaries took over from Americans the⁴² distribution of relief supplies. President Gates of Robert College remained in Constantinople throughout the war as Chairman of the Relief Committee for Asiatic Turkey. W. W. Peet, Treasurer of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and a long-time resident of Turkey, established headquarters in Berne, Switzerland to speed the transfer of relief funds to Gates. The procedure finally established was to have the American Committee pass the funds to the State Department which in turn sent these funds to the Legation in Berne. The money was transferred to Peet who purchased foreign currency, usually Swedish, for delivery to Gates in Constantinople. By December, 1918, the A.C.A.S.R. had distributed relief in the Near East valued⁴³ at over \$9,000,000, much of this subsequent to April, 1917.

At one point, the British Government, which was at war with Turkey, informed the State Department that in its view all subjects of the Turkish Government were enemy citizens, regardless of creed, and the funds being distributed to Armenians by the American Committee would eventually be of assistance to the very weak Turkish financial structure. In answer, an

42. See: Barton, Near East Relief, p. 64. See also: Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien, pp. 344-5.

43. See: Louise J. Peet, ed., No Less Honor, (Chattanooga: Privately Printed, 1939), pp. 165-78; and Decimal File, 867.48/748, Minister Stovell (Bern) to Secretary of State, Mar. 14, 1918; and 867.48/917, C. V. Vickrey to A. B. Ruddock, Jun. 24, 1918, N.A.; The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, (New York: 1919), p. 6.

official of the State Department informed the British Ambassador: "We feel that the material benefit to the Turkish Government is insignificant compared to the moral and political advantage to our own cause which must result from helping these starving races within reasonable limits." ⁴⁴ The British Government did not renew the demarche to have aid to the Armenians discontinued.

During the First World War, particularly during the years 1915-1916, the Department of State was flooded with requests by Armenians in the United States and by naturalized or native-born Americans of Armenian descent for information regarding relatives in the Ottoman Empire. The Department, working through its diplomatic and consular agents, did what it could to secure information but the chaotic condition of the Ottoman Empire and the lack of cooperation of the Turkish authorities made the task difficult and often ⁴⁵ impossible.

In April, 1917, America entered the First World War and on the 20th of that month the Porte officially severed diplomatic relations with the United States. During the months between this event and the conclusion of the war between the Allies and Turkey, United States' interests in the Ottoman Empire were under the protection of the Swedish Legation. Two American diplomats, previously members of the American Embassy staff at Constantinople, Lewis Heck and Luther Fowle, were unofficially attached to the Swedish Legation to report on conditions and assist in the protection of American lives and property in the Empire.

44. Decimal File, 867.48/698, Sir Cecil A. Spring Rice to Secretary of State, Dec. 3, 1917, and Phillips to the British Ambassador, Dec. 18, 1917, N.A.. In a memo to an assistant, also located under this number and dated Dec. 15th, Phillips displayed irritation at "the fool" in the Foreign Office that handled the matter.

45. Many requests for information from the Department are contained in the State Department Decimal File 367.11 in the National Archives.

At the time of the severance of relations, the Sublime Porte announced that this action automatically entailed the suspension of all treaties previously existant between the two nations. This contention on the part of the Ottoman authorities was never accepted by the United States Government. The controversy was to reappear at the time of the Lausanne Conference and especially during the subsequent debate in the United States over the ratification of the Turkish-American Treaty. Intimately involved with this problem, of course, was the question of the future relations between Americans and Ottoman citizens, including the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire.

There was some enthusiasm in the United States to declare war on Turkey but both the Administration in Washington and the American Board were opposed to this action. The major considerations which tended to preclude a declaration of war were (1) the fact that the American educational, philanthropic, religious, and charitable activities could not be protected as well if a state of war existed, and (2) the American and Turkish armed forces did not meet on any battlefield as United States military efforts were concentrated in France.⁴⁶ The Congress had before it, during 1917 and 1918, several resolutions declaring that a state of war existed with Turkey but none were seriously considered after the senior Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge, aligned himself with President Wilson and the State Department against such action. Lodge left no doubt that the only reason that he did not join with those of both political parties who advocated war with the Turks was due exclusively to his fear for the lives and property of Americans still living in the Empire.⁴⁷

46. See: Decimal File, 711.672/183, State Department Memorandum of Aug. 3, 1923; and Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1917, (Boston: The American Board, 1917), p. 72.

47. See: Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 56, pt. 1 (Dec. 4, 1917), p. 17; (Dec. 6, 1917), p. 50; (Dec. 7, 1917), p. 64; and Vol. 56, pt. 6 (Apr. 23, 1918), pp. 5472-8.

This American decision not to declare open hostilities with the Turks probably served the Armenian refugees and deportees well during the period of the World War but this same policy was to have a complicating effect on United States action with regard to Turkey and Armenia following the war. The United States, not having been at war with Turkey, could not expect to play as significant a role in the writing of the Turkish peace treaty as could those nations whose forces had actually been engaged with Ottoman troops on the battlefield.

American interests in the Ottoman Empire suffered considerably during the war. Although at least one commercial enterprise suffered financial loss, it was the gigantic American missionary effort that experienced overwhelming losses and change before the war was over. As early as September, 1915, W. W. Peet informed James Barton that "present advices indicate few interior colleges or schools can open because teachers, pupils, patrons, have perished or (been) scattered by deportation." During the following years, over half of the American missionaries left Turkey, while those remaining were engaged primarily in the distribution of relief to the Armenians. By the end of hostilities in 1918, practically all the churches, schools, and hospitals once administered by the representatives of the American Board, with the exception of those at Constantinople and Smyrna, had been closed, requisitioned, or destroyed. Of the 150 American Protestant missionaries at work in Turkey in 1914, there were but 36 left in 1918; of the 1200 native workers assisting the American missionaries when the war began, scarcely 200 could be found in 1918. The Armenians for whom these American missionaries had labored were scattered throughout the Near East or had

48. Decimal File, 367.116/369, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, Sep. 31, 1915, which enclosed a letter from Peet to Barton.

perished during the deportations. Truly, Armenian Protestantism had suffered
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a "most terrible blow."

Yet despite the appalling changes in the status of the American missionary effort in Turkey between 1914 and 1918, Americans on the whole were treated with regard and a lack of hostility by the Turkish Government and people. Caleb Gates, President of Robert College, who spent the war years in Constantinople, wrote, regarding these years:

The American institutions in Turkey had great reason for gratitude to the Ottoman government for the kindly treatment that had been accorded to them. The Turks had given clear proof of their desire to maintain friendly relations with the United States, and in this crisis [i.e., the Peace Conference at Paris] they hoped that the United States would manifest a like disposition toward Turkey.⁵⁰

As the situation for the Armenian race in Turkey became progressively worse during the war years, a change was occurring across the border in Russian Armenia. The front between the Russian and Turkish armies in the Caucasus fluctuated constantly and over large areas of territory during the World War. At one time, in the spring of 1916, the four vilayets of Turkey containing the largest percentage of Armenians in 1914, had been occupied by the Russian Army. At this point the government in Petrograd announced that the Armenian provinces of Turkey were to be annexed to Russia, the Armenian people to receive cultural and ecclesiastical autonomy - something less than

49. See: Leon Arpee, A Century of Armenian Protestantism, 1846-1946, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 84, 92. See also: Annual Report of the American Board, 1918, pp. 170-4; and Edward M. Earle, "American Missions in the Near East," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 7 (April, 1929) p. 413. One result of the war was even closer collaboration and friendship between the Armenian Gregorian Church and the American missionaries. In 1918, the Armenian Patriarch in the Ottoman Empire sent a despatch to Barton which included the following: "...I come to express my thankfulness to the American Board that has for nearly a century helped the persecuted Armenian nation materially, intellectually, and spiritually." Decimal File, 867.4016/406, Armenian Patriarch to the American Board (Passed by the Department of State), Mar. 23, 1918, N.A.

50. Gates, Not to Me Only, p. 249.

most Armenians had expected after having contributed substantial aid to
51
the Czar's forces. Before this plan of the Russian Government could be
executed, however, the Turkish Army was on the advance and soon there-
after the Russian Revolution began.

By September, 1917, an Armenian National Assembly, representing both
Russian and Turkish Armenians was established in Tiflis to give direction to
Armenian policy as a whole. After the October Revolution, the Russian Army
abandoned the Caucasus front leaving the defense of the area to the Georgians,
Azeris of Azerbaijan, and the Armenians. An attempt to form a Transcaucasian
Government of the three national groups to coordinate defense against the
Turkish advance in late 1917 and early 1918 failed, and on May 28, 1918 the
Armenian National Assembly, now established at Erivan, declared the inde-
pendence of an Armenian Republic. The Turks who had secured Kars, Ardahan,
and Batum from Russia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, demanded even more
territory in Russian Armenia and were partially successful in enforcing their
demands. A peace treaty between the Armenians and Turks was signed on June 4,
1918, and the independent republic of Armenia, a small nation of about 11,000
square kilometers was born in the Caucasus. Lenin had previously recognized
Armenia's right to independence on December 30, 1917.

At Erivan, the Armenian National Assembly expanded its membership and
became the first Parliament of the new state. A Western-oriented republic
was established with a President and ten cabinet members. Of the latter, six
were members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and four were members

51. It is reliably reported that the Russian Government intended to settle
Cossacks on the fertile land in Turkish Armenia. A. Safrastian, "Armenia,"
Encyclopedia Britannica (1956), Vol. 2, p. 381.

of the opposition Peoples Party. The tasks facing this new government were tremendous. The land was poor, over-crowded with 300,000 refugees, and the food supplies were nearly exhausted; famine and disease were responsible for a very high death rate among the population. The new government had no administrative structure, no established economic system, no national revenue, no industrial equipment, and no adequate means of transportation. Cities and towns had been damaged by the war and the land had to be repaired for cultivation. This was by no means the Armenia which the leaders of the country believed was to be their eventual nation; but until the peace conference, this small area would serve as a rallying point for Armenians everywhere. 52

Meanwhile, the Armenians contributed a service of considerable value to the Allies and Associated Powers by holding the oil-rich Caspian port of Baku and forbidding its use to the Turks and their German allies until the Armenian force in the city was overwhelmed by a Turkish Army in September, 1918. The value of this source of petroleum to the German and Turkish armies in 1918 cannot be overestimated and the failure of the Central Powers to secure the petroleum at an earlier date is due almost exclusively to the Armenians who defended the port. 53

During the war, spokesmen of the major Allied Powers were liberal with their promises to the Armenians who craved independence from Ottoman rule. Asquith, Lloyd George, Balfour, Cecil, and Viscount Bryce all made statements

52. See: Missakian, Searchlight on the Armenian Question, pp. 73-4, for an excellent report on the difficulties facing the Armenian Government.

53. See: Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian Question, pp. 41-7. Both the Russians and the British had aided the Armenians in the defense of the city prior to its fall, but in the last weeks before the Turks over-ran the port, the latter faced only Armenian volunteers. Naturally, the Armenian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference stressed this service to the Allies.

which placed Great Britain on record as favoring self-determination or independence for the Armenians in Turkey. Clemenceau, in a letter to the leader of the so-called Armenian Delegation in Paris, wrote in July, 1918, that the fate of the Armenian race must be settled "according to the supreme laws of humanity and justice." On November 30, 1918, the Italian Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution by an overwhelming vote which declared that
54
body in favor of complete independence for an Armenian state.

However, in the spring of 1916, a secret agreement between Great Britain, France, and Czarist Russia was concluded which looked to the post-war settlement in the Near East. Among other provisions in the Sykes-Picot Agreement were several dealing with the future of Turkish Armenia, both the six Armenian vilayets and Lesser Armenia, or Cilicia. The four Armenian vilayets nearest Russian Armenia were to go to Russia, while the other two vilayets and Cilicia were to fall under the control of France. No mention was made of eventual independence or even autonomy for these areas and Russian policy after conquest of much of Turkish Armenia indicated that the Armenians in Turkey would have experienced little political autonomy from Russia if the terms of this Allied agreement of 1916 had eventually been carried out. The Russian Revolution, of course, eliminated Russian participation in the plan and made the rise of an independent Armenian state in this area of the world
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possible.

54. See: Armenia's Charter, (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., Ltd., 1918); Armenian National Union of America, The Case of Armenia, (New York: 1919), pp. 9-10; and Joseph Burt, The People of Ararat, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1926), pp. 150, 158, for statements by the Allied leaders.
55. Provisions of the Sykes - Picot Agreement are given in Jacob C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, (2 Vols., Princeton: D. Van Nostrand

Meanwhile, an important figure in the development of the plan to create an independent Armenian state peopled by Turkish Armenians, as well as their Russian brothers, had appeared in Paris. Boghos Nubar Pasha, an Armenian whose home had been Cairo but whose devotion was to the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, particularly those of Cilicia, had been sent by the Catholicos of Echmiadzin to the Western European countries at the beginning of the war to present the case for the Armenians. Nubar established his headquarters in Paris and became head of the Armenian National Delegation, maintaining contact not only with the French Government but also with the governmental leaders of other Allied and neutral states. Despite his original connection with the Catholicos in Russian Armenia, Nubar consistently concentrated his efforts on behalf of the Armenians of Turkey.

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In late 1916, Nubar and the French Government concluded an agreement whereby, in return for the services of a contingent of Armenians recruited to fight with the Allies in the Near East, the French Government guaranteed the post-war creation of an autonomous Cilicia under French protection. The Armenian Legion, the result of this agreement, contributed much to the Allied drive in Palestine and Syria.

57

Company, Inc., 1956), Vol. 2, pp. 18-22. Apparently there was some conflict of views between the British and French Governments regarding Armenia's future even during the war. When General Bliss, at the request of the State Department, tried to elicit the views of the British military on the future of Armenia in the spring of 1918, he was informed that the British desired that the matter not be formally discussed by the military representatives at Paris. Bliss assumed this was because of Anglo-French disagreement. Decimal File, 763.72/13362, Ambassador Sharp (Paris) to Secretary of State, May 6, 1918, N.A.

56. See: K. S. Papazian, Patriotism Perverted, (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934), p. 46.

57. Burt, People of Ararat, p. 80.

Boghos Nubar Pasha entered into communication with the United States Department of State and President Wilson long before the Armistice of Mudros concluded the Allied war with Turkey. In June, 1916, he sent a despatch to Secretary Lansing in which he recounted the horrors of the deportations and asked for United States' intervention in Turkey to protect the Armenian survivors. In May, 1917, he outlined his plan for the future of Turkish Armenia in a long despatch to President Wilson. In this letter, he called for the creation of an autonomous Armenian state composed of the Armenian territories of the Ottoman Empire (at this time the government at Eriwan had not been established) which would include the six vilayets, Cilicia, and the ports of Trebizond, Mersine and Alexandretta. This autonomous region would be under the protection of the Allied Powers for about twenty-five years with one of the powers assuming a trusteeship over the country during that period of time. Eventually Armenia would become an independent state, and like Switzerland, permanently neutral. Nubar made no recommendation in his letter as to which state should assume the trusteeship over the future state during the first quarter century of its existence. The agreement with the French Government regarding Cilicia had been negotiated by this time, however.

58

This letter resulted in an immediate request for information on the official status of Nubar from Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Sharp in Paris. Sharp replied that the Armenian had no official accreditation to the French Government but was considered by officials of the latter as speaking with authority on Armenian affairs.

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58. Decimal File, 867.4016/287, Boghos Nubar to Secretary of State, Jun. 15, 1916; 867.4016/364, James Barton to Assistant Secretary of State Phillips, Oct. 25, 1917, which incloses a copy of a letter from Boghos Nubar to President Wilson dated May 24, 1917, N.A.

59. Ibid., 701.67m51, Lansing to Ambassador Sharp (Paris), May 29, 1917; and 701.67m51/1, Ambassador Sharp to Secretary of State, Jun. 2, 1917, N.A.

By September, 1917, an unusual situation had developed in the United States. Earlier in that year, D. G. Pasdermadjian had arrived in Washington, accredited to the American Government as Special Envoy of the Catholicos to act as a source of information for the State Department on matters pertaining to the Armenian people. ⁶⁰ Later, Pasdermadjian assumed the post of representative in the United States of the Armenian Government at Erivan. Meanwhile, in a letter of September 12, 1917, Boghos Nubar Pasha informed Lansing that Miran Sevasly, at that time President of the Armenian National Union of America, would henceforth be the representative in the United States of the Armenian National Delegation. It was further stated that he and Pasdermadjian would cooperate in the effort to liberate Armenia from the ⁶¹ Turks. Although some cooperation between the two men was evident during the following years, it was often submerged by a growing spirit of jealousy between the two representatives. As friction between the Armenian National Delegation and the representatives of the Erivan Republic increased in Paris during the Peace Conference, a mutual hostility also developed between their ⁶² representatives in the United States.

60. See: Ibid., 860J.01/398, G. Pasdermadjian to Secretary of State, Mar. 4, 1918, N.A.

61. Ibid., 867.48/676, Nubar to Secretary of State, Sep. 12, 1917, N.A.

62. As early as April, 1918, James I. Barton feared complications from the existence of two representatives of the Armenians in the United States. He suggested to Lansing that a secret committee of prominent Americans, to include Dodge, Crane, Elihu Root, William Peet, and Barton, be formed to coordinate action on behalf of Armenia and help the State Department get at the facts. Apparently no action was taken on this suggestion. Ibid., 867.4016/385, Barton to Secretary of State, Apr. 4, 1918, N.A.

It is certain that all Armenian leaders had reason to hope that in the United States Government and people they had friends and quite possibly protectors. In addition to the representations on behalf of the Armenians by the State Department during the deportations and the huge amount of relief supplies sent to the Armenian refugees by the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, there were statements by prominent Americans that could be interpreted as promising United States support for Armenian post-war plans. President Wilson referred to Armenia indirectly in his famous Fourteen Points, Point Twelve of which stated:

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

Some influential Republicans favored American aid to the Armenians.

In February and again in May, 1918, Representative Little of Kansas urged financial aid to the Armenians in the Caucasus who, joining the British advancing from Mesopotamia, could destroy the Turkish forces and thus put Turkey out of the war. ⁶³ Theodore Roosevelt in a speech of September 6, 1918, ⁶⁴ called for a free Armenia. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge introduced a memorandum to the Senate on November 18, 1918 for the consideration of his colleagues which included the following: "Armenia should be erected into a self-governing community, and all Armenians scattered throughout the Turkish ⁶⁵ Empire should be induced to settle there...."

63. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 56, pt. 6 (May 2, 1918), pp. 5953-4; and Vol. 56, Appendix (Feb. 7, 1918) pp. 175-82.

64. The New York Times, Sep. 7, 1918.

65. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 56, pt. 2 (Nov. 18, 1918), p. 11579

In all references to the future of Armenia by American political leaders there was no mention during the war of a possible American mandate over the new state, but thought was certainly given to this possibility by other people. A sub-committee of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, headed by Dr. James L. Barton, and containing several experts on Turkish history and economy, prepared a study in 1918 and published it under the title Reconstruction in Turkey.⁶⁶ The report emphasized the unique size of the American investment in Turkey both in terms of money and the facilities created in Armenia and throughout the Turkish Empire. The study was later referred to by one American writer as the "textbook" of the American mandate proposal.⁶⁷

In 1918, the American Consul-General at Nantes, who has previously held that post at Constantinople, G. Bie Ravndal, included his recommendations for the future Turkish settlement in a despatch to the Secretary of State. Ravndal envisaged an independent Armenia extending from Mount Ararat to the Mediterranean, while a Turkish regime exercised authority over an independent Anatolia. American advisors would assist both governments during the reconstruction period.⁶⁸

Also in 1918, Nubar Pasha, in an interview to the Parisian newspaper Libre Parole, referred to the future status of an Armenian state which he foresaw under the guidance of one of the great powers. He did not specifically request an American mandate for Armenia but he did point to the history of American guidance to Cuba as an example of the type of assistance which the new Armenian state would need.⁶⁹

66. William H. Hall, ed., Reconstruction in Turkey, (New York: American Committee of Armenian and Syrian Relief, 1918).

67. Clair Price, "Mustapha Kemal and the Armenians," Current History, Vol. 17 (Oct. 1922), p. 119.

68. Decimal File, 867.00/827, Ravndal to Secretary of State, Oct. 1, 1918, N.A.

69. Kevork Aslan, Armenia and the Armenians, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1920), p. xxiii.

On October 30, 1918, the Ottoman Government, completely defeated by the Allies, signed the Armistice of Mudros and thus withdrew from the First World War. The provisions of Mudros included the withdrawal of all Turkish forces in the Caucasus back to the boundary of 1914, the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cilicia, and the right of the Allies to occupy any or all parts of the six Armenian vilayets in case of disorders.

These provisions did not go as far as some individuals desired. The Messrs. Peet, Barton, and Dodge of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief wrote to the Secretary of State requesting that the Turks be forced to evacuate all of Turkish Armenia and part of the vilayet of Trebizond and that Allied forces occupy the area to maintain order "so long as
70
is necessary." The Armenian representatives in the United States, Sevasly and Pasdermadjian, jointly requested that the United States use its influence to secure (1) withdrawal of Turkish forces from all of Russian and Turkish Armenia, (2) occupation of strategic spots in this area by Allied troops, (3) adoption of measures to prevent Turks from organizing an influx of Turkish immigrants into this territory, (4) organization of an Inter-Allied Commission to aid in the repatriation of refugees, and (5) pending the deliberations of the Peace Conference and the final settlement of the Armenian Question, the administration of the territory by a provisional Inter-Allied
71
Government.

From Paris, on November 11, 1918, came a request from Nubar Pasha which

70. Decimal File, 867.48/1075, Peet, Barton and Dodge to Secretary of State, Oct. 31, 1918, N.A.

71. Ibid., 763.72/12246, Sevasly and Pasdermadjian to Secretary of State, Oct. 31, 1918, N.A.

encompassed a more active role for the United States in the Turkish settlement. The head of the Armenian National Delegation requested the immediate occupation of all Armenian territory in the Ottoman Empire by Allied troops aided by American troops in order to prevent further destruction of the Armenian race by the Turks.⁷² In this suggestion, Nubar was ignoring an important fact which was to recur in the debate on the Armenian problem and American involvement therewith many times in the succeeding years. The United States had not declared war on Turkey and, consequently, was to find herself in a singular position in its relations with the defeated nation during the months and years of peace-making.

But at the conclusion of the First World War, Armenians everywhere had reason to rejoice and anticipate a bright and happy future. Conditions in the Armenian Republic were chaotic, and Cilicia was under Allied occupation, but Russia was in revolution, Turkey was totally defeated, and spokesmen for both the Allied nations and the United States had given direct or implied support to the proposal that an Armenian nation, if not independent, at least autonomous, where all members of the Armenian race could live in peace and security, be established.

72. Ibid., 867.4016/ Boghos Nubar to Secretary of State, Nov. 11, 1918, N.A.

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Until approximately the beginning of September, 1919, American-Armenian relations were primarily a European matter, in the sense that pertinent policies were determined in Paris by the peace delegations and the citizens of all nations, including those of Turkey and of Armenia, looked to Paris for important decisions. However, after the introduction of the Williams Resolution in the Senate in September, 1919 and the unfortunate illness of President Wilson which occurred about the same time, the important decisions on American-Armenian relations were henceforth to be made in Washington, where Congress asserted an ever-increasing control over American post-war international relations.

Shortly after the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, Secretary of State Lansing moved toward eventual normalization of relations with the Ottoman Government. On November 30th, he instructed the former Secretary in the Constantinople Embassy, Lewis Heck, to proceed to the Ottoman capital with the rank of American Commissioner to the Porte. Lansing was careful to point out, however, that Heck's primary duty was to be the gathering of information regarding the evolving situation in Turkey and he was to have no official relations with the Ottoman Government, American diplomatic affairs still being handled by the Swedish Legation. The Secretary later pointed out to Heck that his position was not the same as that held by any one of the four Allied High Commissioners to Turkey as these men represented nations which had been actively at war with the Ottoman Empire.¹

1. U. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, (2 Vols., Washington: Government Printing Office), Vol. 2, pp. 810-1.

At the request of the Department of State, the Navy Department selected an officer, Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, to go to Constantinople in January, 1919, to act as the senior American official present at the Porte. Bristol became the first commander of the United States Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters and concurrently assumed charge of directing the relations between the United States and the Allies in Turkey and between the United States and the Ottoman Government itself. Before proceeding to Constantinople, Bristol met with the American Peace Delegation in Paris and² exchanged ideas on the future of his mission.

In May, 1919, Heck was replaced by Gabriel Bie Ravndal, who had recently resumed his position, held prior to the breaking of relations in 1917, as Consul-General in Constantinople. The ill-defined status of Ravndal as Commissioner of the United States in Turkey and that of Admiral Bristol as Senior American Representative at Constantinople eventually led to friction between the two men and the appointment, on August 12, 1919, of Bristol as American High Commissioner to Turkey with all diplomatic and consular representatives in the Ottoman Empire subordinate to his jurisdiction. Bristol was given the triple task of reporting significant information to the State³ and Navy Departments and to the Peace Delegation in Paris.

In early 1919, the situation in the Near East was not particularly favorable for the Armenian allies of the victorious Allied and Associated Powers.

2. An excellent report on the origin of Bristol's mission is given in Henry P. Beers, U. S. Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters, 1919-1924, (Washington: Office of Records Administration, Administrative Office, Navy Department, 1943), pp. 1-14. Another report on Bristol's mission, his activities, and his attitude toward Turkey and Armenia is given in Walter Hiatt, "Admiral Bristol, American Naval Diplomat," Current History, Vol. 27 (Feb. 1928), pp. 676-80.

3. Beers, U. S. Naval Detachment, p. 13.

The Turks had withdrawn to the 1914 boundary in the Caucasus, as required by the terms of the armistice, but the refugees in Russian Armenia and elsewhere, who had fled from their homes in Turkey during the height of the deportations, did not dare to return to Ottoman territory where armed Turks and Kurds roamed the countryside.⁴ The resultant situation found many thousands of refugees in dire need of aid from the outside world in the winter of 1918-1919 and during the spring and summer of the following year, or until the crops of 1919 had been harvested. It was in this field, relief for the refugees, that the United States contributed significantly to the Armenian nation and people during the months immediately following the conclusion of the war. The need for aid was great and three American organizations collaborated in trying to bring relief to the refugees and those others, living on their own lands in the Armenian Republic, who needed such assistance in order to survive.

Near East Relief had decided before the Armistice to send an investigative mission to Turkey as soon after the war as was practicable.⁵ This mission, under the leadership of James Barton, sailed from New York on January 4, 1919. There followed the despatch of many medical and other relief specialists so that between January and June over 400 relief workers arrived in Constantinople to be assigned throughout the Near East. Scores of relief stations were established, radiating out from a few major distribution centers, including one at Erivan, the capital of Armenia, and one at

4. American missionaries who returned to their previous posts in Turkey following the war complained that those for whom they once worked could not return to their homes and thus their activities were limited. See: Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1919, (Boston: The American Board, 1919), p. 29.

5. Decimal File, 867.48/1046, Barton to Secretary of State, Oct. 14, 1918, N.A.

Tiflis in Georgia. In the period from January to July, 1919, Near East Relief delivered to Armenia 33,000 metric tons of relief supplies with a value of over nine million dollars. Major Davis G. Arnold was managing director of Near East Relief at Constantinople and Ernest A. Yarrow was the Director of the Caucasus branch of N.E.R., with headquarters at Tiflis. Working closely with Near East Relief, but concentrating on the sending of clothing to the Near East, was the American Red Cross. This organization supplied Armenia with over 750 tons of clothing, valued at over a quarter of a million dollars during this same period of time.

On February 24, 1919, Congress appropriated \$100,000,000 for relief in non-enemy countries. Recipients of this aid were to include Armenians, Syrians, Greeks, and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. Herbert Hoover, who had held the post of United States Food Administrator during the war, was appointed Director General of the American Relief Administration by President Wilson on that date. Hoover's assistant in charge of the distribution of relief in Turkey and the Caucasus was Howard Heinz. By the end of June, 1919, the ARA had despatched over 20,000 tons of foodstuffs to Armenia and, as the harvest of 1919 was insufficient to end the crisis, the ARA followed this with additional shipments of food adding up to 28,000 tons more by the end of the summer. The total value of this aid reached the sum of \$10,000,000. The ARA ceased to exist as a government organization on July 1, 1919, following the signing of the peace treaty with Germany on the 28th of June.

6. See: The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, (New York: 1919). This pamphlet describes the work of the Committee through June, 1919. See also Frank M. Surface and Raymond L. Bland, American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1931), p. 150.

7. Surface and Bland, American Food in the World War, p. 150.

8. The story of A.R.A. operations in Armenia is given in Ibid., pp. 149-51.

Subsequent operations were under the direction of an Inter-Allied High Commissioner for Armenia, Colonel William N. Haskell of the United States Army.

The relationship between Near East Relief and the American Relief Administration was clarified after the partial collapse of Near East Relief operations in Armenia in the early spring of 1919. Previously, ARA had assisted the Near East Relief operations by securing ships and cargo space and by diverting to Constantinople some cargoes en route to other ports. At the suggestion of Heinz, an investigation was conducted in Armenia on the activities of the local Near East Relief chapter. Hoover later reported that the results of this investigation uncovered an "incredible" state of affairs, regarding both the condition of the Armenian refugees and the administration of relief by the staff of the Near East Relief. Both corruption and thievery were uncovered as well as the fact that many of the relief supplies shipped to the port of Batum for subsequent shipment by rail to Armenia had been sold to natives of Georgia and Azerbaijan who were not suffering from any lack of food. Many of the native employees of NER were engaged in corrupt activities and the American supervisors seemed incapable of administering the activities of the organization efficiently or effectively. Arrests and removals followed and the very able Mr. Yarrow, mentioned above, arrived to assume control of NER operations in the Caucasus. The ARA assumed direct charge of the relief operations in the Caucasus and Armenia in the person of Major Joseph C. Green, and shortly thereafter supplies were again reaching the starving Armenian refugees. Heinz estimated that at least 250,000 people in Armenia were at the point of starvation at that time.

9. A report on the A.R.A. investigation is given in detail in Herbert Hoover, Memoirs, (3 Vols., New York: The MacMillan Co., 1951), Vol. 1, pp. 386-8.

Meanwhile, the Armenian representatives in Paris were preparing their case for presentation to the Peace Conference. On December 18, 1918, before the Conference began, the Armenian National Delegation under Boghos Nubar Pasha declared the independence of "Integral Armenia," which included Cilicia, plus the six traditional Armenian vilayets in Turkey, plus part of the vilayet of Trebizond, and all of Russian Armenia. Nubar's declaration attempted to place this theoretical state under the guarantee of the Entente Powers, the United States, and the League of Nations. The declaration further requested that one of the great powers be given a temporary and limited mandate over the new nation during the period of reconstruction. Although no nation was specifically mentioned as the most desirable mandatory, Nubar did mention the gratitude felt by the Armenians for the aid the United States had previously given to them, and he commented: "This makes us hope that America, which has been so generous in the work of Christian charity, will consent to continue its action on political grounds by contributing, with its allies, to the resurrection of Armenia." Nubar concluded by stating that the Armenian National Delegation had made its declaration in line with President Wilson's statements on the right of peoples to enjoy freedom of national development and, consequently, the Delegation hoped that the United States would be among the first to grant recognition to the new nation.¹⁰

As the Peace Conference assembled in Paris in January, 1919, there were two Armenian delegations present to represent the Armenian people. The two delegations worked in collaboration during the presentation of the Armenian

10. The New York Times, Jan. 2, 1919. This is a report on Nubar's activities in Paris. The report on the actual declaration is given in The New York Times, Dec. 22, 1918.

case before the Council of Ten, but the ingredients for conflict and disagreement between the leaders of the two delegations were present from the beginning. Boghos Nubar Pasha and the members of the Armenian National Delegation represented the Armenians of Turkey, both those still resident in the Ottoman Empire and those who now lived as refugees on foreign soil. In addition, this delegation also represented the conservative, land-owning class of Armenians. The well-known Armenian writer, Avetis Aharonian, was the leader of the other group, an official delegation from the Armenian Republic, representing both the government of the Republic and Armenians who had previously lived in Russian Armenia. In general, the members of this delegation advocated the economic and political policies of the social-democratic-oriented Armenian Revolutionary Federation.¹¹

Working together, the two delegations prepared a memorandum of Armenia's desiderata on February 12, 1919 and presented this memorandum to the Council of Ten on the 26th of that month. This joint effort listed the contribution of the Armenians of both Russian and Turkish Armenia to the victory of the Allied Powers and requested the establishment and recognition of "Integral Armenia," to include both Turkish Armenia and the existing Republic. The Turkish portions which were demanded included the vilayets of Erzerum, Sivas, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekr, Harput, the Sanjak of Marash, part of the Vilayet of Trebizond, and all of Cilicia, that fertile land known also as Lesser Armenia which included a coastline on the Mediterranean Sea. The bases for the

11. Decimal File, 183.9 Armenia/12, Unsigned Memorandum dated Apr. 7, 1919, prepared for the use of the American Delegation to the Peace Conference. See also: K. S. Papazian, Patriotism Perverted, (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934), p. 47.

territorial claims in Turkey were Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Reform Plan of 1895, and the Reform Plan of 1914. In addition, the memorandum asked for financial assistance to the new republic during its transition period to full sovereignty, reparations from the Central Powers, punishment of those responsible for the Armenian massacres, and an effort by the Allies to return those Armenian women and children forcibly converted to Mohammedanism during the war to their relatives in the new state. The following proposal was also put forth by the two leaders:

We demand that Armenia, within the boundaries specified, be placed under the collective guarantee of the Allied and Associated Powers, or under that of the League of Nations, which shall guarantee the integrity and the inviolability of these territories. We also request that they designate one of the Great Powers as mandatory, to aid Armenia during the first years of its existence, in establishing its Government and in the organization and development of its economic and financial system.¹²

A further provision expressed the desire that this mandatory not be permitted seriously to curtail the exercise of sovereign and independent action by the Armenian Government, and specifically limited the exercise of the mandate to not more than twenty years. The two delegations requested that they be consulted on the determination of the great power to be chosen to exercise this power of mandatory.

In addition to the joint memorandum on behalf of Integral Armenia, speeches by both leaders were presented before the Council. Nubar confined his remarks to the subject of Turkish Armenia, the liberation of Armenia from

12. The Armenian Question Before the Peace Conference, A Memorandum presented by the Representatives of Armenia to the Peace Conference at Versailles on February 26, 1919, (1919), p. 11.

Ottoman rule, the establishment of boundaries by a mixed commission, basing their action on historical, geographical, and ethnical rights, and the rejection of Syrian claims to a part of Cilicia. Aharonian described in detail the progress of the Government of the Republic in the Caucasus, now a state covering 60,000 square miles and containing 2,000,000 people, and urged the immediate recognition of his Government by the Allies and a seat for the Armenian Republic at the Peace Conference.¹³ Again on March 8th, Nubar was allowed to present an appeal before the "Big Four." His second speech was similar to the first and, according to one writer, his petition¹⁴ received the "sympathetic attention" of the four heads of state.

Perhaps it would be desirable at this point to look more closely at the territorial provisions of the Armenian memorandum. "Integral Armenia" would have included an area of about 135,000 square miles, extending from a point not far from Baku on the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and including the port of Trebizond. From that city the boundary would have been drawn in a line across Eastern Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea and the ports of Mersine and Alexandretta on that coast would have been included in the new state. The boundary line would then have continued easterly to Lake Van and north to Mt. Ararat and finally back to the point west of Baku. According to statistics compiled by General Sir Charles W. Wilson, an English Army engineer in the Caucasus and Turkey for many years prior to 1914, the pre-war population

13. Comments on these speeches are given in: Decimal File, 180.03101/47, Secretary's Notes on Meeting of Representatives of Allied and Associated Powers, Feb. 26, 1919, N.A.

14. Stephen Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, The Little Nations at Versailles, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), pp. 189-91.

of this large area was not more than one fifth Armenian. In the five vilayets of Turkey containing the largest number of Armenians, plus Russian Armenia, the population was under forty percent Armenian and the total Christian population of the area was a little over fifty percent. Of 159 counties, or Kazes, in these five Turkish vilayets, only nine contained Armenian majorities.¹⁵ These figures had been changed, of course, by the events occurring during the World War, but as both Armenians and Turks had suffered heavily in terms of lives lost, the proportion of Moslems and Christians would probably have been somewhat similar in 1919 if the Armenians who had fled during the war could have returned to their homes. When these figures are taken into consideration it becomes obvious why the Armenian Delegations desired that the frontiers be guaranteed by the Great Powers and that one of them should be selected to act as mandatory for the new state. Only by the forceful expulsion of the Moslems from much of Turkish Armenia could the state be made secure and such action appeared to be in conflict with Wilson's well-known principle of self-determination. Historically, the Armenians may have had a reasonable claim to this vast area, but such claim was not substantiated by the population statistics of the twentieth century.

In addition to the theoretical conflict with the doctrine of self determination and the highly practical problem of policing the new state, the suggested boundaries also ran into conflict with the claims and desires of certain other nations. Ignoring Russia, which had temporarily abdicated all control over the area, and Turkey which was in total defeat in early 1919,

15. These figures are quoted from: Talcott Williams, Turkey, A World Problem of Today, (Garden City, - N.Y.: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1921), p. 210. See also: H. W. V. Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, (6 Vols., London: H. Frowde and Hodder and Stoughton, 1920-4), Vol. 6, p. 82.

there were the claims of Syria to Cilicia, the interests of France in this same area, and the claim of Greece to much of northern Anatolia, or the Pontus, which included the vilayet and city of Trebizond, the latter having a larger Greek population than Armenian. This last fact was recognized by the Armenian Delegation at the Peace Conference, which based its claim to Trebizond solely, and legitimately, on the necessity for an outlet on the

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Black Sea.

At the same time that the Armenian claims were being presented to the Peace Conference, the two delegations were trying to settle whatever differences existed between them at an Armenian National Conference, held in Paris from February to April, 1919. Representatives of Armenians throughout the world converged on Paris to discuss the problems of an Armenian Government and an Armenian representation. The conference considered a proposal that the Government at Erivan be recognized as the Government of Integral Armenia. This suggestion was rejected after debate as this Government had been created by, and represented only, the Armenians who had lived in Russian Armenia. Furthermore, the Armenian problem had now become two-fold with one part to be settled by the peace treaty between Turkey and the Allies, the other to be permanently solved only with the re-establishment of relations between the Allies and Russia. The Conference did admit the necessity of reaching an understanding between the two groups and consequently nominated a new

16. See: "The New Armenia," International Conciliation, Nr. 138 (May, 1919), p. 26. The Armenian claims to Cilicia are given in Vahan M. Kurkjian, The Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, (New York: 1919), p. 21. The Armenian claims to Trebizond are reported in D. E. Siramarc, Armenia and the Pontus, (New York: Armenian National Union of America Press Bureau, 1919). Actually, Venezelos, speaking before the Big Five on Feb. 4, 1919, conceded the necessity to Armenia of including Trebizond, as an outlet to the Black Sea.

Armenian National Delegation containing both Nubar and Aharonian and several of their associates. The President of the new Delegation was Nubar Pasha and only three members of the nine-man Delegation were representatives of the Government at Erivan. The primary task of this new Delegation was to create a united government of Integral Armenia which would contain a fair
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representation of all Armenians.

Unfortunately, relations between the representatives of the Turkish Armenians and the Russian Armenians became increasingly strained. By the 7th of April, Nubar called the attention of the American Delegation to rumors that the Russian Armenians were endeavoring to carry on independent negotiations with the Allies and Associated Powers. Nubar reminded the Americans that he had recently been elected President of the delegation representing all Armenians and was the only person empowered to speak for
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Armenia. On May 28th, the Government at Erivan proclaimed the unity and independence of Integral Armenia and, furthermore, proclaimed itself as the sole government of this expanded state. Nubar immediately protested to the President of the Republic over the assumption of such power by the latter's government. Despite this incident and others which tended to point up the

17. Reports on the conference are given in Decimel File, 183.9 Armenia/10, Unsigned Memorandum dated Apr. 3, 1919, and 183.9/12, Unsigned Memorandum dated Apr. 7, 1919; both prepared for the American Delegation, N.A.

18. Ibid., 183.9 Armenia/13, Unsigned Memorandum dated Apr. 7, 1919, prepared for the American Delegation. Another memorandum, dated Apr. 7, discusses the Armenian representation to Paris candidly and concludes that Nubar and Professor H. Hagopian of Robert College, are thoroughly reliable as regards United States policy, for they are "deeply imbued with the belief that the United States is interested in the welfare of Armenia and they will readily agree to any suggestion regarding the fate of Armenia which emanates from American officials." The comments regarding Aharonian and the other Dashnaks are not as flattering, for the writer regarded them as primarily "party politicians." See: Ibid., 183.9 Armenia/11, Unsigned Memorandum, dated Apr. 7, 1919, N.A.

differences between the two groups, during the year 1919, the representatives in Paris slowly proceeded in the attempt to form a common government for the new Armenian state.¹⁹

Naturally, the conflict between Nubar and the representatives of the Erivan Government was mirrored in the relations between the representatives and partisans of the two groups in the United States. Nubar continued to deal with the Americans through Miran Sevasly while Aharonian and the Government of the Republic were represented by Pasdermadjian and Vahan Cardashian, the latter being one of the foremost members of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, an organization which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.²⁰

When the American Delegation to the Peace Conference sailed for France in January, 1919 it apparently had bi-partisan authorization to assist the Armenian nation in the creation of at least an autonomous, possibly a completely independent, state. On December 10, 1918, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had introduced a resolution in the Senate which was promptly referred to the Foreign Relations Committee:

Resolved, That in the opinion of the Senate, Armenia, including the six vilayets of Turkish Armenia and Cilicia, Russian Armenia, and the northern part of the Province of Azerbaijan, Persian Armenia, should be independent and that it is the hope of the Senate that the peace conference will make arrangements for helping Armenia to establish an independent republic.²¹

19. See: Ibid., 183.9 Armenia/16, Unsigned Memorandum, undated, entitled: "The Armenian National Delegation and the Government of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus," N.A.

20. Ibid., 860J.01/10, American Mission, Paris to Secretary of State, June 24, 1919, N.A.

21. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., Vol. 57, pt. 1 (Dec. 10, 1918), p. 237.

The President, in his message to Congress on January 8, 1919, conceded²² the right of "fullest autonomy" to Armenia. Possibly, it should be noted that Wilson referred to "autonomy" while Lodge specified an "independent republic." However, there is no necessary incongruity or conflict in the terms as normally interpreted. Senator William King, Democrat of Utah, submitted a resolution to the Senate on February 15th which declared it the sense of the Senate that Armenia be constituted "a free and independent country," the language of this resolution being almost identical to that in²³ the Lodge proposal.

Meanwhile, the French Government, whose interest in Cilicia has previously been mentioned, issued a statement which complicated the Armenian situation. On December 29th, Foreign Minister Pichon, speaking in the Chamber of Deputies, stated that French rights were incontestible in Armenia, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine as they were based on "historic conventions and on more recent contracts." The "historic conventions" referred, according to an American correspondent, to protective rights over the Christians in the Near East, rights exercised by France for decades.²⁴ Apparently, the "recent contracts" referred to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the Armenian-French Agreement of that year. Obviously, the French statesman referred exclusively to Cilicia in his reference to "Armenia" for at no time, either prior or subsequent to this speech did the French evince any interest in assuming control of, or exercising protection over, the rest of Turkish or Russian Armenia.

22. The New York Times, Jan. 9, 1919.

23. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., Vol. 57, pt. 4 (Feb. 15, 1919), p. 3414.

24. Quoted in The New York Times, Jan. 2, 1919.

Armenian organizations in the United States protested to the American State Department regarding the statement by Pichon. The argument was predicated on the facts that Cilicia was ethnologically and historically a part of Armenia and that the French claims were based on secret agreements, which were no longer operative after the defection of Russia, one of the signers, from the Entente.

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Nubar himself seemed reluctant to come to an agreement with the French over the future status of Cilicia. A secret memorandum prepared by "A.H.L." for the use of the American Delegation to the Peace Conference on January 19, 1919, described a recent conversation between the author and the Armenian leader. The latter, after affirming his belief that Clemenceau was a true friend of Armenia, stated that he feared the designs and acts of those in charge of Asiatic affairs in the French Foreign Office. The memorandum concluded with the following:

Nubar Pasha also stated that he had been urged by Mousieur [sic] Franklin-Bouillon to send him by a certain date a definite request that France should be made the mandatory of the other Powers to protect the Armenians. Mousieur [sic] Franklin-Bouillon promised him that if this were done, Armenian interests would be guarded by the French and that Armenia would get what she wants.

Nubar Pasha was extremely unwilling to take any such step and hoped that the mandatory Power to protect Armenia would be designated by the Powers themselves. He strongly desired that the State designated should be the United States.

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25. Decimal File, 763.72119/3363, Sevassly to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1919, N.A.

26. Probably A. H. Lybyer, of the American Delegation.

27. Decimal File, 183.9 Armenia/21, Memorandum for the American Delegation, unsigned, dated Jan. 19, 1919, N.A.

From Commissioner Heck in Constantinople came reports that the French, assisted by the Papal Delegate, were exercising pressure on the Armenian Patriarch and leading Armenian citizens of the Ottoman Empire to have them request a French protectorate over Cilicia. Heck stated that it was his belief, based on observations in Turkey, that all Armenians in that country would prefer either the United States or Great Britain to France as manda-
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tory. At least one prominent member of the American Delegation advocated

acceptance by the Armenians of the French request for control over Cilicia. Henry Morgenthau, ex-Ambassador to the Porte, and a specialist on Turkish questions at the Peace Conference, later wrote of his position: "The French were determined to have Cilicia; the Armenians would not consider my advice that they should surrender it, and, by this concession, win French support
29
for their other ambitions."

From the information given above, it is apparent that the Armenians might have fared differently at Paris if they had been willing to accept French control of Cilicia. Regardless of this possibility, the fact is that the Armenians preferred to concentrate their efforts on securing the United States as mandatory for the entire nation including Cilicia. Yet up to the beginning of February there had never been any statement by a competent American official advocating an American mandate over Armenia. There were many accusations made after the Armenian disaster of 1920 that the Armenians had turned away from the French and to the United States in the

28. Ibid., 185.5136/20, Heck to American Ambassador, Paris, Jan. 31, 1919; 763.72119/4331, Heck to the Secretary of State, Jan. 30, 1919; and 867.00/837, Heck to Secretary of State, Jan. 30, 1919, N.A.

29. Henry Morgenthau, All In A Life-Time, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1923), p. 337..

1913-1919 after the American Delegation had conveyed to the
Armenian leaders the impression that the United States would accept a
30
mandate. No evidence exists of any such action by members of the American
Delegation, by Congressional leaders or even by prominent private citizens
in this country during the period in question. It is unfair to accuse the
American Delegation of attempting to entice the Armenian leaders to ask for
an American mandate in preference to one by France. The decision was made
by the Armenian leaders without assistance from any responsible American.

Before the Armenian Question was brought before the Peace Conference
on January 30, 1919, two studies by Americans had been completed relevant
to the future status of Armenia. First, the interpretive commentary on
Wilson's Fourteen Points, written by Frank Cobb and Walter Lippmann, had the
following to say regarding Point Twelve as it applied to the future of
Armenia: "Armenia must be given a port on the Mediterranean, and a protec-
ting power established. France may claim it, but the Armenians would prefer
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Great Britain." The interpretive commentary also allotted Anatolia to
the Turks, Syria to France, and claimed that Great Britain was clearly the
best guaranty for Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.

Incidentally, it is of interest to read Stephen Bonsal's comment on the
attitude of the Armenians at Paris toward Point Twelve. To them, the refer-
ence to "unmolested opportunity of autonomous development" was regrettably
32
similar to the provisions of the Berlin Treaty. They preferred language
less ambiguous so as to ensure full independence for their new nation.

1. A good example of this is: Edward H. Bierstadt, The Great Betrayal,
(New York: Robert M. McBride and Co., 1924), pp. 180, 337.
2. Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), pp. 199-200.
3. Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, p. 188.

The second report which dealt with the future status of Armenia was entitled "Outline of Tentative Report and Recommendations Prepared by Intelligence Section, in Accordance with Instructions, for the President and the Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 21, 1919." This report, which covered the entire political scope of the Peace Conference, devoted a few paragraphs to the Armenian problem. The report admitted that only in a few areas in the projected Integral Armenia did the Armenian population exceed 35 percent of the population. However, in an attempt to "right historic wrongs" and end massacres, deportations, and other misgovernment of this people, the principle of the self-determination of the majority should be ignored and a large Armenian state should be created with outlets on the Black and Mediterranean Seas to ensure economic security. Geographically, the boundaries of the new state could be based on the rugged lines of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus Mountains. The report strongly advocated that Cilicia be incorporated in the new state as it belonged both topographically and commercially to Armenia -- not to Syria or Turkey. As far as the non-Armenians in the new nation were concerned, their protection would be assured by international guarantee and by the fact that Armenia would be under the guidance of a mandatory. This mandatory was necessitated, according to the report, "because of the inexperience and defects of the population, its mixed character, and its weakness."

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By mid-January some Americans at the Peace Conference were becoming convinced that the article on dependent areas, to be inserted in the Covenant

33. Decimal File, 185.112/1, Tentative Report and Recommendations, etc., Jan. 21, 1919, N.A.

of the League of Nations, would lead to American protection over Armenia. David Hunter Miller had become somewhat cynical of British diplomacy and wrote in his paper on the then current draft of the Covenant that doubtless the United States would get such of those dependent areas for mandates "as Great Britain thinks too difficult for herself, and those will lie in the hands of the United States as a bulwark of the British Empire; such as Armenia."³⁴ A few days later, the Council of Ten adopted a resolution which stated that because of the "historic misgovernment" by the Turks of subject peoples and the massacres of the Armenians and others in recent years, "the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire."³⁵

The same day, at a secret session of the Big Five, the question of mandates in the former Ottoman Empire arose. President Wilson, commenting on the fact that the United States had been suggested as a mandatory power, stated that the American people would be "most disinclined" to accept such a burden, but he conceded that he might be able to persuade them to accept in time. Later in the day, when Lloyd George notified his fellow members of the Big Five that Britain desired to reduce its military commitments around the world and particularly in Russian Armenia, where some British troops had been stationed since the conclusion of the war, the American President replied that he could think of nothing that the people of his country would be less inclined to accept than military responsibility in Asia. Again Wilson cautioned that he would have to explain the entire matter to the American

34. David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, (2 Vols., New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), Vol. 1, p. 47.

35. Ibid., p. 109.

people and try to bring them to the desired point of view if the other Allies wished the United States to assume a share of the mandates and the military burdens that accompanied them.³⁶

Possibly with an eye to the education and preparation of the American public for later acceptance of a mandate for Armenia and/or other parts of the Ottoman Empire, President Wilson made reference to the subject of America as a mandatory when he presided at the opening session of the Commission on the League of Nations on February 3rd. He referred to the "almost unanimous" desire of other powers that the United States accept a mandate for Armenia but stated that it was the feeling of the American Delegation that the European powers should look after the problems of Europe and the Near East. However, as the Allied nations and the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire were favorably disposed to America, due to the knowledge that the United States had no territorial ambitions, it would be impossible to give a definite answer on the subject until the sentiment of the people of the United States on this topic could be determined.³⁷

The position of President Wilson in the eyes of the Armenians at Paris has been described as "liberator", "champion," and "le grand defenseur de l'Armenie."³⁸ Boghos Nubar Pasha carried on a correspondence with the President during January and February, receiving assurance from Wilson that on "every hand among the delegates," the President found the

36. Decimal File, 180.03101/25, Secretary's Notes of Conversation Held at M. Pichon's Room on Jan. 30, 1919, N.A.

37. The New York Times, Feb. 4, 1919.

38. Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, p. 186. Decimal File, 183.9 Armenia/34, Nubar to President Wilson, Feb. 6, 1919, N.A. H. Pasdermadjian, Histoire de l'Armenie, (Paris: H. Samuelian, 1949), p. 471.

"most sincere and outspoken sympathy" for the Armenian cause and that he would study the proposals for the future of Armenia, submitted by Nubar, with "the warmest friendliness for the Armenian peoples to whom my sympathy goes out most heartily."³⁹ In submitting to Wilson his suggestions for action regarding Armenia, Nubar included the following statement:

The wish of all Armenians of Turkey, whom I have the honor to represent, and that of all Armenians of the Republic in the Caucasus, whose chief representative, Mr. Aharonian, ex-President actually in Paris, works in perfect harmony with us, is that the United States of America, undertake the mandate for assistance to Armenia.⁴⁰

On February 8, 1919, a cablegram was received by the Delegation in Paris, addressed to the President, and signed by Senator Lodge, Senator Williams (Democrat of Mississippi), Charles Evans Hughes, William Jennings Bryan, and the ex-Ambassador to Germany, James Gerard, on behalf of the membership of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia. The cable was transmitted following a banquet at the Plaza Hotel in New York, where Hughes, Bryan and Gerard had called for American aid in the creation of an independent Armenia. A resolution adopted at the meeting was sent to Paris and called for the creation of "a separate and independent" Armenian state composed of the six vilayets, Cilicia, Russian Armenia and Persian Armenia, and further expressed "the earnest hope of this Committee that the Peace Conference may make requisite arrangements⁴¹ for helping Armenia to establish an independent Republic." It is of

39. Decimal File, 183.9 Armenia/3, Wilson to Nubar, Jan. 23, 1919; 183.9 Armenia/3 $\frac{1}{2}$, Wilson to Nubar, Feb. 11, 1919, N.A.

40. Ibid., 183.9 Armenia/3 $\frac{1}{2}$, Nubar to President Wilson, Feb. 6, 1919, N.A.

41. The cablegram is reproduced in: American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, The Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Armenia, (New York: 1926), p. 188.

interest to note that no reference was made in the cable to a mandate for the United States or any other nation. In fact, at the banquet at the Plaza Hotel, Hughes had declared himself against a mandate but had rather proposed that all present "throw such influence as we have into the scale⁴² for Armenian independence." Wilson replied that the cable struck a "responsive chord" in his heart and he assured the Committee that he would be "as watchful as possible to do my utmost in Armenia's behalf."⁴³

The American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, frequently referred to as the A.C.I.A., was created immediately after the Armistice with the avowed purpose of aiding in the movement for the creation of an independent Integral Armenia. Its membership was both impressive and non-partisan. In addition to Gerard, who was Chairman, Bryan, Hughes, Lodge, and Williams, the Board of Directors included such distinguished Americans as Charles Eliot, Nicholas Murray Butler, Samuel Gompers, Samuel S. Wise, Alfred E. Smith, and Professor Albert Bushnell Hart. The moving spirit behind the organization, however, was one Vahan Cardashian, a Turkish-Armenian who had been in America when the World War started.⁴⁴ Indefatigable in the cause of a free Armenia, this man carried on the fight long after other members of the A.C.I.A. had accepted defeat. He became over the years, a thorn in the side of every Secretary of State

42. Quoted in: American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, (New York: 1924), p. 74; and by Senator King in a speech in the Senate on Jan. 26, 1923; Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th sess., Vol. 64, pt. 3, (Jan. 26, 1923), p. 2494.

43. Quoted in The New York Times, Feb. 16, 1919.

44. For a report on the creation of the organization, see: Simon Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian Question, (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Co., 1943), p. 89. See: Decimal File, 8600.01/591, Memorandum from Clark to Shaw of Near Eastern Affairs Division, May 8, 1929, for a report on the activities of Cardashian. Gerard referred to Cardashian as "a tower of strength in organizing the Armenian cause;" James W. Gerard, My First Eighty-three Years in America, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Ind., 1951), p. 285.

from Lansing to Stimson; and his letters, and those signed by Gerard but apparently written by Cardashian, caused considerable irritation in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs for the next ten years. Politically, Cardashian was a Dashnak and closely associated with Aharonian and the Government at Erivan.

The A.C.I.A. was more than a mere resolution-passing organization; it was also a channel in which the political efforts on behalf of Armenia in the United States could be funneled to the correct recipient. Gerard later wrote that he directed the efforts of 119 prominent American clergy-⁴⁵men and laymen in the effort to help the Armenian cause. The A.C.I.A. at one time passed to President Wilson two petitions asking the President to do his utmost to insure the independence of Armenia "and to exert your great influence to the end that the Peace Conference may make requisite arrangements for helping Armenia to establish adequate reparation for the terrible losses the Armenian people have suffered during the war." One petition was signed by approximately 20,000 American clergymen, both Protestant and Roman Catholic. The other petition was signed by 100 Protestant Bishops, 45 state governors, and 350 college and university⁴⁶ presidents. The size of these petitions is both a credit to the organizing ability of the A.C.I.A. and an example of the tremendous interest in the Armenian cause current in the United States in 1919.

Whereas the A.C.I.A. was not primarily an organization of Armenian-Americans, the Armenian National Union of America, under the Chairmanship of Miran Sevasly, was composed almost exclusively of such Americans.

45. Gerard, My First Eighty-three Years, p. 286.

46. Both petitions may be found under the following number: Decimal File, 763.72119/4142, N.A.

This organization, more closely affiliated with Boghos Nubar Pasha, prepared propaganda tracts to convince the American people of the need to help the Armenian cause and was often in contact with the State Department. At one time the Armenian National Union proposed that the Armenians in the United States be permitted to raise and equip a force of 10,000 men from among the Armenian-Americans already in the United States Army for use in the Near East to protect Armenians and other Christians.⁴⁷ Although the proposal received considerable support from such important organs of the press as The New York Times, it apparently never received the attention it may have warranted from the American Government.

In late February, President Wilson returned to the United States and in a speech at Mechanics Hall in Boston warned the American people that Armenia and other small nations arising from the war-time destruction of empires could not stand alone but must be backed by the "united forces of the civilized world," including those of the United States.⁴⁸

While Wilson was in the United States, Colonel House represented the United States at the meetings of the plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference. On March 7, 1919, House cabled the President that on that day Clemenceau and Lloyd George had both expressed the desire of their respective governments that the United States accept mandates for Armenia and for the Straits area, including the city of Constantinople.⁴⁹ On the 10th, House's secretary, Stephan Bonsal, wrote that his superior was "willing - indeed

47. One of their publications, which is an example of the propaganda which they prepared and published, was: Armenian National Union of America, The Case of Armenia, (New York: 1919). The proposal for an Armenian-American army is contained in Decimal File, 860J.01/6, Sevasly to Secretary of State, Apr. 24, 1919, N.A. It is referred to in The New York Times, Apr. 25, 1919.

48. The New York Times, Feb. 25, 1919.

49. Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, p. 359.

more than willing, he is eager - to accept our share of responsibility for the Armenian settlement, but he is not willing to go into it with our eyes shut." ⁵⁰ It was probably about this time that the idea of a fact-finding mission to Armenia was conceived, although the Harbord Mission to Armenia did not leave until the following autumn.

By the 20th of March, President Wilson was back in Paris and at a meeting of the Council of Four on that date, the subject of the dismemberment of Turkey again was discussed. At this meeting Clemenceau put forth the French demand for a mandate over Syria to include Cilicia. Lloyd George, in line with his request of January 30th that the distribution of troop strength in the Near East be revamped to ease the strain on British military capabilities, suggested that British troops continue to occupy Mesopotamia and Mosul, French troops occupy Syria and Cilicia and Italian troops occupy the Caucasus and Konia. As only a limited number of British troops were in the Armenian Republic and none in Turkish Armenia, no provision was made for troops to occupy these areas. The British and French, of course, had already expressed their desire that the United States accept this territory as a mandate on the 7th of that month and previously on the 30th of January.

When the debate between Clemenceau and Lloyd George became heated over the implementation of the British plan and the question of mandates in general, President Wilson intervened to state the American point of view. After reaffirming the position of the United States that mandates should be assigned on the basis of the consent of the governed and that Cilicia,

50. Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, p. 193.

if included in the French mandate for Syria, would cut Armenia off from the Mediterranean Sea, the President suggested that the wishes of the population of Syria as to their future status should be ascertained by an international commission. Wilson expanded his views by stating that he feared possible conflict between two mandatories if one were exercising control in northern Armenia and another in southern Armenia, or Cilicia. Despite the "great antipathy" to assumption of any mandate in the United States, the President admitted that his country would have to accept the responsibilities as well as the benefits accruing from the existence of the future League of Nations, thus implying that he would support an
51
American mandate over Armenia.

To the American proposal for an investigative commission, to be composed of an equal number of British, French, Italian and American citizens, Clemenceau and Lloyd George agreed "in principle," after Wilson accepted Clemenceau's demand that the mission also determine the wishes of the peoples of Palestine, Mesopotamia and Armenia. Wilson named Dr. Henry C. King, President of Oberlin College, and Charles R. Crane, a Chicago businessman, as the principal American representatives on the joint Allied Commission. Neither the British nor the French named any representatives, ostensibly while awaiting clarification as to the mission's itinerary and proposed activities. By late May, Wilson sent the American group, composing a total of six men, to the Near East to determine the wishes of the native populations as to their future status. The Americans

51. Decimal File, 180.03401/101, British Notes on Conversation in Lloyd George's Flat on Mar. 20, 1919, N.A.

completed a forty day tour of the area by late August, 1919 and subsequently submitted a 40,000 word report on their findings to the Department of State, where it remained "buried" until December, 1922.⁵²

The report dealt primarily with Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, but briefly discussed, and made certain recommendations relative to, Armenia. Cilicia was not to be incorporated into the Armenian state but would become a part of Syria. However, Syria, according to the recommendations of this report, should be assigned as a mandate to the United States or Great Britain, not to France. In order that the frontiers could be defended against outside attack, the boundaries of the Armenian state recommended by the King-Crane Report, were far more restricted than those visualized by the advocates of Integral Armenia. The recommendations of the King-Crane Commission opposed the United States accepting a mandate for Armenia alone due to the bitter hostility of the peoples in that area and the surrounding physical and economic conditions. Nevertheless, the Report did advocate that the United States accept a mandate over all of Asia Minor with the possible exclusion of Syria and Mesopotamia. This one mandate would actually include three subordinate and separate mandates; one for Armenia, one for a Constantinopolitan state including the Straits, and one for a Turkish state in Anatolia. This single mandate would eliminate conflict between Turks and Armenians, would ensure a sound government for both peoples, and would discharge American responsibilities under the mandate provision of the League of Nations. Certain conditions had to be met,

52. Published in full as: "King-Crane Report on the Near East," Editor and Publisher, Vol. 55 (Dec. 2, 1922), pp. 1-26 of Section 2. This magazine obtained the report from ex-president Wilson.

however, before the United States could accept this vast responsibility. First, the people in the area had to demonstrate that they wanted an American mandate; this condition had been met. Second, Russia had to renounce her claims on Armenian territory; third, the Allies had to welcome the American acceptance of this task; fourth, all plans for the dismemberment of Turkey into spheres of influence had to be abandoned. That all of these conditions could be met was possible but not probable due, particularly, to the avaricious demands on Turkish sovereignty being made by Greece, Italy, and France.

This suggestion of an American mandate for all of Turkey, excluding Syria and Mesopotamia, was not new in August, 1919 when the King-Crane Report was transmitted to the Department of State. In fact, this proposal had received support from some high officials of the American political and relief organizations in Turkey, as well as from the members of the Near Eastern staff of experts at Paris. On April 23rd, a report had been submitted to President Wilson by a group of specialists on Western Asia under the direction of Professor W. L. Westermann. This report advocated an American mandate over all of Armenia including Cilicia and possibly Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus as well. Admitting that this proposal would meet with strong opposition from some of the Allied Powers, a suggested alternate and less desirable solution would be an American mandate over Constantinople, Anatolia and Armenia, but this too would probably be opposed by some of the Allies. The only area over which all Allied Powers seem to wish America to assume control included Caucasian
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and the northern part of Turkish Armenia.

53. Decimal File, 185.513/22, Plans for the Ottoman Empire, submitted by Westermann, Montgomery, Yale and Maglie, Apr. 23, 1919, N.A.

In June, 1919, Henry Morgenthau, working with two other experts on the Turkish settlement, submitted a report which advocated a triple mandate over Turkey. Anatolia, Constantinople, and Armenia would each have a separate government but all three would be under one mandatory with a single governor representing the United States sitting in Constantinople. This report strongly opposed giving any spheres of influence to France, Italy, or Greece in Turkey as the inhabitants were opposed to control by these states and American missionary work in Turkey would suffer under a mandate exercised by a Greek Orthodox or Roman Catholic country. To ignore Anatolia while granting mandates for Constantinople and Armenia, was considered unrealistic by this group. In conclusion, Morgenthau and his associates felt that their comprehensive and self-contained scheme for Turkey would appeal to the American people who would appreciate the simplicity of the plan.

At Constantinople, Admiral Bristol, Commissioner Heck, and his replacement, Commissioner Ravndal, all opposed a mandate for Armenia alone and all advocated a mandate by the United States for Constantinople, Anatolia, and Armenia. Bristol, in particular, was strongly opposed to the dismemberment of Turkey and was an advocate of a strong mandatory to ensure good government, combined with freedom of religion and universal education for all ethnic groups.

54. Ibid., 185.513/26, Memorandum submitted by Morgenthau, Westermann, and Buckler, June 20, 1919, N.A.

55. Ibid., 867.00/850, Bristol to Secretary of State, Mar. 7, 1919, N.A. A description of Bristol's opinion is give in: Beers, Naval Detachment, pp. 16-7. On page 17, appears the following: "Admiral Bristol returned from a trip to the Caucasus early in the summer of 1919 strongly convinced that the republics which had been set up there during the war should remain part of Turkey and that from the national point of view there was no such thing as Armenia."

position on the proposed mandate. One of the most important factors to be considered, according to the Commissioner, was the necessity of keeping only about 3,000 American soldiers on guard duty in the whole of Turkey if the large mandate were accepted while many times that number would be needed if the United States accepted a mandate for only part of Turkey. This increase in force being necessitated, of course, in order to protect the boundaries of such a state.⁵⁶ Both Bristol and Ravndal, in their despatches, emphasized something that tended to be ignored by the Americans in Paris, the need for speed in settling the Turkish Question. The situation by mid-1919 was rapidly deteriorating in Turkey and no plans for the future could be made until action was taken on a Turkish Peace Treaty by the plenipotentiaries at Paris.⁵⁷

Among prominent members of Near East Relief who advocated an American mandate for all of Turkey were Cleveland Dodge, James L. Barton, and Caleb Gates, President of Robert College. As early as March, 1919,⁵⁸ Barton advocated but one mandate for all of Turkey. Even earlier, in December, 1918, Gates had written to Dodge proposing a single mandate, explaining that he saw the Armenian Question as a Turkish Question and only a strong mandatory for the entire nation would eliminate the hatred and jealousy of the past and provide for a secure future for both races. President Gates continued

56. Decimal File, 185.513/23, Heck to Secretary of State, Apr. 29, 1919, N.A. See also: 860J.01/5, Heck to Secretary of State, Apr. 11, 1919, N.A.

57. Ibid., 763.72119/5483, Ravndal to Secretary of State, June 26, 1919; and 867.00/850, Bristol to Secretary of State, Mar. 7, 1919, N.A.

58. Dodge's opinion reported in The New York Times, Mar. 30, 1919. Barton's is given in Decimal File, 181.91/42, Memorandum on the substance of a telegram, dated Mar. 1, 1919, from Near East Relief, Mar. 14, 1919, N.A. A representative article advocating a single mandate for all of Turkey appeared as: Talcott Williams, "The Disposition of the Turkish Empire," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 84 (July, 1919), pp. 41-50.

to back his proposal for a single mandate by the United States and, according to his autobiography, was bitterly denounced by Greeks, Armenians,⁵⁹ and not a few Americans for expressing his opinion on the subject.

Indications abound that the Turkish people and many Turkish leaders were favorable to the idea of a single United States mandate over Anatolia, Constantinople, and Armenia. About April 2nd, Ahmed Riza Bey, an ex-Prime Minister of the Ottoman Empire, inquired of Bristol and Heck as to whether the United States would accept a mandate over all of Turkey if his political organization, the Bloc National, which supported the concept of Ottoman unity, and other organizations joined in a request for such action by America. In late July, Ravndal cabled that all major political parties in Constantinople had joined in signing a document favoring a single mandate by the United States. It was even reported that when Mustafa Kemal Pasha left Constantinople for his post in Anatolia in May, 1919, he too favored an American mandate for all of Turkey. However, when the King-Crane Commission was in Turkey in August and informed the Turks with whom they came in contact that the United States was determined that Armenia should be separated from Turkey, the ardor for an American mandate for Turkey cooled perceptibly.⁶⁰

While the Turkish leaders were originally favorably disposed to an American mandate for all of Turkey, most of the Armenian leaders were adamantly opposed to any such plan. Their reasoning was logical for they

59. Caleb F. Gates, Not to Me Only, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), pp. 252-60.

60. Decimal File, 867.00/867, Heck to Secretary of State, Apr. 2, 1919; 867.00/904, Ravndal to Secretary of State, July 31, 1919; 867.00/895, Ravndal to Secretary of State, July 2, 1919; and 763.72119/5960, Ravndal to Secretary of State, Aug. 2, 1919, N.A.

feared that any mandate over all of Turkey would inevitably lead to a revival of Turkish supremacy in Asia Minor. Miran Sevasly informed the Department of State of his opposition on May 24, after rumors of Morgenthau's suggestion regarding a single mandate had received coverage in the press. The Chairman of the Armenian National Union of America stated that "the Armenians will never agree to such a mandate." As for the desired assistance from the United States, "...the Armenian people rely upon the United States to safeguard their independence during the formative period by accepting a mandate over their territory."⁶¹

James Gerard, Chairman of the A.C.I.A., also opposed a triple mandate over all of Turkey but he was able to list twenty-two reasons why the United States should take the mandate for Armenia alone. His opposition to the triple mandate was centered in the belief that under such an arrangement the Armenian refugees would never return to their land in Turkish Armenia through fear of future Turkish encroachment and eventual domination.⁶²

During the month of May, 1919, several meetings of importance to the future of American-Armenian relations were held in Paris by the President of the United States, the British Prime Minister, and the French Premier. On the 5th, they discussed, at some length, the recent Italian landing at Adalia. Lloyd George, reluctantly admitted that the question of mandates in Turkey could not be resolved until the proposed international commission had returned from the Near East, and he again advocated a re-disposition of forces in the Ottoman Empire. France could garrison Syria, Greece could occupy Smyrna, Italian troops could replace British forces in the

61. The New York Times, May 25, 1919.

62. Ibid., July 6, 1919.

Caucasus (Georgia), and American troops could be sent to Armenia and Constantinople to ensure order in those regions. President Wilson reacted to this suggestion with less than enthusiasm. In the first place, he did not believe that he could find American troops to spare for this assignment and he felt that British troops, already at Constantinople and in part of Armenia, were accustomed to this type of duty, whereas American troops would be totally unprepared for it. Secondly, he objected to Italian troops garrisoning the Caucasus. Lloyd George replied that American troops were desired, particularly in Armenia, and would be received warmly. General Wilson of the British Army stated that the United States would need to send no more than one division to Constantinople but declined to estimate the number of American troops needed in Armenia. General Wilson and the American General Bliss were instructed to discuss the subject that afternoon. 63

On the following day, President Wilson informed his two colleagues that his legal advisers had informed him that he had no authority to despatch American troops to any part of the Ottoman Empire as the United States was not, and had not been, at war with Turkey. The President assured Lloyd George and Clemenceau that he would propose correcting legislation to Congress after his return to the United States. For the first time, Wilson mentioned the proposal of a single mandate for all of Turkey which he considered most unacceptable to the United States, where hatred of the Turks had become very pronounced during the recent war. In his opinion, the on

63. Decimal File, 180.03401/144, British Notes on Conversation in Wilson's House on May 5, 1919, N.A.

reason by which America could be enticed to accept a mandate would be the protection of a Christian race from Turkish misgovernment.⁶⁴

On May 13th, the "Big Three" again discussed the Turkish settlement. Lloyd George had another proposal regarding the division of Turkey into mandates. According to this plan, the United States would take mandates over Constantinople and Armenia, France would obtain one for Northern Anatolia, Italy would control Southern Anatolia except for Smyrna, which would go to Greece. Virtually every one of the victorious Allies could have a slice of the Turkish pie. Wilson replied to this suggestion by stating that he could not give a definitive answer about American acceptance of any mandate until he had returned to the United States and ascertained if the American nation were willing to accept such a task. Somewhat reversing the position he had taken on May 6th, Wilson again brought up the proposal for a single mandate for Turkey and felt that there was "much to be said" for this plan. Lloyd George, however, termed the proposal "impractical."⁶⁵

On the following day, the British Delegation again had a proposal to put before the conference. According to this plan, the Americans would accept mandates over Constantinople and an Armenian state which would extend to the Mediterranean Sea, Greece would obtain full sovereignty over Smyrna and adjacent territory and certain islands, and the rest of Anatolia would be divided into spheres of influence between the Allies. A disagreement between the American and British delegations followed on the proposed

64. Ibid., 180.03401/145, British Notes on Conversation in Wilson's House on May 6, 1919, N.A.

65. Ibid., 180.03401/104, British Notes on Conversation in Wilson's House on May 13, 1919, N.A.

boundaries for the Armenian state, but, in general, the British plan was accepted and the following resolution was adopted:

The President of the United States of America, on behalf of the United States, and subject to the consent of the Senate, thereof,

Accepts:

1. A mandate over the Province of Armenia as constituted within frontiers to be agreed upon between the United States, British, French and Italian Delegations, whose recommendations, if unanimous, shall be accepted without further reference to the Council.

2. A mandate over the City of Constantinople, the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and a small contiguous territory, the frontiers of which shall be determined by agreement between the United States, British, French and Italian Delegations, whose recommendations, if unanimous, shall be accepted without further reference to the Council.⁶⁶

It might be assumed that this was the end of the Armenian and Turkish mandate debate before the Supreme Council but such was not the case. Once again, on May 21st, the British Delegation had a new plan for the Ottoman Empire. On that day, Lloyd George, who had considered the one mandate plan "impractical" on the 13th, now proposed an American mandate over Constantinople, Armenia, and Cilicia, plus a "light mandate" over Anatolia, and a provisional mandate over the entire Caucasus. Lloyd George explained that the United States had a fine reputation for ensuring liberty and was well-liked in the Near East where it would be "more acceptable to the Mohammedan world" than any other power. Clemenceau, who had taken little part in the previous debates regarding an American mandate over Constantinople or Armenia, was furious. He informed his colleagues that the introduction of the United States in such a position in Asia Minor would

66. Ibid., 180.03401/134, British Notes on Conversation in Wilson's House on May 14, 1919, N.A.

have a detrimental effect on French public opinion and "would cause a bad ferment and division in the whole of the European world." Clemenceau warned that he might be forced out of the government if he accepted a plan to place all of Anatolia under an American mandate and he hinted of possible Franco-Italian collaboration in opposition to this Anglo-American scheme for Turkey's future. Wilson was able to assure the French statesman that the United States desired nothing in Asia Minor and he felt that any mandate by the United States for all of Turkey was "impossible." In fact it would be difficult enough, Wilson feared, to convince the American nation to take a mandate for Armenia, "where she had permanent interests of long standing, and where a good deal of money had been spent by Americans for the relief of the Armenian people." The President was strangely optimistic about America's acceptance of a mandate for Constantinople and stated that he was convinced that even those who opposed him politically would support a mandate for the Straits. With the same mandatory in both Armenia and Constantinople, Wilson was of the opinion the Turks would be able to do little harm and could best rule their own nation. ⁶⁷

To add to the confusion over Wilson's optimistic statement about the mandate for the Straits, there exists a memorandum relative to a conversation between Wilson and Professor Westermann on the following day in which the President expressed the feeling that American sympathy for Armenia would ensure the acceptance by Congress of a mandate for that state,

67. Ibid., 180.03401/208, British Notes on Conversation in Wilson's House on May 21, 1919, N.A.

but he was doubtful about acceptance of a Constantinopolitan mandate.

On June 17, 1919, the Turkish Delegation presented its case before the Peace Conference. The defunct Committee of Union and Progress received the sole blame for forcing Turkey into the war and for ordering the subsequent massacres and deportations. For this reason, the Turkish Delegation proposed that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire be maintained. However, the Turks did concede the creation of an independent Armenian state in a note from the Delegation to the Supreme Council, dated June 23rd. In this memorandum, the Turkish Government specifically accepted the establishment of a free Armenian state in the area surrounding Erivan and agreed to discuss the drawing of a suitable boundary line between Turkey and Armenia. In addition, the Turks agreed to aid in the repatriation of
69
Armenians to their new nation.

Meanwhile, the Armenian leaders in Paris were continuously petitioning the Allied and Associated Governments for recognition of the Armenian Republic so that international loans could be obtained which would permit
70
the purchase of food, clothing, and military supplies. The Allies and the United States, however, were not yet prepared to recognize the new republic. The fact that the peace treaty with Turkey had progressed very slowly during the first half of 1919 was the cause of distress to the Armenian Patriarch in Constantinople. He informed Ravndal in late June of the desire of the Armenian refugees to return to their homes in Turkish

68. Ibid., 185.5136/31, Memorandum entitled: Interview of Maglie and Westermann with President Wilson, May 22, 1919, N.A.

69. U. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, (13 Vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942-7), Vol. 6, p. 693.

70. Decimal File, 184.611/147, Nubar to French Foreign Minister, Mar. 25, 1919; 184.611/281, Aharonian to President of Peace Conference,

Armenia in time for the harvest. In the name of these thousands of refugees, the Patriarch requested that the Peace Conference "determine the fate of Armenia and to put an end to the present disastrous situation." 71

But action on the Turkish Treaty was impossible until the decision of the United States on acceptance of a mandate for parts of the Ottoman Empire was known. On the 25th of June, Lloyd George, referring to the fact that the American President was soon to leave Paris for home, suggested that at least the Supreme Council could draw the boundaries of the future state and leave the mandate question until a later date. But as he pointed out later in the debate, if the boundaries were drawn and Turkish troops were forced back behind these boundaries, the Armenians in Turkish Armenia would be at the mercy of marauding bands of Kurds. At the present time, the only protection against these bands in that area was provided by the Turkish army. Armenia did not have the troops or weapons to ensure the safety of this additional land as they were having difficulty maintaining order in the existing republic. Consequently, troops from an Allied or Associated Power would have to go into the area to protect the people. As the mandate was apparently going eventually to the United States, no other nation could be expected to furnish troops for this part of Turkey, and the United States, according to the President, was legally prevented from sending armed forces to Turkey. Consequently, for the present, nothing could be done regarding the Turkish treaty or Armenia. 72

May 15, 1919; 184.611/314, Aharonian to French Foreign Minister, May 9, 1915; 184.611/354, Nubar to French Premier, July 7, 1919; and 184.611/748, Nubar and Aharonian to French Premier, Aug. 6, 1919, N.A.

71. Ibid., 763.72119/5483, Ravndal to Secretary of State, June 26, 1919, N.A.

72. Foreign Relations Papers, Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 6, pp. 675-6.

This negative position was officially accepted by the Supreme Council on the 27th when the delegates agreed:

That the further consideration of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should be suspended until such time as the Government of the United States of America could state whether they were able to accept a mandate for a portion of the territory of the former Turkish Empire.⁷³

At a news conference that same day, Wilson seemed highly optimistic that the United States would accept a mandate for Armenia, even though emphasizing that the American people had to make the final decision. He also expressed the opinion that the United States should assume a mandate for Constantinople in order to keep the Straits out of European politics.⁷⁴

Soon after his return to Washington, Wilson apparently realized the tremendous task he faced in securing the consent of the Senate to acceptance of mandates. On July 18, American Delegate White laid before the Supreme Council a cablegram from the President which made reference to the decision of June 27th and in which Wilson stated that he feared that the delay would be "very considerable" and consequently he desired to know what action toward Turkey the other Powers proposed to take in the meantime. Clemenceau, in answer, informed White that the other powers would wait for the United States to act, but this period of waiting could not be indefinite. After the other work of the Council had been completed its members would take up and try to solve the Turkish problem.⁷⁵

73. Ibid., p. 729

74. Charles T. Thompson, The Peace Conference Day By Day, (New York: Brentano's, 1920), p. 406.

75. Foreign Relations Papers, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 7, p. 193.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Lansing, who had remained in Paris after the President's departure, brought up the subject of Armenia and the Turkish Treaty at a meeting of the American Delegation on July 8th. According to the Secretary of State, the American Congress would not take up the mandates question until after the Treaty with Germany had been settled. It is probable that Lansing did not realize that this decision meant the postponement of a decision on mandates for nearly a year and virtually doomed the mandate proposal to overwhelming defeat in the Senate. In discussing Armenia, Lansing emphasized his belief that the boundaries of the new state should be very carefully drawn: "We don't want a perfectly impoverished Armenia, for example. That is a perfectly useless proposition. You might just as well make the Sahara a state as to do that." 76

One decision relative to Armenia was taken by the Supreme Council before President Wilson's departure. On June 27th, Morgenthau and Hoover jointly suggested to Wilson the appointment of a single resident Commissioner for Armenia to represent the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. He would be assigned as representative of the powers in all relations with the de facto Armenian Government but his authority would surpass the boundaries of that state:

76. Decimal File, 184.00101/107, Notes on a Meeting of the Commissioners and the Technical Experts of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, July 8, 1919, N.A.

His duties shall be so far as he may consider necessary to supervise and advise upon various governmental matters in the whole of Russian and Turkish Armenia, and to control relief and repatriation questions pending the determination of the political destiny of this area.⁷⁷

This meant, of course, that in addition to acting as an agent of the Department of State, and acting on behalf of the Allied Government in certain political matters, the Commissioner would coincidentally supervise all activity of the American Relief Administration and Near East Relief in Armenia. The proposal was adopted by the Supreme Council on June 28, 1919, and on July 5th, Colonel William N. Haskell, United States Army, who had previously represented the A.R.A. in Roumania, was appointed Allied High Commissioner to Armenia. Haskell immediately departed for Tiflis where he established his headquarters. Although the sixty-five member mission accompanying the High Commissioner was composed almost exclusively of American army and navy officers, this was not in any sense a military mission and did not represent the War Department.⁷⁸ Subsequently, in November, Georgia and Azerbaijan were added to the mission entrusted to Haskell.

During July and August, the economic and military situation in Armenia steadily deteriorated, causing concern in Paris, London, and Washington. Among other problems, relief supplies were not reaching Armenia in the quantity expected. On July 18th, Hoover informed his colleagues in Paris that the Georgian Government over whose territory relief supplies had to

77. Ibid., 181.94/2, Hoover to President Wilson, June 27, 1919, N.A.

78. See: Ibid., 860J.01/16, Lansing to Acting Secretary of State, July 11, 1919, N.A. Morgenthau describes the action taken preceding the decision to select Haskell in his book, All In A Life-time, pp. 338-40.

be transported to reach Eriyan and the rest of the Armenian Republic, was demanding up to one half of all supplies the Americans proposed to send to Armenia. Hoover termed this action by the Georgian Government nothing less than "blackmail" or "brigandage."⁷⁹

By the 24th of the month, Kurds and Tartars from Azerbaijan had organized military units and were attacking Armenian troops along the border and pushing into Armenia from the south. On that date, the officer in charge of the American Military Mission to the Caucasus termed the situation in Armenia "critical" and stated that the Allies or United States must act immediately if they wished to preserve Armenian independence.⁸⁰

Perhaps the most significant development at this time, however, was the organization of a Turkish army under Kemal Pasha and Raouf Bey in the interior of Anatolia. According to a report carried in The New York Times, this activity in Turkey would not have transpired if Kemal and other nationalist leaders had been assured that the United States would take mandates for Armenia and Constantinople or for all of Turkey, but the uncertainty regarding America's future action, combined with the acts of the Greeks and Italians in Turkey, led directly to the creation of the National-⁸¹ist Army.

The realization that only armed force could protect the Armenians and guarantee for them a secure future began to dawn on Americans. On the 29th of July, the President of Armenia formally requested that the United States

79. Foreign Relations Papers, Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 7, pp. 231-2.

80. Decimal File, 184.01602/97, Benjamin B. Moore of American Military Mission to the Caucasus to Major Royall Tyler of American Commission to Negotiate Peace, July 24, 1919, N.A.

81. The New York Times, July 31, 1919.

despatch troops to his country to aid in its defense. He also requested that arms and ammunition be sent immediately to be used by the small Armenian army in repelling the invaders. ⁸² On the 31st, the American Mission to the Peace Conference despatched a cablegram to Washington suggesting that Congress be informed of the true situation in Armenia and that the only effective solution to the problem was the sending of 10,000 American troops to that nation. ⁸³ This suggestion was in line with a report by British Intelligence, prepared at about the same time which concluded with the following: "It should be made clear to America or any other country proposing to take mandate for Armenia that nothing can be done without troops." ⁸⁴

As the situation in Armenia became more desperate, the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia again despatched a letter to Wilson. The letter, signed by Hughes, Root, Lodge, Williams, Gerard, Eliot, Alfred E. Smith, and Frederic Courtland Penfield, was dated June 22, 1919, but it was not delivered to Wilson before his departure for the United States on June 28th. the letter began: "We believe that without regard to party or creed the American people are deeply interested in the welfare of the Armenian people and expect to see the restoration of the independence of Armenia." After declaring that the Committee members had hoped that the Peace Conference would make it a first duty to end the agony in Armenia and recognize the fidelity and service to the Allied cause displayed by the

82. Decimal File, 184.01602/105, Moore to Tyler, July 31, 1919, N.A.

83. Ibid., 860J. 01/24, American Mission, Paris to Secretary of State, July 31, 1919, N.A.

84. Included in Ibid., 860J.01/31, American Mission, Paris to Secretary of State, Aug. 6, 1919, N.A.

Armenian people, the letter stated that the intense want prevalent in the new state made immediate action imperative. The signers urged:

That as a first step in that direction, and without waiting for the conclusion of peace, either the Allies, or America, or both, should at once send to Caucasus-Armenia requisite food, munitions and supplies for fifty thousand men and such other help as they may require to enable the Armenians to occupy the non-occupied parts of Armenia within the boundaries defined in the memorandum of the delegation of integral Armenia.⁸⁵

It should be noted that the wording of this appeal for action, though strong, did not specify the sending of American troops to Armenia or the assumption by the United States of a mandate over that country. Nevertheless, this letter, signed by three outstanding leaders of the Republican Party, did advocate "such other help as they may require."

In Paris, Morgenthau and Hoover were requested to draft a reply to the above letter. The resultant memorandum reviewed the history of American relief efforts for the Armenians. It emphasized that the primary causes of trouble were the huge refugee population in the de facto republic and the fact that transportation facilities were completely inadequate to meet the demands of the relief effort. Commenting on the military aspect of the situation, the Hoover-Morgenthau memorandum quoted military experts who stated confidently that the present Armenian nation, even if furnished substantial arms and ammunition, could not overcome the pressure being exerted by Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan - unquestionably, it could not "liberate" Turkish Armenia. The two men estimated that at least 60,000 foreign troops would be needed to secure the repatriation of Armenian

85. Ibid., 860J.01/12, Hughes, Root, Lodge, etc., to President Wilson, June 22, 1919, N.A.

refugees to Turkish Armenia and that a continuing force of 30,000 foreign troops would be needed to maintain the Armenian Government in control of this area. Relevant to the suggestion for a mandate over the new nation, the memorandum, noting the poor economic potential of the area, estimated that the mandatory would need to spend not less than \$300,000,000 in order to secure the establishment and protection of Armenia and to undertake the economic development of the state.

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On his own, and without the concurrence of Morgenthau, Hoover attached an addendum to the joint memorandum in which he stated that in his opinion the only way that Armenia could be made economically self-supporting would be by adding Mesopotamia to the Armenian mandate. In short, Hoover suggested that the nation assuming the mandate for one should also take the other. This was a novel suggestion and research does not disclose that such a plan was ever proposed or even discussed seriously by any other American official. It was certain that Great Britain was going to insist on a mandate over Mesopotamia, and Hoover's suggestion amounted to forcing the British to accept Armenia as part of a "package-deal." There is no indication that the British would ever have accepted such a responsibility. Morgenthau later wrote that he warned Hoover at the time that his suggestion would destroy any hope of the United States accepting the Armenian mandate. Hoover's reply, according to the ex-Ambassador to Turkey, was, "Well, I wouldn't object if that was the effect of it."

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86. Ibid., 860J.01/13, American Mission, Paris, to Secretary of State, July 3, 1919, N.A., which contains this memorandum.

87. Ibid., quotes the Hoover memo. Morgenthau describes Hoover's attitude and statement in his All In A Life-Time, p. 341. At a meeting of the

In the Senate, the ardent friend of Armenia who, like Cardashian, was to carry on the fight for a free Armenia for the next decade, Senator William King of Utah, spoke before his colleagues on August 1, 1919, describing the dangers to the independence of Armenia and the plight of the refugees. In his opinion, the incursions on Armenia by Turks and others were due to the uncertainty about the position of the United States in regard to accepting the Armenian mandate. King felt that a strong resolution passed by the American Congress on behalf of Armenia would cause the Turks to cease their hostile acts. He proposed such a resolution which declared that it was the sense of the Senate that the Supreme War Council should immediately demand the evacuation of Armenian territory by Turkish troops and armed bands of Moslems and that the Armenian vilayets in Anatolia should be occupied by military forces of the Allied and Associated Powers. In addition, the resolution advocated the equipping of Armenian troops with the weapons necessary for defense of their territory and the supplying of food, clothing, and medical needs sufficient to enable the Armenian Govern-
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ment to maintain an independent status and to control its territory. This resolution was never reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee but the sense of the proposal was later incorporated into the Williams Resolution.

American Commissioners Plenipotentiary on July 1, 1919, Hoover expressed himself as "very averse" to the United States assuming a mandate for Armenia. Calling Armenia "the poorhouse of Europe" and criticizing the Armenians as being without moral stamina and as poor fighters, Hoover felt that the cost in money and the need for a large military force in Armenia made the entire Armenian mandate project undesirable unless Mesopotamia were added. Decimal File, 184.00101/100, Minutes of Meeting of Commissioners Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference, July 1, 1919, N.A.
88. Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 58, pt. 4, (Aug. 1, 1919), pp. 3476, 3483-4.

The grave situation in Armenia in late summer 1919 was being brought to a climax by the anticipated withdrawal of all British forces in the Caucasus area. As reported above, as early as January, 1919, the British Prime Minister had informed the other governmental leaders at Paris that Great Britain desired a redistribution of Allied forces. The British troops in the entire region was relatively few but they contributed a stabilizing factor to the area out of proportion to the size of their force. The primary task of these troops was to guard the important rail line from Batum, the Black Sea port of Georgia, to the oil-rich port of Baku on the Caspian. About 20,000 men were engaged in this duty. About 500 British troops were in the Armenian Republic, mostly along the vitally important rail line from Batum to Erivan. Over this line passed all supplies for the Armenian Government from the outside world.

At one time in the spring of 1919, the British Government announced its intention to withdraw all armed forces from the Caucasus area by late June. At that time it was hoped that the Italians would take over the job of policing the Caucasus. The Italian Government, after sending an investigative mission to Georgia, declined to send troops due to the prohibitive cost of maintaining a force in that area. The Government of Great Britain then announced that the evacuation would commence on the 15th of August.

Naturally, the Armenian Government was most desirous that the British troops remain in Armenia until replaced by other Allied or American troops

89. Decimal File, 184.01602/106, Moore to Tyler, Aug. 1, 1919, N.A.;
and The New York Times, Aug. 15, 1919.

and so informed the United States. Pressure was now mounting on the American Government to take decisive action. President Wilson, in asking Lansing for his opinion on what course of action to follow, expressed his fear that it would be unwise to put before Congress a proposal to promise to assume the mandate or one to send American troops to replace the British at the present stage of the discussion of the Covenant of the League. Yet, asked Wilson, would the American public tolerate doing, or attempting, nothing?⁹¹

Lansing decided to try to persuade the British to change their evacuation plans. On August 11th, Lansing directed Ambassador Davis in London to urge the British Government "with all earnestness" not to withdraw troops from Batum at that time. The following day Davis replied that Lord Curzon informed him that the British Government could not change its decision but "would be highly gratified to see America take [the] mandate for Armenia and assume [the] duty of policing."⁹²

On the 19th, Curzon sent a note to Davis containing excerpts from a speech before the House of Commons by Andrew Bonar Law. After stating that American help would be gladly welcomed in the Caucasus and that the United States was in a better position to deal with the Armenian problem than the British, Bonar Law called the situation an American, rather than a British affair, for the Americans had greater interests in the area. He concluded his remarks with the following: "I can assure the House that if

90. Decimal File, 860J.01/59, Doolittle, Tiflis to Secretary of State, Aug. 15, 1919, N.A.

91. Ibid., 860J.01/261, Wilson to Secretary of State, Aug. 4, 1919, N.A.

92. Ibid., 860J.01/39a, Lansing to American Ambassador, London, Aug. 11, 1919; and 860J.01/40, Davis, London to Secretary of State, Aug. 12, 1919, N.A.

the President of the United States were to say to the British Government 'We wish you to hold the fort for a little until we can make arrangements' we would certainly do our best to meet him." In commenting on Bonar Law's speech and the situation in general, the British Foreign Secretary informed Ambassador Davis that the financial burden of retaining forces in the Caucasus past the time limit already established for evacuation "should be assumed by the State which expects to be or is likely to become the mandatory for the Armenian people."⁹³ Possibly Curzon was offering the American Government at least a temporary escape from the dilemma if they could help finance the cost of maintaining the British forces.

Lansing took the matter up with Wilson immediately but the two found the situation most difficult to meet. No funds were available to aid the British in keeping their forces in the Caucasus and the necessary request to Congress would, in Lansing's words, "complicate the political situation" in the United States. The President could not possibly request the British Government to "hold the fort" until arrangements could be made, as the Senate would react violently against such an assumption of power by the Executive.⁹⁴ The only answer appeared to be to appeal to the humanitarianism of the government in London. In a later despatch to Ambassador Davis, Lansing challenged the theory that the Armenian problem was an American affair. The British had voluntarily assumed an important role in this problem in 1856 and 1878, by the Cyprus Convention, and by other acts over

93. Ibid., 860J.01/53, Davis to Secretary of State, Aug. 20, 1919, N.A.

94. Ibid., 860J.01/53, Lansing to American Ambassador, London, Aug. 23, 1919, N.A.

a period of years. Lansing also used about the only weapon at his command to force the British to change their plans by warning Curzon that if massacres followed the withdrawal of His Majesty's troops from Armenia, a strong anti-British feeling would be generated in the United States.⁹⁵ Curzon was apparently not impressed.

President Wilson decided on one course of action which he could take to help protect Armenians returning to Turkish Armenia - a warning to the Turks. As early as the 2nd of August he had been contemplating such action and on the 16th instructions were sent to Bristol to warn the Turkish Government to take immediate and efficacious measures to prevent massacres or atrocities against Armenians. If such action were not taken, the position of the United States at the Peace Conference in support of Turkish sovereignty in the purely Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire might be changed and result in the "absolute dissolution" of the Empire. A plea of inability to maintain control over all parts of the Ottoman Empire would not be tolerated by the American Government on the grounds that if the Turkish Government wished to exercise any sovereignty over any portion of the Empire, it must demonstrate its ability and willingness in the Armenian vilayets.⁹⁶

The reply from the Grand Vizier, to whom Bristol delivered the note,⁹⁷ was a carefully worded statement which promised virtually nothing. However, the same day that the reply was delivered the Grand Vizier protested to the

95. Ibid., 860J.01/53, Lansing to American Ambassador, London, Aug. 26, 1919, N.A.

96. Ibid., 860J.01/44, Wilson to American Mission, Paris, Aug. 2, 1919; and 763.72119/5960, Lansing to American Mission, Paris (pass to Bristol), Aug. 16, 1919, N.A.

97. Ibid., 867.00/914, Ravndal to Secretary of State, Aug. 25, 1919, N.A.

Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople against the American action. On August 25th, Clemenceau brought the matter up before the Supreme Council where he criticized the American initiative, particularly as the action was taken without consultation between Admiral Bristol and the Allied High Commissioners. In the opinion of the French Premier, no one High Commissioner should try to dictate the action of the Turkish Government and this was especially true when that High Commissioner represented a government which had not declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The American representative to the Supreme Council explained that the American demarche was simply an act on behalf of the United States and that Bristol had not attempted to act on behalf of the Allies. Nevertheless, a resolution was adopted by the Council in which the powers agreed that, henceforth, no pressure would be brought to bear on the Sultan by any Allied or Associated Power acting alone.

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Meanwhile, the A.C.I.A. had become alarmed at the situation in and near Armenia and Gerard was frequently in contact with other prominent members of his Committee and with Secretary Lansing. On August 21st, the Secretary of State informed Gerard that Allied military experts were agreed that only by the sending of Allied or United States military forces to Armenia could effective protection be granted to that nation. Gerard contacted Senator Lodge, Hughes, Root, and others and passed to them this information with a request for their comments. These written opinions

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98. Ibid., 180.03501/38, Notes on a Meeting of Supreme Council at M. Pichon's Room on Aug. 25, 1919; and 180.03502, Resolutions of Supreme Council on Aug. 25, 1919, N.A.

99. Ibid., 860J.01/33, Lansing to Gerard, Aug. 21, 1919, N.A.

by certain prominent Americans as to what their country should do about the Armenian problem are interesting in the light of their general position on international issues. The view of the power of the President of the United States as proclaimed by both Lodge and Hughes, and the opinions of the latter as contrasted with the viewpoint he expressed as a later Secretary of State, are enlightening.

Gerard transmitted to Lansing the written replies to his request for opinions. Hughes wrote, regarding the despatch of American troops, that he:

...was not disposed to join unless it appeared after your [Gerard's] full conference with the President that with all the facts at his command such course should seem feasible. As to the disposition of our troops now in Europe only the President can judge what it is practicable to do. Am perfectly willing that you as Chairman if you think you have sufficient facts should urge sending of our troops which are now in Europe unless President knows adequate objection. I am anxious that we should give all help possible in the present emergency, but as to specific measures President must be the judge and must take the responsibility.¹⁰⁰

Senator Lodge's answer was more concise: "I agree with Mr. Hughes that responsibility for action lies with the President. He can order the troops to Armenia if he sees fit. The Senate has no power to send troops."¹⁰⁰

This statement by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee seems to imply that no objection would have been raised by him if President Wilson had decreed that American troops were to be sent to Armenia to assist in protecting the people of that country, despite the fact that the United States was not at war with Turkey.

¹⁰⁰. Both statements to Gerard are quoted in Ibid., 860J.01/70, Gerard to Secretary of State, Aug. 28, 1919, N.A.

If the statements by Hughes and Lodge placed a heavy responsibility on the President and their authors appeared to be attempting to avoid making definite decisions on the despatch of troops themselves, such could not be said of the expressed opinion of former Secretary of State Root: "I consider imperative duty of allies to send without any delay whatever sufficient troops to insure organization and equipment of Armenian forces adequate to protect the country and its inhabitants and that America should immediately do its part in furnishing troops."¹⁰¹

Despite this apparent carte blanche from some highly influential leaders of the Republican Party to the President, Wilson did not move to despatch American troops to Armenia. Possibly he did not have confidence that Senator Lodge would continue to support his apparent position on the issue if he, Wilson, were to accept the power conferred upon him in the Senator's letter to Gerard. More likely Wilson realized the legal barrier to his acting without Congressional authorization in this case. In the reply to Gerard's query received from Senator Williams of Mississippi, there is expressed the definite conviction that only Congress could act to send American troops to Turkey or Armenia.¹⁰² There is also the possibility that some confusion existed in the Department of State regarding the situation in Armenia and Turkey due to somewhat conflicting information and suggestions received from American representatives in the field. Colonel Haskell felt that in view of the British evacuation, the United States should send troops to the Caucasus immediately. He foresaw the need for only a small

101. Quoted in Ibid., 860J.01/91, Gerard to Secretary of State, Aug. 30, 1919, N.A.

102. Ibid., 860J.01/70, Gerard to Secretary of State, Aug. 28, 1919, N.A.

detachment of Americans, apparently depending in part on the psychological effect of their arrival. Commissioner Ravndal in Constantinople also saw the need for only about 10,000 American troops to ensure the safety of Armenia and the Armenians.¹⁰³

On the other hand, Admiral Bristol had by this time become an ardent supporter of non-intervention in the Armenian problem. He was strongly opposed to the sending of American troops to the Caucasus or Armenia. He predicted that if such action were taken these troops would eventually come into conflict with the Moslems in the area, or with a resurgent Russia, or both. In Bristol's mind, the question of the entire Near East was being over-shadowed in America by the smaller Armenian question. He was also violently opposed to the "strong, inaccurate propaganda" widely dispensed in France and the United States which gave only one side of the story and appealed to "the sentimental side of people."¹⁰⁴ By this time the American High Commissioner had become convinced that Armenia could never exist as an independent state - he was never to change his mind.

Meanwhile, in Paris, the Supreme Council was trying to deal with the situation in the Caucasus and Armenia, particularly as it had developed with the departure of British troops. At one point, Clemenceau, apparently at the suggestion of Hoover, sent a despatch to the Georgian Government warning that its action in demanding huge sums of money or supplies for the passage of trains through Georgia to Armenia, when such trains were carrying

103. Ibid., 860J.01/62, Lansing to American Mission, Paris, Aug. 28, 1919; and 860J.01/102, Ravndal to Secretary of State, Sep. 29, 1919, N.A.

104. Ibid., 860J.01/73, Bristol to Secretary of State, Received on Sep. 4, 1919, N.A.

relief supplies, would result in prejudicing their case before the Peace Conference.¹⁰⁵ This action apparently had a beneficial effect on the shipment of relief supplies to Erivan.

On the 11th of August, Clemenceau laid before the Conference a recent letter, addressed to him, from Colonel Haskell. The Allied High Commissioner warned that British evacuation would leave relief stores unguarded in highly dangerous areas of the Caucasus, would make transportation of supplies to Armenia exceedingly difficult, and might also result in famine and massacre. Haskell requested that the Supreme Council request the British to revoke their decision. In the discussion that followed, the British representative, Balfour, announced that a change in plans was impossible; the Italian and French representatives announced that their countries could do nothing, the American representative, Polk, proclaimed the inability of the United States to send troops as it had not declared war on the Ottoman Empire. A statement was adopted which read as follows: "As no government was prepared to furnish troops for Armenia, the question raised by Colonel Haskell's telegram of 5th August 1919 was left without a solution."¹⁰⁶

On August 25th, a new development occurred at Paris which was to have an effect on the Armenian problem. Another telegram from Haskell had described the "horrible situation beyond description" in Russian Armenia, where the de facto government of Armenia was nominally exercising full sovereignty. When there seemed to be no suggestion from other representatives for a solution to the problem, the French Premier hinted broadly that

105. Foreign Relations Papers, Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 7, p. 211
Hoover refers to this in his Memoirs, Vol. 1, p. 387.

106. Decimal File, 108.03502/28, Resolution Adopted by the Supreme Council on Aug. 11, 1919, N.A.

France might be willing to send troops to Armenia if permission were granted by the British Government whose troops occupied Syria and Cilicia. At the suggestion of Balfour, Clemenceau agreed to explore the possibilities of sending troops to aid the Armenians. 107

On August 29th, Clemenceau informed his colleagues that the French Government had found it possible to send 12,000 troops to Armenia to occupy the critical locations mentioned by Colonel Haskell. The French statesman insisted that the French troops must land at ports in Cilicia and could then utilize the railways and highways of the country to reach their final destinations where they could perform their tasks "pour la protection des Armeniens." Polk noted that a more easily accessible port for entry into Armenia would be Batum and suggested that the French troops land at this location. Clemenceau rejected this plan and insisted on the ports of Alexandretta and Mersine. 108 The following day, Polk cabled the Department that, in his opinion, the French action and offer were made in an attempt "to get a footing in Asia Minor" rather than as an attempt to protect the Armenians. Nevertheless, on September 2nd, Secretary Lansing wired the American Mission in Paris that the Department of State would "welcome" the despatch of French troops to Armenia. 109

On September 15, 1919, the British and French proclaimed an understanding between the two governments in which the British agreed to withdraw

107. Ibid., 180.03501/38, Notes on a Meeting of the Supreme Council in Pichon's Room on Aug. 25, 1919, N.A.

108. Ibid., 180.03501/42, Notes on a Meeting of the Supreme Council in Pichon's Room on Aug. 29, 1919, N.A.

109. Ibid., 763.72119/6462, Polk to Secretary of State, Aug. 30, 1919; and 860J.01/68, Lansing to American Mission, Paris, Sep. 2, 1919, N.A.

their forces from Syria and Cilicia and permit the despatch of French troops to Alexandretta and Mersine as the French Government had "accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people." Clemenceau announced dramatically that this amounted to "an enormous burden" to France but that his government agreed to the action because massacres were threatened and France could thus be of service to the Peace Conference.¹¹⁰

By the 22nd of the month, Polk cabled from Paris that his fears were justified. The French action amounted to occupation of Cilicia only and thus the fulfillment of the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.¹¹¹ The French troops would be nowhere closer than 300 miles to Erivan.

It would appear from the evidence readily available that the French Government acted in a most hypocritical manner toward the Armenian people in August and September, 1919. Colonel Haskell specifically referred only to Russian Armenia and the danger threatening the de facto government of Armenia in his cablegrams to the President of the Peace Conference. Clemenceau, in his pious statements regarding the affording of protection to the Armenians, referred again and again to the dangers mentioned in the despatches from the Allied High Commissioner. But in the final analysis the French Government deployed their troops only in that small area of Turkish Armenia assigned to France by the secret agreement concluded in 1916.

110. Ibid., 180.03501/53, Notes on a Meeting of the Supreme Council in Pichon's Room on Sep. 15, 1919, N.A.

111. Ibid., 860J.01/90, Polk to Secretary of State, Sep. 22, 1919, N.A. French troops occupied Cilicia on Oct. 30, 1919.

THE MANDATE QUESTION

After the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference in 1923 and the realization that the Armenian state as envisaged in February, 1919 at Paris would not and could not be created, some critics of American policy, in reviewing United States' action during the critical years of Armenia's independence, determined that September, 1919 might well have been the most important single month in the history of the Armenian Question. According to these American critics and French apologists, the French Government would have sent troops to guard the independence of the Armenian Republic in the Caucasus if the United States Senate had not indicated an intention to send American forces to that country at or about the same time. According to these sources, the action of the Senate in debating the so-called Williams Resolution of September 8, 1919, caused the French to hesitate and finally decide against the despatch of French soldiers to the Caucasus and also caused the British Government to decline to send weapons to the Armenian Government to be used in the defense of the nation.¹

On September 8, Senator Williams, Democrat of Mississippi and a prominent member of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, possibly in an attempt to test the sincerity of his Republican colleagues in the A.C.I.A. who had appeared to favor the sending of American troops

1. Edward H. Bierstadt, The Great Betrayal, (New York: Robert M. McBride and Co., 1924), p. 337; American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, (New York: 1924), p. 14; and Simon Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian Question, (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Co., 1943), p. 94.

to Armenia in their letters to Gerard in August, introduced a resolution to the Senate which would have authorized the President to send troops to Armenia and also to send arms and ammunition for the use of the Armenian Army. This resolution was integrated into the Lodge Resolution of the previous December and passed to the Foreign Relations Committee in the following form:

Whereas the withdrawal of the British troops from the Caucasus and Armenia will leave the Armenian people helpless against the attacks of the Kurds and the Turks, and whereas the American people are deeply and sincerely sympathetic with the aspirations of the Armenian people for liberty and peace and progress: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in the opinion of the Senate, Armenia (including the six vilayets of Turkish Armenia and Cilicia), Russian Armenia, and the northern part of the Province of Azerbaijan and Trebizond, should be independent, and that it is the hope of the Senate that the peace conference will make arrangements for helping Armenia to establish an independent republic.

Sec. 2. That the President of the United States is hereby authorized to use such military and naval forces of the United States as in his opinion may seem expedient for the maintenance of peace and tranquility in Armenia until the settlement of the affairs of that country has been completed by treaty between the nations.

Sec. 3. That the President is hereby authorized to suspend the foreign enlistment act to the extent necessary to enable Armenians in the United States to raise money and arm and equip themselves as an armed force to go to the aid of their countrymen in Asia Minor.

Sec. 4. There is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated the sum of \$_____ to enable the President to execute the foregoing resolution.²

2. Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 58, pt. 5 (Sep. 9, 1919), p. 5067.

In an exchange of telegrams between the President, who was now on his speaking tour of the West, and Acting Secretary of State Phillips, Wilson declared himself "heartily in favor" of sending American troops to the Armenian Republic. Noting that the French Government also appeared willing to despatch a force to the Caucasus, the President stated that he was willing to send United States troops in conjunction with the French or send them without French cooperation. When Phillips later informed the President that Senator Williams had indicated that he intended to delete from his resolution the words relevant to the sending of American soldiers to Armenia due to the French action and the "decided feeling" in the Foreign Relations Committee against the despatch of American troops, Wilson replied that he was disappointed as he was of the opinion that only "energetic" action could save the Armenian race from extinction.³ Possibly because of the President's feeling on the subject, Williams did not delete from his resolution the pertinent section on the sending of an armed force to Erivan.

Meanwhile, conflicting despatches from American representatives in Turkey on the desirability of sending American troops to Armenia continued to arrive in Washington. The Allied High Commissioner in Armenia, Colonel Haskell, recommended the sending of at least 2,000 American troops to act as a police force, to guard the rail line from Batum to Erivan, and to act

3. Decimal File, 860J.01/82, Wilson to Ass't-Secretary Phillips, Received Sep. 17, 1919; 860J.01/82, Phillips to President Wilson, Sep. 20, 1919; and 860J.01/92, Wilson to Ass't-Secretary Phillips, Sep. 23, 1919, N.A.

as a quieting or stabilizing force in the Armenian Republic. To Haskell, this action would not in any way commit the United States on the future question of accepting an Armenian mandate as the troops could be used as a police force of the Peace Conference, performing an international task.⁴

On the other hand, Admiral Bristol, American High Commissioner in Constantinople, was adamantly opposed to the sending of any American troops to Armenia. Throughout the fall of 1919 Bristol urged in what he termed the "strongest way possible" against the despatch of an American force. To him, the proposed action would destroy American influence in Turkey, which was the strongest single factor insuring peace in the area, and would eventually bring the United States into open conflict with both the Turkish nationalists and the Russians. Completely at variance with Haskell's estimate was Bristol's belief that at least 150,000 American troops would be needed or the United States might face the humiliation of being literally forced out of the Near East. Admiral Bristol suggested that under no circumstances should American troops be sent alone to Armenia. If they had to be despatched, then they should go as part of an international police force composed of equal numbers of French, Italian, British, and American troops. This solution to the problem was in itself not as desirable, according to the High Commissioner, as another which he suggested, that the United States Government apply the requisite pressure to force the Allies to occupy strategic spots throughout the Ottoman Empire in line

4. Ibid., 763.72119/7432, Bristol to Secretary of State, Oct. 26, 1919, which incloses a message, dated Oct. 16, 1919, from Haskell to Secretary Lansing, N.A.

with provisions of the Armistice of Mudros. According to Bristol, major causes of the unfortunate situation in Armenia and the demand for American troops to remedy it were: (1) selfish British motives to create a buffer state between Russia and the area that Great Britain wanted in Turkey, and (2) "a strong propaganda for Armenian affairs that is giving ⁵ [the] wrong impression regarding affairs in Turkey and [the] Caucasus."

In the United States Congress, the combined resolution of September 8th was referred to a sub-committee of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee under the chairmanship of Senator Harding of Ohio, the other members being Senator New of Indiana and the co-author of the Resolution, Senator Williams. Hearings on the bill began on September 27th and were completed by October 10th. Speakers before the sub-committee were mostly prominent members of the Armenian-American community and individuals prominent in relief organizations. Both Republican members of the sub-committee continuously attempted to insert the question of an American mandate over Armenia into the discussion despite the fact that the original resolution did not deal with that subject at all. Although the speakers before the sub-committee strongly urged the sending of troops to Armenia, Chairman Harding appeared unimpressed and termed the proposed action an act of war by the United States.⁶ Harding's expressed views should have prepared Gerard and others who advocated the despatch of troops for the eventual recommendations of the sub-committee.

5. Particularly Ibid., 867.00/938, Bristol to Secretary of State, Sep. 30, 1919; 867.00/941, Bristol to Secretary of State, Oct. 3, 1919; 181.9402/6, Bristol to American Mission, Paris, Oct. 20, 1919; and 181.9402/10, Bristol to American Mission, Paris, Nov. 5, 1919, N.A.

6. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Maintenance of Peace in Armenia, Hearings Before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. J. Res. 106, 66th Cong., 1st sess, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919).

In October, 1919, it was reasonably anticipated that the recommendations relative to the Williams Resolution would soon be made to the Foreign Relations Committee and to the full Senate. But due to the pressure of other work, including preparation for the Republican primaries by the Chairman of the sub-committee, the recommendations by Senator Harding and his colleagues were not presented until May, 1920. Considering that the despatch of troops by the United States to foreign territory was normally not anticipated in 1919 except in an unusual emergency, Harding's delay of seven months in bringing forth the report appears unusual.

One thing should be stated, however, in fairness to the Senator from Ohio. Although he did not submit the recommendations on the resolution as soon as he implied he would in correspondence with Gerard in the fall of 1919, at which time he informed the latter that he hoped to submit the report in the early part of November, Harding did inform Gerard as to what his eventual recommendations would be. Some writers have stated that Harding did not make in May the recommendations that he informed Gerard he would make in October, but a letter from Gerard to Lansing of October 17, 1919 contains the list of recommendations which Harding had informed Gerard were anticipated for the final report. These recommendations are almost identical with those contained in the final May report.

7. See: Decimal File, 860J.01/323, Gerard to Secretary of State, Nov. 6, 1919, in which Gerard informs Lansing that Harding has notified him that he will act soon in submitting the report; and 860J.01/119, Gerard to Secretary of State, Oct. 17, 1919, in which Gerard lists the recommendations that Harding informed him would be made in the final report. Bierstadt, particularly, castigated Harding for not making recommendations he had told Gerard that he would make in the report; see: Bierstadt, The Great Betrayal, p. 338.

In July, 1919, at the time that Hoover and Morgenthau had recommended the appointment of Colonel Haskell as Allied High Commissioner in Armenia, the desire to secure accurate information on the true situation in the Caucasus, Armenia, and Turkey had also been discussed among members of the American Commission in Paris. The need for an accurate report on the situation was obvious to anyone reading the conflicting reports and recommendations being received by the American Mission and by the State Department from American official and unofficial representatives in the area. Consequently, in early July, Hoover and Morgenthau recommended a fact-finding mission to President Wilson. They proposed that the mission be despatched to the Near East to secure information on the problem of repatriation, the general economic situation, and various political problems existing in the new state of Armenia so that future United States' action could be more easily determined. As leader of this investigative mission, the two men suggested Major General James G. Harbord, who had been Chief of Staff to General Pershing in France and who had served twelve years in various military and civilian positions in the administration of the Philippine Islands.

8. See: Henry Morgenthau, All In A Life-Time, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1923), p. 343; and Herbert Hoover, America's First Crusade, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), pp. 48-9. Hoover's attitude relative to the Harbord Mission is confusing. He claims, and Morgenthau substantiates, that he and Morgenthau originated the proposal for a mission. However, at a meeting of the American Commissioners on July 2nd, Hoover opposed the sending of a fact-finding mission, labeling the plan "an involuntary piece of propaganda, looking towards the acceptance by the United States of a mandate over that country." Decimal File, 184.00101/101, Notes on Meeting of American Plenipotentiaries, July 2, 1919, N.A. See also, 860J.01/13, Polk to Charles Hughes, July 12, 1919, in which Acting Secretary Polk reviews the genesis of the proposal.

By the first of August, Wilson had agreed to the plan and on the 13th of the month, Frank Polk informed General Harbord of his appointment, the details having been coordinated with the War Department. According to Polk's directive, Harbord's instructions were to:

Proceed without delay on a Government vessel to Constantinople, Batum, and such other places in Armenia, Russian Transcaucasia, and Syria, as will enable you to carry out instructions already discussed with you. It is desired that you investigate and report on political, military, geographical, administrative, economic, and other considerations involved in possible American interests and responsibilities in that region.⁹

The Harbord Mission, or, as it was titled officially, the American Military Mission to Armenia, was composed of fourteen "experts," mostly officers of the United States Army, and twelve other members. The twenty-six man team arrived in Constantinople on September 2nd, left immediately for Armenia and the Caucasus, traveled over 10,000 miles in the succeeding month, and was back in Paris on October 25th, having previously submitted a voluminous report to the State Department, under date of October 16th. At a meeting on the 25th between Polk and Harbord, the General warned that delay in settling the Turkish problem was making it daily more complex, and he strongly recommended that the Peace Conference immediately
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take up consideration of the Turkish settlement.

The report submitted to the United States Government by the Harbord Mission was quite long and only the most important points can be summarized here. This comprehensive report, on the situation existing in the Caucasus

9. Decimal File, 184.021/142, Polk to Maj. Gen. J. G. Harbord, Aug. 13, 1919, N.A.

10. Ibid., 184.02102/18, Polk to Secretary of State, Oct. 25, 1919, N.A.

and the Ottoman Empire in 1919, furnishes interesting and informative reading four decades after its preparation. It tended to substantiate the proposals of the Morgenthau group at the Paris Peace Conference and the often expressed opinion of Admiral Bristol and was in complete conflict with the views of those advocating a mandate for Armenia alone.¹¹ In the preparation of the report, the Mission interviewed representatives of every government in the area and individual Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Tartars, Georgians, Russians, Persians, Jews, Arabs, Britons, Frenchmen, and Americans. The report was broken down into four separate parts: (1) a history and report on the current situation of the Armenian people, (2) the political situation and suggestions for readjustment, (3) the conditions and problems involved in a mandatory, and (4) the considerations for and against the undertaking of a mandate.

In discussing the situation in the Caucasus, the report described the tragic situation of the refugees in Armenia, emphasized the economic interdependence of the three new states, and expressed doubt as to the ability of the three governments, which were referred to as "thoroughly inefficient, without credit, and undoubtedly corrupt," to administer their territories.¹² For the entire Caucasus, the Commission recommended one

11. The complete report, including the several annexes, is filed under 184.02102/5 in the Decimal File. The report, without annexes, was published as: American Military Mission to Armenia, Conditions in the Near East, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Sen. Doc. 266, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920). The Military Annex was published as: American Military Mission to Armenia, Mandatory Over Armenia, Report made to Maj. Gen. Harbord by Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley., 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Sen. Doc. 281 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920).

12. Military Mission, Conditions in the Near East, p. 14.

mandatory but warned that the power accepting this mandate would face:

...a long period of tutelage for possibly unappreciative and ungrateful pupils, much expense, probably diplomatic embarrassment from a reconstitution of Russia, and little reward except the consciousness of having contributed to the peace of the world and the rehabilitation of oppressed humanity.¹³

Turning to Turkey, the Harbord Mission Report declared that any mandatory for the Caucasus or Armenia which did not also exercise control over Constantinople and Anatolia would be working under the most difficult circumstances. It emphasized that the lack of control over all areas would be both economically expensive and politically dangerous due to the existence of foreign powers in control of other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Regarding Constantinople itself, the report read as follows:

Without dependable centralized control of Constantinople, a power exercising mandate in Armenia would be crippled in administration, restricted in trade development, ridden by concessionaires, dependent on Turkish discredited diplomacy for redress of local and boundary grievances, and in extreme case practically cut off from communication with the western world.¹⁴

The report went on to declare that a mandate for Armenia alone would entail the sending of a much larger military force to protect the boundary of that state than would a mandate over all of the area, the latter solution permitting the consideration of boundaries to be taken up at a later date. All Americans in the Ottoman Empire or the Caucasus who had been resident in the Near East over a period of years had expressed to the members of the Harbord Mission their approval of a single mandate for the entire area.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 15.

As to determining which great power should exercise the power of mandatory over this large and diverse population and vast area, the report had the following words of caution:

No disinterested nation would undertake such a mandatory except from a strong sense of altruism and international duty to the peace of the world in this breeding place of wars and at the unanimous wish of other parties to the covenant of the League of Nations.

No nation incapable of united and nonpartisan action for a long period should undertake it.¹⁵

Turning next to the possibility of the United States accepting this mandate over 15,000,000 people and 400,000 square miles, the members of the Mission pointed out that the United States had many desirable qualities for the assumption of the task. The world would expect the United States to develop the people rather than the mineral resources of the area, due to the nation's traditional lofty ideals, expressed so well by the President. Distance from the Near East, non-participation in previous intrigue in the Ottoman Empire, the lack of a binding necessity to consider the effect of American action on other Moslem colonial peoples, and a lack of financial interest in Turkey all combined to place the United States in a unique position.

The Report dealt at length with the amount of men and money that the United States would have to contribute to the Near East if the large recommended mandate were accepted. The military experts estimated that a force of about 60,000 United States soldiers would be needed if the mandate were accepted at that time. This force could be reduced during the

15. Ibid., p. 20.

following years as a native constabulary was created, but it could not be reduced to under one American infantry division in the foreseeable future. The cost of the mandate, only a small amount of which could be returned initially from the area to the United States, would be about \$90,000,000 for the first year but this sum would also be reduced as the years passed, being no more than half that figure at the end of three years.

To the members of the Harbord Mission, the most important sine qua non to be demanded by the United States before accepting a mandate such as that proposed in the Report was the formal acceptance by the leading powers of Europe of the necessity for this American mandate: "In our opinion there should be specific pledges in terms of formal agreements with France and England and definite approval from Germany and Russia of the dispositions made of Turkey and Transcaucasia, and a pledge to respect them." 16

In conclusion, the Report listed fourteen reasons why the United States should accept a mandate and thirteen reasons why it should not. The reasons against such assumption stressed the traditional isolationism of the American people and government and the fear of involvement in Old World politics, the many problems facing the American people at home in 1919, the fact that other nations could equally well guarantee security in the area, the expense involved, and the fact that continuity of American foreign policy could not be guaranteed. Among the reasons for accepting the mandate, the Report emphasized the humanitarian aspect, the fact that the United States would be insuring peace in a world danger spot, the obvious fact that America was the overwhelming choice of the people of the

16. Ibid., p. 24.

affected nations as mandatory, the fact that Americans could exercise control in an area into which millions of their dollars were going in relief projects, the knowledge that the mandated areas would eventually become self-supporting, that massacres would cease, that American prestige would be enhanced abroad, and the fact that the isolationist argument had been somewhat shattered by successful participation by the United States in the World War. The Report of the Harbord Commission did not recommend that the United States accept or reject a mandate for Armenia or for Turkey, Armenia, and the Caucasus combined. It attempted to establish facts upon which the Government of the United States could base subsequent action on the problem. However, at the end of the report, the members of the Mission inserted the following words: "If we refuse to assume it [the mandate] for no matter what reasons satisfactory to ourselves, we shall be considered by many millions of people as having left unfinished the task for which we entered the war, and as having betrayed their hopes." 17

By the fall of 1919, the debate on American acceptance of an Armenian mandate had been joined by American Congressmen, business leaders, educators, religious leaders, foreign government officials, and by the average citizens of the United States and other nations. Unfortunately, for the proponents of an American mandate over Armenia or for all of Turkey, the problem became intertwined in Congress with the more general question of mandates under the League of Nations and also with the question of American participation in the League itself.

17. Ibid., p. 28.

The growing hostility between President Wilson and the Republican leadership of the Senate had a pronounced effect on the Armenian mandate¹⁸ question. As early as February, 1919, Senator Lenroot (R-Wis) lashed out at the mandate provisions in the then currently debated draft of the League Covenant. The provision for obligatory acceptance of a mandate was convincing evidence to the Wisconsin lawmaker that the Council of the League would force upon the United States acceptance of responsibility for the "sick man of Europe," and it was equally obvious that "every community¹⁹ in the Turkish Empire" would wish to be under American mandate.

After Wilson, at the suggestion of several influential members of both political parties, succeeded in changing the provisions of the mandate article in the Covenant from its obligatory character to a voluntary one, he still failed to satisfy the desires of some members of the Senate. In May, Senator Sherman (R-Ill.) delivered a blistering attack upon the revised draft of the Covenant in which he contended that the voluntary character of Article 22 was negated in effect by the fact that President Wilson had had a most important place in the creation of the League, and America, being the wealthiest of all nations with the largest productive capacity and manpower, could justifiably be expected by other members of the League²⁰ to assume a mandate. This argument, which was to be heard again, implied that if the United States accepted the Covenant of the League, it would be morally obliged to accept mandatory control over part of the former Turkish or German Empires.

18. See: Rayford W. Logan, The Senate and the Versailles Mandate System, (Washington: The Minorities Publishers, 1945).

19. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., Vol. 57, pt. 5 (Feb. 28, 1919), p. 4571.

20. Ibid., 66th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 58, pt. 1 (May 23, 1919), p. 169.

The ineffective defense of the League Covenant and the mandate provisions contained therein was exemplified by Senator Williams' (D-Miss.) action on August 15th. On that day he inserted an article in the Congressional Record by news correspondent Frederick Palmer, which was supposed to quiet the fears of those who opposed American embroilment in European affairs. Regarding Armenia, Palmer tried to convince his readers that once European nations had regained their equilibrium, destroyed by the war, they would demand the right to direct Armenian affairs. Palmer asked: "Does anyone think that European pride would welcome American soldiers policing a region [Armenia] which naturally belongs in the domain of European interests"?²¹ In light of the many positive reasons why the United States should have accepted an Armenian mandate, this appears to have been an unnecessarily negative approach to the problem. However, as was stated above, it was probably developed, not to justify the assumption of a mandate, but to eliminate or reduce the fears of those who opposed it. Unfortunately, for the proponents of a mandate, there is no evidence that the latter design was realized.

In early September, Senator Poindexter (R-Wash.), taking note of Wilson's recent speeches while on his Western tour, commented on the President's references to Armenia and his anticipation that the United States would aid in the protection of that country. Poindexter foresaw the involvement of 150,000 American soldiers in the Near East and the expenditure of over a billion dollars if the United States became involved in the

21. Ibid., pt. 4 (Aug. 15, 1919), pp. 3911-2.

Armenian Question by assuming a mandate for the area. The Senator from Washington warned that some of these American boys would die in Armenia while the expense of maintaining the mandate would fall squarely on the over-burdened American taxpayer.

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On September 10th, Senator Lodge laid before the Senate the report of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Versailles Treaty. Among the forty-five amendments to the Treaty, which were listed in the report, was one to the effect that acceptance of any mandate by the United States rested exclusively in the hands of the Congress. In his speech before the Senate that day, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee warned his colleagues that the Paris Peace Conference was "trying to force upon the United States the control of Armenia, Anatolia, and Constantinople."

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In the "Great Debate" regarding the Versailles Treaty that followed, many of the members of the Senate expressed their views on the subject of mandates for the United States and particularly on the issue of an Armenian mandate. Not only were all the participants at the Paris Peace Conference denounced, in general, for trying to foist an Armenian or Turkish mandate on the United States, as was stated by Lodge, but the British Government and the President of the United States were specifically accused of attempting to do this.

22. Ibid., pt. 5 (Sep. 8, 1919), pp. 5024-5.

23. Ibid., (Sep. 10, 1919), pp. 5113-4. After the defeat of the amendments and reservations by the Foreign Relations Committee, Lodge introduced his resolution of ratification with 15 reservations on November 6th. Reservation Number 4 stated: "No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article 22, Part 1, or any other provision of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States." It should be noted that this does not apply to the treaty with Turkey. Ibid., pt. 8, (Nov. 6, 1919), pp. 8022-3.

On the 11th of September, Senator Harding (R-Ohio) expressed his opposition to the Treaty and the assumption of a mandate. Harding, like many others in the Senate who opposed the mandate, was eager to deny that he was "insensible" to the sufferings of the Armenians but he was firmly against the despatch of American troops to the Near East. In Harding's view, the British were "urging, insisting" that the United States take the mandate and send American troops to relieve the British garrisons, and yet if America answered the Armenian call for help, disaster would follow: "Answer the call, and we station this American Army at the gateway between Orient and Occident, to become involved in every conflict in the Old World, and our splendid isolation becomes a memory and our boasted peace a mockery. This is the avenue to unending war."²⁴

In the days that followed, the attack in the Senate on the treaty and the mandates increased in intensity. On the 16th of September, Sherman (R-Ill.) attacked the President's secretiveness about his acceptance of an Armenian mandate while at the Peace Conference. On the 22nd, Reed (R-Mo.) denounced in most vitriolic terms the Covenant and the mandate system. On the 24th, Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.) described for his colleagues the grim picture of American boys dying in Armenia. On the 30th of the month, Fall (R-N.M.) surpassed his predecessors by denouncing the attempt of the administration to send American boys "to guard Turkish harems." On the 16th of October, Brandegee (R-Conn.) denounced Wilson's lack of cooperation with the Foreign Relations Committee on the subject of American

24. Ibid., pt. 5 (Sep. 11, 1919), p. 5222.

commitments made at Paris regarding Armenia and warned that little could be done by that Committee on the Williams Resolution until the President supplied more information. On October 24, Gronna (R-N.D.) inserted in the Congressional Record an editorial from The Washington Post which questioned the "ambiguities and hidden meanings" in Article 22 and brought up the question of how a nation could relieve itself of a mandate once it had accepted such a charge. To Gronna, a clarifying amendment on mandates was necessary due to the tendency of Article 22 "to embroil the United States in foreign quarrels."²⁵

Not all of the opposition to the Armenian mandate plan came from the Republicans. One of the most out-spoken critics of the plan was Senator Hoke Smith (D-Ga.). On November 7th, the Senator from Georgia emphasized his interest in the cause of the Armenians but regretted the fact that they were scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire and that this would necessitate a mandate by the American Government over all of Turkey. To secure such a mandate, the Georgian estimated that the United States would have to send 250,000 troops to the Near East. On the 19th of November, Smith declared himself unwilling to allow the Council of the League, and, in particular, Great Britain, to "impose" an Armenian mandate on the United States. In an interview for the Atlanta Journal the following month, Smith noted that the English historian, H. G. Wells, had recently stated that the League of Nations would soon be able to pass on the treatment of Armenians in Turkey and Negroes in Georgia. If anything more were

25. Ibid., pt. 6 (Sep. 16, 22, 24, 30), pp. 5496, 5700-23, 5847, 6137; and pt. 7 (Oct. 17, 24), pp. 7051-2, 7425-6.

needed to convince the Georgia lawmaker that he should oppose the mandate plan as detailed in the Covenant, this statement by Wells supplied that need.²⁶

Meanwhile, within the Administration, there was some conflict of views on the question of a mandate for Armenia. Wilson made frequent reference to the need for a mandate system in his tour of the West in the fall of 1919. Two days before illness struck the President, he spoke at Ogden, Utah and reemphasized his belief that Armenia would be "redeemed" under the League and that Christians would be allowed to aid and protect the people of the new state. He did not demand that the United States accept this responsibility but he did state: "I believe that there is no region of the world toward which the sympathies of the United States have gone out so abundantly as to the poor people of Armenia...."²⁷

The Secretary of State, however, was far from convinced of the desirability of a mandate for the United States over Armenia. On September 12th, William C. Bullitt, testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee, affirmed that on May 19th Lansing had told him that he was "absolutely opposed" to the United States accepting mandates for Armenia and/or Constantinople.²⁸ In his book, The Peace Negotiations, Secretary Lansing confirmed Bullitt's testimony. According to Lansing, both before and during the Peace Conference he opposed mandates for either or both areas as they would require heavy financial aid from the United States and Armenia would

26. Ibid., pt. 8 (Nov. 7, 1919), pp. 8059-60; pt. 9 (Nov. 19, 1919), p. 8768; and Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 59, pt. 1 (Dec. 3, 1919), pp. 62-4.

27. Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, (2 Vols., New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927), Vol. 2, p. 358.

28. The New York Times, Sep. 13, 1919.

also require, in the Secretary's opinion, 50,000 troops to ensure tranquility. On a more general plane, Lansing stated that he had opposed including the mandate system in the Covenant as, this being an American suggestion, the United States would be expected to assume its share of mandates and this was opposed to what the Secretary considered traditional
29
American foreign policy.

By the time his tragic illness overcame President Wilson, he must have realized the futility of insisting on an American mandate for Armenia or for Armenia and Constantinople. The half-hearted defense of the Armenian mandate proposal by Williams in the Senate in August was the strongest oral support the President had received in that body. Among most Americans, both those serving in diplomatic posts in Turkey and those in governmental and non-governmental positions in the United States, the debate over the Armenian mandate had become a debate between those who favored a mandate over all of Turkey north of Syria and those who favored no mandate for the United States outside the Western Hemisphere. With the exception of the Armenian Delegations in Paris and some Allied statesmen, no one seemed to stand with the President by the late fall of 1919 in favor of implementing the plan agreed to in Paris in May of that year.

The outstanding advocate of a mandate for all of Turkey was the American High Commissioner in Constantinople. Admiral Bristol was as adamantly opposed to the United States accepting a mandate for part of Turkey as he had been to sending American troops to Armenia. Bristol had a low regard for the ability of the Armenian Revolutionary Society to govern Armenia

29. Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921), pp. 159, 195.

and he stated in despatches to Washington that he was convinced that the Dashnak leaders preferred a mandate by Russia under Admiral Denikin over
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a mandate exercised by the United States.

In several long despatches in early 1920, Admiral Bristol presented his views on the Turkish settlement. In his opinion, none of the ethnic groups of the Caucasus had been prepared to assume self-government in 1918 when it was accepted. Due to the mis-government by both Russians and Turks prior to that year, there existed in 1918 a dearth of people to form a responsible government to rule over the fellow members of their race, not to mention over a majority of another race and religion. The problem of accurately drawing a boundary between the various proposed nations and mandates within Turkey and in the Caucasus was, to Bristol, utterly impossible of solution due to the physical distribution of the Turks and other Moslem peoples and the Armenians and other Christian peoples. To the American High Commissioner, the attempt to create an independent Armenian state under American mandate was both "impractical and sentimental" and might even be dangerous to the safety of Christians in the Ottoman Empire due to the reaction of the Moslems to the detachment of a portion
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of the Empire for the establishment of the new state. Bristol came to the following conclusion:

30. Decimal File, 860J.01/168, Bristol to Secretary of State, Nov. 3, 1919; and 867.00/1007, Bristol to Secretary of State, Nov. 17, 1919, N.A.
31. Ibid., 867.00/1100, Bristol to Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1920; 763.72119/9091, Bristol to Secretary of State, Feb. 14, 1920; 867.01/23, Bristol to Secretary of State, Mar. 10, 1920; and 867.00/1190, Bristol to Secretary of State, Mar. 29, 1920, N.A.

My opinion grows stronger all the time that the only solution of this problem in this part of the world is the retention of the old Ottoman Empire as a whole and place over it one country that is able to give it good government and modern civilization. It is my opinion that it is the bounden duty of the United States to insist on this being done. This is a big idea and one that should appeal to every true American. I believe if American people could know the facts they would insist on this idea being carried out. If the United States is not willing to come and do this, at least she should insist on somebody else doing it.³²

In addition to Bristol in the advocacy of a mandate over all of Turkey, were other important personalities and groups. Among the latter were most of the American businessmen in Turkey, many high ranking officials of Near East Relief, the members of the Harbord Mission and the Presidents of Robert College and of the Women's College of Constantinople.³³ Like Bristol, these people had the advantage of being in the field where supposedly the relevant facts could be more easily observed or determined. Those who favored a single mandate solution for the Turkish and Armenian questions were bitterly attacked by some Armeno-philés in the United States for, in addition to supporting the single mandate plan, these people often advocated a prohibition on the supplying of arms to the Armenians on the grounds that such action would probably cause additional hostilities to break out in the area.³⁴

32. Ibid., 867.00/1100, Bristol to Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1920, N.A.

33. Ibid., 860J.01/231, Barton to President Wilson, Mar. 18, 1920; 860J.01/420, Memorandum of Apr. 30, 1920 from Division of Near Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State; see also: Leland J. Gordon, American Relations With Turkey - 1830-1930, An Economic Interpretation, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), p. 29; and Eliot G. Mears, ed., Modern Turkey, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1924), pp. 515-6. See: Decimal File, 860J.4016/23, President of Robert College to Secretary of State, May 4, 1920; and 185.513/4, President of Womens College of Constantinople to Secretary of State, undated, N.A.

34. Decimal File, 860J.01/173, Pasdermadjian to Secretary of State, Jan. 7, 1920, N.A.

Directly opposed to the joint mandate scheme, advocated by Morgenthau, Bristol, et al, was the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia. In September, 1919, Chairman Gerard wrote to Lodge that the triple mandate was "immoral and impracticable." "Our purpose," continued the ex-Ambassador to Germany, "is to dismember and not to reintegrate." In a speech on December 7th, Gerard called the joint mandate proposal "a purely Turkish scheme" with the result that the rule of the Turk would be consolidated and at the conclusion of the mandatory period the Turks would again rule the entire area of the Ottoman Empire north of Syria and Mesopotamia. In January, 1920, Vahan Cardashian, Director of the Press Bureau of the A.C.I.A. published a small booklet in which the joint mandate scheme was violently denounced as an attempt to foster the Turkish Empire under American protection, to annihilate the Armenian race and nation, and to smother Christianity in the Near East.

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As the A.C.I.A. was opposed to the joint mandate plan for Turkey and Armenia, it might be anticipated that they were among those who favored a mandate by the United States for Armenia alone. This, however, was no longer true. By the fall of 1919, Gerard and the other leaders of the A.C.I.A. were supporting a plan which entailed immediate de facto recognition of the Armenian Republic, followed by the sending of food and clothing for the Armenians, the organization of Armenian forces with American assistance to the point where such troops could liberate all of Integral Armenia, and the subsequent repatriation of Armenians to their homeland. On December 7th,

35. Ibid., 860J.01/109, Gerard to Senator Lodge, Sep. 11, 1919; and 860J.01/174, Cardashian to Secretary of State, Jan. 7, 1920, N.A. See also: The New York Times, Dec. 8, 1919.

Gerard declared that he was "unalterably opposed" to the United States
36
accepting a mandate over Armenia.

There is evidence to indicate that the views of Senator Lodge, a member of the Board of Directors of A.C.I.A., were quite influential in bringing the organization into opposition to the mandate proposal. In November, another member of the A.C.I.A., Senator Williams of Mississippi, wrote to Lansing urging immediate de facto recognition of Armenia and stating that both Gerard and Lodge favored such a course. The argument was based on the proposition that following de facto recognition, the Senate could more easily comply with suggestions for aid to Armenia, which it was anticipated would be received from the President. Williams also stated that Lodge had said that it was extremely unlikely that the Senate would consider any mandate for Armenia. The Senator from Mississippi commented that Lodge was undoubtedly correct because if the latter felt that way, the Foreign Relations Committee would also support that position as the members would
37
do anything Lodge advocated.

Senator Lodge's position on an Armenian mandate was presented succinctly in a letter to Gerard, dated November 17, 1919. He wrote:

We need not discuss the merits of a mandate. It is out of the question. Congress would never assent to taking a mandate for Armenia, Anatolia and Constantinople. It cannot be done. The only way to help Armenia is by direct help. Of course, the President ought to recognize their government, and when recognized, then we could do something in the Senate if he would recommend anything
38
for us to do....Recognition would help us very much in that respect.

36. The New York Times, Dec. 8, 1919.

37. Decimal File, 123R.391/69, Williams to Secretary of State, Nov. 26, 1919, N.A.

38. Quoted in: Ibid., 860J.01/189, Cardashian to Under Secretary Polk, Jan 12, 1920, in which correspondence between Gerard and other members of the A.C.I.A. was printed.

In line with this theory, it is of interest to note that in the seven months between the date of American de facto recognition of Armenia and the collapse of the Armenian Government, the Congress of the United States did not accomplish very much in the way of aid to Armenia and certainly did not achieve the desired goal of maintaining Armenian independence, not to mention the conquest of the rest of Integral Armenia. Of course, it was then possible for those who advocated the policy outlined above to claim that the international situation was altered between December, 1919, and April, 1920 and that the President did not propose any Congressional action following American recognition of the Government at Erivan.

The members of the A.C.I.A. in December, 1919 again made use of a public telegram to Wilson, as they had done in February, June, and August of that year. This time the telegram was signed by Gerard, Hughes, Root, Alton B. Parker, Frederick C. Penfield, Nicholas Murraby Butler, J. C. Schurman, J. G. Hibben, P. N. Rhinelanders, and Bradley Fiske. Lodge did not sign but adhered to it by a separate letter and offered to sponsor a bill in line with the recommendations contained in the telegram. The telegram advocated the union of Turkish and Russian Armenia. The signers declared themselves opposed to the acceptance of an American mandate for Armenia and in favor of America's extending direct aid to the new nation. As a preliminary step, the A.C.I.A. requested immediate recognition of
39
the Armenian Republic.

39. See: Ibid., 860J.01/162, Gerard to Secretary of State, Dec. 19, 1919, N.A.

In February, 1920, after the Allies had recognized, de facto, the new Armenian nation, and the United States continued to hesitate, Gerard's attitude toward the Department of State and the President changed from one of urging a course of action to one of threatening belligerency. In a bitter telegram to Lansing dated February 3rd, Gerard complained that "the Executive Branch of the Government has shown no willingness to do anything looking toward the solution of the Armenian case." Shortly thereafter, when it appeared that Britain and France were about to settle the Turkish and Armenian problems by drastically reducing the size of the proposed Armenian state, Gerard warned the American Government that the A.C.I.A. would soon launch a nation-wide campaign to encourage protest meetings against the action of the Allies and the inaction of the United States.
40

What of the attitude of the Turkish people and leaders toward an American mandate and an independent Armenia? In the last chapter, it was pointed out that in the spring of 1919 there was much support for an American mandate for all of Turkey and actual acceptance by the Turkish Government at the Peace Conference of the concept of an independent Armenia. During the summer of 1919, two nationalist congresses were held under the presidency of Mustapha Kemal Pasha; one at Erzerum in July, and one at Sivas in September. The Greek landing at Smyrna in May and continued procrastination by the Allies at Paris in the drafting of a peace treaty for Turkey

40. Ibid., 860J.01/203, Gerard to Secretary of State, Feb. 3, 1920; 860J.01/203, Gerard to Joseph P. Tumulty, Feb. 9, 1920; and 860J.01/217, Gerard to President Wilson, Feb. 28, 1920, N.A.

had combined to give a rebirth to the spirit of nationalism in the nation. One of the resolutions adopted at Sivas declared against "every movement tending toward the formation, at the expense of the mother country, of an independent Armenia...."⁴¹

Bristol reported on September 12th that the Sivas Congress had decided unanimously in favor of an American mandate for all of Turkey.⁴² But on the 16th and again on the 25th, Ravndal, in discussing the Nationalist movement, stated that the insurgents were unanimous for American aid but that the word mandate had "fallen into disgrace."⁴³ It was at the Congress of Sivas that the Nationalists prepared and sent to the United States Senate a request that that body send a delegation to visit all of the Ottoman Empire to learn the full truth before permitting the disposal of peoples and territories within the confines of that Empire.

In January, 1920, a newly elected Turkish Assembly, overwhelmingly nationalistic, adopted the Turkish National Pact, which embodied the principles of the Turkish Nationalists. The Assembly later withdrew from Constantinople and established its headquarters and capital at Angora, where, on April 23rd, the Grand National Assembly was convened to preside over "the present and future destiny of Turkey." Among the men who formed the insurgent government in Angora, the idea of an independent state for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia was anathema and the proposal for an American mandate for all of Turkey was no longer discussed.⁴⁴

41. Edgar Turlington, "The American Treaty of Lausanne," World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. 7, Nr. 10 (1924), pp. 574.

42. Decimal File, 763.72119/6973, Bristol to Secretary of State, Sep. 12, 1919, N.A.

43. Ibid., 867.00/929, Ravndal to Secretary of State, Sep. 16, 1919; and 763.72119/6931, Ravndal to Secretary of State, Received Sep. 25, 1919, N.A.

44. Turlington, "The American Treaty of Lausanne," p. 575.

During the same period of time that the Turks were recovering from the defeat of 1918 and preparing to assert themselves in international affairs, the Armenian Government was attempting to draw closer to the Government and people of the United States. On September 29, 1919, Lansing was informed by official notification from Aharonian in Paris that Dr. Gareguine Pasdermadjian, a member of the Armenian Parliament, had been appointed as Diplomatic Representative of the Government of the Armenian Republic to the United States. Actually, Dr. Pasdermadjian never had the opportunity to present his credentials to the President of the United States for the official documents, appointing him as Minister Plenipotentiary arrived almost simultaneously with the total eclipse of the government⁴⁵ he represented at Erivan.

In October, 1919, Dr. Pasdermadjian authorized publication of a report on the nation and people he represented. In this document, the Armenian mission to the United States expressed the gratitude of the citizens of the new republic for economic and relief supplies sent to the Caucasus by American citizens. However, the report also recommended three steps for the Government of the United States to take immediately: the de facto recognition of the Government at Erivan, the sending of a "few thousand" American troops to guard the rail line from Batum to the Armenian frontier, and the granting of permission for the securing of a loan in the United States by the Armenian Government. The loan was to be used for the purchase

45. Decimal File, 701.60J11/1, Aharonian to Secretary of State, Sep. 29, 1919; and as reported in 860J.01/457, Pasdermadjian to Secretary of State, Aug. 1, 1921, N.A.

of supplies adequate to organize an army of 30,000 men and for the purchase of relief supplies to be used until the harvesting of the crop of 1920.⁴⁶

Shortly after the announcement of the arrival of the representative of the Armenian Republic, the State Department was informed of the arrival of Professor Der Hagopian in Washington. Professor Hagopian was Vice President of the Armenian National Delegation in Paris and was in possession of official papers accrediting him as Plenipotentiary of the National Delegation. It was pointed out to the officials of the Department of State that Pasdermadjian represented the Armenian Republic but could not represent "Integral Armenia" and thus it was necessary to have Hagopian in Washington to represent this concept and its leader, Boghos Nubar Pasha.⁴⁷ The two Armenian diplomats both took up residence in the District of Columbia.

Meanwhile, in Armenia, an American army officer, in his role as an international representative, was trying to secure peace in the Caucasus between Armenia and her neighbors and at the same time administer the distribution of millions of dollars of relief supplies for the people in that country. Colonel Haskell was quite successful in his role of peacemaker. A border war which developed in the fall of 1919 between Armenia and Azerbaijan was concluded through the efforts of the American officer, and an uneasy truce resulted between the two nations. Haskell was specifically named in the final agreement, accepted by both countries, to arbitrate all future disagreements. He established a neutral zone along

46. Armenian Special Mission to the United States, The Republic of Armenia, 66th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. 151, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 14-5.

47. Decimal File, 860J.01/142, Sevasly to Assistant Secretary Phillips, Nov. 8, 1919, N.A.

the Armenian-Azerbaijan border and placed a few American officers in strategic places throughout the zone to ensure respect for the demarcation lines. As long as Haskell remained in the Caucasus no other trouble developed in this area.⁴⁸

Colonel Haskell's other task was to administer the distribution of relief in Armenia. In Hoover's words, Haskell performed this job in an "admirable manner." During the period of his residence in Armenia, June, 1919, to July, 1920, Colonel Haskell was responsible for ensuring the correct and expeditious distribution of over 40,000 tons of flour contributed by the United States Grain Corporation and over 50,000 tons contributed by the American Relief Administration. Refugees in the Armenian Republic were clothed and fed and many had resumed useful occupations by mid-1920. During this period, forty hospitals and seventeen orphanages were opened and provisioned for a full calendar year in advance. By the time Haskell departed from his post a program had been set up for the daily feeding of over 50,000 children.⁴⁹

The United States Government was the only government to appropriate relief funds for Armenia during the existence of the free Armenian Republic. Between January, 1919 and July, 1920 the American Government loaned over \$15,000,000 in supplies to the Government at Erivan. In November, 1919 President Wilson authorized and directed the President of the United States Grain Corporation to sell to the Armenian Government, "on credit or otherwise," 35,000 tons of wheat or wheat flour. The President stated that he considered it of great importance for the peace of Eastern Europe that the wheat and flour be made

48. See: Ibid., 860J.01/152, Bristol to Secretary of State, Received Dec. 4, 1919; and 763.72119/8322, Wallace (Paris) to Secretary of State, Dec. 17, 1919, enclosing a cable from Haskell to Logan in Paris. See also: Herbert Hoover, Memoirs, (3 Vols., New York: The MacMillan Co., 1951), Vol. 1, p. 388.

49. Decimal File, 123H.271/4, Hoover to Secretary of State, July 26, 1920, N.A.

available to Armenia, and he reaffirmed his desire to aid the Armenian people in the establishment and continuance of a stabilized government, "the maintenance of which has a direct influence in protecting our own economic position."⁵⁰ During the same period of time, nearly \$13,000,000 from private charity was sent to Armenia from the United States, most of it collected and despatched by Near East Relief. Charitable organizations in Great Britain contributed over \$600,000 worth of relief supplies to the Armenians during these months but this was the total of all other foreign aid to the natives and refugees in the new state.⁵¹

At the meeting of the Supreme Council in Paris on September 15, 1919, Lloyd George once again expressed the opinion that nothing could be done regarding the Turkish Treaty until the American Government could declare its position on mandates. The American representative, Polk, confidently predicted that the American position would be made known by the end of October. The British Prime Minister retorted that he felt Polk was overly optimistic to believe that an answer would be forthcoming as soon as that.⁵² Meanwhile, the Peace Conference turned to the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties and the Treaty with Turkey was indefinitely postponed.

On September 25, 1919, President Wilson collapsed at Pueblo, Colorado and subsequently suffered a stroke on October 2nd. The importance of this event to the settlement of the Armenian Question can hardly be overestimated.

50. Decimal File, 860J.48/5, Wilson to Julius H. Barnes, Nov. 14, 1919, N.A. The Grain Corporation accepted interest bearing notes from the Government of Armenia in exchange for the grain.

51. Hoover, Memoirs, Vol. 1, p. 389; James L. Barton, Story of Near East Relief, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1930), p. 125; and Frank M. Surface and Raymond L. Bland, American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1931), p. 152.

52. Decimal File, 180.03501/53, Notes on a Meeting of the Supreme Council on Sep. 15, 1919, N.A.

Wilson, strongest supporter of an American mandate over a large and defensible Armenia, was totally incapacitated at this vital time. On the 18th of November, Secretary of State Lansing wrote to Polk in Paris, in answer to a recent communication from the latter who had stated that the Turkish treaty would be negotiated by the Peace Conference in the near future. According to Lansing, an informal note had been sent to Lord Grey in the British Foreign Office on November 17th in which Grey was informed that the question of the negotiations for a treaty with Turkey had been before the President for some time "but that up to the present moment he has not been in a condition to render a decision in the matter."⁵³

In December, the President recalled the American Delegation to the Peace Conference due, primarily, to the virtual rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by Congress. The American Ambassador in Paris, Hugh Wallace, represented the United States at future meetings of the Supreme Council but active American participation in the deliberations of the Council was a thing of the past and, unfortunately, just as the negotiations on the Turkish settlement were about to begin.⁵⁴

In January, 1920, the situation in the Caucasus again came before the Supreme Council. The Bolsheviks in Southern Russia were driving toward the three newly created states and, in an attempt to secure the active participation of the governments and peoples of these states against the Red Army, as well as to make loans and the despatch of troops to these

53. Ibid., 867.00/970, Lansing to Polk, Paris, Nov. 18, 1919, N.A.

54. Wallace was instructed to attend meetings if invited to do so but he was required to state that he was not in a position to give the views of the American Government unless they were requested in a specific case and then only after submission of the question to the Department of State for answer. See: Ibid., 763.72119/8818, Polk to American Ambassador, Paris, Feb. 18, 1920, N.A.

countries possible, the Allies recognized as de facto the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan on January 10th. On the 19th, the British proposed and the other Allies agreed, to the de facto recognition of the Government of the Armenian Republic, such recognition in no way to prejudice the future boundaries of Armenia which would be established at a later date.⁵⁵ On the 21st, Wallace was directed to inform the Allies that the United States agreed to this decision and it also granted de facto recognition to the Government at Erivan. On the 26th, the American Ambassador communicated the information to his colleagues and to the press. Unfortunately, on the same day, a cablegram was hastily despatched to Wallace from the Department of State rescinding the despatch of the 21st. According to the latter instructions, President Wilson had not given his sanction to the decision to recognize Armenia and the American press had now been informed that the United States was not in a position to grant such recognition at that time although it was emphasized that the Government of the United States had much sympathy for the Armenian people. Wallace, with some embarrassment, transmitted the information to the Council and the incident passed, but not without indicating to the world a certain amount of confusion existing in the conduct of foreign relations by the government at Washington.⁵⁶

In late January, the deliberations of the Supreme Council were moved to London where discussion of the Turkish settlement was taken up. On the

55. Ibid., 180.03801/8, Notes on a Meeting of the Supreme Council on Jan. 19, 1920, N.A.

56. Ibid., 860J.01/192, Polk to American Ambassador, Paris, Jan. 21, 1920; 180.03301/2, Notes on a Meeting of the Supreme Council on Jan. 26, 1920; 860J.01/192a, Polk to American Ambassador, Paris, Jan. 26, 1920; and 860J.01/192b, Polk to American Ambassador, Paris, Jan. 27, 1920, N.A.

25th, prior to the London Conference, the French Ambassador to the United States, M. Jusserand, transmitted to the Secretary of State a communication from the Supreme Council in which it was stated that the Allied Governments, who had postponed the negotiating of a Turkish settlement for several months in order to give the United States an opportunity to decide on the policy and role it desired to follow in the matter, had now decided to proceed with the debate over a peace treaty with that country. It was emphasized that the Allies still desired the advice and cooperation of the Government of the United States and they requested that an American plenipotentiary be designated to assist the Supreme Council in considering the Turkish question. If this latter request were impossible of fulfillment, the Supreme Council would be forced to proceed without an American plenipotentiary but would attempt to keep the United States Government fully informed regarding the negotiations and would on occasion attempt to secure American views on specific problems. President Wilson declined to name a plenipotentiary and informed Ambassador Davis in London not to attend the
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meetings.

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In early March, (1919), the deliberations in London had progressed to the point where consideration was being given to the early summoning of the Turkish delegates. The French Ambassador again inquired, on behalf of the Supreme Council, if the United States desired to send a plenipotentiary to be present at the negotiating of the final peace terms.
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In answer to a request for further information from Acting Secretary Polk, Jusserand, on the 12th, provided a résumé of the decisions already made by

57. Ibid., 763.72119/8818, Jusserand to Secretary of State, Jan. 25, 1920; and 767.68119/195a, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, undated, N.A.

58. Foreign Relations Papers, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 748.

the Council at the London meetings. Among the provisions for the Turkish treaty were a few relative to Armenia. According to the report, the independence of Armenia had been accepted as final, the League of Nations would be expected to aid in the organization of the financial and military departments of government, and access to the Black Sea had been provided for by giving the Erivan Government special rights of communication over the newly-proposed state of Lazistan which would cut Armenia from the sea. 59

The American reply was dated the 24th of March and was a long commentary on all aspects of the proposed Turkish settlement. Once again, the President declined to send a plenipotentiary to join with the other members of the Supreme Council, but America's interest in the Turkish treaty was reiterated and America's right to be consulted on the provisions of that treaty was proclaimed, a right based on the fact that the United States had assisted in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by helping in the defeat of its ally, Germany. As for the Armenian settlement, the reply stated that there could be no question as to the genuine interest of the American Government in the plans for Armenia. The Government of the United States was convinced that the civilized world demanded and expected the most liberal treatment for that unfortunate country. It was recommended that the boundaries should be drawn in such a way as to recognize all the legitimate claims of the Armenian people and particularly to give them easy and unencumbered access to the sea. Specifically, the American note suggested that Trebizond be included in any territorial award to Armenia. Possession of this port would make unnecessary the crossing of the proposed state of Lazistan by Armenian commerce. 60

59. Decimal File, 767.68119/195a, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, undated, N.A.

60. Ibid.; see also: Foreign Relations Papers, 1920, Vol. 3, pp. 750-3.

The extent to which Great Britain was willing to defer to American hesitation in joining the settlement of the Turkish problem was exemplified by the words of Lloyd George on March 25, 1920. Commenting on the fact that the Allies had postponed a discussion of the Turkish treaty at the request of the United States and were still desirous of being informed of America's position on Armenia and other questions, the British statesman admitted that the delay had undoubtedly aggravated unrest in Turkey and had intensified Allied difficulties there. However, he thought it better that the Allies accept such a situation and strive to resolve it than that they create suspicion in the United States that they were quite willing to take American help, but that whenever there was any question of dividing the mandates over undeveloped territories they instantly took advantage of political difficulties in America "in order to divide the whole thing
61
among ourselves."

In March, 1920, the Supreme Council offered the mandate for Armenia to the League of Nations. Leon Bourgeois, Chairman of the Council of the League, called this generosity "touching" but doubted that the Council
62
of the League was in a position to accept such responsibility. The Armenia which was offered to the League was to include the Republic and all of Turkish Armenia with the exception of Cilicia, that territory having already been allotted to France, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.

On the 11th of April, the Council of the League replied to the Supreme

61. The above quotation is taken from an article appearing in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1 (Mar. 15, 1923), p. 80.

62. The New York Times, Mar. 15, 1920

Council, declining to accept the mandate for Armenia because (1) the Covenant of the League did not provide the Council with the powers necessary for exercising a mandate, and (2) the mandate for Armenia would require heavy financial and military responsibilities, and such were not available to the League Council per se. In the opinion of the Council, the "best way to reach an aim which is universally recognized as being desirable would be for a civilized state to accept; under the auspices of the League of Nations, a mandate over Armenia."

The actual peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire was drawn up by the Supreme Council at San Remo between April 19 and 26, 1920. The United States was represented at the San Remo Conference by an observer, the American Ambassador to Italy, Robert Underwood Johnson, who did not arrive at the conference site until the 24th. He was immediately informed that the Council had decided to request the American President to arbitrate the boundaries of the new Armenian state. Johnson was also supplied with a report of the proposals of the Commission for the Delimitation of the Boundaries of Armenia, an organization created at the London Conference in February. This report strongly advocated the creation of an Armenian state with a preponderant Armenian population, a far smaller state than "Integral Armenia," but one which could conceivably protect its own boundaries from invasion. This report was the basis for subsequent action by the negoti-
64
ators at San Remo.

63. Reply described in detail and commented upon in: The Times (London), Apr. 21, 1920 and Apr. 23, 1920.

64. Decimal File, 180.03801/11, Notes on Meeting of Supreme Council at San Remo on Apr. 24, 1920, N.H.

On the 25th of April, the conference members accepted a British draft proposal that the President of the United States be requested to secure acceptance by his government of a mandate over Armenia and that he be requested to arbitrate the boundaries of the new state. The proposal further suggested that until such arbitration the boundaries between Turkey and Armenia remain unchanged.

The note to Wilson, signed by the President of the Conference, Francesco Nitti, was actually dated April 26th. It began by tracing the offer of the mandate to the League and its rejection by that body:

The Supreme Council in considering this reply were at once reminded of the conviction long entertained by them that the only great power which is qualified alike by its sympathetic and its material resources to undertake this task on behalf of humanity is America. It has indeed been rightly described in Mr. Colby's note as 'the demand and expectation of the civilized world'. Never had the Supreme Council forgot that the inclusion of a liberated Armenia among the objects for which the Allied and Associated Powers fought and won the war nowhere received more eloquent expression than in the speeches of President Wilson.

Consequently, the Supreme Council addressed a "definite appeal" for acceptance by the United States of the Armenian mandate. As for the boundary of the new state, as "an independent and absolutely impartial arbiter" was needed to determine the Turkish-Armenian boundary, the Supreme Council requested President Wilson to accept this task, whether or not the United States accepted the mandate. An article would be inserted in the final peace treaty which would obligate both Turkey and Armenia to accept Wilson's arbitration. In commenting on the territory to be granted

65. Ibid., 180.03801/12, Notes on Meeting of Supreme Council at San Remo on Apr. 25, 1920, N.A.

to the new nation, the note stated that the prospect of an Armenia extending to the Mediterranean and including Cilicia had long been abandoned as "impracticable." The only problem remaining was the drawing of the boundary line in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. [It should be noted that, in addition to Cilicia, three of the six so-called Armenian vilayets of Turkey were not to be included in the new state.] The Supreme Council reserved for itself the right to draw the Armenian boundaries in the north and east; i.e., with Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Turning from the mandate and boundary questions to the more urgent need for immediate material aid, the note to Wilson stated that Armenia needed outside assistance for the creation of a military force to defend itself and financial aid for the creation of an orderly administration and the development of the economic resources of the country. According to Nitti, the Allies were presently sending munitions to the Armenian forces but commitments elsewhere made the despatch of troops impossible. The suggestion was made that the United States permit and encourage the formation of a volunteer corps within its boundaries to be sent to Armenia. If this were impossible, it was further suggested that at least technical and material aid be sent to assist the Armenian armed forces. As for the financial problems faced by the Erivan government, the Supreme Council urged that the United States make available to the Armenian treasury a loan amounting to "a few million sterling." The note paid tribute to the large amount of private charity which had been sent by Americans to the Armenian people and urged that these contributions be continued for the indefinite future.

66. Ibid., 763.72119/9749, Johnson to Secretary of State, Apr. 27, 1920, N.A.

Meanwhile, in the United States new demands for action by the Executive Branch on the Armenian Question were precipitated by press reports of new massacres in the Armenian provinces of Turkey. On the 5th of March, Senator King spoke before his colleagues of the massacre of 19,000 Armenians in Marash following the evacuation of that area by French forces and the arrival of Kemal's Nationalists. On the following day, King introduced a resolution which demanded that the Allies:

...should now impose terms upon the Turks for the complete liberation of the Armenian people, and the vindication and restoration of their territorial rights and political independence, and that adequate military measures be forthwith taken, in conformity to the terms of the armistice with the Turks, to occupy Armenia, to expel all armed Turks and Kurds from the said six vilayets, to protect the inhabitants against a recurrence of these disorders and outrages, and make them secure in their persons and property.⁶⁷

In line with the continued interest of the Senate in the Armenian Question, Senator Wadsworth, on the same day, requested that the President make available to the Congress and the public the report of the Harbord Commission. This was the second request for this document, the first one having been sent to the White House the preceding November but never having been acknowledged. The Report had been sent to President Wilson by Secretary Lansing on January 9, 1920 but was not returned to the Department of State until March 27th. When Wilson finally released the document in early April, in answer to Congressional and public clamor for it, the Department carefully updated Lansing's letter sent with the report on January 9th, to April 2nd and signed the name of Bainbridge Colby to the letter, the latter having replaced Lansing in February, 1920.⁶⁸

67. Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 58, pt. 4, (Aug. 15, 1919), p. 3907; and Ibid., (Aug. 18, 1919), p. 3946.

68. Ibid., 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 59, pt. 4 (Mar. 3, 1920). pp. 3792-3; and Decimal File, 860J.01/344a, Colby to President Wilson, Apr. 2, 1920, N.A.

Why Wilson retained the document for this extended period of time is a matter of speculation. A memorandum from the Division of Foreign Intelligence of the Department of State to Assistant Secretary Frank Polk, dated March 3, 1920, credited Senator Wadsworth with accurately describing the reason for the President's reticence in making public the Harbord Report when he attributed the action to fear of the effect of the disclosure of the findings of the Harbord Mission on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.⁶⁹ This factor was eliminated on March 19, 1920 with the final vote on the Treaty in the Senate. The New York Times, which had supported an American mandate for Armenia and most of President Wilson's policies in the post-war settlement, condemned the refusal to release the Harbord Report and the continued non-publication of the King-Crane Report in an editorial on April 6th. To the editorial writer, the Harbord Report was now being released to the Senate "several months after it ceased to have any practical value."⁷⁰

Senator King, meanwhile, had begun a campaign to secure American recognition of the Armenian Government in the Caucasus. It was also the desire of the Senator from Utah that it be made known that it was the sense of the Senate that the Allies and United States immediately furnish arms, munitions, and equipment to Armenia to allow the government to raise and equip an army sufficient to secure, and subsequently protect, the entire area of "historic" Armenia. King was hopeful that American recognition would help in preventing the Allies from forcing the Armenians to once again accept Turkish "misrule."⁷¹

69. Decimal File, 860J.91/221, Memorandum from Division of Foreign Intelligence to Under Secretary Polk, dated Mar. 3, 1920, N.A.

70. The New York Times, Apr. 6, 1920.

71. Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 59, pt. 4 (Mar. 10, 1920), p. 4119; and Ibid., pt. 6, (Apr. 23, 1920), p. 6076.

On the 23rd of April, the United States reversed its position of the preceding January and granted de facto recognition to the Armenian Government at Eriwan. As in the case of the Allied recognition in January, the American Government's recognition was conditional in that it was in no way to prejudice the frontiers of the new state. This action by the State Department opened the way for increased direct military and economic aid to Armenia from the United States and also encouraged the Armenian representatives in Washington who were attempting to secure an American loan of between fifty and seventy-five million dollars to be used to secure agricultural and railway equipment and to act as a basis for the Armenian monetary system. The press release on the 24th, which described the action taken the preceding day, included a statement to the effect that the American Government assumed that Turkish Armenia would eventually be added to the territory under the administration of the Government in Eriwan.

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On May 11, 1920, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee finally presented to the full Senate the report by the Harding Sub-Committee which had concluded hearings on the Williams Resolution the preceding October. The sub-committee had actually presented its report to the Foreign Relations Committee on March 24th. In presenting his report to the full Senate in May, Senator Harding emphasized that the report had the unanimous support

72. Decimal File, 860J.01/2394, Colby to Pasdermadjian, Apr. 23, 1920, N.A. Activities of these Armenian representatives and the desires of the Armenian Government are given in Ibid., 860J.01/246, Gerard to Secretary of State, Apr. 29, 1920. See also: The New York Times, Apr. 25, 1920.

of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee and that Senator Williams aided in the actual preparation of the final report.

The text of the report is relatively brief and should be read in its entirety:

Whereas the testimony adduced at the hearings conducted by the sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations have clearly established the truth of the reported massacres and other atrocities from which the Armenian people have suffered; and

Whereas the people of the United States are deeply impressed by the deplorable conditions of insecurity, starvation, and misery now prevalent in Armenia; and

Whereas the independence of the Republic of Armenia has been duly recognized by the Supreme Council of the peace conference and by the Government of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the sincere congratulations of the Senate of the United States are hereby extended to the people of Armenia on the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Armenia, without prejudice respecting the territorial boundaries involved; and be it

Further resolved, That the Senate of the United States hereby expresses the hope that stable government, proper protection of individual liberties and rights, and the full realization of nationalistic aspirations may soon be attained by the Armenian people; and be it

Further resolved, That in order to afford necessary protection for the lives and property of citizens of the United States at the port of Batum and along the line of the railroad leading to Baku, the President is hereby requested, if not incompatible with the public interest, to cause a United States warship and a force of marines to be despatched to such port with instructions to such marines to disembark and to protect American lives and property.⁷³

73. Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 59, pt. 7 (May 11, 1920), p. 6844.

A comparison of the original Williams Resolution as offered in September, 1919 and the report and recommendations of the Harding Sub-Committee as presented in May, 1920 is rather striking for the lack of similarity. Of the three suggested resolutions for adoption by the Senate given in the latter, the first two are somewhat perfunctory and of questionable value in assisting in the defense of Armenian territory already under the control of the Armenian Government, not to mention the securing of Turkish areas proposed for incorporation in the final Armenian state. The third proposed resolution did involve American military action in the area of Armenia, but the action was severely limited to one port, in Georgia, and no mention was made of Armenia or Armenians. The rail line running south from Batum to Erivan was of vital import to the Armenians as this was their principle, and almost only, route for contact with the West, but the significance to the Armenian cause of the railway running east from Batum to Baku is somewhat difficult to understand.

Harding, in his oral comments on the resolution, presented at the same time as the written report, stated that careful investigation of the proposition of sending American troops to Armenia, taken in conjunction with the "various angles of the political situation internationally" convinced the sub-committee of the impossibility of that action. Harding explained that the real reason for sending marines to Batum was to protect the terminus of the Batum-Erivan railway and to strengthen the morale of Armenian forces. ⁷⁴ The report of the Harding sub-committee was adopted overwhelmingly by the Senate on May 13, 1920. There is no reason why it should not have passed in this manner for adoption of its resolutions involved little risk to the United States.

74. Ibid., (May 13, 1920) pp. 6978-9.

May, 1920 was a month of decision for the United States. President Wilson had received the communication from the Allied Premiers at San Remo in which he was requested to delimit the frontiers of Armenia with Turkey and to have the United States assume a mandate for the Armenian state. On the 17th of May, Wilson, acting in his capacity as a distinguished American citizen, but not on behalf of the United States, cabled his acceptance of the request to arbitrate the boundary problem between the two rival states. In the letter actually handed to the President of the Peace Conference by the American Ambassador to France, in which the President of the United States accepted this task, no mention was made about the problem of enforcing the boundary decision that Wilson would announce. There was also no reference in the letter to the subject of the American mandate over Armenia.⁷⁵

On this latter subject, Wilson turned to the Congress of the United States for permission to accept the proffered mandate. As both Congress and the President had been in essential agreement on the prerogative of the Congress to determine what, if any, mandates would be accepted by the United States, there was no question of the legal necessity for Wilson to take this course of action. The request of the President for permission to accept the offer of the Supreme Council was read before both houses of Congress on May 24, 1920. The President's message began by taking note of the resolution passed on May 13 by the Senate, a resolution which Wilson declared embodied his own convictions. He then discussed the receipt of the two requests from San Remo and his decision to accept the role of

75. The New York Times, May 23, 1920.

arbitrator. Coming to the main object of his message, the President requested the Congress to grant him the right to accept a mandate for Armenia. Wilson reminded the lawmakers of the tremendous free-will offering of charity by the American people to Armenians in the Near East and deduced from this that it would be the wish of his countrymen that the mandate be accepted. Rejection of the offer by the United States, would, in the opinion of the Chief Executive, possibly "arrest the hopeful processes of civilization" in the Near East.

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The situation in the Caucasus was not conducive to tempting the Senate to vote to involve the United States in that area in May, 1920. The Armenian Government exercised sovereignty over an area of 26,130 square miles containing a population of 2,160,000, both defended by an army of only 25,000 men. On April 27th, Bolsheviks took over the Government of Azerbaijan; on May 7th, representatives of the Georgian Government signed a treaty of friendship with the Russian Government in Moscow. On the 5th of the month, Haskell, with reports of bloodshed and revolution coming into his headquarters, ordered all American women workers in the Near East Relief organizations to leave the Caucasus.

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There was never any real possibility that the Congress would accept the mandate for Armenia in May, 1920. An editorial in The New York Times

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76. U. S. President, Mandate for Armenia, Message from the President to Congress, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., House Doc. 791, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920).

77. Decimal File, 860J.01/258, Memorandum from the Division of Near Eastern Affairs to Secretary of State, dated Apr. 14, 1920. See also: Paxton Hibben, "Arbitrating for Armenia," The New Republic, Vol. 23 (Jun. 16, 1920), pp. 86-7.

78. The American historian, Thomas A. Bailey, wrote that in 1920, the taxes in the United States were high, the American soldiers were homesick, the nation was basically isolationist, and the "suspicion was not easily quieted that Uncle Sam was being played for a sucker.... We wished the Armenians well, but we wished them well at a distance." Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1945), pp. 295-6.

emphasized that no hope of acceptance existed but speculated on what might have happened eighteen months earlier. In the writer's opinion, there was no question but that the American people and Congress would have accepted the task in November, 1918 and so would Kemal and most of the leaders of Turkey if the mandate had been increased to include all of Anatolia and the Caucasus. But in the intervening months the political, military, and economic situations in the Near East had been drastically altered; even the conception of an Integral Armenia had been changed by the Allies to an Armenia containing less than one half the area originally proposed and with most of the mineral and agricultural wealth of the nation included in the land occupied by Turkey, France, and Great Britain. To the writer of the editorial there was one possible benefit to be reaped from the certain defeat of Wilson's request in Congress: "Our evident unwillingness to live up to our expressions of Christian sympathy will, it may be hoped, abate in some degree our conviction that we are the most moral, altruistic and beneficent people on the face of the earth."

Before the formal offer had been received from San Remo, Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska, ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced his opposition to assuming any mandate for Armenia.⁷⁹ James Gerard of the A.C.I.A., and a Democrat, urged Wilson not to send the proposal to Congress as rejection, which he said was assured, would indicate to the world, the Turks included, that the United States had no interest in Armenia. The isolationist feeling in the Senate plus the

79. The New York Times, May 26, 1920.

80. Ibid., Apr. 27, 1920.

natural political partisanship exercised by the Congress during any presidential election year were convincing proof of the hopelessness of the project to Gerard and consequently, he recommended that the President instead take the lead in formulating plans to send direct aid to the government at Erivan. The ex-Ambassador to Germany also suggested that now was the time for the American Government to issue a statement declaring its interest in the existence and protection of Armenia, comparable to the notes issued in regard to the interest of the United States in Liberia by Secretaries of State Webster and Hay.

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Naturally, President Wilson's action did receive plaudits in Europe. The President of the Council of the League expressed his pleasure at the possibility that the United States would assure the "prosperous and secure development" of Armenia. Reports from Paris and London indicated a strong hope that America would accept the mandate. Some British newspaper editorials probably did little to influence the Congress to grant Wilson authority to accept the mandate when they expressed the opinion that if the United States accepted the mandate, it would be virtually placing itself under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations, as mandates should be granted only to League members.

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81. Decimal File, 860J.01/261, Gerard to Colby, May 19, 1920; and 860J.01/268, Gerard to Colby, May 21, 1920, N.A. Substituting Armenia for Liberia in Webster's despatch, the following results: "This Government regards Armenia as occupying a peculiar position, and as possessing peculiar claims to the friendly considerations of all Christian powers; that this Government will be at all times prepared to interpose its good offices to prevent any encroachment by Armenia upon any just right of any Nation; and that it would be very unwilling to see it despoiled of its territory rightfully acquired, or improperly restrained in the exercise of its necessary rights and powers."

82. The Times (London), May 17, 1920. See also: The New York Times, May 26, 1920 and May 23, 1920.

On May 27, 1920, Senator Lodge reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 in answer to President Wilson's request of the 24th. It was brief, even to the point of bluntness:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress hereby respectfully declines to grant to the Executive the power to accept a mandate over Armenia, as requested in the message of the President, dated May 24, 1920."⁸³

The debate on the resolution began in the Senate on May 29th and lasted until June 1st. The principal opposition to the request of the President was voiced by Republican leaders and Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia. Lodge began his comments on the resolution by pledging his "very deepest sympathy" for the Armenian race and he expressed the hope that his vote on the resolution would not be taken to mean a lack of this sympathy. He even suggested the possibility of suspending the foreign enlistment act and the sending of surplus weapons to the Government of Armenia to assist the Armenians in their own defense. However, the Senator from Massachusetts described himself as "utterly opposed" to any mandate requiring 60,000 troops and a quarter of a million dollars for the first year of its existence. Armenia, according to Lodge, was at the crossroads of the world, a "poorhouse," without established boundaries. If the United States accepted the mandate it would find itself guarding the frontiers of a state which was acting as a convenient buffer between British, French, and Italian interests in the Near East.⁸⁴

83. Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 59, pt. 8 (May 27, 1920), p. 7714.

84. Ibid., (May 29, 1920), pp. 7876, 7887, 7889; and Ibid., (June 1, 1920), p. 8062.

Senator Brandegee (R-Conn.) denounced the President's request as there were no boundaries for Armenia, no specified duties suggested for the United States to perform in implementation of the proposal, and no time limit set on the period of the mandatory. Brandegee also brought up the constitutional issue of whether or not the necessary power had been granted the federal government to accept a mandate or to levy taxes⁸⁵ on the American people in order to pay the expenses associated with it. Senator McCormick (R-Ill.) complained of the cynicism he detected in the offer by the Allies of an Armenian mandate, pointing to the rich mineral resources in Syria and Mesopotamia. Senator Lenroot (R-Wis.) claimed that no other nation wanted a mandate over Armenia due to its economic poverty and tragic internal situation. Senator Thomas (R-Col.) quoted at length from the Harbord Report on the expense to the United States involved in the acceptance of the mandate for Armenia. Senator Smith (D-Ga.) questioned the right of the Congress to tax Americans for⁸⁶ "altruistic" purposes.

The oratorical highlight of the attack on the President's message was probably reached by Senator Reed (R-Mo.). He began his discourse by bringing the League of Nations into the debate. A comparison was drawn between sending armies and navies to protect one small area, Armenia, and the sending of greater armies and navies to protect any member of the League, as proposed in the Covenant. By joining the League, according to Reed, America would hold, not one nation in subjugation, but would help

85. Ibid., (May 29, 1920), p. 7914; and Ibid., (June 1, 1920), p. 8057.
86. Ibid., (June 1, 1920), pp. 8059, 8061-2, 8052-3; and Ibid., (May 29, 1920), p. 7888.

in holding the entire world in that position. The Missouri lawmaker then turned to the situation in the Caucasus where he found Bolshevism on the advance and the peoples of the area addicted to it. His words on the Armenian race were far from complimentary for he affirmed his belief that they were as bloody in their cruelty as the Turks and he further implied that they were cowardly. The entire area was described by Reed as "a cesspool of criminality, of cruelty, of villainy, of race hatred." The Senator from Missouri ended his speech by stating that a "more monstrous proposition was never put before the American people" than this suggestion of the President, and he begged for a return to basic "national-⁸⁷ism" and "Americanism."

On the Democratic side of the Senate, little support was to be found for the mandate proposal. Senator Williams (D-Miss.), long-time friend of the Armenians, criticized the United States Congress and people for wishing to accept all the benefits and advantages of a situation while shirking all relevant burdens and responsibilities. He requested that⁸⁸ the United States act in this case for the peace of the world. Senator Hitchcock (D-Neb.) was opposed to the request but did argue that the resolution from the Foreign Relations Committee was worded in such a way as to imply a summary treatment of the Chief Executive and to discourage the Armenians, while giving corresponding encouragement to their enemies. He proposed an amendment to the resolution which would set up a joint commission of Americans and Armenians to supervise the preparation, issuance, and offering for sale of up to \$50,000,000 in Armenian bonds in the

87. Ibid., (May 31, 1920), pp. 7964-70.

88. Ibid., (May 29, 1920), p. 7877.

United States; the money to be used to buy rail and agricultural equipment⁸⁹ and to act as a basis for a sound currency system in Armenia.

Senator Walsh (D-Mont.), Senator Jones (D-N.M.), Senator Robinson (D-Ark.), and Senator Pomerene (D-Ohio) all criticized the Foreign Relations Committee for its handling of the President's request. Walsh pointed out that no hearings were conducted on the proposed resolution and requested more information on the entire mandate subject from the Committee. Jones felt that little or no investigation had been made of the possibility of a limited mandate, restricted to the furnishing of advice and assistance. Robinson called the resolution equivocal as the Senate had recently proposed to land marines at Batum and now refused to accept a mandate in the same general area. Senator Pomerene, although he complained that the request from Wilson was too vague to accept, suggested that the Foreign Relations Committee do more work on the subject and submit another report.⁹⁰

Finally, seeing an unpleasantly large defeat for the President's request becoming a certainty, the Democratic leadership moved for recommitment of the resolution. Senator Underwood, Minority Leader of the Senate, called for no vote until after ratification of a peace treaty with the Central Powers. Senator Hitchcock followed with a formal motion to recommit⁹¹ the resolution. The results of the voting in the Senate on June 1st, came as a surprise to no one. Before votes on the actual resolution, the Hitchcock amendment, or the move by Hitchcock for recommitment could be taken, Senator Brandegee moved to change the wording of the resolution

89. Ibid., (May 29, 1920), p. 7875.

90. Ibid., (May 29, 1920), pp. 7886-8; Ibid., (May 31, 1920), p. 7965; and Ibid., (June 1, 1920), pp. 8054-6, 8062-4.

91. Ibid., (June 1, 1920), pp. 8066-7, 8069.

from "respectfully declines to grant" to "grants." This action was to determine for the record which senators were willing to grant Wilson the power he requested, as it had become obvious that many Democrats would vote against the Lodge Resolution, but on the grounds that they did not approve of the wording contained therein rather than on the basis that they supported the idea of the United States accepting the mandate. On Brandegee's resolution, the vote was 12 in favor and 62 opposed.⁹² The voting on the Hitchcock motion for recommitment was 34 in favor and 43 opposed. On the Hitchcock amendment to set up a joint commission to supervise the issuance of bonds, the vote was 34 in favor and 41 opposed. Finally, the time arrived for the vote on the resolution received from the Foreign Relations Committee. On this resolution the vote was 52 in favor and 23 opposed.⁹³

In the House of Representatives, a report favoring adherence to the Senate Resolution was brought out by the Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 3rd. The report dealt at length with the danger of the United States falling unwittingly under the control of the Council of the League of Nations and warned that acceptance of the mandate might "amount to an unreserved ratification of the Covenant."⁹⁴

At the same time, a minority report was filed in which a limited mandate involving a continuation of the "moral, intellectual, and sympathetic interest which America had exercised on the Armenians for nearly

92. Ibid., (June 1, 1920), p. 8071.

93. Ibid., (June 1, 1920), pp. 8070, 8073.

94. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mandatory for Armenia, Report to Accommodate S. Con. Res. 27, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., House Report 1101, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), Part 1.

a century" was advocated. As in the debate in the Senate, the Democrats in the House favored no action on the mandate proposal until after a treaty of peace had been signed with the Central Powers. The Senate resolution was castigated as a "direct, deliberate, gratuitous insult to the head of the Nation."⁹⁵

The Republican leadership in the House decided on June 4th that no further action was necessary on the President's request as the Senate Resolution had effectively ended any plan to accept an Armenian mandate. According to a contemporary report in The New York Times, Speaker Gillette told other members of the Foreign Affairs Committee that he wanted no action taken by the House as such might arouse the enmity of Armenian sympathizers in the United States.⁹⁶

One of the interesting aspects of the Senate debate was the constant reference to the findings of the Harbord Mission. On the day that Lodge submitted the resolution declining to grant the requested authority to the President, he requested and was permitted to have, the military sections of the Harbord Report printed in the Congressional Record.⁹⁷ Yet, the fact remains that the President had not asked for a mandate comparable to that described in that Report but rather for one over a much smaller area. A study by the War Department on the requirements of a mandate limited to Armenia was sent to Secretary Colby on June 2nd. The report estimated that the number of troops needed in Armenia to maintain tranquility would number no more than 27,000 and this figure could be reduced

95. Ibid., Part 2.

96. The New York Times, June 5, 1920.

97. Congressional Record, 66th Cong. 2nd sess., Vol. 59, pt. 8 (May 27, 1920), p. 7714.

to about 10,000 at the end of three years. However, this report makes one highly important assumption, that the protection of Armenia from outside invasion would be assumed by the League of Nations.

98. Decimal File, Baker to Secretary of State, June 2, 1920, N.A.

THE WILSON AWARD

To those Americans interested in the welfare of Armenia and the Armenians, the rejection of the mandate scheme by the United States Congress was not accepted as a final American rejection of all plans to aid that nation. On June 4, 1920, James Gerard of the A.C.I.A. wrote to the President reminding him of the statements by prominent Republican leaders indicating that they believed the Chief Executive had the power to send aid to Armenia by executive action. In Gerard's opinion, Wilson should immediately send munitions and supplies for an Armenian army of 50,000, should give the moral backing of the American Government to the creation of an Armeno-American Commission to raise fifty to seventy-five million dollars, should address notes to the major powers comparable to Hay's note relative to Liberia, and finally, should authorize the dispatch of civil and military officers from the United States to aid Armenia, as had been done in the case of Chile in 1912.¹

The Armenian Minister to the United States outlined the requests of the government at Erivan in a note to the Secretary of State, dated June 10th. He began by referring to the rejection of the mandate, "so much desired by us," as a "most unfortunate incident." However, turning to the future, Pasdermadjian requested arms and supplies for 50,000 men, a small international force to assist the Armenians, and part of the reparation payments to be made to the Allied nations by the Central Powers. The Armenian diplomat freely admitted that the present Armenian Army of 25,000

1. Decimal File, 860J.01/289, Gerard to Joseph Tumulty, June 4, 1920, N.A.

poorly equipped soldiers could not possibly defend the area that it was assumed President Wilson would assign in his arbitral award to Armenian² administration.

Events in the period between June 1st and the signing of the Treaty of Sevres moved rapidly on the international stage. In Great Britain, Lord Balfour spoke before the House of Commons on June 17th and stated that his government had neither the troops nor the money to assume a mandatory for Armenia or to keep forces in the Caucasus.³ However, the American Ambassador in London reported at about the same time that the British had decided to send arms and munitions to the value of £1,000,000 to be used by the Armenian forces; and later in the month, the Armenian Minister in Washington confirmed that equipment was arriving from Great Britain.⁴ Conversely, about the same time, July 7th, the last British soldier departed from Batum, finally bringing to a close the period of British military occupation of the Caucasus.

In early 1920, the French were in conflict with the forces of Mustapha Kemal in Cilicia. After being driven back in the late spring, the French concluded an armistice with the Nationalists on May 30 of that year, in which part of Cilicia passed under Turkish control. Gerard bitterly denounced the French Government for signing the truce with Kemal and evacuating that part of Lesser Armenia.⁵ The American Secretary of State instructed the Ambassador in Paris to inform the French Government of the

2. Ibid., 860J.01/407, Pasdermadjian to Secretary of State, June 10, 1920, N.A.

3. The Times (London), June 18, 1920.

4. Decimal File, 860J.24/5, Davis to Secretary of State, June 4, 1920; and 860J.24/6, Pasdermadjian to Secretary of State, June 30, 1920, N.A.

5. Ibid., 860J.01/302, Gerard to President Wilson, June 19, 1920, N.A.

interest of the United States in the protection of Armenians affected⁶ by this transfer of part of Cilicia to Turkish control. From Constantinople, however, came a despatch from Admiral Bristol in which the American High Commissioner stressed his disapproval of the United States becoming involved in the Cilician matter. He advocated, instead, a "strict neutral position" for his country in Franco-Turkish affairs.⁷

Back in the United States, the Armenian Question became involved in the Presidential election of 1920. On June 10th, at Chicago, the Republican Party inserted the following plank in its platform: "We deeply sympathize with the people of Armenia and stand ready to help them in all proper ways, but the Republican Party will oppose now and hereafter the acceptance of a mandate for any country in Europe or Asia." In addition, at the convention, Wilson was roundly denounced for submitting the mandate proposal to Congress, the Republicans calling this "a striking example" of the President's⁸ disregard "of the lives of American boys or American interests."

Before the Democrats met in convention in New York City that same month, the President gave to his fellow Virginian, Carter Glass, a proposed plank for inclusion in the Democratic Platform. Below is given the text of that proposed statement and following it, the plank on Armenia actually adopted by the Democratic Party. The change is rather striking:

We hold it to be the Christian duty and privilege of our Government to assume the responsible guardianship of Armenia, which now needs only the advice and assurance of a powerful friend to establish her complete independence and to give her distracted people the opportunities for peaceful happiness which they have vainly sought for

6. Ibid., 867.00/1286, Colby to American Ambassador, Paris, June 17, 1920, N.A.

7. See: Ibid., 860J.01/308, Bristol to Secretary of State, June 24, 1920; and 867.00/1300, Bristol to Secretary of State, July 1, 1920, N.A.

8. The New York Times, June 11, 1920.

through so many dark years of suffering and hideous distress.

We express our deep and earnest sympathy for the unfortunate people of Armenia, and we believe that our Government, consistent with its Constitution and principles, should render every possible and proper aid to them in their efforts to establish and maintain a government of their own.¹⁰

Warren Harding decided to make the Armenian Question an issue in the campaign. On July 14th, after denouncing Wilson's mandate proposal, the Republican candidate demanded to know if his opponent in the election would reintroduce a request for American acceptance of a mandate for Armenia if he were elected. Cox declined to reply until September 26th when he declared himself in agreement with the decision made at the Democratic Convention against further recommendations for an Armenian mandate. Harding, meanwhile, had stated his position as in favor of aid to the Armenian Republic but against the stationing of "the sons of this republic there in the gateway between the Orient and the Occident to involve us in every conflict of the old world."¹¹

During the summer of 1920, an Armenian military mission was in the United States attempting to secure arms and ammunition from the American Government. In May, the Secretary of War, Newton Baker, informed Colby of the arrival of the mission but also informed the Secretary of State that existing law made it illegal to sell, or loan, or give arms or munitions to countries not at war with nations with which the United States was engaged in conflict. However, Baker did suggest the sending of surplus quantities

9. Quoted in: Stephen Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, The Little Nations at Versailles, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), pp. 196-7.

10. The New York Times, July 3, 1920

11. Ibid., July 14, 1920, July 31, 1920, Sep. 26, 1920, and Sep. 19, 1920.

of general supplies to Armenia if the State and Treasury Departments concurred in the action. Colby replied that his department would approve any action to improve the situation of the Armenians. Apparently Baker also obtained the sanction of the Treasury Department, but in August, the Secretary of War personally decided against the despatch of any supplies to Armenia due to the conditions of transportation existing in the Caucasus¹² region at that time. Thus, the Armenian Republic was shut off from an important source of war material, material which would be desperately needed for the defense of the nation in case of external aggression.

Also during the summer of 1920, the leading American official in the Caucasus resigned from his position and returned to the United States with his staff. Colonel Haskell and his mission had evacuated Tiflis and moved their headquarters to the port of Batum as the Russian Red Army advanced into the Caucasus in May. On July 3rd, Haskell wrote that Georgia might soon follow Azerbaijan into the Communist camp. On August 1st, the American officer resigned from his international position as Allied High Commissioner for Armenia and turned over the refugee and relief functions of his organization to representatives of Near East Relief.¹³ No new High Commissioner was appointed.

12. Decimal File, 860J.24/2, Baker to Secretary of State, May 13, 1920; 860J.24/2, Colby to Secretary of War, June 23, 1920; and 860J.24/11, Baker to Secretary of State, Aug. 4, 1920. N.A.

13. Ibid., 860J.01/339, Haskell to Commissioner for Relief in Belgium, July 3, 1920. See also: Ibid., 860J.01/314, Haskell to Chairman, American Relief Administration, June 24, 1920; and 123H271/4, Hoover to Secretary of State, July 26, 1920, N.A.

On June 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sevres was presented to the Turkish Government at Constantinople. Despite its severe terms, including the reimposition of capitulations, the Government of the Sultan accepted the provisions and the treaty was signed between the Allies and Turkey on August 10th. This immediately resulted in a nearly complete break between the government at Constantinople and the Nationalist Government at Angora under the leadership of Kemal.

Articles 88 to 93 of the Treaty of Sevres dealt with Armenia, the two most important articles being 88 and 89. Under the provisions of the former, Armenia was recognized de jure as a free and independent state. Article 89 stipulated that Turkey and Armenia would agree to the arbitration by President Wilson of the boundary line between the two nations in the four vilayets mentioned in the April despatch from San Remo to the American President. Provision was also made in that article for the acceptance of decisions by President Wilson which would grant Armenia access to the sea and provide for the demilitarization of Turkish territory adjacent to the new frontier.

On the same day that the Treaty of Sevres was signed, the Allies and the Government of Armenia signed a separate treaty, guaranteeing the rights of minorities in Armenia and providing for the establishment of suitable diplomatic and economic relations between the Allied states and the new republic.¹⁴ The United States, not having signed Sevres, of course, did not join with the Allies in subscribing to the provisions of this second treaty.

14. Text of this treaty is found in: Ibid., 185.9/3. N.A.

On the same day that Sevres was being formalized, the United States was apparently initiating a new policy toward the settlement of the Armenian Question - at least, it was recognizing a new and complicating factor being injected into the solution of the Armenian problem. On that date, the Secretary of State wrote to the Italian Ambassador to the United States in reply to a question from the latter on Russo-Polish relations.

Colby stated:

While gladly giving recognition to the independence of Armenia, the Government of the United States has taken the position that final determination of its boundaries must not be made without Russia's cooperation and agreement. Not only is Russia concerned because a considerable part of the territory of the new State of Armenia, when it shall be defined, formerly belonged to the Russian Empire; equally important is the fact that Armenia must have the good will and the protective friendship of Russia if it is to remain independent and free.¹⁵

Immediately following the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, the President of the United States set about the delimiting of the Armeno-Turkish frontier in accordance with the request of the Allied premiers at San Remo. A commission began work in the State Department on August 11, 1920, to draw a boundary line based on ethnic, religious, economic, and physical factors. The commission was under the direction of Professor W. L. Westermann of the University of Wisconsin, who had previously held the post of Chief of the Division on West Asian Affairs for the American Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Westermann was assisted by Major Lawrence Martin of the Army General Staff, who had been one of the members of the Harbord Mission in 1919, and by H. G. Dwight of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in the

15. Ibid., 760C.61/1, Colby to Italian Ambassador, Aug. 10, 1920, N.A.

Department of State. General Harbord was consulted by Westermann before the report of the commission was presented to the Secretary of State and he gave his endorsement to the recommendations for the establishment of a boundary. The report, drawn up by the Westermann Commission was submitted to the Secretary of State in late September, 1920, and was forwarded to the President on November 11th.

Naturally, there was considerable interest in the work of the Commission and in the fact that the President had, once again, involved his country, at least indirectly, in the Armenian Question. Advice came from many sources but none was more opposed to the entire plan of delimiting the frontiers than that received from the American High Commissioner in Constantinople. In a letter dated June 24th, in which, incidentally, Bristol stated that he had been "delighted" at the rejection of the mandate proposal by the Senate, the High Commissioner once again advocated the resolution of the Armenian problem by solving the Turkish problem, i.e., by one power assuming control over the government of a united Ottoman state, thus ensuring good government for all peoples in the area. Admiral Bristol complained that the decision of President Wilson to delimit the boundary had already resulted in a refusal by Turkish authorities to permit American relief workers to travel in the interior of Asia Minor. The American naval diplomat foresaw

16. See: Ibid., 860J.01/502, Memorandum from Robbins to Secretary of State, May 16, 1921; and the file of documents on the boundary decision in the Archives under 760J.6715.

17. Messages from Turkish, Armenian, Kurdish, and Greek Government officials, pro-Armenian societies in the United States, religious organizations interested in the Near East, relief organizations, and private citizens from many nations are included in the Decimal File, 760J.6715.

possible danger to the lives of Americans in the country if the United States became further embroiled in the controversy between Turks and Armenians and also warned that unless adequate military forces were present to enforce any boundary decision, the attempt to draw a boundary between the two nations might well result in the physical elimination of non-Moslems in Turkey.

Bristol concluded that "the present attitude of our people in America is doing the Armenians, for whom they have the greatest possible sympathy, the great-¹⁸est possible harm."

In August, Bristol discussed in detail the intense hatred and spirit of revenge that had developed between the races in the Near East. To the American naval officer, this spirit had to be eliminated before peace could be assured in the area. Once again, he advocated a single mandate for all of Anatolia, Constantinople, and Armenia, and went on record against the establishment of separate countries which "will only intensify these feelings
¹⁹of revenge and perpetuate the fighting between the races."

On September 18th, Admiral Bristol cabled a long despatch once again giving his views on the delimitation of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia. He emphasized that the Turkish Nationalists would never surrender any territory to Armenia, even if such land were given to the government at Erivan by the decision of President Wilson. Consequently, Bristol foresaw a necessity arising for physically ejecting the Turkish troops from the area awarded to Armenia. He wished to know if the President's decision to render

18. Ibid., 860J.01/308, Bristol to Secretary of State, June 24, 1920, N.A.

19. Ibid., 860J.4016/41, Bristol to Secretary of State, Aug. 11, 1920, N.A.

arbitration in this matter would make it incumbent on the United States to secure this land for Armenia. Even if America were not morally or legally bound to perform this duty, Bristol warned that unless such a task were performed by some nation or nations, the United States would lose prestige in the Near East through rejection of the President's award by the Nationalists. The Admiral repeated his warning that American lives in Turkey might well be in danger following the announcement of the boundary decision. Once again, the American High Commissioner, who had often before given evidence of his lack of confidence in the good faith of the Allied Powers, denounced their "long cherished desire to draw us into their selfish and imperialistic troubles in order to use us for their own political ends."²⁰

It was to be anticipated that Admiral Bristol would make recommendations and send warnings in line with the above; however, he was not alone in his views on the necessity for the use of force to implement the Wilson decision. The President of Euphrates College in Harput also warned that the area near the boundary would need to be brought under the strong hand of a protecting power before any decision could be safely announced. Otherwise, the effect of such an announcement would be "disastrous in the extreme." President Riggs suggested that the Allies occupy eastern Turkey and Armenia and establish occupation forces of Turkish and Armenian troops under Allied officers. He concluded: "In no case can a Turkish Government be expected, unaided, to pass over any territory to Armenia without great bloodshed."²¹

20. Ibid., 760J.6715/23, Bristol to Secretary of State, Sep. 18, 1920, N.A.

21. Ibid., 760J.6715/42, Ernest W. Riggs to Secretary of State, July 24, 1920, N.A.

From Paris, on the other hand, came a message to Wilson from Aharonian. In it, the Armenian official expressed the "full confidence" of the Armenian nation in the sympathy of the President for the sufferings of the Armenian people and stated that hundreds of thousands of refugees "whose lives have been saved by generous American relief" were waiting eagerly to return to their Turkish homelands before winter; and consequently, they were "wait-²²ing for your decision which will warrant occupation of those regions."

On the 23rd of November, the arbitral decision of President Wilson was cabled to the American Ambassador to France to be presented by the latter to the President of the Supreme Council. The document awarded to Armenia about 42,000 square kilometers of territory at that time under the control of the Turkish Government, making the total area of the proposed Armenian state, 68,500 square kilometers. This award included only about 40% of the area previously known as Turkish Armenia, but did include pro-²³vision for Armenian access to the Black Sea.

There has been some discussion, since the award by President Wilson, of its legal effect on the Armenian problem. According to the Solicitor of the State Department at the time of the award, the arbitration by the American Chief Executive was performed in a personal, not an official, capacity. Yet Wilson attached to the arbitral decision, transmitted to²⁴ Paris, the Great Seal of the United States. There can be no doubt, however, about one fact, the Treaty of Sevres, under which the arbitral award

22. Ibid., 760J.6715/41, Colby to President Wilson, Aug. 26, 1920, N.A. which encloses a note from Aharonian.

23. Ibid., 760J.6715/61, which is the official copy of the Wilson Award.

24. Discussed in: Ibid., 760J.6715/94, Memorandum from Division of Near Eastern Affairs to Secretary of State, Apr. 23, 1926, N.A.

was made, was never ratified by any state. From a purely practical point of view, there is also no doubt about the fact that the Allied nations, whose representatives on the Supreme Council had asked the American President to arbitrate the boundary dispute, did nothing to ensure that his decision was carried out.

By August, 1920, the international position of the Armenian Republic was becoming precarious. Not only was a resurgent Turkish Nationalist army in the field on the borders of Armenia to the west, but the Red Army of Soviet Russia had eliminated the volunteer forces of Admiral Denikin in the Ukraine and the Caucasus and was stationed on the Armenian border to the north and east. Meanwhile, Russian Armenians, who had joined the Communist revolution and were now in positions of power in Moscow, offered the officials of the government at Erivan assistance and relief in exchange for permission for Russian troops to use the railway through the Republic of Armenia on their way to join with the Turks in expelling the Greek troops who had invaded Anatolia. The Armenian Government declined to grant such

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permission. The Russian Government subsequently refused to recognize the Treaty of Sevres and during the same month, August, 1920, a secret pact was signed between the Turkish Nationalists and the Soviet Government in which Kars and Ardahan, pre-war Russian provinces occupied by the Armenian
26
forces in 1918, were ceded to Turkey.

25. A. Safrastian, "Armenia," Encyclopedia Britannica, (1956), Vol. 2, p. 381.

26. Jirayr Missakian, A Searchlight on the Armenian Question 1878-1950, (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Co., 1950), p. 109.

In late September, 1920, Turkish troops, acting under orders from Kemal, invaded the Republic of Armenia to enforce the provisions of the recently negotiated treaty between Turkey and Russia relative to Kars and Ardahan. On October 9th, an American diplomat at Tiflis cabled that information had reached him that Russian troops were massing on the Armenian border.²⁷ A few days later the Soviet Government sent an ultimatum to Erivan in which the Armenians were asked to (1) grant free passage to Russian troops on their way to join with the army of Kemal, (2) sever all relations with the Allied Powers, (3) denounce the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres. Naturally, the Armenian Government refused to accede to these demands and that refusal was followed by a Russian invasion of the small republic.

In desperation, the Armenian Government turned to the Allies and to the United States for assistance in its nearly hopeless situation. In August, Ambassador Wallace had reported from Paris that Aharonian wished to call to the attention of the United States the danger of Turco-Russian collaboration against Armenia and the need for immediate diplomatic, financial, and other material aid from America to Armenia. Following the Turkish invasion, Aharonian protested to the Conference of Ambassadors and asked for Allied aid, particularly the immediate occupation by Allied forces of the port of Trebizond. Numerous appeals for aid and military support from the Western Powers followed the Russian ultimatum and attack, but the hour was late and it is questionable that the United States or

27. Decimal File, 760J.61/6, Moses, Tiflis to Secretary of State, Oct. 9, 1920, N.A.

the Allies could have acted in time to save the Armenian Republic in the
28
few critical weeks before the Armenian forces were overwhelmed.

The Department of State was receiving reports from Constantinople during the latter months of 1920 which were no more favorable to the Armenian cause than had been the previous despatches from the American High Commissioner. In October, Bristol transmitted an Armenian appeal for American aid to repulse the Turkish invasion but enclosed a report of his own which dealt at length with an Armenian incursion into Turkey in August,
29

1920. On the 1st of November, the American naval officer wrote that he suspected Armenian propaganda as the basis for the news despatches going to the United States and warned of the lack of accuracy of such reports. In his own words, Bristol expressed his skepticism about the importance of the events in eastern Anatolia as follows: "I am inclined to doubt the importance of the reported attack of the Nationalists on the Armenians....Therefore, I desire to warn the Department in advance not to
30
take these reports too seriously."

Even after the collapse of the Armenian Republic, Bristol continued his opposition to things Armenian by describing in detail, for the benefit of the Department of State, the reported cowardice of the Armenian troops who had defended Kars and Alexandropol against the Turks. He stated that the Armenians had more troops, better equipment, better clothing, and more food than the attacking Turkish forces and yet had shamefully offered no resistance. At one point, the High Commissioner stated that the Armenian

28. Ibid., 760J.61/5, Wallace to Secretary of State, Sep 24, 1920; 184.612/1241, Aharonian to President of the Conference of Ambassadors, Oct. 6, 1920; and see also: 760J.67, wherein many appeals to the United States and the Allies are filed.

29. Ibid., 760J.67/19, Bristol to Secretary of State, Oct. 15, 1920, N.A. He repeated his report of Armenian invasion in: Ibid., 760J.67/35, Bristol to Secretary of State, Nov. 1, 1920, N.A.

30. Ibid., 760J.67/35, Bristol to Secretary of State, Nov. 1, 1920, N.A.

race was not "at the present time morally or mentally fit to govern itself
"31
or to govern any other races.

One suggestion for active assistance by the United States was proposed by several prominent Americans during the period of Turco-Armenian, Russo-Armenian conflict. In October, James Gerard suggested that the President put into effect the provision relative to the sending of an American warship to Batum, which had been incorporated in the Harding Resolution passed by the Senate the preceding May. The Chief of the Near East Division of the Department of State concurred in this recommendation, in a memorandum to Secretary Colby dated November 16, 1920.³² But when inquiry was made in London to determine British reaction to the proposal, it was discovered that the Foreign Office considered the proposal worthless to the extent that it was supposed to assist the Armenian defense. As the British pointed out, by mid-November the Turkish forces had cut the rail line from Batum to Erivan and the value to the Armenians of the landing of an American force at the port city was consequently reduced to insignificance. Furthermore, the Americans were reminded that the Georgians, who were in treaty relationship with the Russian Soviet Government, might resent the landing of American Marines at their
33
major port. The United States Government discarded the idea.

31. Ibid., 760J.67/58, Bristol to Secretary of State, Dec. 23, 1920, N.A. Bristol's charges against the Armenians for lack of determined defense of Kars and Alexandropol are substantiated by two letters from other sources: Ibid., 760J.67/59, C. K. Moses, Tiflis to Secretary of State, Dec. 16, 1920; which transmits a letter from the Director General of the Caucasus Branch of Near East Relief at Alexandropol; and 760J.67/74, Bristol to Secretary of State, Jan. 17, 1921, which transmits a letter from Edward Fox of Near East Relief at Kars, N.A.

32. Ibid., 860J.01/351, Gerard to Secretary of State, Oct. 26, 1920; and 867J.00/10, Memorandum from Robbins to Secretary of State, Nov. 16, 1920, N.A.

33. See: Ibid., 860J.00/13, Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 26, 1920, N.A.

The inevitable defeat of the Armenian forces by the combined Turco-Russian armies was accomplished by the beginning of December. On December 2nd, the Treaty of Alexandropol was signed by representatives of the Turkish Nationalists and the Armenian Government. According to the provisions of this peace treaty, the previous Treaty of Sevres was renounced and the Turks incorporated Kars, Ardahan, and other parts of western Armenia into the Turkish state. On the same day, December 2, 1920, another treaty was signed between the Russian Government and the Armenian Government, according to which the existing Government of the Armenian Republic would withdraw in favor of a governing junta composed of five Bolsheviks and two Dashnaks. In return, the Russian Government recognized the "independence" of Armenia. On that same date, Armenia was declared an independent Soviet Republic, but not an integral part of the Soviet Union.

Mention has already been made of a reaction in the United States to the news of the invasion of Armenia by the combined armies of the Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviks. The proposal to send a ship to Batum was about the only concrete proposal advanced during the months of October and November for assisting the Armenians, and this plan was never implemented. The United States public and government officials were thoroughly involved in participating in or observing the presidential election of 1920 during these weeks, and foreign affairs, though a vital issue in the election, were pushed into the background of public interest.

Turning now to the reaction of other bodies, wherein the appeal of the Armenians might be expected to hit a responsive chord, it is easy to find an equal amount of sympathy for the Armenian cause to that registered by

most Americans and also an equal lack of ability or desire to perform the necessary tasks to effectively aid the Armenians. On the 12th of November, in answer to a desperate appeal for aid from the Armenian Delegation in Paris, the Allied Conference of Ambassadors adopted a reply which stated that the Conference, "in spite of the sympathy which they feel for this country," did not possess the requisite power to deal effectively with the situation and suggested that the Armenians take up the problem with representatives of the Allied Governments directly.³⁴

The application of the Armenian Government for membership in the League of Nations was before that organization during the last weeks of Armenian independence. On the 20th of October, the Council of the League had proposed and requested that the Allied Supreme Council immediately appoint a mandatory for the Armenian state.³⁵ By late November the situation was critical in the extreme for the Armenian Government. Consequently, on the 26th, the League Assembly appointed a commission to determine the number of troops necessary to grant effective aid to the Armenians. It is difficult to believe that this action by the Assembly would have eventually resulted in the actual despatch of troops to the Caucasus even if the League had not been faced with a fait accompli long before such action could have been taken. However, on the 22nd of November, the Assembly had initiated another project which appeared feasible and probably highly desirable to the member nations. On that date, the Assembly unanimously passed a resolution in which the Council was asked to secure the services

34. Ibid., 180.03301/92, Notes on a Meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors on Nov. 12, 1920, N.A.

35. The New York Times, Oct. 22, 1920.

of one or more nations to assist in the negotiating of peace between the Armenians and the Turkish Nationalists. On the 26th, President Hymans of the League Council formally requested from all members of the League and from the United States offers to mediate between the Armenians and Kemalists. In the despatch to Washington, the League official assured the American Government that acceptance of such a role as mediator would not, of course,
36
involve any obligations as a mandatory.

On November 30, 1920, President Wilson sent a reply to President Hymans in which he agreed to use his good offices and proffered his personal mediation through a designated representative in an attempt to end the hostilities between Armenia and Turkey. In return, he asked only for "the moral and diplomatic support" of the principal powers in this endeavor. In his letter to Hymans, the President reminded the Council President that he, Wilson, was without authorization to use military force or to make material contribution in the attempt to secure peace without Congressional approval. But the President also reemphasized that "the fate of Armenia has always been of special interest to the American people." In the implementation of his offer to mediate, the President informed the League official that he relied on the Council to suggest avenues through which he might convey his
37
offer to the belligerents.

As early as November 26th, Secretary of State Colby had urged Wilson to pursue this course of action. In a letter to the President on that date, Colby had suggested that Wilson make the offer to mediate and then send

36. Ibid., Nov. 27, 1920; and Nov. 26, 1920.

37. Decimal File, 760J.67/39a, Wilson to President of the Council of the League, Nov. 30, 1920. N.A.

Henry Morgenthau to act as his personal representative for the negotiations. The Secretary admitted the probability of failure in the attempt to end the hostilities on a mutually acceptable basis but expressed his opinion that the act would be one which "the world would welcome and history approve." Colby cautioned Wilson, however, against including in his reply to Hymans words, which apparently the President had proposed, to the effect that Congress had "declared its unwillingness to assume any responsibility regarding Armenia." He pointed out that, although the statement that Congress had refused to accept responsibility was correct, that body, nevertheless, had not specifically declared such to be the case.³⁸ Wilson abided by this recommendation in his reply to the League.

In an answer to Wilson on December 2nd, President Hymans thanked the American Chief Executive for his offer and informed him that the Governments of Spain and Brazil had also offered to mediate and, consequently, the representatives of these governments had been instructed to contact President Wilson to coordinate their actions with his. Hymans informed the President that the Council after investigation, would inform him of the most desirable method for contacting the Kemalist officials in Turkey. The day preceding this despatch, Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, had written to Wilson assuring him of the moral support of every member of the League of Nations.³⁹ Significantly, no mention was

38. Ibid., 760J.67/37a, Colby to President Wilson, Nov. 26, 1920, N.A. In this letter, Colby gives credit to Frederick Jones Bliss for suggesting Morgenthau.

39. Ibid., 760J.67/42¹, Paul Hymans to President Wilson, Dec. 2, 1920, N.A. On the 3rd, Wilson expressed "embarrassment" at the offers from Brazil and Spain, apparently feeling that they would tend to limit the effectiveness of his personal offer; see: Ibid., 760J.67/86, Wilson to Under Secretary Davis, Dec. 3, 1920, N.A.; 760J.67/42, Eric Drummond to Wilson, Dec. 1, 1920, N.A.

made of the diplomatic support that the President also had indicated was a sine qua non for his acceptance of the role of mediator.

On December 7th, Wilson informed the State Department that he desired to name Henry Morgenthau, "in whose skill and good sense in such matters I have the highest confidence," as his representative in the attempt at mediation. This decision was cabled to Hymans on the 15th of the month. The Acting Secretary of State, however, emphasized to the President of the Council that the American President had yet to receive either the information as to the means to be used in contacting the belligerent parties or the assurances of the diplomatic support of the principal powers.⁴⁰ As was later to be discovered, the President of the Council had sent a letter to Wilson two days earlier in which it was suggested that Wilson could contact the Turkish Nationalists via the French or Italian representatives at Constantinople.⁴¹ This information had not arrived in Washington on December 15th.

At the final meeting of the First Assembly on December 18th, that body took formal note of the fact that Armenia had received offers of mediation on her behalf from President Wilson, from Spain, and from Brazil. On the 26th of the month, Hymans cabled a suggestion to President Wilson, originally proposed by Lloyd George, that as the Council now was in possession of information indicating that Armenia had been over-run by Soviet forces, the President of the United States send instructions to the American High

40. Ibid., 760J.67/84, Wilson to Acting Secretary Davis, Dec. 7, 1920, N.A.; and 760J.67/47a, Davis to President of the Council of the League, Dec. 15, 1920, N.A. In late January, 1921, the American Minister in Berne was informed by Eric Drummond that the telegram of Dec. 15, 1920 never reached the League of Nations; Ibid., 760J.67/67, Gary, Berne, to Secretary of State, Jan. 29, 1921, N.A.

41. Ibid., 760J.67/46, Paul Hymans to President Wilson, Dec. 13, 1920, N.A.

Commissioner in Constantinople to act in consultation with the Allied High Commissioners in that city on the question of Armenia. The British Prime Minister had also indicated to the Council, so Hymans informed the President, that in his view, basic issues were involved in the solution of the Armenian Question which involved not only Armenia and Turkey but also the complex problem of Soviet Russia.⁴²

No further action was taken toward mediation until the latter part of January. Morgenthau did not leave for Europe and Wilson did not answer the new suggestion of the Council until January 18, 1921. In a long despatch under that date, the Acting Secretary of State informed the President of the Council of the views of the American Chief Executive on the Armenian settlement. Wilson declined to follow the suggestion of Lloyd George and entrust the negotiations for a settlement to the American and Allied High Commissioners. He reminded the members of the Council that he had never received promises of the diplomatic support of the principal powers as he had requested. In the President's opinion, the immediate cause of the unpleasant situation in the Armenian region was due to the failure of the Treaty of Sevres - the fact that some powers had refused to recognize its provisions and others had refused to enforce such recognition. The United States accepted no responsibility for this unfortunate state of things. President Wilson agreed with the British Prime Minister that basic issues were involved in the settlement, and, repeating some of the arguments which

42. Stated in: Ibid., 860J.01/410, Eric Drummond to Secretary of State, Mar. 17, 1921, in which the Secretary-General reviews the history of the mediation offer, N.A.

appeared in the letter to the Italian Ambassador on August 10th, the President called the Armenian situation "but one detail of this vast Russian problem." He earnestly stated his conviction, "that it is only by a general and comprehensive treatment of the whole problem, only by full and generous cooperation of the principal powers, that a hopeful approach to the pacification and independence of Armenia can be found." In line with this point of view, he suggested pledges of non-intervention in Russia by the principal powers in an attempt to bring about pacifica-⁴³ tion along the entire border of the Soviet Union.

President Wilson never received an answer to his suggestion of January 18th. The Council was not in session until the latter part of February and by that time a new conference of the Allied Powers and the Turks (both the governments at Constantinople and at Angora were represented) was convened in London to discuss a possible revision of the Treaty of Sevres. Wilson's views were submitted to the participating governments at that time but apparently were not considered a basis for further action. On March 12, 1921, at a conference of the Allied Premiers in London, it was agreed to set aside the Wilson award to Armenia of the preceding November and to refer the problem of the Armenian border with Turkey to a commission of the Council⁴⁴ of the League.

The general reaction in the major Allied countries to the Wilson proposals for settlement of the Armenian Question as outlined in his January

43. Ibid., 760J.67/57a, Davis to President of the Council of the League, Jan. 18, 1921, N.A.

44. Ibid., 860J.01/502, Memorandum from Robbins to Secretary of State, dated May 16, 1921, N.A. See also: Ibid., 760J.67/65, Wallace to Secretary of State, Jan. 27, 1921, N.A.

letter was hostile. The British press ridiculed the price that would be exacted from the Allies for a general Russian settlement and The New York Times correspondent in Paris reported that all Allied statesmen in the French capital were opposed to the President's suggestion.⁴⁵

One of President Wilson's last proposals to aid Armenia in her struggle for independence came in his annual message, delivered on December 7, 1920. In that speech he proposed that Congress authorize the Treasury Department to make a loan to Armenia similar to loans made to the Allied Governments during the World War. The actual expenditure of this money would be supervised by commissioners from the United States so that, as the President stated: "...revolutionary tendencies within Armenia itself might not be afforded by the loan a further tempting opportunity."⁴⁶ It is questionable that the Congress would have considered such a proposal for a loan to a communist state under any circumstances, but the decision was not theirs to make for on the 22nd of that month the Armenian Soviet Government annulled all foreign loans.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, immediately following the election of 1920, James Gerard, a prominent Democrat as well as Chairman of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, in a letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, bitterly attacked President Wilson's policies toward Armenia. In this letter, the rejection of the Armenian mandate by the Senate, "for which step the Senate can in no wise be blamed," was singled out as the fatal blow to Armenian

45. The New York Times, Jan. 24, 1921; and Jan. 25, 1921.

46. Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, (2 Vols., New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927), Vol. 2, p. 520.

47. The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1920.

independence. Wilson, according to Gerard, should have protested when the San Remo Conference attempted to limit his arbitration to only four Armenian provinces and should have announced his decision weeks before he did submit his award to Paris. In a direct appeal to the powerful Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the ex-Ambassador to Germany requested that Lodge declare publicly that whatever the result of the Turco-Armenian war then raging, the independence and political rights of the Armenian nation would be respected by the United States and that the American people would determine their future attitude toward a European rapprochement, "in the light of the attitude of the Powers toward Armenia." 48

On the 17th of December, Gerard and other members of the A.C.I.A. visited the newly-elected President of the United States at his home in Marion, Ohio. At that time Harding granted his approval to the wording of a memorandum on Armenia and he promised to support the provisions of the memorandum after his inauguration. The memorandum was passed to the President with the suggestion that it be sent to the major Allied Powers, to the Turkish Government at Constantinople, and to the Kemalist Government in Angora. The proposed note included a review of the recent events relative to Armenia and called attention to the non-fulfillment of Allied promises to the Armenian people. It pronounced the continued interest of the United States in the development of an autonomous Armenian state, discussed the material aid which the American people had given to Armenians throughout the Near East, and cited the Wilson award as an example of continued American interest in the Armenian Question. The memorandum con-

48. Decimal File, 860J.01/359, Gerard to Wilson, Nov. 10, 1920, N.A., which encloses a copy of the letter to Lodge.

cluded with the statement that Congress would be asked to authorize "such financial aid to the new Republic, when put in possession of its rightful territory, as will enable it undisturbed to attain in due time its proper development."⁴⁹

Wilson never acted on this memorandum from the A.C.I.A. and thus incurred the increased wrath of the members of that organization. In a letter to Hughes in March, 1921, shortly after the advent to power of the Republican administration, Henry Jessup denounced Wilson for refusing to send the note to the powers. According to Jessup, the President had, instead, sent "a beautifully-worded pronunciamento, doing the Armenian cause no good, and practically postponing it to the Greek calends by linking it up to the Russian chaotic conditions."⁵⁰

Perhaps President Wilson expected the violent denunciations of his actions in the Armenian affair from the extreme Armenian proponents, such as Gerard and Jessup, but it must have come as an ironic blow to the President when his acts were attacked by some of those for whom he had labored so often. Former Armenian Premier, Katissian, passing through Constantinople on his way to exile in February, 1921, told an American diplomatic representative in that city that Wilson had been to blame for the Armenian disaster. In his opinion, the American President's offer to arbitrate the border between Armenia and Turkey had so infuriated the Turks that they had attacked the Armenians in an attempt to ensure that any boundary decision⁵¹ by Wilson could not be fulfilled.

49. Ibid., 860J.01/444, Alton B. Parker to Secretary of State, May 24, 1921, N.A., which attaches the memorandum approved by Harding and sent to Wilson.

50. Ibid., 860J.01/394, Henry Jessup to Secretary of State, Mar. 18, 1921, N.A.

51. Ibid., 760J.67/75, Allen Dulles to Secretary of State, Feb. 23, 1921, N.A.

In February, 1921, many Armenians under the leadership of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, rose in open revolt and drove the Bolsheviks from Soviet Armenia. The revolt was short-lived, however, as the Red Army completely occupied the country within a month. On March 16, 1921, a treaty of friendship was signed between the Kemalists and the Government in Moscow. Under its provisions, the Turkish conquests of the previous fall were confirmed, the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic received territorial cessions from the Armenian Republic, and the rest of that once "independent" soviet republic was annexed outright to the Soviet Union.

52. Text of treaty is given in: Jacob C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, (2 Vols., Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), Vol. 2, pp. 95-7.

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

The liquidation of the independent Armenian Republic of the Caucasus in the latter part of 1920 brought to a conclusion one phase of the Armenian Question and introduced another. From the 2nd of December, 1920, when the Armenian Government in Erivan succumbed to the overwhelming force of the Turkish Nationalists and the Russian Bolsheviks, to the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in July, 1923, the issue foremost in the minds of the Armenian nationalists and Armeno-philés of all nationalities was the salvaging of some form of Armenian autonomy in an area wherein Armenian refugees from the entire Near East could settle and renew their ancient way of life. After Lausanne, a new phase began for the Armenian Question in which realistic Armenians and their friends were forced to recognize that, with the exception of the Soviet Armenian state, the dream of an independent, or even autonomous Armenian nation, was not to be realized.

On February 21, 1921, a conference was convened in London to consider the Near Eastern situation and the possible revision of the Treaty of Sevres. Although the primary concern of the negotiators was to bring peace to the area, particularly peace between the Turkish Nationalists and the Greeks, the future of the Armenians in Turkey was also discussed. As in 1919, the Armenians were represented by Nubar and Aharonian. On the 26th of February, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, informed the Turkish Nationalists, who were present as were representatives of the government in Constantinople, that the Allied Powers insisted on the erection of an independent Armenian¹ state. However, on the 12th of March, a proposal for revision of Sevres

1. Decimal File, 860J.01/447, Cardashian to Secretary to the President, June 15, 1921, in which Cardashian reviews the progress at London.

was presented to the Turks which incorporated the following words:

In regard to Armenia, the present stipulations might be acceptable on condition that Turkey recognize the right of Turkish Armenians to a National Home on the eastern frontiers of Turkey-in-Asia, and agree to accept the decision of a commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to study on the spot the amount of territory that should equitably be transferred to Armenia.²

This paragraph was important for at least two reasons. First, the idea of a "National Home" for the Armenians was mentioned. It is difficult to determine exactly what was meant by this term, which was to receive increasing support from many sources during the succeeding months, but it is obvious that the term implied less than full independence. Second, the Wilson award to Armenia, as accepted in Sevres, was cast aside in favor of the decision of a commission of the League of Nations. Of the two, the former was to have the most important long-term effect for it implanted in the minds of many the idea of establishing something less than an independent Armenian nation, a national home, a concept which it might be expected that the Turkish nationalists could accept.

The London Conference was not successful in resolving the international problems relative to Turkey. During the remainder of 1921, three formal agreements were concluded between the Turkish Nationalists and their neighbors or previous enemies. All had at least an indirect effect on the settlement of the Armenian Question. In October, 1921, by the provisions of the Treaty of Kars, the Turks formally recognized the Armenian Soviet Republic. During the previous March, the Government at Angora had negoti-

2. Jirayr Missakian, A Searchlight on the Armenian Question 1878-1950, (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Co., 1950), p. 102.

ated an agreement with the Italians, in which the latter had agreed to withdraw forces from Anatolia in exchange for economic concessions. This agreement had little direct affect on the Armenian problem, but any division of policy toward the Turkish settlement on the part of the Allies could not but help Kemal and hurt Armenian chances for eventually securing the establishment of an independent or autonomous state.

By far the most significant agreement negotiated by the Kemalists in 1921 was the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty, signed on October 20th of that year. Not only did this have an indirect affect on the Armenian problem, similar to that realized by the Italian-Turkish Agreement, but the provisions of this treaty also affected the Armenians directly. Prior to the signing of the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty there had been constant conflict between the forces of the Kemalists and the French in Cilicia since February, 1920. Naturally, the Armenians in Cilicia, both natives of the region and the many refugees from the provinces of northeastern Turkey, had aided the French in the defense of the region against Turkish attack. By the terms of this treaty, France evacuated all of Cilicia and part of Syria in exchange for economic concessions in Turkey. Provisions were incorporated in the treaty to guarantee the rights of Christian minorities; but, when the French troops left Cilicia in December, 1921, over 150,000 Armenians and Greeks fled with them. These refugees later settled in Syria, Greece, and throughout the Near East.

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3. See: Clair Price, "Mustapha Kemal and the Armenians," Current History, Vol. 17 (Oct., 1922), p. 122; Joseph Burt, The People of Ararat, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1926), pp. 86-7; and Fridtjof Nansen, Armenia and the Near East, (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1928), p. 317.

In March, 1922, the Allies again futilely attempted to bring peace to the Near East. At a meeting in Paris of the Foreign Ministers of the Allies and interested powers, the following proposal was adopted by the Allies:

The situation of the Armenians has received special consideration, as much on account of the obligation contracted by the Allied Powers during the war as on account of the cruel suffering endured by that people. Consequently the aid of the League of Nations is sought, in addition to the provisions made for the protection of minorities, with a view to satisfying the traditional aspirations of the Armenian people and the establishment of a national home for them.⁴

Again, mention was made of a "national home" but without definition or location. The press reported at the time that Lord Curzon favored the establishment of the home in Cilicia while the French statesman, Poincaré, advocated establishment of the home in northeastern Turkey.⁵ It is also noteworthy that the Allies were now attempting to foist the problem of Armenia onto the League of Nations.

In the Assembly of the League, the idea of a national home had also received considerable support, but the members of the Assembly called upon the Allied Supreme Council to implement the proposals for the home. The Second Assembly, in September, 1921, called upon the Council of the League to "press upon the Supreme Council the necessity of making provisions in the Treaty, safeguarding the future of Armenia, and further, insuring for the Armenians a National Home, wholly independent of Turkish rule." This resolution was adopted unanimously as was a resolution at the Third Assembly a year later in which the Allies were reminded that a national home for

4. Quoted in Decimal File, 860J.01/547, Montgomery to Chief, Near Eastern Division, State Department (Dulles), Sep. 14, 1922, N.A.

5. Ibid.

the Armenians must not be ignored in any peace negotiations between the
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Allies and Turks. Beyond these resolutions the League Assembly was not prepared to act on behalf of the Armenians.

The year 1922 finally brought peace to Anatolia and resulted in the triumph of Turkish nationalism. The Greek invasion of Anatolia had resulted in a stalemate after the decisive battle of Sakkaria in August, 1921. A year later the Turkish Nationalists mounted an offensive against the Greek invaders which eventually drove the Greek forces into the sea. The Allies were no longer united in their actions in Turkey and only Great Britain supported the Greek cause. On September 9, 1922, Smyrna fell to the forces of Kemal, and a month later, on October 11th, the Convention of Mudania between the Allies and the Turkish Nationalists was signed. By the terms of this armistice, the Nationalists recovered territory in Eastern Thrace but agreed to the neutralization of the Straits. Shortly after the Convention of Mudania was concluded, Mustapha Kemal consolidated his control over Turkey by the elimination of the Sultanate. On November 20, 1922, a delegation representing a united Turkey met with delegations from the Allied nations at the Swiss city of Lausanne to conclude a definitive peace for the Near East.

Meanwhile, among the Armenians in Paris, the proposal for a national home received varying reactions. The delegation originally representing the government at Eriwan and composed primarily of members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation opposed the plan at the London Conference in 1921, insisting on the acceptance of the provisions of Sevres with the incorporation of the Wilson Award.⁷ The National Delegation, under the leadership of Nubar, on the other hand, favored the establishment of an autonomous

6. See: American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, The Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Armenia, (New York: 1926), p. 202; and Nansen, Armenia and the Near East, p. 320.

7. Decimal File, 860J.01/547, Montgomery to Chief, Near Eastern Division, State Department, Sep. 14, 1922, N.A.

region in Cilicia under French protection, wherein Armenian refugees could reside in peace and security. After the French evacuation of Cilicia, the representative of the National Delegation in the United States informed the State Department that that organization now desired the establishment of a national home in either the six traditional Armenian vilayets of Turkey⁸ or in Cilicia, either apparently under Turkish sovereignty. At the same time, the dispute between the delegations of Nubar and Aharonian flared anew after the Russo-Turkish triumph of 1920, once again hurting Armenian⁹ aspirations.

In the United States a new administration took office in March, 1921. Both President Warren G. Harding and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes were familiar with the history of the Armenian problem as it had evolved since the conclusion of the World War. Both were to be conscious of its continued development during the succeeding years. Harding, of course, had been Chairman of the Foreign Relations sub-committee in the Senate which held hearings on the Williams Resolution in 1919 and brought forth the recommendations, accepted by the Senate but never implemented by the administration, of May, 1920. Hughes had been one of the founders and most influential members of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia and one who had signed his name to several communications to President Wilson demanding strong action by the Executive Branch of the government in assisting the Armenian cause. Gerard once reminded Hughes that he,

8. See: Ibid., 767.68119/195a, which includes a letter from Nubar to members of the French Senate, dated Dec. 9, 1920; and 860J.01/562, M. Vartan Malcom to Williams Phillips, Oct. 7, 1922, N.A.

9. See: Ibid., 860J.01/386, Montgomery to President Wilson, Jan. 31, 1921, in which Nubar is quoted as saying that Aharonian's delegation no longer has any legal or political existence.

"more than any other person," was responsible for the movement for Armenian independence in America.¹⁰

President Harding, during his administration, seemed fully aware of the hardships suffered by the Armenian refugees but frustrated by the knowledge that the American people had put his administration in power in 1920 on the basis of a return to an isolationist policy toward European and Asiatic problems. In commenting on one of many petitions regarding Armenia received by him in the months before Lausanne, the President wrote that he feared that the petitioners had a conception of the influence and power of the United States which was "born of an earlier attempt to direct the affairs of the world."¹¹

Yet, in November, 1921, when reports of atrocities committed against the Armenians in Turkey were frequent and the French had agreed to evacuate Cilicia, Harding suggested to the State Department that he, as President, recommend the sending of an American warship to the Mediterranean if Hughes felt that the action would aid the Armenians. He also suggested that either he or Hughes contact representatives of the Allied Governments in an attempt to bring "some assurance of safety to this dreadfully stricken people."¹²

The Secretary of State, who had once so ardently urged strong action on behalf of the Armenians, described the situation as "changed" by the time he was sworn into office.¹³ In this, the Secretary, of course, was correct for by then the Allies, the United States, and the Armenians found

10. Ibid., 860J.01/434, Gerard to Secretary of State, Apr. 25, 1921, N.A. Hughes resigned from A.C.I.A. on Feb. 26, 1921, before Harding's inauguration.

11. Ibid., 860J.01/499, Harding to Secretary of State, May 2, 1921, N.A.

12. Ibid., 860J.4016/96, Harding to Secretary of State, Nov. 21, 1921, N.A.

13. Ibid., 860J.01/512, Hughes to Alton B. Parker, Aug. 1, 1921, N.A.

themselves confronted with a fait accompli - no independent Armenian nation existed. In answer to repeated pleas for him to despatch the note recommended to Wilson, with Harding's approval, in December, 1920, Hughes replied that the situation had been so drastically altered that the sending of the note was no longer practicable. Secretary Hughes made his position quite clear in April, 1922 when he wrote to Henry Jessup regarding this suggestion:

No mere note will suffice to clear the Turks and the Russians out of Armenia or to protect Armenian territory against future invasion. That would require a military effort of a magnitude which the Allies are hardly in a position to consider. Otherwise, without entering into certain delicate questions as to the responsibilities of the Allied Governments and the ability of the Armenians to hold the territory awarded them under the Treaty of Sevres, it seems to me that treaty would long ago have been put into effect. Nor, with respect to ourselves, do I need to point out to you that in spite of the wide-spread sympathy for the Armenians which exists in this country, there appears to prevail an even more widely spread sentiment against active participation in transatlantic affairs.¹⁴

The Congress of the United States continued to assert its interest in the settlement of the Armenian problem. Senator Sterling (R-N.D.) introduced a resolution in the Senate in 1921 in which the Allies were requested to "rescue" the Armenians. Hughes wrote to Harding that in his opinion the passage of such a resolution would be "inadvisable," as it would fail to receive the proper amount of attention from the European states and such reaction in turn, would be unfortunate for American prestige. Furthermore, the Secretary of State warned, the resolution would almost certainly evoke a rejoinder from the Allies that if the United States had such a pronounced interest in the matter, it should take appropriate action

14. Ibid., 860J.01/518, Hughes to Henry Jessup, Apr. 4, 1922, N.A.

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itself. Sterling's resolution was never brought out of Committee.

Representative Edward C. Little (R-Kans.) wrote to Hughes in July, 1921 stating his belief that the "auspicious moment" had arrived to implement the provisions of the Sevres Treaty. In Little's opinion, this could be partially accomplished by offering to reopen negotiations with the Russian Government in exchange for the independence of the republics in the Caucasus. 16
Needless to say, Congressman Little's recommendation did not change American policy toward Russia or Armenia.

One of the Congressional recommendations that received considerable attention in the House and by the Administration was a resolution introduced by Representative John Jacob Rodgers (R-Mass.) on December 12, 1921. Because this resolution was the subject of hearings before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, it should be quoted in full:

Whereas the Armenians and other Christian peoples of Turkey continue in their evil plight and the refugees are unable to return to their homes; and

Whereas the evacuation of Cilicia, already begun, has brought calamity to the Christian population there; and

Whereas the humanitarian sentiment of the people of the United States is strongly enlisted in behalf of these Christian populations, for whom American relief has been generously given: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the President be requested to express to the de facto Government at Angora the moral protest of the United States against the persecution of the Armenians and other Christian people; and be it further

Resolved, That the President be requested, if not incompatible with

15. Ibid., 860J.4016/138, Hughes to President Harding, July 7, 1921, N.A.

16. Ibid., 860J.01/462, Edward Little to Secretary of State, July 31, 1921, N.A.

public interest, to take up with Great Britain, France and Italy the question of calling a conference for the purpose of considering methods by which the Armenians may be given an opportunity to establish themselves as a nation.¹⁷

Those who spoke at the public hearings in behalf of the resolution were mostly members of the increasingly powerful organization known as the Armenia-America Society, about which more will be written later in this chapter, and the representatives in the United States of Nubar's organization in Paris. The emphasis placed by the speakers was on the lack of any conflict between the resolution and traditional American policy. As one speaker phrased it, those who advocated passage of the resolution simply wished to put the Congressional seal on the sentiment of the majority of Americans. All speakers emphasized the power of moral persuasion which was described as even greater than the threat of the use of armed force. Emphasis was also placed on the optimistic assumption that by the use of American good offices, the Allies and Turks could be gathered around the conference table where the acceptance of a national home for the Armenians¹⁸ would be assured.

The Department of State could find little that was desirable in the Rodgers Resolution. When Senator Lodge informed Hughes that he had been requested by the Armenian National Union of Boston to introduce the resolution in the Senate, Hughes requested that the Senator decline for two reasons. First, any conference held in 1921 would necessitate the United States dealing with both the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks, neither govern-

17. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, In Behalf of the Armenians, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. Res. 244, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 1.
18. Ibid., pp. 7, 9, 10, 11, 13-4, 18-9, 34, 42-3.

ment having been recognized by Washington. Second, Hughes reminded Lodge that any suggestion, such as the one contemplated, to the Allies would certainly evoke a response "that if we are so much interested in Armenia¹⁹ we had better do our share in taking care of it." The resolution was never introduced in the Senate.

Back in the House of Representatives, Representative Rodgers informed his colleagues, in answer to direct questions on the subject, that his resolution had not been acted on by the Foreign Affairs Committee after it was determined that the Executive Branch of the government had an interest in Armenia and had hopes of showing that interest. He assured his fellow law-makers that both Congress and the Administration were fully aware of the "gravity of the situation" and were "determined to do whatever may appropriately be within the power of the American people to remedy the situation and to put a stop to the atrocities in the Near East so far as they are found to exist." The Congressional Record notes that applause²⁰ from the galleries followed Rodgers remarks.

The man who has previously been mentioned as the most tireless advocate in Congress of Armenian rights, Senator William King of Utah, continued throughout this period to demand action by the United States and by the Allies to secure Armenian independence. Again and again the Senator from Utah introduced resolutions requesting that the President call to the attention of the Allied Governments the non-fulfillment of the Sevres provisions

19. Decimal File, 860J.01/516, Lodge to Secretary of State, Mar. 15, 1922; and Ibid., Hughes to Senator Lodge, Mar. 23, 1922, N.A.

20. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 62, pt. 9 (June 15, 1922), pp. 8779-80.

in regard to Armenia and demanding that such provisions be implemented by the Allies. His resolutions were, without exception, passed to the Foreign Relations Committee where, to all intents and purposes, they were buried. Not one of them was ever reported out for action, not one of them was even
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a subject for hearings before the Committee.

King became irritated at this handling of his proposals and on June 3, 1922, roundly denounced the Foreign Relations Committee, the Department of State, and the President for ignoring his resolutions and doing nothing to demonstrate American sympathy for "the suffering and unfortunate people, or to indicate that the United States views with abhorrence the wicked and cruel course pursued by the Kemalists regime." King then introduced another resolution, "diluted to the point of extreme weakness" for those "afraid of speaking for the fallen and the weak, or entangling the United States in the affairs of other nations," which stated simply that the American Government could not regard with indifference "attempts or projects to oppress the Armenian people or to deprive the Republic of Armenia of its status as a
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free and independent state." This resolution was also passed to the Foreign Relations Committee but was subject to no further action.

After the start of the conference at Lausanne, Congress once again became active in regard to the Armenian Question. Senator Wadsworth (R-N.Y.) spoke before his colleagues on December 5, 1922, calling attention to the statement by the Secretary of State on October 30th, in which Hughes warned

21. See Ibid., 66th Cong., 3rd sess., Vol. 60, pt. 2 (Jan. 21, 1921), p. 1824; Ibid., pt. 4 (Feb 25, 1921), p. 3835; Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 62, pt. 1 (Dec. 22, 1921), pp. 690-9; Ibid., pt. 5 (Mar 24, 1922), p. 4500; and Ibid., pt. 6 (Apr. 14, 1922), p. 5492.

22. Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 62, pt. 8 (June 3, 1922), pp. 8093-5.

that the United States would have no relations with Mexico until that nation's government respected property rights. Wadsworth expressed the opinion that respect for human rights was even more important and therefore the United States should under no circumstances resume relations with the Kemalists.²³

This fear of a Turkish-American rapprochement apparently worried the Senator from Utah as well, for on March 3, 1923 Senator King introduced still another resolution which stated it to be the sense of the Senate that the United States should not resume diplomatic relations with Turkey or permit its nationals to advance financial aid to the Turkish Government until that government had withdrawn its military forces from the Armenian state, as created by Sevres, and had accepted the existence of an independent Armenia.²⁴

As an inducement to the negotiators at Lausanne to create an Armenian National home, Representative Fish (R-N.Y.) introduced a bill on December 21, 1922 which would have authorized the loan of twenty million dollars to an Armenian state if and when created.²⁵ The results of the Lausanne Conference made this suggestion a dead issue.

Perhaps it is significant that on January 26, 1923 a United States senator spoke out in favor of Mustapha Kemal and the new Turkey. On that date, Senator Owen (D-Okla.) requested insertion in the Congressional Record, with his own highly favorable comment thereon, of a speech by the Turkish leader. In Owen's words, here was a man who spoke "the American language."

23. Ibid., 67th Cong., 4th sess., Vol. 64, pt. 1 (Dec. 5, 1922), p. 23.

24. Ibid., pt. 6 (Mar. 3, 1923), p. 5271.

25. Ibid., pt. 1 (Dec. 21, 1922), p. 840.

To the senator, there were many similarities between the Turkish and American attempts to secure independence and democracy. Senator King denounced the action and ridiculed the idea of Turkish democracy, but even he must have recognized that the public opinion of some Americans toward Turkey was changing when an American senator would pay tribute to the leader of the previously reviled Turkish nationalists.²⁶

Turning from governmental to unofficial American reaction to the events in the Near East during the period prior to the opening of the Lausanne Conference, it is natural to examine first the previously mentioned American Committee for the Independence of Armenia and its two spokesmen, James Gerard and Vahan Cardashian, both of whom had had contact with the Department of State before December, 1920. Gerard continued to urge the fulfillment of the provisions of the Sevres Treaty and the Wilson Award. At first, he refused to accept the proposal for anything less than full independence for Armenia and roundly denounced certain Americans and Nubar Pasha for advocating a national home. In some variation from his normal insistence on Armenian sovereignty, Gerard in a letter to Harding, dated March 1, 1922, emphasized the importance of Russia to any settlement of the Armenian problem. The Chairman of the A.C.I.A. even suggested that Russia might assume a temporary veto over the foreign relations of the Armenian state in exchange for assisting in the creation of a truly independent Armenian republic.²⁷

26. Ibid., pt. 3 (Jan. 26, 1923), pp. 2487-2501.

27. See: Decimal File for the following letters or telegrams from Gerard to Secretary of State, 860J.01/409, Mar. 30, 1921; 860J.01/426, Mar. 7, 1921; 860J.01/427, Apr. 12, 1921; and 860J.01/434, Apr. 25, 1921. See also: Ibid., 860J.01/489, Gerard to President Harding, Mar. 1, 1922, N.A.

The correspondence between Gerard and the President eventually resulted in a letter from Harding's secretary to the former, dated November 10, 1922, and which was later widely (and inaccurately) quoted by the A.C.I.A. in their attempt to prove Republican duplicity at Lausanne. Because of the future importance of this letter and its exposition of the policy of the administration, the significant part of the letter is quoted:

He [the President] is of the opinion that in the exercise of American influence in behalf of the protection of racial and religious minorities that the United States will be doing everything that it can do becomingly in the protection of the Armenians. The President does not agree that this government is responsible for the Armenian situation and he does not understand that it is practical for this country to dictate the settlement of the Near Eastern situation. However, everything which may be done consistently will be done in seeking to protect the Armenian people and preserve to them the rights which the treaty of Sevres undertook to bestow.²⁸

Vahan Cardashian, Director of the Press Bureau of the A.C.I.A. and a man whose sympathies had always been closely associated with the government at Erivan and its representatives at Paris, was infuriated by the suggestion of a national home for the Armenians. In a bitter memorandum to the President and Secretary of State, dated June 15, 1921, he attached the blame for this proposal to the Armenian National Delegation under Nubar, to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, to the Near East Relief, and to the more recently organized Armenia-America Society. The American Board was also condemned by Cardashian for keeping Wilson from declaring war on Turkey and even for the success of the Communist revolution in Russia.²⁹

28. Ibid., 860J.01/580, Harding to James Gerard, Nov. 10, 1922, N.A. The sentence containing the underlined word [underlined by this writer] was later widely quoted but usually with the word "consistently" omitted.

29. Ibid., 860J.01/447, Cardashian to Secretary of State and President Harding, June 15, 1921, N.A.

As the months passed and Cardashian found the situation even less propitious for the creation of an independent Armenian nation, he lashed out at supposed or actual enemies of Armenia in The United States and Europe. In a published volume entitled Wilson, the Wrecker of Armenia, the Press Bureau Director denounced the ex-President, the missionaries in Turkey, and the American Board. In October, 1922, Cardashian blamed both the Democratic and Republican administrations for the failure of Armenia to secure independence. Shortly after the Lausanne Conference opened, Cardashian sent a letter to Hughes in which he singled out the Republicans for almost sole blame for the collapse of Armenian independence. In retrospect, it appears that Cardashian was sure that someone or several people were to blame for the Armenian tragedy and by indiscriminately castigating anyone who had anything to do with the problem, he was certain³⁰ to hit the guilty party sooner or later.

In addition to the A.C.I.A., there existed several organizations in the United States devoted to securing material or political aid for the Armenians in the postwar period. Only one of these organizations rivaled in size and importance the American Committee. The Armenia-America Society, previously mentioned in this chapter, was organized in the fall of 1919

30. See Ibid., 860J.01/502, Bristol to Secretary of State, June 8, 1921; 860J.01/538, Cardashian to Secretary of State, Oct. 3, 1922; and 860J.01/553, Cardashian to Secretary of State, Dec. 1, 1922, N.A. Subsequently, in a memorandum prepared by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on the activities of Cardashian during the decade following the World War, the subject is described as "a naturalized American of American origin, who has apparently one purpose in life: to make our relations with Turkey as difficult as possible and to secure the maximum publicity for his activities in this direction." Ibid., 860J.01/591, Memorandum from G. Howland Shaw of Near Eastern Affairs Division to Under Secretary of State, dated May 8, 1929, N.A.

but did not attain its full measure of influence in the United States until after the defeat of the Armenians in the latter part of 1920. By the spring of 1922, the Armenia-American Society had sixty chapters in the United States and was closely associated with such national organizations as Near East Relief and with such international organizations as the Philo-Armenian League, the latter with headquarters in Geneva but associated with pro-Armenian groups throughout the world.³¹

According to the charter of the organization, the Armenia-America Society was created to "unite in cooperation the many friends of Armenia for the purpose of ascertaining the needs of Armenia, of bringing these needs before the American people and securing satisfaction of those needs through American assistance."³² In short, Armenia-America looked after the political needs of Armenia much as Near East Relief attended to the measures designed to bring material relief to the members of that race. The Chairman of the Society was the distinguished Philadelphia attorney, Walter George Smith. Among his associates on the Executive Committee were Hamilton Holt, Editor of The Independent; ex-governor William Runyon of New Jersey; and Dr. Charles Macfarland, Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. The Director of the Armenia-America Society was George R. Montgomery, a one-time professor, one-time editor, and a technical advisor to the Western Asia Department of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in 1919.

31. Information contained in this and succeeding paragraphs is from a pamphlet entitled, The Armenia-America Society, undated, published in New York; and from testimony by Smith and Montgomery before the Foreign Affairs Committee during hearings on the Rodgers Resolution, U. S. Congress, House, In Behalf of the Armenians, pp. 4, 9, 19, 23.

32. The Armenia-America Society, p. 3.

From the beginning, Armenia-America was less adamant and belligerent than the A.C.I.A. in advocating Armenian nationalist aspirations. Whereas the A.C.I.A. often appeared to coordinate its policies with those of the Armenian Republic at Erivan, this organization tended to associate itself closely with the cause advocated by Boghos Nubar and his associates who represented the Armenians of Cilicia and Eastern Turkey. ³³ In reviewing the large volume of correspondence which passed between the Department of State and the members of the Armenia-America Society, it appears that the Society was particularly strenuous in its efforts in regard to three aspects of the Armenian problem: the establishment of a national home, the securing of an American loan to Armenia, and the representation of Armenian interests by the United States.

The earliest reference in the correspondence of the Department of State to an "Armenian Home," or national home, appeared in a letter from Montgomery to Senator Lodge, dated January 13, 1921, and passed by the Senator to the Department. This "Home" was described as an area under a joint protectorate which would eventually become a "commonwealth." At another time, Montgomery suggested an Armenian National Home in Cilicia with an Ottoman Christian Governor, this plan to be accepted by the Turks in return for giving them territory previously taken from them by the terms of the Treaty of Sevres. ³⁴ Possibly the Turks had good reason to be wary of the national home proposals for at another time the Director of Armenia-America wrote: "We look forward to the establishment of another Bulgaria in the Taurus region." ³⁵

33. See: Decimal File, 860J.01/386, Montgomery to President Wilson, Jan. 31, 1921; and 860J.01/459, Montgomery to Secretary of State, July 25, 1921, N.A.

34. Ibid., 860J.01/375, Montgomery to Senator Lodge, Jan. 13, 1921; and 860J.4016/131, Montgomery to Henry P. Fletcher, Dec. 16, 1921, N.A. See also: Ibid., 860J.01/471, Montgomery to Secretary of State, Oct. 19, 1921, in which the author suggests an American protectorate over Cilicia after the withdrawal of the French.

35. Ibid., 860J.51/5, Montgomery to Secretary of State, Mar. 29, 1921, N.A.

The interest of Armenia-America on the financial side of the problem of creating an Armenian home, or state, was concentrated in the securing of a loan to assist in its establishment. In March, 1921, mention was made of the need for a loan from the United States to be used in "making the beginnings of an Armenian state." The following year, Montgomery urged that the American unofficial representative on the Reparations Commission speak out on behalf of allotting a share of the reparations from the Central Powers to be used in creating an Armenian state under a mandatory who would receive the grant in trust.³⁶ Later in the year, Montgomery and England's foremost Armeno-ophile, Robert Cecil, agreed that the sum of twenty-five million dollars would be needed to create an Armenian national home.³⁷ In the summer of 1922, Montgomery even went to the extent of assisting the President of the Economic Commission of Soviet Armenia in his futile attempt to secure an American loan.³⁸ Possibly the Director of Armenia-America envisioned the setting up of a national home in what was then Soviet Armenia.

Throughout the period preceding Lausanne, the Executive Committee and the Director of Armenia-America strongly advocated action by the United States on behalf of the Armenians in the field of international diplomacy.) In November, 1921, they proposed that President Harding take the initiative in calling an international conference to consider methods of re-establishing the Armenian nation. During the following year, they urged Secretary Hughes

36. Ibid.; and 462.00R29/1600, Montgomery to Secretary of State, Apr. 3, 1922, N.A.

37. Ibid., 860J.48/123, Montgomery to Secretary of State, June 30, 1922, N.A. In April, 1921, Lodge, in commenting on a proposal that the United States appropriate money to help establish Armenia, wrote that it "is very unlikely that Congress will at present and before our financial difficulties are in some degree met, undertake to lend more money to establish any government anywhere." Ibid., 860J.01/498, Lodge to Secretary of State, Apr. 25, 1921, N.A.

38. Ibid., 860J.48/127, Memorandum from Dulles to Secretary of State, July 20, 1922, N.A.

to take action on behalf of the Armenians at the Paris Conference in the spring and at Lausanne in the fall. Walter G. Smith was among the first to advocate that the United States participate in the negotiations for, and signing of, any eventual peace treaty with Turkey so that American influence could be used to protect United States' interests and the interests of the Armenian people.³⁹

In addition to the organizations specifically created to aid the cause of the Armenians, such as A.C.I.A. and Armenia-America, the churches of the United States also played a major role in applying pressure on the Department of State to secure favorable action on behalf of the persecuted peoples of the Near East. In December, 1921, the Executive Committee of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America urged member churches to "exert every possible influence to secure immediate active measures by our Government for the protection of Christians under Turkish rule." In August of the following year, the same organization issued a press release demanding "action" to save the Armenian "ally" of the United States. Reported atrocities in Turkish Armenia, according to this release, could be halted by a word from Washington.⁴⁰ Later in the year, the General Secretary of the Church Peace Union, an organization of Christians and Jews, denounced the "weak and faulty" policy of the American Government in the Near East.⁴¹

39. *Ibid.*, 860J.01/477, Vickrey and Montgomery to Secretary of State, Nov. 10, 1921; 860J.01/486, Montgomery to President Harding, Jan. 28, 1922; 767.68/393, Montgomery to Secretary of State, Sep. 29, 1922; and 711.67119/2, Smith and Montgomery to President Harding, Feb. 11, 1922, N.A.

40. *Ibid.*, 860J.4016/130, Copy of Resolution adopted that day, Dec. 16, 1921; and 867.4016/635, Copy of Press Release of Aug. 30, 1922, N.A.

41. *Ibid.*, 867.4016/787, Henry Atkinson to Secretary of State, Dec. 11, 1922, N.A.

Among the religious leaders of American life no one was more outspoken in denouncing United States policy relative to Turkey than Bishop James Cannon of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He openly advocated the use of armed force by the United States to assist Greeks and Armenians in the attainment of their goals in Turkey. Hughes attempted to answer the Bishop in a long letter dated October 2, 1922. In part, it stated:

Keenly alive to every humanitarian interest involved, this Government has not failed in any way to make the sentiment of the American people understood and to take every appropriate action. It is hardly necessary to add that we have taken proper measures for the protection of American interests.

As you are probably aware, the Executive has no authority to go beyond this and there has been no action by Congress which would justify this Government in an attempt by armed forces to pacify the Near East or to engage in acts of war in order to accomplish the results you desire with respect to the inhabitants of that territory and to determine the problems which have vexed Europe for generations.⁴²

President Harding was shocked at Cannon's suggestion. In commenting on the suggestion, he stated that it was "unthinkable" to send armed forces to the Near East and he warned that there would be "open rebellion in this country" if such an operation were attempted.⁴³

Finally, in addition to the petition from large organizations, whose representatives were constantly bombarding the State Department with requests and suggestions for aiding the Armenians, there were many letters from individual citizens. Some Americans wrote to their representatives in Congress and a great number of these letters were transferred to the Department of State for answer. Many of these letters contained suggestions for action

42. Quoted in: Ibid, 767.68/607, Dulles to Rev. E. S. Beebe, Mar. 5, 1924, N.A.

43. Ibid., 867.4016/607, Harding to Secretary of State, July 24, 1922, N.A.

by the United States which indicated vividly the "internationalism" of⁴⁴ at least part of the American population in 1921 - 1922. Few figures are readily available on the size of this avalanche of mail which descended on the Near Eastern Affairs Division of the State Department, but one memorandum does exist which states that in the period from November 1 to 17, 1922, nearly 1,500 letters relative to the Armenian situation were⁴⁵ received.

Among the more interesting letters from private citizens was one from Charles Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard and a leading figure in the Republican Party. In this letter, Eliot suggested to Secretary Hughes that the so-called "mandate" of the election of 1920 had been modified by subsequent events to the point where American influence should now be actively used in the struggle of the Armenians and Greeks against the Turks. Hughes replied that he felt that there was no substantial support for any⁴⁶ policy involving active American intervention in the Near East. —

The opinion of the officials of the State Department was influenced in regard to the Near East settlement by the reports from the field, and, as during the period from mid-1919 to the end of 1920, so during this phase of the Armenian problem, the majority of these reports were filed by the American High Commissioner in Constantinople. Admiral Bristol maintained the same attitude toward the settlement that he had developed in 1919, i.e.,

44. For example, a Mr. Brown of Wichita Falls, Texas, wrote to the State Department advocating the immigration into America of 500,000 Armenians from the Near East. He offered land upon which some families could settle. Ibid., 860J.48/74, Brown to Secretary of State, Jan. 24, 1921, N.A.

45. Ibid., 867.4016/926, Memorandum from Dulles to a Miss Hanna, Nov. 17, 1922, N.A.

46. Ibid., 867.4016/584, Eliot to Secretary of State, July 20, 1922, and the reply from Hughes to Charles Eliot, Aug. 10, 1922, N.A. Eliot ventured

protection of American interests, aloofness from association with his Allied colleagues, and neutrality, verging on Turco-philism, in the controversy between Kemal and the Greeks and Armenians.

In the protection of American interests in Turkey, Bristol was particularly alert in the latter part of 1922, at the time when the Turks overran the Greek positions near Smyrna and burned the city, and also after the Convention of Mudania, when the Allies and Turks were preparing for Lausanne. No American lives were lost at Smyrna, thanks in no small measure to the High Commissioner's actions. Before the convening of the delegates at Lausanne, Bristol warned the Department of the importance of immediately formulating the nature and extent of American interests in the Near East settlement and the necessity of participating at Lausanne in order to protect American pre-war rights. However, Admiral Bristol strongly urged the State Department not to identify the position of the United States with that of the Christian minorities in Turkey as such action would make American diplomatic negotiations with the Turks extremely difficult.⁴⁷

In the summer of 1921, the British High Commissioner suggested a joint protest to Kemal by the American and British representatives at Constantinople against alleged massacres of Christians in Turkey. Bristol requested instructions from Washington but advised against the action as it would lead to Turkish suspicion of American motives if he acted in conjunction with the Allies. Hughes was convinced by Bristol's argument and instructed the

beyond this with a suggestion in World's Work in February, 1923, in which he advocated the acceptance by the United States of a mandate for Armenia, Anatolia, and Constantinople; see: Ibid., 867.4016/926 for a copy of this article.

47. Foreign Relations Papers, 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 880-1.

American High Commissioner to use his influence at Angora to prevent atrocities but to avoid direct association with Allied action toward the
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Nationalists.

Admiral Bristol, in his reports on the Armenian problem, continued to stress its humanitarian aspect but demonstrated little or no regard for Armenian political aspirations. When the French evacuated Cilicia, Bristol urged the Armenians to remain in that area and live in peace with the Turks. Shortly before the Convention of Mudania, when the Turkish nationalists were threatening to move on the Straits area, Bristol was actively trying to secure official permission in Washington for the immediate immigration of 5,000 Armenian orphans living in Constantinople. During this same period of time, Bristol attempted to use his known influence in Angora to secure the elimination, or at least the mitigation, of the Nationalist program
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to force all Christians to leave Turkey. Perhaps Bristol's position on the Armenians problem was best summed up in a despatch to Hughes in which he discussed his attempt to influence the conduct of Americans in Turkey. He wrote that the Americans should "realize that partiality for the Christian races is an injury to those races so long as the necessary military and naval forces are not supplied to conquer the Moslems and protect the
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Christian races.

48. Decimal File, 860J.4016/80, Hughes to U. S. High Commissioner, Aug. 31, 1921, N.A.

49. Ibid., 860J.4016/103, Bristol to Secretary of State, Nov. 28, 1921; 860J.48/132, Bristol to Secretary of State, Oct. 11, 1922; and 860J.48/132, Hughes to U. S. High Commissioner, Oct. 13, 1922, N.A. Bristol's efforts on behalf of the Armenians are described in: Ibid., 867.4016/730, 732, and 741, N.A.

50. Ibid., 860J.4016/125, Bristol to Secretary of State, Dec. 21, 1921, N.A.

Naturally, there were attempts in the United States to have Admiral Bristol replaced by a man more in sympathy with the designs of the pro-Armenian organizations. On one occasion, Montgomery requested Bristol's replacement by someone from the United States "who is more in touch with American opinion."⁵¹ Allan Dulles, Chief of the Near Eastern Affairs Division of the State Department, in a memorandum to the Secretary, commented on this effort to remove Bristol. According to Dulles, the opposition to the High Commissioner was based on three assumptions: (1) that he was pro-Turk, (2) that he was not sympathetic to the aspirations of the Christian minorities, and (3) that he was more interested in business than philanthropic interests in the Near East. Dulles noted, however, that Bristol enjoyed the support of most representatives of business and missionary organizations in Turkey, in particular, those representatives who had⁵² "accepted" the post-war world.

This last statement appears to have foundation in fact. As an example, two of the foremost members of the American Board were W. W. Peet and Dr. Caleb F. Gates. Peet, who spent the post-war years in the United States, denounced Bristol, while Gates, who was President of Robert College, strongly⁵³ backed him. One of the American delegates to the Lausanne Conference wrote of Bristol that he was a capable American diplomat but he also admitted⁵⁴ that the Admiral was "very pro-Turk."

51. Ibid., 123B773/31, Montgomery to Secretary of State, Jan. 6, 1922, N.A. See also: Ibid., 860J.01/464, Montgomery to Secretary of State, Aug. 25, 1921, N.A.

52. Ibid., 867.4016/596, Memorandum from Dulles to Secretary of State, dated June 15, 1922, N.A.

53. See: Ibid., 123B773/31, Montgomery to Secretary of State, Jan. 6, 1922, in which Peet is quoted; and 867.4016/701, Bristol to Secretary of State, Oct. 4, 1922, which encloses a letter from Gates, N.A.

54. Joseph C. Crew, Turbulent Era, A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, (2 Vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), Vol. 1, p. 539.

Before turning to the Lausanne Conference, it is desirable to recount briefly the reaction of the American Government to another suggestion for United States participation in an international endeavor. On May 15, 1922, Sir Auckland Geddes, the British Ambassador in Washington, proposed on behalf of his government, that the United States join with Great Britain, France, and Italy in sending representatives to Turkey to investigate and seek information relative to reported atrocities against Greeks and Armenians in Asia Minor. Geddes assumed that the investigative team would be permitted to travel through the area under Nationalist control, as, otherwise, the British Government was prepared to revise its attitude toward the peace proposals for Turkey.

Despite Bristol's opposition to the proposed mission, the Secretary of State on June 3rd announced that the United States was prepared to send representatives to join the international fact-finding group in view of the humanitarian considerations and the desire of the American Government for adequate information on the situation. Hughes warned, however, that the American action was limited to the inquiry and that the Government of the United States assumed no further obligation or commitment. Within a few days, President Harding named his representatives to the international commission. However, friction between the Allies subsequently resulted in the cancellation of the inter-Allied project and the eventual assumption of the task by the International Red Cross.

55. Decimal File, 867.4016/459, Geddes to Secretary of State, May 15, 1922, N.A.

56. See: Ibid., 860J.4016/150, Copy of Press Release of June 3, 1922; 860J.4016/543a, Hughes to American Ambassador, London, June 16, 1922; 867.4016/569, Bristol to Secretary of State, July 7, 1922; and 867.4016/590a, Copy of Press Release of July 27, 1922, N.A.

The reluctant attitude of the President toward American participation in the inquiry was demonstrated in a letter to Hughes, dated May 20, 1922, in which the President admitted that he would hesitate to hold aloof "from a participation which makes such a strong appeal to a very large portion of our American citizenship." Nevertheless, he warned that he could not escape the feeling that the American Government would be "utterly helpless" to do anything effective in case the investigation substantiated the statements concerning atrocities. As no armed forces could possibly be sent to the Near East from the United States, Harding wondered if this "manifestation of our impotence would not be more humiliating than our non-participation is distressing." In concluding his letter to Hughes, the President stated that he was conscious of "a highly sentimental and very earnest sympathy" among Americans for the unfortunate Armenians but he expressed doubt that that sympathy "would assert itself in a positive maintenance if we were called upon to participate in a drastic action to cure conditions there."⁵⁷

In reply, Hughes emphasized the purely investigative function of the mission and attempted to prove that the results of American intervention in this case would probably be more desirable than the results of non-participation. As noted above, Harding acquiesced in the sending of American representatives to join in the investigation, but he apparently was never fully convinced of the desirability of this action. When the British announced in July that the investigation had been turned over to

57. Ibid., 867.4016/498, Harding to Secretary of State, May 20, 1922; and reply from Hughes to President Harding, May 22, 1922, N.A.

the International Red Cross, Harding, obviously relieved, wrote to Hughes that the new turn of events was "altogether a more acceptable proposition."⁵⁸

On the 27th of October 1922, the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy announced the convening of a conference on Near Eastern affairs to be held at the Swiss resort city of Lausanne and at the same time formally invited the United States to send representatives to participate in the discussions. Recalling that an American observer took part in the San Remo Conference of 1920, the inviting Allied Powers requested that the United States representative at Lausanne participate "in a similar capacity or in a more active capacity, especially in the discussion upon the question of the Straits." On November 14th, Secretary of State Hughes sent a memorandum to the Allied ambassadors in Washington in which it was announced that the United States would accept the invitation to send representatives to Lausanne.⁵⁹

The American Delegation to the Lausanne Conference was led by the Ambassador to Italy, Richard Washburn Child, the American Minister to Switzerland, Joseph Clark Grew, and Admiral Mark L. Bristol. These principal observers were assisted by a staff of experts on the Near East which included the Assistant Chief of the Near Eastern Division at the Department of State, Harry G. Dwight.⁶⁰ In addition to the official American Delegation,

58. Ibid., 867.4016/586, Harding to Secretary of State, July 21, 1922, N.A.

59. Foreign Relations Papers, 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 889, 897.

60. See: Richard W. Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, (New York: Duffield and Co., 1925), p. 82.

there were several prominent Americans who attended as unofficial observers or experts. The Armenia-America Society sent James L. Barton, George R. Montgomery, and W. W. Peet. Bristol requested the presence of President Gates of Robert College and the latter attended as an advisor to the American High Commissioner. The differences in approach to the Near Eastern settlement by Peet and Gates, both in Turkey under the auspices of the American Board for many years, were demonstrated in two books they wrote in subsequent years. Peet in 1922 stated that "not only were we [the American Board] unwilling to surrender any rights which we had before the war, but there were other rights which had been withheld from us during that period which we would like now to have conceded." Gates, commenting on his position toward the Turkish settlement, later wrote "...I felt that we must understand the language of accomplished fact."⁶¹

The State Department issued an Aide Memoire on October 30th which outlined the American position at the forthcoming conference. In it the proposition was stated that as the United States was neither at war with Turkey nor a party to the Armistice of 1918 it did not desire to participate in the final peace negotiations or "to assume responsibility for the political and territorial adjustments which may be effected." Nevertheless, the United States did not desire to give the impression that it would relinquish any of its rights for commercial or humanitarian pursuits and, in the

61. Louise J. Peet, ed., No Less Honor, (Chattanooga: Privately Printed, 1939), p. 192; and Caleb F. Gates, Not To Me Only, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), pp. 287-9.

interest of ensuring the continuance of these rights on a par with those enjoyed by other states, the American observers had been despatched to Lausanne. The Aide Memoire listed seven subjects of particular American concern. These included the maintenance of capitulations, the protection of philanthropic, educational, and religious institutions, equal commercial opportunity, indemnity for losses suffered by Americans in Turkey, assurances touching on the freedom of the Straits, opportunity for archeological⁶² research, and suitable provisions for the protection of minorities.

In a confidential report to the American ambassadors in the major European capitals, issued simultaneously with the appearance of the Aide Memoire, the Secretary of State noted that American public opinion "demands" that the United States exert its influence for the protection of minorities, difficult as this task might be. Hughes suggested that the Armenians of Turkey might achieve their best chances for security and a pleasant future by living in the Russian Caucasus if and when conditions in Russia became more stable. In this same report further mention was made of throwing "the full weight" of American influence to obtain assurances for the protection⁶³ of minorities. This, apparently, did not go beyond the protection of minorities in Turkey, for the State Department declined, when requested by an Armenian proponent in the United States to use its good offices to⁶⁴ ensure Armenian representation at the Lausanne Conference.

62. Foreign Relations Papers, 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 884-5.

63. Ibid., pp. 886-8.

64. Decimal File, 767.68119/98, Under Secretary Phillips to M. Vartan Malcom, Nov. 8, 1922, N.A.

The first phase of the Lausanne Conference lasted from November 20, 1922 to February 4, 1923. The work of the Conference was divided among three commissions and several sub-commissions. The First Commission on Territorial and Military Questions was presided over by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon. The Fourth Sub-Commission of this Commission, under the chairmanship of Giulio C. Montagna, Italian Minister to Greece, was delegated responsibility for discussing and making recommendations relative to the protection of minorities.⁶⁵ In this Commission and its Sub-Commission the future of the Armenians in Turkey was debated.

Child and Grew lost no time in making informal contact with the members of the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne. In a conversation between the two Americans and two members of the delegation from Angora on November 22nd, the Turks spoke frankly about the many topics on the agenda for the conference. The Turks were adamantly opposed to the proposal for an Armenian National Home. According to them, public opinion in Turkey and the expressed sentiment of the Grand National Assembly on this subject made any refuge granted out of Turkish soil "absolutely impossible." They compared the presence of Greeks and Armenians in the Turkish state with an open wound, "not only painful in itself but inviting infection from foreign contacts." However, appreciating the feeling in the United States on this subject, the Turkish negotiators were prepared to grant the strongest possible guarantees for the protection of the minorities provided provisions were made in

65. For the organization and proceedings of the Conference, see: Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923, Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, Turkey No. 1 (1923), Cmd. 1814, (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1923). American participation in the conference is recorded in Foreign Relations Papers, 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 879-1252.

the peace treaty for the gradual reduction of these minority races by
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emigration from Turkey.

The American representatives passed a report of this conversation back to the Secretary of State and questioned how far they should go in initiating projects for concessions to the Armenians in the light of the bitter opposition of the Turks to any territorial diminution to provide refuge zones for any minorities. Child and Grew warned of the unpleasant results accruing to the United States if they initiated projects which failed to be accepted or which incurred the ill will of the Turkish Government.
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In his reply, Secretary Hughes expressed the deep interest of the American Government in the fate of the Christian minorities and the desire of his government to assist "in any practicable way" the securing of proper consideration for their future. The Secretary emphasized the desire of the American Government to secure an end of forced evacuation of Turkey by the Christian minorities during the severe winter weather ahead. On the subject of the Armenian National Home, Hughes wrote:

As regards the Armenian national home. Department is in accord with your view that the Turks would not be disposed to give up any territory for a national home, and Department believes that even if territory in Cilicia or bordering on the Caucasus could be wrung from Turkey it would afford no safe refuge for the Armenians. Department has considered the possibility that Turkish Armenians could later join Russian Armenians in Caucasus but it is realized that economic conditions render this impossible now. For the present if any constructive plan is possible it would seem preferable to endeavor to find an area where the Armenians would be entirely protected from Turkey by natural barriers, such, for example, as the Islands of the Aegean or Cyprus.
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66. Decimal File, 767.68119/174, American Mission to Secretary of State, Nov. 22, 1922, N.A.

67. Ibid., 767.68119/178, American Mission to Secretary of State, Nov. 22, 1922, N.A.

68. Ibid., 767.68119/178, Hughes to American Missions, Nov. 24, 1922, N.A.

On November 23rd, Ambassador Child had a long conversation with Lord Curzon during which the British diplomat informed Child that the French and Italians would not support with any zeal the proposed national home for the Armenians. According to Grew, Curzon stated at that time that his government was prepared to support, or was even willing to propose to the conference, the American position on the Armenian problem.⁶⁹

The minorities question was faced directly by the First Commission of the Conference on December 12, 1922. Lord Curzon introduced the subject and his speech was followed by somewhat similar statements by members of the other Allied Delegations and by Child. Curzon stated that the Armenians of Turkey deserved "special consideration" due to the suffering that they, as an ethnic group, had undergone and due to the pledges made to the Armenians by the Allies during and following the war. He expressed the hope of the British Government that the Turkish Government would permit the repatriation of the Armenians who had fled to neighboring countries in the Near East. As for the Armenian National Home, Curzon noted that the Soviet Republic of Armenia was over-populated and many Armenians did not approve of the government of that state, which gave new impetus for the creation of a national home. The British Foreign Secretary admitted that circumstances made the fulfillment of the demand for a national home "more difficult than it once was" but he expressed his interest in hearing the views of the Turkish delegates on the subject.⁷⁰

The speech delivered on the same day by American Delegate Child was a fairly accurate review of the Armenian problem as it had evolved from the

69. Reported in Grew, Turbulent Era, Vol. 1, p. 496.

70. Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, pp. 178-9.

war, was heavily embellished with dramatic and figurative phrases, and contained few specific recommendations for future action. He began by citing the desire of the United States to hold aloof from affairs not her own, but emphasized that humanitarian interest was an American right and duty. He described the relief effort put forth by the American people in the Near East over the years and particularly since 1915. Turning to the Armenians, Child recounted the broken promises of the Allies and the unfulfilled resolutions of the Supreme Council and the League of Nations. On behalf of the people of the United States, Child expressed the hope:

...that this Conference will never leave Lausanne without providing some means for permanent joint labors to find refuge for unprotected hordes and to create if possible safe territorial refuges for special populations if it be determined that they require separation from other nationalities, religions or races. Above all this Conference should secure by agreement and by measures of humanitarian administration strong guarantees that safety shall attend the continuance in their present situation of populations which now are vexed by fears.⁷¹

In a cable to Hughes, Child explained why he had made no suggestion for definite action, claiming that the British or French would use any such suggestion by him "to charge us with responsibility for course of any negotiations in pursuance thereof." He also indicated that the statement had been made, not so much to assist the minorities in Turkey, as to counter the obviously strong appeal to the people of the United States which the speech by Curzon would have created. This rather odd fear of the affect of Curzon's speeches on the American public was noticeable in Child's behavior more

71. Ibid., pp. 185-7.

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than once during the First Phase of the Lausanne Conference. Hughes replied on December 14th, granting his full approval to the statement by Child and adding: "No question is of more immediate concern to the American people than that of the minorities and Department is glad to have you use your full influence for its satisfactory solution."

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The reply to the speeches of the Allied and American representatives was delivered by Ismet Pasha, Senior Turkish Delegate to the Peace Conference. He reviewed the history of the growth of ill-will between the minorities and the Turks and, according to him, this developing hatred was directly attributable to the interference by other powers in Turkish affairs and the encouragement given by representatives of these Powers to the Greeks and Armenians, particularly the latter, to create independent states. Ismet did not discuss in detail the return of the refugees but spoke of the friendly relations now existing between Turkey and the Armenian Soviet Republic. As for the relatively few Armenians still living in Turkey, Ismet concluded that "they must already have recognized the unavoidable necessity of living as good citizens." In his opinion, the best guarantees for these minorities were supplied by (1) the laws of the Turkish Republic, and (2) the liberal policy of the new Turkey. On the subject of the Armenian National Home, Ismet was adamant. In the opinion of the Turkish Delegate, this was nothing more than a fresh attempt to dismember Turkey and such schemes were both

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"illegitimate and impossible."

72. Decimal File, 767.68119 T&M/14, American Mission to Secretary of State, Dec. 13, 1922, N.A. See also: 767.68119 T&M 3/9, American Mission to Secretary of State, Jan. 1, 1923, N.A.

73. Ibid., 767.68119 T&M/16, Hughes to American Mission, Dec. 14, 1922, N.A.

74. Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, pp. 197-204, 208-9.

Reaction of the American Delegation is given in: Decimal File, 767.68119 T&M/17, American Mission to Secretary of State, Dec. 13, 1922, N.A.

Curzon in replying to Ismet, expressed regret at the Turk's uncompromising stand on the minorities issue. He threatened that the conference might break up on this question and warned that the minorities problem excited more attention throughout the world than any other being dealt

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with at Lausanne. Ismet apparently had a change of heart after this speech by the British Delegate, and on December 14th, stated that Turkey would be prepared to join the League of Nations following the conclusion of peace. This would automatically place the minorities question under the cognizance of that international body and was a partial answer to a previous request of the Allies that the League be given jurisdiction over this problem. As for the Armenian Home, however, Ismet was as unmovable
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as ever. By the 14th of December, it was obvious that the Turks were not prepared to bargain or compromise in any way regarding the territorial integrity of their nation.

Following the exchange of views on the minorities problem between the Western Powers and Turkey in the First Commission, the issue was turned over for further discussion to the Sub-Commission on Minorities under the chairmanship of G. C. Montagna. The American observer at the seventeen meetings of this sub-commission was H. G. Dwight of the Near East Division of the Department of State. The Turkish representative on the sub-commission was Riza Nour Bey, one of the most un-compromising nationalists in the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne.

75. Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, pp. 212-5.

76. Ibid., p. 219.

At the second meeting of the sub-commission on December 15th, Montagna listed ten topics for the agenda, including such issues as amnesty, military service, political equality, freedom of movement, etc. The tenth item listed was the Armenian National Home and on this item alone, the Turkish representative refused, not only its inclusion on the agenda, but even its discussion.⁷⁷ The adamant refusal by the Turks to discuss the possibility of an Armenian Home temporarily terminated further Allied efforts in its behalf and on December 21st, the American Delegation reported to Washington that in the Allied proposals on the minorities recently presented to the Sub-Commission, no reference appeared relative to that topic.⁷⁸ The Allied representatives appeared satisfied with securing Turkish acceptance of the legal safeguards for minorities provided under the aegis of the League of Nations.

On the 26th of December, the unofficial Armenian representatives at Lausanne, those who had arrived at the beginning of the Conference from Paris, were allowed to present their case before the sub-commission by the inviting powers. The Turkish representatives not only refused to attend the meeting on that date but also succeeded in preventing the keeping of an official record of the proposals presented by the Armenians to the Allied representatives. According to the representatives from Angora, the presentation of the Armenian case was wholly illegal as the Armenians present at Lausanne represented no government in existence anywhere in the

77. Decimal File, 767.68119 T&M 3/1, American Mission to Secretary of State, Dec. 15, 1922, N.A.

78. Ibid., 767.68119/321, American Mission to Secretary of State, Dec. 21, 1922, N.A.

world and, furthermore, the Turkish nation had established diplomatic relations with a Soviet Armenian Government in Erivan. The actual presentation of the Armenian case by Noradoughian before the sub-commission was both reserved in manner and mild in demand. The Armenian representative asked only for the creation of an area in Turkey where the Armenians could gather and which would exist governmentally in relation to Turkey as the dominions in the British Empire were in relation to the government in London.⁷⁹

On December 29th, the American observer at the meetings of the sub-commission on minorities presented a statement on the status of the multitudes of refugees who had fled from Turkey during and following the war. Dwight called attention to the fact that the provisions for an amnesty that had been agreed to by the delegations did not mention the refugees or deportees and did not provide for their return to their homes or their regaining of the property they had been forced to leave behind. The American observer concluded his remarks by suggesting that the Turkish Government voluntarily make a statement which would provide a solution to the unfortunate situation of the refugees.⁸⁰ The Turkish Delegate did not reply to the suggestion.

The American Mission to Lausanne took a surprisingly strong stand on the subject of the Armenian National Home at one of the last meetings of the sub-commission. On December 28th, the American Mission warned the

79. See: Ibid., 767.68119 T&M 3/7, American Mission to Secretary of State, Dec. 30, 1922; and The New York Times, Dec. 27, 1922.

80. Decimal File, 767.68119 T&M 3/6, American Mission to Secretary of State, Dec. 29, 1922, N.A.

Department that it had become evident that the Allies would use the question of the home only "for trading purposes" but would be delighted to have the United States become involved in pressing it so that "we might appear to be entering into political and territorial settlements." ⁸¹ Two days later, however, the American observer on the sub-commission read a statement which favored the creation of a National Home and which included an unofficial plan outlining in detail the steps for the creation and organization of such a home. That same day the American Mission gave out a press release describing this action and further defining the American position.

The statement presented before the sub-commission was an introduction to an attached detailed plan for the creation of an Armenian Home in which it was stated that the plan for an autonomous area for the Armenians had "engaged the deep and sympathetic interest of large bodies of citizens in the United States." It was also noted by Mr. Dwight that the Allies as well had often shown an interest in the desirability from a humanitarian view ⁸² of creating such a homeland for the Armenians. The press release was as follows:

The American delegation, though not negotiating a peace treaty nor submitting definite plans for adjustments to which the United States Government cannot become a signatory, has stated to the conference its full approval of the demands of Lord Curzon and the other allied statesmen for any practicable plan for a national Armenian home and for the acceptance of such a plan. The American delegation has sought and obtained the views of those who represent the movement in the United States for a national Armenian home, and who

81. Ibid., 878.4016/321, American Mission to Secretary of State, Dec. 28, 1922, N.A.

82. Ibid., 767.68119 T&M 3/8, American Mission to Secretary of State, Dec. 30, 1922, N.A.

may be considered representative experts upon the subject, and has laid these views before the conference today. In addition to this and on behalf of the Armenians and Americans interested, we have given assurance that the case for a national Armenian home shall be put before the conference and have a hearing.

We have contributed and will continue to contribute to the insistence that Turkey shall give consideration to any practicable, concrete plan which may be put forward.⁸³

The reasons for issuing the statement and press release would appear to be two-fold, the pressure exerted on the American Delegation by the pro-Armenian private American groups at Lausanne and Child's recurring fear that Curzon would outmaneuver him. The activity of the private groups at Lausanne has been mentioned before and was described in American newspapers at the time.⁸⁴ The two enclosures which were presented at the time of the speech on December 30th were drawn up by James L. Barton, George Montgomery, and W. W. Peet, all members of the Armenia-America Society. Child, in his book, quotes from his diary under date of December 29, 1922: "It is evident that the 'Church element', as it is called, has been pressing upon the Department of State to demand from the Turks a National Armenian Home." However, he refers to any plan for such a national home as both "futile" and "lacking in sense."⁸⁵

If, as is indicated by Child's book, the ranking member of the American Delegation considered the proposal for an Armenian Home "futile" and "lacking in sense" in late December 1922, there must have been at least one other reason besides the desires of the "Church element" which prompted

83. The New York Times, Dec. 31, 1922.

84. See: Ibid., Dec. 8, 1922, for report on activities of Montgomery.

85. Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, pp. 115-6.

him to put the statement before the sub-commission and issue the press release. That reason is found in his despatch to Hughes, dated January 1, 1923, in which he describes and defends the action of the American observers on the 30th. Referring to the fact that the meetings of the sub-commission were drawing to a close, Child wrote:

...we believe it unwise to delay giving such satisfaction as the instructions indicated could be accorded to American public opinion interested in the Armenians. This was particularly urgent because we received indications that Curzon might at any moment put forth a display on this subject intended to appeal to American public opinion in contrast to our silence.⁸⁶

In the same despatch, the American delegate again stressed the fact that there was little hope for any practical settlement of the question of an Armenian National Home, thus indicating more fully the fact that the statement was issued primarily for domestic consumption in the United States. Child assured Hughes that the American Delegation had no intention of taking any initiative or committing itself in advance to any concrete program which did not have the support of the Allies. The New York Times commented tartly on this "side-line diplomacy" whereby a delegation, "which in advance had divested itself of all responsibility for the political and territorial settlements," was now giving advice on the establishment of
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a new nation.

The reaction of the Turkish Delegation and Government to the American statements of December 28 and 30, 1922 was rapid and bitter. At Lausanne, Riza Nour Bey granted an interview to the press in which he denounced

86. Decimal File, 767.68119 T&M 3/9, American Mission to Secretary of State, Jan. 1, 1923, N.A.

87. The New York Times, Dec. 31, 1922.

American missionaries operating in Turkey as trouble-makers and threatened their expulsion if the United States continued to press the Armenian claims. In Turkey, the Grand National Assembly placed all negotiations between American business firms and the Turkish Government in abeyance until further notice. The press in Turkey started a violent campaign against the United States and American participation at Lausanne. ⁸⁸ From Washington, Hughes cabled to the American Delegation: "You of course appreciate that your continued support of measures to aid the suffering peoples of the Near East ⁸⁹ will in no way be affected by Turkish threats."

Meanwhile, at Lausanne, the proposal for an Armenian National Home was not quite dead. At the sub-commission meeting of January 6, 1923, the representatives of the three major Allied powers read statements favoring the establishment of such a home. After listening to the first of these speeches, Riza Nour Bey walked out and refused to return until after the final speech had been completed. ⁹⁰ On the 9th of January, the sub-commission presented its report to the First Commission. It was an almost complete Turkish victory. The brief reference to the Armenians described the refusal of the Turks to accept a proposal by Montagna to create a home, possibly on the Syrian border, where Armenians could congregate and maintain their ethnic unity, language and culture while living under the political

88. Ibid., Jan. 2, 1923; and Decimal File, 767.68119 T&M 3/9, Hughes to American Mission, Jan. 2, 1923; and 767.68119/421, F. R. Dolbeare (Acting U. S. High Commissioner) to Secretary of State, Jan. 17, 1923, N.A.

89. Decimal File, 767.68119 T&M 3/9, Hughes to American Mission, Jan. 2, 1923, N.A. This statement is important in the light of charges leveled at the administration by its critics after the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference; see Edward H. Bierstadt, The Great Betrayal, (New York: Robert M. McBride and Co., 1924) as an example of the attack against American "trading" of Armenian "rights" for oil.

90. Decimal File, 767.68119 T&M 3/14, American Mission to Secretary of State, Jan. 6, 1923, N.A.

administration of a Governor-General appointed by the Turkish Government.

Back in the United States, the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, which had once denounced the plan for an Armenian National Home in the most violent terms, now advocated such a solution to the problem of settling one million Armenian refugees in the Near East. The A.C.I.A. made one further concession to the changing times. Unlike their previous strong advocacy of an Armenian state in the north-eastern part of Turkey, the A.C.I.A. now accepted Cilicia as the most logical site for a future Armenian Home. The members of this organization continued however to insist on a home free from Turkish suzerainty, advocating instead that a mandatory, to be chosen by the League of Nations, be asked to assume the task of
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rehabilitating and governing the proposed Armenian homeland.

In Washington one last attempt to assist the Armenians in the securing of a national home was debated. This attempt grew out of a conversation between the Chief of the Near East Division of the Department of State, Allan W. Dulles, and Vartan Malcom, representative in the United States of the Armenian National Delegation in Paris. Malcom suggested that strong pressure be applied on the Turkish Government to force it to grant to the Armenians the desired area in Cilicia. While looking at the map of the area, Dulles concluded that possibly an Armenian home could be carved out of a part of Turkey and a larger part of the Syrian mandate administered by France. Malcom had stated that the Swiss Government would probably accept

91. Given in its entirety in: Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, pp. 301-13.

92. See: The New York Times, Jan. 7, 1923, and Jan. 12, 1923; and Decimal File, 860J.01/562, Gerard to Harding, Jan. 10, 1923, N.A. For highly critical comments on the accuracy of the statements and quotations contained in the text of the A.C.I.A. resolution of Jan. 6th, see Decimal File, 867.4016/816, Memorandum from Dulles to Secretary of State, dated Jan. 12, 1923, N.A.

a mandate for the area and Dulles suggested this to Hughes. In addition Malcom told Dulles that he was convinced that the Turkish Delegation was split on the issue of an Armenian home, with Ismet Pasha favoring such a plan.
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Hughes immediately sent a despatch to Lausanne requesting the members of the American Delegation to informally approach the Turks, convince them of the desirability of the plan for an Armenian homeland and the beneficial effect on Turkish-American relations of a Turkish voluntary grant of land for the project, and sound out the French on their position relative to the Dulles' proposal. The reply from Child and Grew dashed all hope for this plan. According to their report, not only was there "no subject upon which the Turkish Delegation is more fixed in obstinacy," but even the chief Allied representatives had privately expressed their opposition to the creation of any new segregative areas. As for the rumor that Ismet favored the plan for an Armenian homeland or that there was any division of opinion in the Turkish delegation, the Americans were of the belief that no truth could be attached to such a report.
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Dulles, in commenting on the information received from Lausanne gloomily concluded: "I do not know that there is anything further we can do regarding the Armenian National

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Home."

Hughes informed the Chief Executive of his recent exchange with the

93. Report on conversation given in Decimal File, 767.68119 T&M 3/15, Memorandum from Dulles to Secretary of State, dated Jan. 4, 1923, N.A.

94. Ibid., 767.68119 T&M 3/16, Hughes to American Mission, 6 Jan. 1923; and American Mission to Secretary of State, Jan. 7, 1923, N.A.

95. Ibid., 767.68119. T&M 3/16, Memorandum from Dulles to Secretary of State, dated Jan. 9, 1923, N.A.

American Mission in Lausanne. In reply, the President commented that the failure to create an Armenian home would be a "keen disappointment" to the religious people in the United States but he could not see how his administration could do more than "strongly appeal on their [the Armenians'] behalf." According to Harding, the most ardent supporters of the Armenians in the United States "would hesitate to sanction armed warfare in order to establish a separate territory for the Armenians."⁹⁶ The President was undoubtedly correct.

If the question of the future of the Armenians had been the only problem to be faced at Lausanne, the conference could have been concluded at an early date and a treaty signed. Other problems, however, proved equally thorny and on some of these issues neither the Allies nor the Turks were willing to compromise to the extent necessary for agreement. On the 4th of February negotiations for a peace treaty collapsed over the problem raised by discussion of the special jurisdiction previously enjoyed by foreigners in the Ottoman Empire and economic concessions previously granted in Turkey.

An American diplomat at Angora, commenting on the attitude of the Turks toward the Western nations following the collapse of the negotiations at Lausanne, noted in mid-February that the Turkish population, though resenting American representations at Lausanne on behalf of the Armenians, approved strongly of the American statements relative to the Open Door, treaty settlement of the Straits Question, and the compromising attitude of the Americans on the question of capitulations. This American, in

96. Ibid., 867.4016/817, Harding to Secretary of State, Jan. 15, 1923, N.A.

summing up the position of the United States in Turkey on February 15, 1923, concluded that the United States was better liked by the Turkish people and government than any other Western nation.

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In line with this high regard for the United States and Americans, the Turkish Government on April 10, 1923 gave approval to the so-called Chester Convention. The Chester project was a complicated commercial maneuver involving several prominent Americans and at least one Canadian in an enterprise which planned to build a costly railroad across eastern Anatolia in exchange for permission to exploit the mineral resources found within a specified distance from the path of the rail line. The negotiations of the Chester Convention or Concession make a fascinating story in themselves but it is not desirable to discuss them in detail in this work. Because the American Government was later accused of selling out the Armenian cause in exchange for the granting of the Chester Concession, it is, however, necessary to mention the project. A search of the documents available on the American Government's position in regard to the negotiation of the concession failed to unveil any information indicating that the United States traded Armenian "rights" for anticipated mineral wealth from the Chester Concession. On the contrary, the Secretary of State warned American diplomatic representatives in Turkey repeatedly to treat with "utmost circumspection and reticence" the entire Chester project. Bristol described his doubts about the desirability of the concession and referred in one despatch to his own "guarded attitude" toward the Chester

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97. Foreign Relations Papers, 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 970-1.

98. The documents regarding the Chester Concession in the National Archives are filed as: Decimal File, 867.6020t81. For views of the Secretary of

The Second Phase of the Lausanne Conference began on April 23, 1923 and was concluded on the 24th of the following July. After being virtually ignored by the Allies, possibly because of displeasure at the securing of the Chester Concession, and not even informed as to the date of the reconvening of the conference, the United States Government finally inquired about the plans for reconvening and informed the Secretary General of the conference that the American Government would send observers.⁹⁹ Child and Bristol did not attend this second phase of the conference and thus Joseph C. Grew, Minister to Switzerland, acted in the capacity of chief American observer.

The two issues which had been the cause of the break-down in negotiations in February were, of course, the principal issues for discussion during the following weeks. Finally, these issues settled, the Allies and Turks concluded the definitive Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923. In the minority provisions of the treaty, the Turkish Government undertook to assure the full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of the nation without distinction as to birth, nationality, language, race, or religion. The Turks further agreed to adopt measures permitting the settlement of questions of personal status and domestic relations affecting non-Moslems in accordance with the customs of the latter. Non-Moslems were also guaranteed the same political and civil rights as Moslems. Finally, the stipulations regarding the minorities were to be recognized

State, see especially: Ibid., 867.6020t81/229, Hughes to U. S. High Commissioner, Dec. 7, 1922; and 867.6020t81/264, Hughes to U. S. High Commissioner, Apr. 20, 1923, N.A.

99. See: Foreign Relations Papers, 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 980-6; and Decimal File, 767.68119/537, Memorandum from Dulles to Secretary of State, dated Apr. 4, 1923, N.A.

as a fundamental law of the nation and constituted as an international
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obligation between Turkey and the League of Nations.

The United States did not adhere to the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, but instead negotiated a separate treaty signed on August 6th. There had never been any question regarding the position of the American Delegation on this point and no attempts were made by the Allies or Turks to entice the United States to sign the earlier treaty. The provisions in the Allied-Turkish treaty guaranteeing the security of non-Moslem minorities in Turkey under the League of Nations and the provisions whereby the signatories were obligated to take measures prescribed by the Council of the League in case of attack against the demilitarized zone of the Straits made American adherence impossible.

As early as January 6, 1923, Hughes suggested to his observers at Lausanne the desirability of entering into negotiations with the Turks for a treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and Turkey after
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the conclusion of a Turkish-Allied draft treaty. The collapse of the Allied-Turkish negotiations in February came before these Turco-American pourparlers could be started. Shortly after the beginning of the second phase of the Lausanne Conference, however, Grew was informed by the Secretary of State of his approval for the immediate start of informal discussions with the Turks for the conclusion of a treaty. On May 1st, Grew informed both the Allies and the Turks that he was prepared to enter into

100. Provisions of the Allied-Turkish settlement are given in: Edgar Turlington, "The American Treaty of Lausanne," World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. 7, Nr. 10 (1924), pp. 587-90.

101. Decimal File, 711.672/6, Hughes to American Mission, Jan. 6, 1923, N.A.

negotiations with Turkish representatives leading to a treaty of amity and commerce. On May 5th, Ismet formally proposed to Grew that negotiations commence at once.¹⁰²

Before the signing of the Allied-Turkish Treaty, Grew cabled Hughes that he had been informed that the Allies, shortly before the actual signing of the treaty, were going to make forceful representations to the Turks on behalf of permitting the return to Turkey of the Armenian refugees in the Near East. Hughes, in reply, suggested to the American diplomat at Lausanne that he also make a statement, which would "give expression to the deep interest of our people and Government in helping to find a solution of the refugee problem...." At one of the last sessions of the Lausanne Conference, on July 17th, Grew did speak out on behalf of the Armenian refugees, calling attention to the legitimate right of the American people to exercise an interest in the humanitarian aspects of the refugee problem and asking for justice for these people.¹⁰³

Hughes was also interested in securing some provisions in the proposed Turco-American Treaty relative to the protection of minorities in Turkey, similar to those incorporated in the Allied-Turkish Treaty. Grew's attempts to secure the acceptance by the Turkish delegation of inclusion of such provisions was futile. Ismet pointed out that unlike the Allies, the United States was not a member of the League, was not a party to the Allied treaty, and controlled no lands inhabited by Moslem minorities (or majorities). In addition, the chief Turkish delegate met Grew's reference

102. Foreign Relations Papers, 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 996-9; and Grew, Turbulent Era, Vol. 1, p. 538.

103. Foreign Relations Papers, 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 1015-6, 1019-20; and Decimal File, 860J.48/1744, Memorandum on the refugee situation from Dulles to Secretary of State, dated Feb. 13, 1924, N.A.

to the necessity of placating American public opinion with the blunt statement that Turkish public opinion also merited some consideration.¹⁰⁴ In the treaty signed on August 6th, no mention was made of the Christian minorities in Turkey.

Some of the provisions of the American Treaty of Lausanne did deal with subjects indirectly connected with the Armenian Question and its effect on Turco-American relations. The capitulations, over which so much argument revolved in the days prior and during World War I, were abolished. On the question of naturalization, which had been the subject of so much controversy since the latter part of the 19th Century, particularly where Armenians born in Turkey were concerned, no final agreement was found possible and the method by which a person's nationality was to be determined remained unsolved.

The reaction of the Armenian leaders in Paris to the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference differed as had their reaction to so many events over the preceding five years. Aharonian, on behalf of the Delegation of the Armenian Republic to the Peace Conference, protested to the Allies and to the United States over the peace treaty "concluded as if the Armenians did not exist. It ignores them and passed over them in silence." Once again he cited the contributions of the Armenians to the Allied victory and the many promises made by the leaders of the Allied and Associated Powers. He concluded by describing in detail the current disastrous situation in which one million Armenian refugees found themselves.¹⁰⁵

104. Decimal File, 767.68119P/55a, Hughes to American Mission, June 11, 1923; and 767.68119P/57, Grew to Secretary of State, June 21, 1923, N.A.

105. Ibid., 767.68119/729, Manuelian (Charge of Armenian Legation) to Secretary of State, Aug. 30, 1923, N.A.

On the other hand, the leader of the Armenian National Delegation in Paris, Boghos Nubar Pasha, in communicating to the Allied Foreign Ministers his disappointment over the results of the Lausanne Conference, admitted that, for him, the recent conference had ended the dream of an Armenian National Home. He asked only that the powers take it upon themselves to help the Armenian refugees find work in the lands in which they were now living.

In conclusion, it is fitting to quote from Joseph C. Grew on the results of the Lausanne Conference: "It was probably the greatest diplomatic victory in history and could hardly result otherwise if we stop to consider that Ismet held all of the cards in his hands from the very start."

106. Ibid., 860J.4016/179, Copy of a despatch from Nubar to Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, dated Aug. 2, 1923, N.A.
107. Grew, Turbulent Era, Vol. 1, p. 569.

EPILOGUE

The agreement signed at Lausanne between plenipotentiaries of the United States and the Republic of Turkey on August 6, 1923 did not bring to an end discussion of the American relationship with the Armenian problem. Actually, the debate over ratification of the treaty by the Senate was nearly as bitter as that over the controversial Treaty of Versailles but the number of active participants both in and out of Congress was more limited and leaders of the two major political parties, in a sense, reversed the positions taken in 1919. The primary issue in this "great debate," which lasted for five years, was the treatment afforded to the Armenians under the terms of the treaty.

As early as February, 1923, the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia warned Secretary of State Hughes that it would fight the ratification of any treaty negotiated between the United States and the Turkish Government if the final document contained terms comparable to those included in the then current draft Allied-Turkish treaty.¹ Following the conclusion of negotiations between Grew and Ismet Pasha on August 6th, the members of the A.C.I.A. began an active campaign in line with their threat. Books, pamphlets, articles in periodicals, newspaper editorials, letters to the editors, and speeches before mass meetings were utilized to place and keep the issue before the American people. An organization calling itself the American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty was created with David Hunter Miller as Chairman and James Gerard

1. The New York Times, Feb. 26, 1923.

and Professor Albert Bushnell Hart of Harvard as Vice-Chairmen. Vahan Cardashian served as editor of the numerous pamphlets published by this Committee, the latter including articles against the treaty by the three men mentioned above and by such individuals as Professor William S. Davis of the History Department at the University of Minnesota, Dean A. D. F. Hamlin of the School of Architecture at Columbia University and son of Cyrus Hamlin, ex-Ambassador to Turkey Oscar Straus, Colonel John P. Jackson² of the Harbord Mission, and the well-known newspaperman Frederick Powers. Ex-President Woodrow Wilson denounced the treaty as "iniquitous" and publicly asked for its defeat in Congress. In the field of religion, Bishop James Cannon of the Methodist Church and Bishop William T. Manning of the Protestant Episcopal Church were leaders in the move to prevent ratification. One of the most vitriolic attacks on the treaty and the administration's handling of the Near Eastern situation was contained in a book, also appearing as a series of articles in the Christian Herald³ magazine, entitled The Great Betrayal, by Edward H. Bierstadt. In Congress, the opposition to the ratification of the treaty was led by the arch Armenophile and Turco-phobe, Senator William King of Utah.

It would be incorrect to state that the opposition to the treaty was based solely on the fact that no provisions relative to the Armenians were

2. Examples of these publications are: American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, The Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Armenia, (New York: 1926); American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, (New York: 1924); Herbert A. Gibbons, Armenia in the World War, (New York: 1926).

3. Edward H. Bierstadt, The Great Betrayal, (New York: Robert M. McBride and Co., 1924). Senator King had part of Bierstadt's book inserted into the Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 65, pt. 6 (Apr. 2, 1924), p. 5390. A Dr. Brodie, prominent in Near East Relief, referred to

incorporated in it; but certainly the Armenian issue was one of the major reasons, continually cited by these opponents of the treaty, for their stand against ratification and was unquestionably the issue most charged with an emotional appeal to the American people. In addition to the lack of provisions relative to the Armenians, those who advocated rejection of the treaty contended that (1) it did not provide for recognition by the Turkish Government of responsibility for the misgovernment and massacres of former years, (2) the United States should have insisted on the continuance of the capitulations, (3) the naturalization problem was not solved, (4) provisions for the rights of educational and missionary activities were not included, (5) there were no provisions relative to minorities, such as were included in the Allied treaty, (6) the Kemalist Government was weak, could not enforce the provisions of the treaty, and would soon collapse, (7) there had been massacres since 1918 of 1,000,000 Christians in Asia Minor, (8) the United States should not give recognition to a nation of murderers, acting in this case as Wilson had in refusing to recognize Huerta's Government in Mexico, (9) the United States was not getting equal advantages with those secured by the Allies, e. g., no mandates, and (10) the Americans were naive in accepting the promises of the Turks to reform.

On the subject of the Armenian Question, the opponents of ratification pointed to the thousands of Armenian refugees in the Near East who were

Bierstadt as a paid anti-Turkish propagandist; see Decimal File, 767.68/630, Memorandum from Dulles to Secretary of State, June 19, 1924, N.A.

in dire straits. They cited the need for land where these refugees could be settled and stated their belief that only in Turkish Armenia could such land be found where the refugees could establish their homes. Even if many refugees chose to go to Soviet Armenia and if that government were willing to accept them, the area was small and the land poor so that the number that could be absorbed in this way was only a small proportion of the total refugee population. Land was needed and Turkey must provide it, either for an independent state or as land to be incorporated with Soviet Armenia into a greater Armenia. The relationship of this proposed enlarged Armenian state to the Russian Government was to be something less than full membership in the Soviet Union. One writer suggested that a relationship similar to that between the United States and Cuba be created while another advocated one more in line with that existing between Great Britain and Egypt.⁴ The proponents of rejection strongly urged that the United States resume diplomatic relations with Turkey and with the USSR only when those nations agreed to accept at least a semi-autonomous Armenian state composed of parts of both nations. During the period of time prior to this event, when both nations would recognize Armenian aspirations, the United States should use the promise of recognition and other means of diplomatic pressure to force the Turks to revise the American Treaty of Lausanne.

4. Cardashian's views are given in: American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, The Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Armenia, p. 172. Gerard's views are stated in: American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, p. 18.

In Congress, Senator King, on December 11, 1923, in attacking the provisions of the treaty, introduced a resolution similar in scope to the one he had introduced earlier that year. This resolution stated, in part, that it was the sense of the Senate that America should not resume diplomatic relations with Turkey or permit United States nationals to advance any financial aid to Turkey:

...until the Turkish Government shall have withdrawn all its military forces and occupation from the territories allocated to Armenia in the Treaty of Sevres and delimited by the President of the United States in conformity with said treaty and shall have removed all impediments to the peaceable settlement of Armenians within said territory and shall have consented to the setting up of an independent Armenian state therein free from any claim of sovereignty thereover by the Turkish Government.⁵

As usual, the resolution of Senator King died in committee.

Another course of action which was advocated by both David Hunter Miller and Vahan Cardashian would have permitted the treaty to be ratified by the Congress but with reservations attached regarding capitulations and the recognition of Armenia as an independent state which would have resulted in Turkish rejection of the treaty.⁶

Still another suggestion was made by Professor Albert Bushnell Hart. In his opinion, the Treaty of 1830, the provisions of which had been unilaterally abrogated by the Turks in 1914, was still in effect as the United States had never accepted this action by the Turks nor had war ever been declared between the two nations. Thus, there was no need for the

5. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 65, pt. 1 (Dec. 11, 1923), p. 228.

6. Miller's views are given in: American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, The Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Armenia, pp. 15-6. Cardashians views are expressed in: Decimal File, 711.672/261, Cardashian to Secretary of State, Feb. 7, 1924, N.A.

creation of a new treaty and the United States could insist that the capitulatory regime for Americans and the other provisions of that earlier treaty were still in effect.⁷ Professor Hart had legal justification for his position but it is questionable that any practical result could be obtained from such an argument as virtually every major nation had, by 1924, accepted the "new regime" in Turkey.

In addition to the few suggestions for action, most of them of somewhat questionable practicality, made by those who led the fight against the American Treaty of Lausanne, there were many charges brought forth against the Allies, the Department of State, the American negotiators at Lausanne, and the High Commissioner at Constantinople. The Allies were accused of lacking courage and engaging in duplicity in their relations with the Armenians. The Department of State and the negotiators at Lausanne, were accused of having sold out the Armenian cause for the ill-fated Chester Concession and other oil interests and of having abandoned the Christians in Asia Minor to a horrible fate under the rule of the Turk. The High Commissioner in Constantinople was accused of being "the defender of Turkish practices and of the Turkish cause," and his office was said to be a center of Turkish propaganda.⁸ Even the American missionaries in Turkey were denounced as having had a "soft side" to turn to the Moslem Turks while facing the Christian minorities with a "hard side."⁹ The history of

7. Given in: American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, The Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Armenia, pp. 62-70.

8. American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, p. 18, which states Cardashian's views.

9. Albert B. Hart and Edward M. Earle, "The Turkish Treaty - A Debate," Forum, Vol. 6 (Dec. 1924), p. 739.

American efforts toward the Turkish settlement since 1918 were reviewed and found wanting. All advocates of rejection of the treaty admitted that there was no legal obligation on the part of the United States to ensure a favorable settlement of the Armenian Question but they stressed a moral obligation. Cardashian wrote:

The fact is that the United States injected itself, of its own free will, into the Near Eastern situation; it led the whole world to believe that it would help Armenia; it deprived Armenia of the opportunity to look for help elsewhere, and it delayed for one and one-half years the settlement of the Turkish problem. This delay led to the division and cross purposes among the Allies, and made it possible for the Turks to organize resistance.¹⁰

The end result of the campaign against ratification of the American Treaty of Lausanne was quite successful. Many prominent Americans let their names be used in the attempt to defeat the treaty. A memorandum signed by 103 prominent educators, religious leaders, businessmen, and politicians was circulated in Congress and widely published. It said in part:

Our paramount interests in Turkey are, and have ever been, humanitarian, and it is the manifest duty of our Government to safeguard these interests. We are confronted with a moral issue of supreme importance which cannot be compromised with honor. We believe that the American people, who have shown their great interest in Armenia, and who, for 92 years, have supported the philanthropic and educational efforts of the missionaries in behalf of the Christians of the Near East, expect their Government to subordinate other considerations to these primary interests.¹¹

Unfortunately, the Lausanne Treaty became a partisan political issue

10. American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey, p. 16.

11. Ibid., p. 55.

in the United States. At the Democratic Convention in 1924, the following plank was inserted in the platform at the instigation of Bishop James Cannon and Senator King: "We condemn the Lausanne Treaty. It barter legitimate American rights and betrays Armenia for the Chester oil concession. We favor the protection of American rights in Turkey and the fulfillment of President Wilson's arbitral award respecting Armenia." ¹² By 1928, the

wording of the "Armenian plank" of the Democratic Platform was less strong: "We favor the most earnest efforts on the part of the United States to secure the fulfillment of the promises and engagements made during and following the World War by the United States and the Allied powers to Armenia and her people." ¹³ Perhaps significantly, the Republican Party Platforms in 1924 and 1928 did not mention the Lausanne settlement or the Armenian Question.

The campaign in support of ratification of the American Treaty of Lausanne was launched, appropriately enough, by a speech by the Secretary of State before the Council on Foreign Relations on January 24, 1923, ¹⁴ during which he denied vigorously any connection between the action of the American negotiators at Lausanne and the granting by the Turkish Government of the Chester Concession. ¹⁴ Prior to the speech by the Secretary, Hughes had cabled Bristol at Constantinople about the activities of Gerard and his associates and asked the American High Commissioner to collect state-

12. Quoted in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3 (Sep. 15, 1924), p. 46.

13. The New York Times, June 30, 1928.

14. Recent Questions and Negotiations, an Address by Charles E. Hughes Before Meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, 23 (Jan 1924), (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924).

ments and evidence to support ratification. Within a few days Bristol replied that there existed a unanimous desire on behalf of the American leaders in Turkey, in the commercial, educational, missionary, and philanthropic fields, for prompt ratification of the treaty.¹⁵ The American High Commissioner, himself, was an advocate of ratification, as were Richard Washburn Child and Joseph C. Grew, who had also served at Lausanne, the latter having negotiated the final settlement. Edgar Turlington, who participated in the Conference in a lesser role, contributed an article to The New Republic in which he reviewed actual and implied American promises to the Armenians from the twelfth of Wilson's Fourteen Points to the letter from Harding to Gerard in November, 1922 which promised that: "Everything which may be done will be done to protect the Armenian people." He concluded that the United States had never obligated itself to the Armenian people nor did there exist any stain upon American honor or integrity due to American action at Lausanne.¹⁶

The Council on Turkish-American Relations, under the presidency of Rayford Alley, published pamphlets advocating ratification in answer to the numerous publications of the American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty. Other organizations which supported the treaty were the Foreign Policy Association, the National Chamber of Commerce, and the Commission on International Relations of the Congregational National Council, the latter an organization created under the auspices of the church which supported

15. Decimal File, 711.672/225b, Hughes to U. S. High Commissioner, Nov. 27, 1923; and 711.672/231, Bristol to Secretary of State, Dec. 8, 1923, N.A.

16. Edgar Turlington, "Armenia and America's Honor," The New Republic, Vol. 47 (June 9, 1926), pp. 83-5.

114 of the 119 American missionaries then operating in Asia Minor. From Turkey came pleas for prompt ratification from the American Y.M.C.A. and the American Men's and Women's Clubs of Constantinople. Such well known figures among Americans in Turkey as James L. Barton, Chairman of Near East Relief, President Caleb F. Gates of Robert College, and Dr. Staub, American Director of Near Eastern Colleges, all supported the Treaty, as did many professors and missionaries of lesser note. In the United States, articles for the treaty were written by Professor Edward M. Earle of Columbia University and by Professor of International Law Philip M. Brown of Princeton. When Bishop William Manning of the Episcopal Church presented the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate with a petition against the treaty signed by 110 bishops of the Episcopal Church, the Editor of the well-known Episcopal periodical, The Churchman, denounced Manning's action and denied that the latter had the authority to speak for
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the Episcopal Church.

In the American press, many editorials were favorable to ratification. The New York Times concluded that the United States was not in a position to dictate terms relative to the Armenians or on any other subject to the Turks and had to accept the best obtainable treaty, this being a "disagree-
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able necessity." The Washington Post, strongly advocated Senate acceptance of the treaty and warned that possibly foreign business interests were

17. Articles by, and quotations from, these individuals are given in: Council on Turkish-American Relations, The Treaty With Turkey, Why It Should Be Ratified, (New York: 1926); and Committee on the Lausanne Treaty, The Turco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1924).

18. The New York Times, Apr. 6, 1926. |

financing the campaign against the treaty in the United States so that rejection of the treaty by the Senate would reduce commercial competition¹⁹ by American business interests in Turkey.

The arguments for ratification can be summed up as follows: (1) the United^{States} received the same guarantees and provisions for its nationals that were granted to the Allies; (2) the only way to secure reimposition of capitulations, an Armenian National Home, or any other provisions which had been rejected by the Turks was through the use of force by the United States; (3) no connection existed between the lack of provisions regarding Armenians and the granting of the Chester Concession; (4) the United States was under no political obligation to the Armenians but American rejection of the Treaty might encourage the Armenians to action which could lead to their complete liquidation in Turkey; (5) the Treaty of 1830 was ineffective and was not recognized by Turkey, the present treaty gave legal sanction to a fait accompli; (6) Americans in Turkey were unanimously in favor of ratification, realizing that rejection by the Senate might prejudice their position in the country; (7) a truly new Turkey was being created, one in which the United States could effectively use moral persuasion on behalf of the minorities; (8) American religious, educational and philanthropic work, though more limited than in 1914, continued in Turkey; (9) the minorities in Turkey were protected by provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne between the Allies and Turkey; (10) a "homeland" did exist for the

19. "Why the Democrats Defeated the Turkish Treaty," The Literary Digest, Vol. 92 (Jan. 29, 1927), p. 11.

Armenians, i.e. Soviet Armenia; and (11) further action on behalf of the Armenians, or rejection of the Treaty because it failed to deal with the Armenian Question, would be a reversal of traditional United States policy in Turkey where its primary concern had always been the protection of American nationals and interests.

Just as the opponents of the treaty denounced those who favored it, so did its proponents denounce the actions and motivations of those who advocated rejection by the Senate. Nathaniel Peffer termed the actions of Gerard and his associates "irresponsible" while Edgar Turlington dubbed these people "incurable romanticists."²⁰ In his autobiography, written many years later, Joseph C. Grew placed the blame or credit for opposition to the treaty on the Armenians in the United States:

...the Armenian element in New York having been strong enough to get their case included in the Democratic platform and to enlist the support, undoubtedly by copious funds to the Democratic campaign, of a small but aggressive group of American senators and bishops.²¹

The Treaty was submitted to the Senate for ratification by the Executive Branch on May 3, 1924, along with a covering letter from Hughes to Senator Lodge, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, advocating prompt and favorable action by the Senate.²² On June 3rd, Senator King delivered a long and fervent speech against ratification, denouncing the actions of the State Department at Lausanne. He demanded an investigation

20. See: Nathaniel Peffer, "Armenians and the Lausanne Treaty," The New Republic, Vol. 37 (Feb. 20, 1924), pp. 333-4. See also: Turlington, "Armenia and America's Honor," The New Republic, p. 83.

21. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era, A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, (2 Vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), Vol. 1, p. 678.

22. Given in: Foreign Relations Papers, 1924, pp. 715-21. This appears to be an excellent summation of the Administration's position on the Treaty.

by the Foreign Relations Committee into the reasons why the United States abandoned its position as announced prior to the beginning of the Conference, what action the Department of State took in "procuring, preserving, or protecting" the Chester Concession, and why the United States abandoned the Allies after the granting of the Chester Concession and thereafter supported the Turks in the negotiations regarding capitulations and other issues. King termed "sinister" the fact that the most important part of the Chester Concession was the privilege to exploit the oil reserves in Armenia and he deplored the "unusually deep interest" of Secretary Hughes in American commercial adventures in the Near East. King's obvious intention in his speech was to convince his colleagues and the American people that the rights of the Armenians had been bartered at lausanne for oil
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concessions.

Four days later, Senator Lodge had printed in the Congressional Record a reply from Hughes to the allegations of the Senator from Utah. The Secretary pointed out that negotiations for a Turco-American treaty began after the Chester Concession had been granted, that the American position throughout the conference was consistent with the Aide Memoire of October 30, 1922, that the United States did not reverse its position and give support to the Turks in their negotiations with the Allies following the granting of the concession, and finally, that Americans residing in Turkey

23. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 65, pt. 10 (June 3, 1924), pp. 10292-6. Other speeches by King, implying or stating that Armenian rights were exchanged for oil concessions are given in: Ibid., 69th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 68, pt. 1 (Dec 22, 1926), pp. 910-1; and Ibid., 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 69, pt. 6 (Apr. 16, 1928), pp. 6494-5.

unanimously supported ratification of the Treaty. On the same day, June 7, 1924, the Senate adjourned without taking action on the treaty. By the time the Senate reconvened in January, 1925, Senator Lodge had died and the new Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee was Senator William Borah of Idaho. Unfortunately for the supporters of the American Treaty of Lausanne, Borah, although he spoke on the floor of the Senate for acceptance of the treaty, did not have an interest in the subject comparable to that of the out-spoken critic of the treaty, Senator King.

On January 31, 1925, the Foreign Relations Committee, having held no hearings on the treaty, reported it out favorably. It must have been fairly obvious to the leadership of the Senate, however, that the necessary two-thirds majority in favor of ratifying the treaty could not be mustered and, consequently, no action on the treaty took place during that session. Meanwhile, the Turks had not ratified the Treaty, preferring to wait for the American Congress to act first. The American High Commissioner was notified in March, 1925 that, pending ratification of the treaty, the Turkish Government would grant American goods the same benefits as those granted to the Allies in the Treaty of Lausanne of July, 1923. This commercial relationship was extended into an official modus vivendi granting the United States most-favored nation treatment on February 18, 1926, and was subsequently renewed at six month intervals until 1929.

24. Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 65, pt. 11 (June 7, 1924), p. 11180.

Meanwhile, in Congress, debate on the treaty continued during 1925, 1926, and into 1927 with the opposition to ratification being led by Senator King, Senator Robinson (R-Ind.), and Senator Swanson (D-Va.). In addition to Borah, Senator Copland (D-N.Y.) and Senator Bingham (R-Conn.) pleaded for acceptance of the treaty's provisions. An interesting exchange took place in the Senate in January, 1927 when Senator Blease of South Carolina inserted into the Congressional Record a letter from Bishop Manning in which it was affirmed that the Northern Baptist Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church South, the Reformed Church, and the bishops of the Episcopal Church in the United States all denounced the Lausanne Treaty and asked for its repudiation by the Senate. Three days later, Senator Bingham had inserted into the Record a telegram from James L. Barton, Cleveland Dodge, John R. Mott, and others pointing out that not one of the churches listed in Manning's letter was engaged in philanthropic, religious, or educational work in Turkey, while the Congregational Church, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., and the Near Eastern Colleges, all with a large stake in the Turkish Republic, requested immediate ratification.

In March, 1926, seeing that a two-thirds vote in favor of the treaty was impossible of attainment, the Congressional leadership permitted its recommittal. But in January of the following year, the American Treaty of Lausanne was finally brought to a vote in the Senate. The vote at that time was 50 to 34 in favor of ratification but as this was six votes short of the necessary two thirds, the treaty was defeated. Without question,

25. Ibid., 69th Cong. 2nd sess., Vol. 68, pt. 2 (Jan. 8, 1927), p. 1266; and Ibid., (Jan. 11, 1927), p. 1412.

26. King claimed that he convinced the leaders of the Senate to recommit; see: Ibid., 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 1 (Mar. 17, 1925), p. 290.

the repetitious charge that the State Department had sold out the Armenian cause for oil concessions was the most influential factor in the vote. ²⁷

Events in the re-establishment of diplomatic and full commercial relations between the United States and Turkey followed rapidly after the voting in the Senate on January 18th. On February 17, 1927, High Commissioner Bristol, acting on instructions from the Department of State, participated in an exchange of notes with the Turkish Foreign Minister in which the two governments agreed to re-establish for an indefinite period diplomatic and consular relations and to regulate conditions of establishment and residence according to the principles of international law. At the same time, a new modus vivendi was created to regulate the commercial relations between the two nations.

On May 12th, Joseph C. Grew, who had negotiated the American Treaty of Lausanne, was appointed by President Coolidge as the American Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey. Shortly thereafter, Admiral Mark L. Bristol, after nearly a decade as American High Commissioner in Turkey, relinquished his post and returned to the United States. On October 12, 1927, Grew presented his credentials to the Turkish President and in December of the same year, Moukhtar Bey assumed his duties as Turkish Ambassador in Washington.

In the Senate, King denounced the action of the President in permitting the exchange of notes establishing relations with Turkey, in appointing Grew as Ambassador, and in accepting a diplomatic representative from Turkey.

27. Senator King's views as to why the treaty failed in the Senate are given in: "Why the Democrats Defeated the Turkish Treaty," The Literary Digest, Vol. 92, (Jan. 29, 1927), pp. 10-1.

He called these acts on the part of the Chief Executive:

...subversive of the harmonious relations which should exist between the Executive and legislative departments of the Government, and constitute a serious and unwarranted infringement by the Executive of the constitutional powers of the Senate and a violation of both the spirit and letter of the Constitution.²⁸

King's resolution, offered at the same time, to declare these acts of the President invalid, received little support from the Senate.

In October, 1929, a new commercial treaty was negotiated by Grew in Ankara. Although its provisions were not as favorable as those secured in the abortive treaty of 1923, the Senate voted its approval to the new treaty in February, 1930.²⁹ In April of that year, the Grand National Assembly also approved the new agreement and, consequently, almost exactly thirteen years after the rupture in Turco-American relations, full diplomatic and commercial relations were re-established on a permanent basis.

During the years following the Lausanne Conference, while the United States and Turkey were struggling to re-establish diplomatic and commercial relations, another relationship, that between the United States and the so-called Government of Armenia, was also undergoing a change. The Legation of Armenia in Washington continued to function long after the fall of the government it had represented. In 1922, in answer to a question from an American Consul at Port Said as to the procedure to be followed when confronted by an individual holding a passport issued by the Armenian Legation,

28. Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 69, pt 6. (Apr. 10, 1928), pp. 6142-3.

29. Grew, who negotiated both treaties, states that the second treaty was not as favorable to the United States. Grew, Turbulent Era, Vol. 1, p. 678.

an official of the Department of State informed the Consul that, as there were Armenians in the United States not in sympathy with the regime at Erivan and as these people had no other means of obtaining passports or visas, "...the Department, pending the determination of the status of Armenia and of our relations therewith, has raised no objection to the issuance of passports by unofficial representatives of the regime which preceded the present Government of the Armenian Republic."³⁰

In October, 1922, Dr. Pasdermadjian, the first Armenian Minister to the United States, left Washington for Switzerland, never to return. The Legation was left in the hands of a Charge d'Affaires, A. Manuelian. This individual continued to issue passports and visas and conduct himself as the representative of an independent government. Memoranda in the Archives of the United States, written by members of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, testify to the fact that virtually no relations were carried on between the Department and Manuelian after the latter assumed charge.³¹ Nevertheless, no public announcement was made to the effect that the American Government had ceased to recognize the 1918-1920 Republic of Armenia or its representatives in Washington for obvious reasons, i.e., the pending ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne.³²

During the years 1924 and 1925, both Gerard and King suggested to the Secretary of State that it would be a heartening gesture toward the Armenians if the United States would accept a successor to Dr. Pasdermadjian,

30. Decimal File, 701.60J11/7, Wilbur Carr to Consul, Port Said, Oct. 26, 1922, N.A.

31. Ibid., 860J.01/581, Memorandum from Turlington to Secretary of State, dated July 13, 1925; and 701.60J11/9, Allen Dulles to Under-Secretary of State, Oct. 11, 1922, N.A.

32. See: Ibid., 860J.01/581, Memorandum from Turlington to Secretary of State, dated July 13, 1925, N.A.

who had died in Switzerland. This suggestion received no support in the Department of State.³³ Furthermore, in August, 1925, the American Consul at Windsor, Ontario, in answer to another question regarding the issuance of passports, was informed that the American Government did not recognize any Armenian Legation in the United States and that Manuelian had no official status, thus precluding his right to issue passports.³⁴

During the decade of the 1920's, one of the major problems for the world to solve was that of the Armenian refugees, those Armenians who had successfully escaped with their lives during and following the World War but who were now refused permission to reenter Turkey. In 1925, Senator King estimated the number of Armenian refugees at 50-60,000 in Greece, 125,000 in Syria, 45,000 in Bulgaria, 43,000 in Roumania, 50,000 in France and Italy, 60,000 in Persia, 10,000 in Yugoslavia, 400,000 in Georgia, 340,000 in Azerbaijan, 200,000 in other parts of the USSR not including Armenia, and 120,000 in the rest of the world.³⁵ In addition to the problems created by the existence of these refugees in the Near East, the huge influx of refugees into Soviet Armenia during the period from 1915-1925 had resulted in a dangerously over-crowded nation in which many people existed only with the aid supplied by philanthropic organizations in Europe and America.

33. Ibid., 701.60J11/11, Gerard to Under-Secretary of State, with comment by Dulles, Dec. 4, 1924; and 860J.4016/184, King to Secretary of State, Oct. 19, 1925, N.A.

34. Ibid., 701.60J11/12, Carr to Consul, Windsor, Ontario, Aug. 8, 1925, N.A.

35. Ibid., 860J.4016/184, King to Secretary of State, Oct. 19, 1925. In 1951, there were an estimated 100,000 Armenians living in Turkey, mostly in the area surrounding Istanbul. Eleanor Bisbee, The New Turks, Pioneers of the Republic, 1920-1950, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 282.

The United States had taken official note of the problem at Lausanne when Child, in two of his few speeches before the delegates, spoke out on behalf of the refugees in the Near East, claiming that the American people had a "vital interest" in the solution of the problem. Grew also spoke in their behalf on July 17, 1923 when he called attention to the vital humanitarian aspect of the problem and pointed to the "practical and constructive evidence" by which the American people and Government had demonstrated their³⁶ interest in the welfare of these people.

In the Congress of the United States, a bill was proposed by Senator Williams of Mississippi in December, 1922, which would have permitted the admission into the United States of 100,000 Turkish Armenians above their quota for 1923. This figure would have been divided between 75,000 farm laborers and 25,000 orphans. The only requirements which the adults would have had to meet were that they be literate, in good physical health, and not anarchists or communists. In February, 1923, a much restricted version of the Williams Bill was passed by the Senate, with bi-partisan support. According to the provisions of this bill, 5-6,000 adults and 25,000 orphans would be granted permission to enter the United States during the year, in addition to the normal quota. Unfortunately, the House of Representatives insisted on integrating these provisions for Armenians into a general immigration bill for 1923 with the final result that virtually no refugees³⁷ were permitted to enter the United States.

36. For review of this activity, see: Decimal File, 860J.48/1741, Memorandum from Dulles to Secretary of State, dated Feb. 13, 1924, N.A.
37. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th sess., Vol. 64, pt. 2 (Jan. 9, 1923), pp. 1448-9; Ibid., pt. 3 (Feb. 5, 1923), pp. 3034-6; and Ibid., pt. 5 (Feb. 23, 1923), pp. 4351-3.

One other attempt was made by a member of the Senate to give aid to the Armenian refugees and to assist the government of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in providing for its over-crowded population. In 1925, Senator King introduced a resolution relative to the disposition of a certain sum of gold relinquished by the German Government to the Allies and Associated Powers by the Treaty of Versailles. This gold originally had been deposited by the Turkish Government in the Reichsbank in Berlin in 1916. By the provisions of Article 58 of the Lausanne Treaty between the Allies and the Turkish Government, the latter renounced all rights to this gold, which by 1925 equaled a total of about \$40,000,000. It was the contention of Senator King, and some others, that the gold, originally deposited by the Turks in Berlin, had been taken from the Armenians during the deportations and massacres of 1915-1916. Consequently, the Senator from Utah argued that, as the United States had an interest in these funds as one of the Associated Powers, the President should make a representation to the Allied Powers requesting that the deposit should be set aside and held as a trust fund for the Armenian people:

...the part thereof which is not claimed by individual Armenians or their personal representatives to be hereafter expended by a commission, including representatives of the Armenian people, for the removal to and settlement in Armenia of Armenian refugees now in the Mediterranean and Black Sea countries and for hygienic, 38 reclamation, agricultural, and educational purposes in Armenia.

38. Ibid., 69th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 67, pt. 1 (Mar. 13, 1925), p. 208; and Ibid., (Mar. 17, 1925), pp. 293-5.

From a practical point of view, there was no possibility that the gold could be used for aid to the Armenians as the Allies, at Lausanne, had agreed to use the fund to settle the claims of their nationals against Turkey for events arising from the war. Also, as the Department of State pointed out to Senator King, there was no conclusive evidence that the gold had been taken from the Armenians. Finally, from a legal position, the project was not feasible as an American representative at Paris, in January, 1920, had stated that the United States had no objection to the release of the Turkish gold held by the German Government, as proposed by the Allied representatives.

Although the United States Government appeared somewhat impotent to give effective aid to the Armenian refugees during the period following the end of the war, there did exist a semi-private organization, Near East Relief, which contributed help to the Armenians in Soviet Armenia and the rest of the Levant on an astronomical scale. Near East Relief continued to function in that area of the world until 1931. During the period from its creation to its withdrawal from active relief work, it collected over \$91,000,000 from private sources in the United States. In addition to dispensing with all of this money on behalf of relief projects in the Near East, the organization was granted an additional \$25,000,000 in funds by the American Government and this sum was also expended under the auspices of Near East Relief. Never in history had so much money been contributed

39. See: Decimal File, 860J.51/12, Dulles to James Gerard, Dec. 22, 1924; and 860J.51/14, Memorandum from Near Eastern Affairs Division to Secretary of State, dated Feb. 5, 1925, N.A.

by the private citizens of one nation to assist in the relief from suffering of foreign nationals. During the period of its existence, it is estimated that Near East Relief saved the lives of over 1,000,000 people, provided the food for 12,500,000, and gave medical aid to 6,000,000. In the field of education, 136,000 children were educated by this organization along practical lines so that they could contribute to the reclamation of the economy of the area.

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The relations between Near East Relief and the government of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic were surprisingly cordial after the initial contact between representatives of the two in 1920. At the time of the invasion of the Armenian Republic, the representatives of Near East Relief fled before the advancing Bolsheviks. However, shortly after the Soviet Government had been established at Erivan, an agreement was concluded between Near East Relief and that government which permitted the re-entry of American workers. In 1924, there were more than 100 American nationals living in Soviet Armenia and dispensing aid to the impoverished citizens of that republic. By 1931, as Near East Relief prepared to relinquish its duties in the Caucasus, James L. Barton informed the Department of State that a change was becoming apparent in the attitude of the Soviet authorities who now appeared to wish to rid the country of all foreigners.

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40. See: James L. Barton, Story of Near East Relief, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1930); Frank A. Ross, Luther C. Fry, and Elbridge Sibley, The Near East and American Philanthropy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929) for a report on the success of Near East Relief. See also: Paul Monroe, R. R. Reeder, James I. Vance, and Others, Reconstruction in the Near East, (New York: Near East Relief, 1924) for an excellent report on the overall activities of the organization in the Near East, particularly in regard to relief for orphans.

41. Decimal File, 860J.48/241, Memorandum on a conversation between James L. Barton and a representative of Near Eastern Affairs Division, dated Mar. 7, 1931, N.A.

It should not be concluded from the above that Near East Relief was the only organization which gave assistance to the Armenian refugees in the Near East, but it was by far the most ambitious and successful. In addition, organizations were created in Great Britain and other Dominions of the British Commonwealth which solicited funds and supplied various forms of aid.⁴² One of the most ambitious projects on behalf of these people was initiated by the Assembly of the League of Nations. This plan was originally proposed by the Armenian National Delegation in Paris in 1924 and received the support of the League Assembly following an extensive study of the proposal by a commission under the leadership of Fridtjof Nansen, the League's High Commissioner for Refugees. The project involved the irrigation and drainage of a small area in the Sardarabad desert in Soviet Armenia and the subsequent settling of about 25,000 Armenian refugees in that area. However, when the Conservative Government in Great Britain failed to support the plan with financial assistance, the entire project collapsed.⁴³

Closely associated with Near East Relief in the field of assistance to the uprooted natives of the Near East was the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. This organization, which had wielded so much power in the lives of Armenians, Americans, and Turks in the Ottoman Empire of 1914,

42. See: Joseph Burt, The People of Ararat, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1926), pp. 96-119. Vahan M. Kurkjian, Armenia's Call, (New York: Armenian General Benevolent Union, 1926), discusses the work of the Armenian General Benevolent Union, a world wide organization of Armenians, in aiding the Armenian refugees in the Near East.

43. See: Fridtjof Nansen, Armenia and the Near East, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1928). See also: The New York Times, Nov. 17, 1929, Section 3.

found its power greatly diminished ten years later. The missionaries in Turkey and their parent organization in the United States had achieved influence in the affairs of Turkey through the existence of the capitulatory regime and by the support from a large and growing proportion of the Armenian population of the Empire. By 1924, the capitulations were but a memory and nearly all of the Armenians had fled to other countries.

In 1918, the American Board moved to meet the changing situation by creating the Armenian Missionary Association of America, Incorporated. This organization was created: "...to promote the general interests and agencies of Armenian Evangelical Churches in the United States and abroad, and to carry on religious, educational, literary, philanthropic and other work, including the establishment and aiding of Armenian evangelical churches."⁴⁴ In 1927, the administration of all evangelical missionary enterprises overseas was placed in the hands of a nine man Executive Council of Armenian Missions, composed of five from the Missionary Association and four from the American Board. The activities of the missionaries acting under the direction of this Council were concentrated in Iran, Syria, Greece, the Balkans, and to a limited degree in Soviet Armenia; in short, wherever large groups of Armenian refugees from Turkey now lived.

As for the missionary activity in Turkey, per se, a change in emphasis was decreed by the Board in 1923. Following the exchange of populations, few Armenians were to be found in Turkey with the exception of the area

⁴⁴. Leon Arpee, A Century of Armenian Protestantism, 1846-1946, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 95.

near Constantinople. Work on behalf of these Christians was to continue but emphasis was henceforth to be placed on aiding the Turks in the fields of education and medicine. As the Annual Report of the American Board for 1923 stated:

Missionaries can no longer think of their institutions as being foreign and privileged.

Missionaries can no longer themselves be privileged advocates of justice guarded by their Government but must help to build up a new justice within Turkey.⁴⁵

On this basis, the representatives of the American Board have continued to aid in the development of a new Turkey for the past three decades. Their original difficulties with the Turkish Government have largely been resolved and they have become a valuable and integral part of the Turkish Republic. In the field of religious proselytizing, however, the missionaries found little encouragement left in Turkey. By 1935, only three unorganized Armenian Protestant Churches remained in all of Asia Minor, each with a membership of less than thirty communicants.⁴⁶

Before concluding this chapter, it is desirable to review very briefly a series of events which occurred over twenty years after the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference. During the interval between 1923 and 1945, the Armenian Soviet Republic became largely industrialized, the population increased to nearly a million and a half, and its course of history was

45. Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1923, (Boston: The American Board, 1923), p. 32.

46. See: Arpee, Century of Armenian Protestantism, for a complete report on the activities of the missionaries in Turkey and throughout the areas in which the Armenians now live.

inextricably bound up with that of the Soviet Union. About forty thousand refugees entered the republic during these years and, partly in consequence of that fact, by the end of the Second World War the Armenian Republic was a very heavily populated area for its size and natural resources.⁴⁷

In July, 1945, the Government of the USSR requested that the Turkish Government return Kars, Ardahan, and Sarikamish, the three pre-World War I provinces having a total area nearly as large as that of the existing ASSR. Shortly thereafter, a Repatriation Committee was created in Erivan and propaganda was directed toward Armenian refugees living throughout the world, including the United States, requesting them to return to the Armenian homeland. In 1946, over 50,000 Armenians entered the Soviet republic to join their fellow countrymen. A few of these returnees were Armenians who had taken up residence in the United States.

The campaign to get world opinion behind the Soviet demand for the return of the Armenian section of Turkey was launched at the meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco in the fall of 1945. On September 21st, the Armenian National Council of America, recognized at the Conference as an "American national organization" by the Department of State, presented a memorandum demanding the transfer of all the land delimited by President Wilson in 1920 plus the rest of historic Armenia to the Armenian Government at Erivan.⁴⁸ On the following day, an appeal was issued to President Truman requesting his support for the project.

47. Highly favorable reports on developments within the ASSR are given in: Charles A. Vertanes, Armenia Reborn, (New York: The Armenian National Council of America, 1947); and in Stanley Evans, Frontier of Dollar Imperialism, (London: British - Soviet Society, 1947).

48. See: Vertanes, Armenia Reborn, pp. 109-18. The memorandum presented to the United Nations Conference is given in this book on pp. 173-9.

This Armenian National Council of America was formed in 1944 by the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party, the Armenian Progressive League of America and the Social Democratic Hunchakian Party. It is noteworthy that the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the largest of all the Armenian patriotic groups in the United States, did not join this Council, nor did the Federation actively support the program for annexation of Turkish Armenia to the Soviet Union.

The activities of the supporters of the proposal to force Turkey to cede her Armenian provinces to Russia were intensified in the latter part of 1945 and during 1946. The American Committee for Justice to the Armenians, with several well-known Americans as members of its National Advisory Council, was founded in November, 1945. This organization had two stated aims: (1) to increase the public's knowledge of the Armenian Question, (2) to mobilize public opinion for the repatriation of refugees and the return of land to Soviet Armenia so that such refugees might settle there. In 1946, a Church Committee for Armenian Rights was created to recall to church bodies in the United States their sense of obligation to Armenia. On April 28, 1946, a rally was held in Carnegie Hall on behalf of the Armenian repatriation program and the proposal to detach the eastern part of Turkey. Among the speakers were Senator Tobey of New Hampshire and Congressman Emanuel Celler of New York, both of whom urged the fulfillment of the Wilson Award to Armenia. Messages in the same vein were read from the
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Governors of Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

Once again, as had happened so many times in the past, a change in

49. Ibid., pp. 148-53.

the relations between the great powers overshadowed the Armenian Question and once again the hope for a united Armenia on traditional Armenian lands, even though politically subservient to Soviet Russia, was extinguished. The development of the "Cold War" between the USSR and the Western democracies ended for the time being the creation of an Armenian homeland. On March 12, 1947, President Truman called for the containment of Soviet imperialism and pledged the employment of American economic and military resources to aid Greece and Turkey to resist Russian aggression. In February, 1952, Turkey joined the United States and the other Western Powers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Armenian Question was never a problem of great importance to the majority of the American people or to the Government of the United States; but it was a problem which, intermittently, over a period of more than thirty years, caused vexatious issues to be raised before Congress and in the policy-planning discussions of the Department of State. In addition, during the period 1894 to 1924, the Armenian Question was a recurring emotional issue before the American public, of vital interest to Americans of Armenian descent and to certain religious groups in the United States, and capable of exploitation for profit by American politicians and writers.

In the long history of Turco-American relations, the Armenian Question was an important but by no means over-riding issue. The massacres of 1894-1896 and 1915-1916 and the continued repression of the Armenian people in the Ottoman Empire were complicating factors in the attempt by leaders

of both governments to maintain friendly relations; so also were the activities of some Armenians in the United States and the acts of other naturalized Armeno-Americans after returning to the land of their birth. The reports of deportations and massacres of Armenians in 1915-1916, not only resulted in a very great strain being placed on Turco-American relations, but in addition, were effectively utilized by the Allied Governments to convince Americans of the barbarism of the Central Powers.

Although the Government and people of the United States had a legitimate interest in the Armenian Question, it was primarily a European problem and subject to solution by European diplomacy. This was particularly true until 1919. From the Congress of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention of 1878 to the negotiation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the Armenian people and their aspirations for freedom were often helpless objects of the diplomatic machinations of those European Powers with an interest in the Ottoman Empire. During the World War, the Armenians for the first and only time found themselves in the enviable position of receiving supplications for aid and grandiose promises of future benefits from most of the major European states. Following the war, a new international rivalry developed in the Near East between Great Britain and France. This rivalry, supplemented by the armed forces of a revived Turkey and a resurgent Russia, led directly to the collapse of the Armenian experiment in independence.

In the century between the arrival of the first American missionary to the Armenians and the departure of Near East Relief personnel from Soviet Armenia in 1931, the American people and Government contributed much of great value to the Armenians in the Near East.

The missionaries of the American Board brought a new and challenging religion to the Near East which appealed to many Armenians as is evidenced by the unquestioned success of the proselytizing efforts of the Americans between 1830 and the beginning of the First World War. Some writers have questioned the propriety and desirability of this introduction of Protestantism to Armenia, but no one has questioned the value of the contingent activities in which the American missionaries engaged. The creation of a large network of schools, from primary to collegiate level, and the training of native teachers did much to raise the educational standards of the Armenians. In the field of medicine, the population received modern medical treatment from American and American-trained doctors and nurses in hospitals which were largely built through contributions from American citizens. Finally, the missionaries brought with them the publishing equipment necessary to greatly expand the volume of literature, much of it in their native language, available to the Armenian people.

During and following the events of 1894-1896 and 1915-1916, the American people contributed funds and material in unprecedented amounts, for the aid of those Armenians who suffered from persecution and privation. This outpouring of charity on behalf of the Armenian people was not only large in volume but also nearly unique. With the exception of relatively modest funds contributed by citizens of British Commonwealth countries, the American relief program accounted for the only concrete aid furnished the Armenians during their years of suffering. A large amount of the relief funds collected was gathered through the churches of the United States and dispensed by the missionaries in the field. Other funds were collected

by American citizens working in organizations created specifically for the purpose of soliciting and dispensing of charity for this stricken people. The last and greatest of the relief organizations received the official recognition of the American Government when it was incorporated by an act of Congress.

The Government of the United States acted in an official capacity on behalf of the Armenians many times. During the sanguinary events of 1894-1896, Minister Terrell attempted to protect, not only naturalized American citizens of Armenian descent who had returned to the Ottoman Empire, but also Armenians who were employed by or who worked with the American missionaries in Turkey. In 1896, Congress adopted a resolution calling to the attention of the Great Powers of Europe their duties to the Armenians under the Treaty of Berlin. During the deportations of 1915-1916, Ambassador Morgenthau did more than any other foreign representative in Constantinople to rally the diplomatic community to protest Turkish action. During the early years of the war, Morgenthau and his successor protested frequently and strongly to the Sublime Porte against the Armenian policy of the Turkish Government. During the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson consistently supported the concept of a large, strong, and autonomous Armenian state. During the early post-war period, there was bi-partisan support in Congress for giving American aid to assist in the creation of an independent Armenian republic. In 1920, President Wilson accepted the difficult task of delimiting the boundaries of the Armenian nation and when that nation was attacked by the combined forces of Russia and Turkey,

the American Chief Executive offered his personal mediation in an attempt to bring peace to the Near East and preserve Armenian independence. Although American representatives to the Lausanne Conference were accredited only as observers, they spoke out on behalf of the minorities in the Turkish Republic, the Armenian refugees in the Near East who could not return to their homes, and the concept of an Armenian National Home.

Perhaps one of the greatest gifts bestowed by the United States on thousands of Armenians was not one connected with private charity or public policy. The United States became the new homeland for nearly a quarter of a million Armenians. Some came to America for education and remained as permanent residents. Others arrived and joined with immigrants from other nations in search of wealth; still others came to the United States fleeing from Turkish persecution or as refugees searching for new homes. Although they have retained many of the political, religious, economic, and social customs and organizations of their previous homeland, the Armenian-Americans and the Americans of Armenian descent are today integrated into the American nation, to which they have contributed much.

Although, as has been stated above, the United States has contributed much to the Armenian people and their cause, Americans have also committed acts and created situations detrimental to that people and that cause.

American missionaries, in their publication of books in the Armenian language, their sympathetic references to the "Armenian nation," and, infrequently, their active aid to revolutionary plans, gave impetus to the developing spirit of nationalism in this subject people. This growth of nationalism, in turn, led directly to the calamitous events of 1894-1896

and 1915-1916, during which so many Armenians were to suffer. In addition, the apparent belief of the missionaries in 1894-1896 that their acts in the Ottoman Empire would, if necessary, receive the military support of the United States Government, a belief undoubtedly shared by some Armenian revolutionary leaders, may have led the latter to hope, in vain, for active American intervention in their behalf. But, whereas the development of nationalism tended to weld the Armenian people together against their rulers, the creation of a Protestant community in Armenian life tended to destroy the religious unity of the Armenian people within their ancient church.

In 1917, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire but did not declare war on that nation. Unquestionably, this act was dictated by the facts that many Americans were still resident in Turkey, American and Turkish troops were not facing each other on any front, and the United States had no territorial possessions or ambitions in the Near East. However, during the negotiations for a peace treaty with Turkey following the war, the United States Government found itself in a unique and often unfortunate position among the major Allied and Associated States. This situation was not particularly noteworthy while Wilson was at Paris but, subsequently, from the rebuff to Admiral Bristol in August, 1919 through the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference in 1923, the American position on a peace treaty for Turkey was weakened by the fact that the United States had not declared war. Consequently, American proposals regarding the territorial settlement of Armenian claims did not always

receive the desired attention from other governments.

The conflicting views regarding the Armenian settlement which existed in the American nation, the American Government, and even in the American Delegation to the Peace Conference, also had a detrimental effect on Armenian plans for a secure future. President Wilson and a few others favored an American mandate over Armenia. His advisor, Henry Morgenthau, the American High Commissioner in Constantinople, many leading figures in the relief effort and missionary work in Turkey, and the leader of the Harbord Mission all favored a larger mandate for the United States which would include all of Anatolia, the Straits, and Armenia. Many influential Republicans, ex-Ambassador James Gerard, and the most nationalistic of the Armenian spokesmen favored a completely independent Armenia, to which the United States could send direct aid. These conflicting recommendations for solution of the Armenian Question resulted in uncertainty in the United States, in Paris, and most unfortunately for the Armenians, in Turkey where a strong nationalist movement began to flourish. In addition, conflicting reports and recommendations for action from American representatives in the Near East led to additional uncertainty and delay on the part of the State Department in reaching accord among its leaders as to the course to follow on the Turkish settlement.

Probably the most serious fault that could be found with the post-war policy of the United States as it related to the Armenian settlement was the nearly complete lack of any positive action which, consequently, resulted in a delay in reaching agreement on a peace treaty for Turkey due to the uncertainty of the Allied leaders as to what American policy was to be. The Turkish treaty was delayed until it could be determined whether

or not the United States would accept a mandate for Armenia and possibly other parts of the defunct Ottoman Empire. The King-Crane Mission and the Harbord Mission sought facts upon which American action could be based but these investigations were time-consuming. The Williams Resolution, which would have at least ensured direct military and economic aid to Armenia, if accepted in its original form, was subject to hearings before a sub-committee of the Senate. This sub-committee finished hearings on the resolution in October, 1919 but brought forth no report until May of the following year and the final report was merely a shadow of the original resolution. President Wilson's tragic illness prevented him from taking an active part on behalf of the Armenian mandate proposal at a critical period. The decision to await action by the Congress on an Armenian mandate until after the long and bitter debate over ratification of the Versailles Treaty postponed a decision on the subject for months - months during which the relations between the Administration and the Republican leaders in Congress progressively deteriorated. The final overwhelming rejection by the Senate of the proffered Armenian mandate was a predictable result of the delay in reaching a solution to the Armenian problem and the continuing struggle between the two political parties over American participation in the post-war settlements. This delay in concluding the Turkish peace treaty, largely attributable to American inaction, permitted friction to develop between the Allies, the Turks and Russians to revive, and the Armenians to face a hostile ring of neighboring states alone and without the funds or material to ensure their newly-won independence.

Despite partial American responsibility for the unhappy resolution of the Armenian Question, it should be emphasized that the United States was only one of the participants in the post-war settlement of the Armenian problem. There has been no attempt in this work to record or analyze the actions of other states as they effected the Turkish settlement. However, the following facts are established and should be noted. The British had a responsibility to the Armenians dating back to 1878 but could not find the troops or necessary material to aid the Armenians in the post-war period, although they were able to absorb other large areas of the Ottoman Empire. The French were guilty of duplicity in 1919 when they offered to aid the Armenians in the Erivan Republic but did not attempt to extend their armed control over more than the long-coveted Cilicia. The Allied premiers requested that President Wilson delimit the Armenian boundaries and later accepted his offer of personal mediation in settling the Turco-Armenian struggle; yet they failed to take the necessary action to enforce the President's arbitral award or to utilize his proffered mediation. Lenin promised independence to the Armenians in 1917 and yet the Russians occupied Armenia in 1920 and annexed the area to the Soviet Union the following year. Finally, the Armenian delegations at Paris in 1919, were far too ambitious in their territorial demand for an "Integral" Armenia - a state which would have contained a minority of Armenians in an area difficult if not impossible to pacify internally or to defend externally.

The Armenian Question has been and will continue to be a subject for debate among historians and political scientists. As was evidenced by the

events of 1945-1946, the Question is not necessarily solved in an irrevocable manner. America's part in this international problem furnishes an example of an awakening interest on the part of the Government and people of the United States in what had previously been exclusively European problems. The solution of the problem was unsatisfactory to most Americans, but the consequent education in international affairs gained by the people of the United States may have more than offset the frustrating disillusionment of American involvement with the Armenian Question.

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